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I. ABSTRACT
"While academic debates about the possibility of objective truth and
falsehood are often rarified to the point of absurdity, Rwanda
demonstrated that the question is a matter of life and death."'
The tension between universalism and cultural relativism lies at the heart
of war crimes and war crimes prosecutions. While cultural relativism
arguments should never be the basis for ignoring war crimes outside of the
West (particularly in Africa), neither should the international community adopt
a radical universalist approach that ignores the unique circumstances underlying
each war crimes prosecution. The establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR"), over the objection of the post-
genocide Rwandan government, probably erred on the side of universalism by
ignoring the legitimate needs of the Rwandan people. Nevertheless, the ICTR
has appropriately adopted a mild cultural relativist approach in its proceedings
by considering cultural differences when evaluating witness testimony,
interpreting the definition of certain crimes within the context of the Rwandan
experience, and considering Rwandan sentencing practices when sentencing
defendants. Future international tribunals should learn from the ICTR exper-
ience and consider cultural differences, as necessary, to do justice in the
communities they are designed to serve.
11. INTRODUCTION
The creation of several new international war crimes tribunals over the
past fifteen years raises a host of legal and policy issues concerning the way
these tribunals seek to do justice. Arguably one of the most important issues
is the role, if any, that cultural differences should play in the establishment and
operation of these tribunals. This issue is important because the long-run
legitimacy of the tribunals will depend on their acceptance by both the
communities in which they seek to do justice, as well as the larger international
community. This dual acceptance, in turn, will largely depend on the ability of
these courts to recognize and take into account cultural differences that may
affect their ability to uncover the truth, while also ensuring that people from all
backgrounds are equally protected from (or held accountable for) the crimes
under their jurisdiction.
There are easily recognizable truths on both sides of the debate. On the
one hand, if the international community has universally condemned a
1. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT ToMoRRow WE WILL BE KILLED WrrT
OUR FAMILIES: STORES FROM RWANDA 259 (1998) [hereinafter GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA].
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particular crime, why should cultural differences play any role in how an
international tribunal investigates and prosecutes that crime? On the other
hand, how can international judges seek to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of
individuals from a culture that is not their own, while also attempting to
combine different legal cultures and receive evidence in a language that they do
not speak, without recognizing and taking these differences into account?
Part Il of this article explores this dilemma in general terms. First, the
article will provide a brief summary of the debate between universalism and
cultural relativism in the field of international human rights. The article will
then argue that cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of war crimes and war
crimes prosecutions. The very definition of war crimes is affected by cultural
relativism, and relativism is often a subtext in debates about whether war
crimes should be addressed by international, domestic, or hybrid courts.
Moreover, even within the context of an international criminal tribunal, there
is a need for cultural sensitivity in the way that tribunal seeks to do justice.
Part IV of this article applies these general observations to the establish-
ment and operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (herein-
after "ICTR" or "Tribunal"). The facts leading up to the Rwandan genocide
and the establishment of the ICTR will first be set out, with an eye towards the
role that the international community played in these events. The article will
then ask whether the establishment of the tribunal was reflective of a harmful
"one-size-fits-all" attitude in the international community, or if it was a
necessary step in order to accord justice equally in Africa as in Europe? It will
also explore select decisions of the ICTR with an eye toward whether, and how,
these decisions were influenced by real or perceived cultural distinctions
between the international judges and the persons before them, specifically
focusing on: 1) cultural factors that affect witness testimony; 2) the question
of applying the international law of genocide in the Rwandan context; and 3)
the role of culture in sentencing at the ICTR.
Part V will conclude that future international tribunals can learn a great
deal from the ICTR experience. It will argue, generally, that sensitivity to
cultural differences will assist international tribunals to be more effective in
war crimes prosecutions, but that the international community must also be
careful not to allow actual or perceived cultural differences to become an
excuse to disregard or minimize war crimes. The article then specifically
argues that international tribunals should follow the lead of the ICTR in its
willingness to recognize and take into account cultural differences as they arise.
Additionally, the article also argues that hybrid tribunals have a better chance
of striking the proper balance in this respect. Finally, the article argues that any
international or hybrid tribunal should exercise jurisdiction only when the
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to do so. The article therefore advo-
cates a mild cultural relativism approach to international war crimes prosecu-
tions.
2005]
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III. THE CULTURAL RELATIVISM DEBATE AND ITS APPLICATION TO WAR
CRIMES AND WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS
A. The Universalism-Cultural Relativism Debate
One of the major ongoing debates in the field of international human rights
is between the opposing views of universalism and cultural relativism. Put
most starkly, the debate is between those who believe that "[h]uman rights are,
literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being,"2
regardless of an individual's location, culture, or background, and those who
maintain that at least some rights vary depending on a person's culture.
According to Professor Jack Donnelly, a western political scientist, this
debate is better understood as points along a continuum rather than as a choice
between two extremes. At one end of the spectrum, radical cultural relativism
holds that culture is the only source of the validity of a human right or rule.3
On the other end of the spectrum, radical universalism holds that culture is
completely irrelevant to the validity of these rights and rules.4 Between these
two extremes lies a continuum of views ranging from strong to weak cultural
relativism.5 Strong cultural relativists would argue that culture is the principal
source of the validity of a right or rule, but would nevertheless accept the
universal validity and application of a few basic rights. Weak cultural
relativists (strong universalists) would presume the universality of most rights
and rules, but would hold that culture may also be an important source of the
validity of others.6
In addition, one element of confusion that runs through this debate is that
there are two different faces, or aspects, to cultural relativism, one generally
positive, and the other negative. On the positive side, cultural relativism
evolved largely as a reaction to the evils of colonialism. Given the fact that
"African, Asian, and Muslim (as well as Latin American) leaders and citizens
have vivid, sometimes personal, recollections of their sufferings under colonial
masters," there is an understandable sensitivity to external pressure.' In
addition, cultural relativism may be seen as a rejection of the West's "moral
imperialism," or "the rush to judge another person's flaws without revealing or
2. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS].
3. Id. at 89-90.
4. Id. at 90.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99 (arguing that this sensitivity,
though understandable, is not always justifiable).
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recognizing one's own."8 Finally, as a practical matter, human rights activists
are likely to be more effective if they ground their advocacy in local cultural
norms.
9
On the negative side, however, cultural relativism arguments are often
used as an excuse to avoid responsibility for human rights violations. Thus,
regime elites often make cultural relativism arguments in an "attempt to deflect
attention from their [own] repressive policies."'" A related problem is that,
although the community and the state are different entities, cultural relativism
arguments sometimes "assume unjustifiably an identity between government
objectives and cultural values."" "[P]articularly in states that lack democratic
institutions, the crude cultural relativists' identification of the state-and its
objectives-with the cultural values of its people remains dubious."' 2
Another slightly more subtle version of the negative face of cultural
relativism is that of the international community ignoring or excusing human
rights abuses that are occurring in a particular state. This may take the form of
well-meaning westerners, aware of the largely negative legacy of western
colonialism, failing to criticize arguments advanced by non-westerners "even
when [those arguments] are... inaccurate or morally absurd."' 3 The negative
side of cultural relativism may also take the more vicious form of neglect or
8. Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol & Christy Gleason, Introduction, in MORAL IMPERIALISM:
A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 8-9 (Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol ed., 2002); see also DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99 (noting that U.S. President Clinton expressed great
indignation at the prospect of an American teenager being publicly caned in Singapore without "find[ing]
it even notable that in his own country people are being fried in the electric chair."); see also Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 38 (1992) ("[I]t is extremely important to be
sensitive to the dangers of cultural imperialism, whether it is a product of colonialism, a tool of international
economic exploitation and political subjugation, or simply a product of extreme ethnocentricity. Since we
would not accept others imposing their moral standards on us, we should not impose our own moral standards
on them.").
9. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Reflections on Liberal Individualism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURALPERSPECTIVES 155 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) ("Often appeal to local shared
understandings [in denouncing practices such as torture, slavery, and genocide] has the practical advantage
of touching a government or political movement more deeply than an appeal to international standards...
[which] can be portrayed as alien and invasive, especially to collective autonomy."); see also An-Na'im,
supra note9, at 20 ("[S]ince people are more likely to observe normative propositions if they believe them
to be sanctioned by their own cultural traditions, observance of human rights standards can be improved
through the enhancement of the cultural legitimacy of those standards.").
10. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 100.
11. Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of
International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 586 (2001) (arguing that "in the Rwandan
genocide of 1994, it was not culture per se, but a political elite's manipulation and exacerbation of preexisting
socio-cultural divisions within Rwandan society that caused the systematic slaughter of Tutsi").
12. Id. at 587.
13. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 100.
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outright xenophobia, with an underlying attitude of "they've always been that
way, why should we make any effort to change things now?"' 4
The anti-relativist, or universalist, stance is also strengthened by
recognizing that relativist arguments are sometimes put forward by those
cultures who would seem to need their protective value the least. 5 For
example, in the past the United States sometimes adopted a cultural relativist
approach with regard to the juvenile death penalty, a practice widely recognized
to be in violation of customary international law.'6 Finally, Professor Donnelly
argues, with some force, that in developing countries today, rather than "the
persistence of traditional culture in the face of modem institutions ... we
usually see instead a disruptive and incomplete westernization, cultural
confusion, or the enthusiastic embrace of 'modem' practices and values. In
other words, the traditional culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far
too often no longer exists."' 7
B. Application of the Debate to War Crimes and War Crimes Prosecutions
1. Cultural Relativism and War Crimes
As in other areas of human rights, cultural relativism issues lie at the heart
of war crimes and war crimes prosecutions. With respect to the crimes them-
selves, most scholars, including relativists, seem to agree that there are at least
a small, core set of prohibitions that are universal. 8 "Few today, for example,
14. Cf GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 284 (criticizing western
commentators who, observing the serious post-colonial problems in Zaire, "took cynical solace in the
conviction that this state of affairs was about as authentic as Africa gets. Leave the natives to their own
devices, the thinking went, and-Voilh!-Zaire. It was almost as if we wanted Zaire to be the Heart of
Darkness; perhaps the notion suited our understanding of the natural order of nations."); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo 's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a BlindAlley?, 93 Nw. U.
L. REv. 215, 238-39 (1998) (discussing norm theory and social science studies that demonstrate that "[w]e
respond to persons in need according to how normal or abnormal their plight seems to us. Thus, famines in
Biafra evoke little response because we think they are normal in that part of the world.").
15. See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99.
16. See Patrick D. Curran, Developments: Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of
Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311, 315 (2004); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1198 (2005) (holding recently that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional, in part because of the
"stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile death penalty" ).
17. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 411
(1984) [hereinafter Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights].
18. See, e.g. MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A PoLTcAL AND CULTURAL CRTQUE xi, 66
(2002); Henry J. Richardson I, Book Note, Imperatives of Culture and Race for Understanding Human
Rights Law: Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique Makau Mutua, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 511,514-15,
517(2004).
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would resort to cultural relativism to defend cultural practices that sanction
slavery, human sacrifice, or genocide."' 9 Beyond this sense of agreement as to
a small subset of crimes, however, the specifics of what acts are universally
prohibited, and when they are prohibited, are seldom articulated.2 °
In fact, one commentator, David Chuter,2' has pointed out that "there are
few, if any, war crimes ... that were not at some time regarded as permissible,
if not actually praiseworthy, in various civilizations. 22 Moreover, Chuter
argues that "international criminal justice [today] has a heavily Western, white,
Anglo-Saxon character," and that its "vocabulary and concepts are not neutral
... [but instead] are culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very
small number of countries, most of which have English as their native or second
language.,23  Chuter therefore concludes that international humanitarian law
does not embody universal values, but rather "is in part a form of
19. Sloane, supra notel2, at 583; see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity,
29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 126 n. 145 (2004) ("[E]ven those inclined to embrace relativist positions on human
rights never press their relativism to the point of overtly defending genocide or crimes against humanity.").
20. See, e.g., An-Na'im, supra note 9, at 21 ("[D]espite their apparent peculiarities and diversity,
human beings and societies share certain fundamental interests, concerns, qualities, traits, and values that can
be identified and articulated as the framework for a common 'culture' of universal human rights. It would
be premature in this exploratory essay to attempt to identify and articulate these interests, concerns, and
so on, with certainty.") (emphasis added); Donald W. Shriver, Jr., Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials:
Complementary or Antagonistic Servants of Public Justice? 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2001) (arguing that
there is an "emerging international consensus on the nature of 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity,"'
but also noting that "[w]e are still in the midst of an international struggle to specify these categories [and]
to give them legal definition..."); MUTUA, supra note 18 ("There are aspects of the official human rights
corpus that I think are universal. Prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and other basic abominations violate
humanity at the core. But beyondthese obvious points ofagreement, the ground becomes tricky.") (emphasis
added).
21. Chuter works for the British Ministry of Defense where he had responsibility for Balkans war
crimes issues, and support to the ICTY. See DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCTY IN THE
MODERN WORLD 299 (2003).
22. Id. at 10; see also id. at 17 ("Killings, wife-stealing (the basic story in Homer's Iliad), cattle-
rustling, and the spoiling of crops were among the staples of intergroup relationships in earlier times, and
there was no sense that any of these acts was wrong, provided it was directed at a member of the out-group.
Indeed, most heroic poetry (see Homer) praises deeds that today would be thought illegal as well as
immoral.").
23. Id. at 94. Chuter specifically argues that international humanitarian norms reflect western
biases in their focus on individual guilt, imputation of command responsibility, and demand that soldiers
disobey unlawful orders. Id. at 96-97; see also CHUTER, supra note 22, at 95 ("[n]one of the major players
in the international humanitarian law game can dictate to others from a position of complete moral
superiority: all have done things comparable to some of the atrocities of Rwanda and Yugoslavia in modem
times, or they have excused similar behavior on the part of their allies. Likewise, all have blocked, or
attempted to block, investigations by international authorities into their own conduct more recently.").
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neocolonialism, in the sense that it gives the West practical leverage to achieve
political objectives such as the replacement of rulers or regimes. 2 a
Even the term war crimes is problematic. In this paper, the term generally
is used to refer to all of the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of
international criminal tribunals, including war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. As such, it is useful shorthand, but it can also be confusing and
deceptive, and inevitably means different things in different contexts. In fact,
"each successive international court has tended to define the categories of war
crimes and crimes against humanity with new components or variations. .26
Moreover, the crimes that fall under this broad umbrella are international
crimes only because of the context in which they take place. In other words,
rape is rape, and murder is murder, but sometimes they are international as well
as domestic crimes and sometimes not. In general, it depends on whether they
take place during an armed conflict or in a situation where the violence is
"widespread and systematic" in nature-all inquiries that are somewhat
subjective.27 Finally, within the context of an armed conflict, it is typically the
character of the victim as a civilian or other non-combatant that makes a certain
act a crime, and there is often a degree of subjectivity in the definitions of
combatants and non-combatants.28
24. Id. at 95.
25. Id at 3 ("[T]he expression war crimes... needs to be used with great care. Neither the [ICTY]
nor the [ICTRI tribunals punish war crimes--they punish serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Confusingly, the Statute of the [ICC] does refer to war crimes, but in a context that is describing what was
called Violations of the Laws or Customs of War or Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the past.
It is a mistake to assume that war crimes are a conceptual category all their own.").
26. Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging: At Home andAbroad, 7 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 219,235
(2004).
27. See, e.g., CHUTER, supra note 22, at 77-78 ("violations of the laws or customs of war, as well
as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, require an armed conflict of some kind if they are to be
charged.... [The ICTY's] statute requires it to prove the existence of an armed conflict first before crimes
against humanity can be charged. (This stipulation is not found in the statute for the [ICTR] or in the ICC
Statute.)"); id. at 214-15 (the requirement of an armed conflict "has been dropped in the ICC Statute... [b]ut
the other requirement for the proof of crimes against humanity is that the atrocities should be 'widespread
and systematic,' which is to say that random atrocities, even conduced on a large scale and very brutally,
would not qualify unless there were an underlying plan of some kind."); see also Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts
Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 145, 160
(2003) ("[J]udging individual acts of criminal responsibility always presupposes some normative context, but
in many cases involving alleged war crimes, it is that very context that is the subject of dispute. As soon as
the law tries to assess that larger historical and political context, the law moves into areas of indeterminacy
and political conflict.").
28. See e.g., CHuTER, supra note 22, at 80 ("[a]ny troops sent into Rwanda in 1994 to 'stop the
genocide' would have found themselves firing on women and children, who made up a substantial proportion
of the Hutu killers.").
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Thus several levels of contextual nuance surround the definition of war
crimes, all of which will be impacted by the cultural viewpoints of, inter alia,
the victims, perpetrators, judges, and others who create and interpret
international humanitarian law. It is, therefore, unsurprising that cultural
relativism arguments also play a large role in determining the appropriate
response to war crimes when they occur, particularly the response by the
international community.
2. Cultural Relativism and Responses to War Crimes
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community, and
particularly the United Nations (hereinafter "U.N."), has begun to respond more
and more often to the occurrence of war crimes throughout the world. In many
cases, that international response has taken the form of the establishment of an
international legal tribunal. First, in 1993 the U.N. Security Council created the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter
"ICTY") in response to atrocities in the Balkans during the various conflicts in
that region.29 Then in 1994, the Security Council created the ICTR in response
to the Rwandan genocide of that same year.3" In addition, several hybrid courts,
combining national and international judges and law, have also been established
or discussed-most notably in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and
Cambodia.3 Finally, the long-awaited International Criminal Court (hereinafter
"ICC"), the first ever permanent, treaty-based international criminal court, was
established in July 1998, and the Rome Statute governing the jurisdiction and
functioning of the court entered into force in July 2002.32
29. See S.C. Res. 808, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding in principle to
establish the tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting the Statute of the
tribunal); see also VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA vol. 1, at 30-31 (1998); Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide
Adequate Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353, 354 (2001).
30. See S.C. Res. 955, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); see also MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note29, at 72; Nizich, supra note29, at 354.
31. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'LL. 295,296-300
(2003); Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case
ofKosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1070-71 (2003); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 55 (2003); Patricia M. Wald,
Accountability for War Crimes: What Roles for National, International and Hybrid Tribunals?, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192 (2004) [hereinafter Wald, Accountability for War Crimes].
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also International Criminal Court, About the Court (2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about.htmil.
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Yet if "[lI]aw is a form of cultural expression and is not readily transplant-
able from one culture to another . . . ,"" then the creation of international
criminal tribunals will necessarily have implications for the cultural relativism
debate. The concept of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is largely
accepted and "there is a remarkable degree of consensus among international
lawyers in favor of international criminal accountability for mass murderers,
rapists, and torturers."34 There is also, however, a healthy body of scholarship
that argues that purely outsider prosecution is a flawed response to war crimes.
For example, in critiquing the international community's response to the
Rwandan genocide, including the establishment of the ICTR, Professor Jose
Alvarez has argued that "the international community needs to be responsive
to the idiosyncratic conditions that gave rise to massive violations of human
rights as well as to the conditions prevailing in those societies in the immediate
wake of atrocities. '35  Professor Alvarez asserts that his critique "is not
premised on cultural relativism,"36 however, he does admit that there may be
"idiosyncratic cultural or historical reasons why Rwandans or other groups may
resist solutions designed or imposed by the international community," and he
agrees that some of those reasons are suggested by his analysis."
Similarly, in an analysis of the effectiveness of both the ICTR and the
ICTY, Ivana Nizich, a former intelligence analyst and research officer for the
ICTY, has opined that "[t]he international community cannot have an elitist,
paternalistic attitude toward [war] crimes and toward the victims of these
crimes, i.e., viewing local participation as inherently biased, tribal,
inexperienced, and inept., 3' Nizich also argues that "hybrid attempt[s] to fuse
international and national participation in adjudicating war crimes may, in some
cases, be preferable [to] the 'elitist' models (i.e., the ICTY and ICTR)."39
Again, though not specifically using the language of cultural relativism, the
subtext to this argument is that the hybrid tribunals will better understand and
reflect cultural values and be less prone to the moral imperialism dangers of a
radical universalist approach.
33. MARYANNGLENDON, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADmONS INANUTSHELL 10 (1982). Seealso
Kristina D. Rutledge, Note, "Spoiling Everything "-But for Whom? Rules of Evidence and International
Criminal Proceedings, 16 REGENT U. L. REv. 151 (2004).
34. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
365,366(1999).
35. Id. at 370 (emphasis added); see discussion infra Part IV (exploring the Rwandan situation and
the ICTR).
36. Alvarez, supra note 34, at 369.
37. Id.
38. Nizich, supra note 29, at 364.
39. Id. at 363; see also discussion infra Part V (returning to the advantages of hybrid tribunals).
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Finally, Professor Mark Drumbl has argued that "although all genocides
are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole," nevertheless, "each genocide is unique ... [and] the modalities of
securing accountability and encouraging healing should vary in each individual
case."4 Professor Drumbl thus argues that policy responses to war crimes
should be based on a "contextual approach" rather than a "deontological
approach . . . [that] posits that trials of selected individuals (preferably
undertaken at the international level) constitute the favored and often exclusive
remedy to respond to all situations of genocide and crimes against humanity.""'
Although he hesitates to specifically invoke the language of cultural
relativism,42 Professor Drumbl clearly embraces at least some aspects of the
theory, arguing that "[p]rocesses based on local culture and regional practice
may create a greater sense of familiarity among victims than the potentially
alienating procedure of trials."' 3 Thus the subtext of cultural relativism is
present, and should be recognized, in this and other debates about the relative
value of international versus domestic responses to war crimes.
3. Cultural Relativism Within International War Crimes Prosecutions
As this discussion illustrates, the response to war crimes that reflects the
most universalist approach is that of an international war crimes tribunal such
as the ICTY or ICTR. Nonetheless, even given a decision to address war
crimes through the use of an international prosecutorial body, there may still be
room for cultural sensitivity in how that body goes about doing justice.
Of course one could argue that the philosophy underlying international war
crimes prosecutions is diametrically opposed to the idea of cultural relativism.
40. Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1221, 1224-1225 (2000) (quoting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1999)) [hereinafter Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide]; see also Mark Drumbl,
Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 539,
548 (2005) ("[I]nterpretations of justice are often multi-layered and, for many people, take root in national
and local contexts.") [hereinafter Drumbi, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment].
41. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 41, at 1228.
42. See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note41, at 602
("Cultural relativism should not impede the establishment of a system-wide norm that holds accountable those
individuals who perpetrate acts of great wickedness. There is no culture that views the infliction of such acts
as tolerable.").
43. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 41, at 1265; see also Drumbl, Collective
Violence andIndividual Punishment, supra note 41, at 548-49, 610 ("[A]t a minimum, some space should
be retained in this accountability process for alternative (and perhaps competing) mechanisms, such as those
that draw from local custom, national practices, or indigenous legal process .... I propose . . . that
international criminal law and punishment contemplate communitarian underpinnings, in which international
norms become sedimentary integrated into communities in a manner that takes into account cultural needs
instead of imposing cultural values.").
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For example, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor for the
ICTY and ICTR, has called cultural relativism "a dangerous trend" and has
argued that it should play no role in war crimes prosecutions." Indeed, we
would be appalled if an international war crimes tribunal judged the architect
of a genocide in Africa differently from the architect of a genocide in Europe
on the basis that the African defendant's actions reflected a part of his culture
with which the international community should not interfere.
Yet, at the same time, culture, and cultural differences, have been and will
continue to be an undeniable fact of life for all parties involved with
international tribunals. International tribunals typically consist of legal officers
(judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and staff) who come from different
cultures than the defendant and/or victims.4" As Judge Patricia Wald has noted
with respect to the ICTY,
[The ICTY] tries suspects in a country to which they have no ties and
sentences them to prison in other foreign countries. To many
internationalists this may reflect a triumph, but there are also voices
urging caution.... Our judicial systems, with their peculiar rights and
remedies, are products and reflections of our unique political and
cultural notions.'
If international legal officers refuse to acknowledge this reality, and
instead simplyjudge the witnesses, facts, and defendant's behavior solely based
on their own cultural norms, it is less likely that justice will result. We would,
therefore, want these judges to acknowledge and consider cultural differences
as they proceed.
Thus one could accept the universal validity and application of certain war
crimes, but nonetheless see a role for cultural sensitivity in how an international
war crimes tribunal operates. To return to Professor Donnelly's thesis, cultural
relativism arguments can apply to either the substance of human rights, the
interpretation of particular rights, and/or the form in which those rights are
implemented.47 One could, for example, advocate a universalist position with
44. Justice Richard Goldstone, Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View,
7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Drumbl, Punishment, Posigenocide, supra note 41, at 1259 (Professor Drumbi notes
that the ICTR prosecutions are "held in Tanzania, . . . where the language of the trial may not be
understandable to all Rwandans, ... [and] where the trials may be encumbered by foreign (and seemingly
technical) procedures."); see discussion infra Part IV (returning to a discussion of the specific impact that
cultural or language differences have had at the ICTR).
46. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of
Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemma ofan International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 87,
117 (2001) [hereinafter Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal].
47. See DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 90, 96-98.
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respect to a substantive list of human rights (e.g., protection against genocide),
but also allow culture-based deviations from international norms at the level of
interpretation (e.g., how genocide is defined in a particular situation) or at the
level of form and implementation (e.g., how a tribunal goes about investigating
and prosecuting an alleged genocide).
IV. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
With these general observations in mind, it will be helpful at this point to
apply them to a specific case study. The ICTR is an ideal subject for this study
because several aspects of the cultural relativism debate have resonated
throughout the Rwandan experience. Moreover, the Tribunal has considered
cultural differences in the course of fulfilling its mandate, thus illustrating the
importance of these issues even when operating within a universalist
framework.
A. History of the Rwandan Genocide and the Establishment of the ICTR
1. Rwandan History Through 1994
The history leading up to the Rwandan genocide is well documented
elsewhere.4 8 However, a brief recitation of the relevant facts here-with special
emphasis on the role that the international community played in these
events-will assist us in evaluating the relevance of cultural relativism to the
establishment and work of the ICTR.
On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President, Juvdnal Habyarimana, was
killed when his plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.49 This incident
sparked the widespread and systematic murder of between 500,000 and
1,000,000 civilians-mostly Tutsis-throughout the country. When the
violence subsided, more than seventy-five percent of Rwandan's ethnic Tutsi
population had been slaughtered." The scale of the violence was
unprecedented; the murders occurred at almost three times the rate of the killing
of Jews during the Holocaust.52 Yet this genocide was not a spontaneous
48. See generally GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note2; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note29, at 47; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995).
49. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Philip Gourevitch, After the Genocide, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 78; Daphna
Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUl. J. INT'L L. 501, 502
(1996).
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uprising, nor the inevitable result of ancient tribal warfare. It was carefully
planned, and, most agree, fully preventable by the international community.53
Rwanda is composed primarily of two ethnic groups: the Hutu majority
and the Tutsi minority.54 Yet these two groups historically "spoke the same
language, followed the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled,
without territorial distinctions... sharing the same social and political culture
in small chiefdoms."" In fact, because of the great degree of intermixing
throughout the years, ethnographers and historians question whether the Tutsi
and Hutu are in fact distinct ethnic groups.56 Rather, the main historic
distinction between the two groups was economic: "Hutus were cultivators and
Tutsis were herdsmen."" Because being a herdsman was a more prosperous
vocation, the minority Tutsi eventually emerged as an aristocratic elite;
however, the lines between the two groups remained porous.5"
Nevertheless, when European colonizers arrived in Rwanda at the end of
the nineteenth century, they quickly seized on real or perceived differences
between the two groups in order to further their own brand of "race science."59
As Phillip Gourevitch describes it in his history of the Rwandan genocide:
[W]hen the Europeans arrived in Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth
century, they formed a picture of a stately race of warrior kings,
surrounded by herds of long-homed cattle and a subordinate race of
short, dark peasants, hoeing tubers and picking bananas. The white
53. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48; but see CHUTER, supra note22, at 123-24
(criticizing the post hoc calls for intervention in Rwanda as unrealistic).
54. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48. A third ethnic group, the Twa, comprise
approximately two percent of the Rwandan population. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n
on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, 1 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/61
(Jan. 20, 1997) (prepared by Rdne Degni-Sdgui).
55. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 47. Although the Tutsis are generally
described as tall and lanky, with aquiline noses and longer jawbones, and the Hutus as stocky, dark-skinned,
and round-faced, "[n]ature presents countless exceptions." Id. at 50. Moreover, intermarriage was common,
and "through marriage and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become
hereditary Hutus." Id. at 47; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48-49.
56. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49. See also GOUREVITCH, STORIES FRoM RWANDA,
supra note 2, at 48 (stating that "ethnographers and historians have lately come to agree that Hums and Tutsis
cannot properly be called distinct ethnic groups.").
57. GouREviTct-, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 48; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
58. GouREVITcH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 48; see also MORRIs & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
59. GouREvrlC, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 50; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 29, at 49.
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men assumed that this was the tradition of the place, and they thought
it a natural arrangement.'W
Thus to conform reality to their vision of it, the colonizers encouraged and
deepened the divide between the two groups. The Germans, and then the
Belgians set up a policy of indirect colonial rule, with the Tutsis serving as
feudal lords on the Europeans' behalf.6 The Belgians also furthered the
division of Hutu and Tutsi by "conduct[ing] a census for the purpose of issuing
identity cards which labeled every Rwandan as a Hutu, a Tutsi, or a Twa." '62 A
person's classification was based on patrilineal lineage, and membership in a
particular group became increasingly rigid.63
Naturally, the majority Hutu population resented the assumption of Tutsi
superiority and the imposition of Tutsi rule by the Europeans." After World
War H, as independence movements spread throughout Africa, the Belgians
began to sympathize with the Hutus desire for self-determination.65 The Hutus
therefore seized power in Rwanda in 1959," and the first wave of systematic
political violence between Hutus and Tutsis followed. During the next few
years, over 100,000 Tutsis fled the country in the face of mass killings.67
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was a dictatorship ruled by the
French-supported President Habyarimana, and France brought the country
within its "neocolonial sphere in Francophone Africa." ' During this same time
period, the exiled Tutsis attempted several times to invade Rwanda and
overthrow the government. After each unsuccessful attempt, Tutsis in Rwanda
would be massacred by the thousands.69
In 1990, the largely Tutsi refugee army known as the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (hereinafter "RPF") attacked again, and France responded by sending
arms to Rwanda and providing a contingent of troops to fight with the Rwandan
army.7" In late 1992, the fighting between the Rwandan army and the RPF
60. GOUREVrrCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 50.
61. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49; see also GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA,
supra note 2, at 54.
62. MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
63. Id. at 49-50.
64. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 57-58.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Id. at 59; MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
67. See GOUREVrrCH, STORIESFROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 59; MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note
29, at 50.
68. MoRRis & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
69. Id; GOUREVrTCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 65 ("The British philosopher, Sir
Bertrand Russell, described the scene in Rwanda in 1964 as the most horrible and systematic massacre we
have had occasion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis.").
70. See generally GOuREVrrCH, STORIES FRoM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 88; MoRRIS & SCHARF,
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forces reached a stalemate, and the two camps began negotiating a series of
agreements that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha Aeace accords.71
"[C]rucially, throughout the peace-implementation period a United Nations
peacekeeping force would be deployed in Rwanda."72
Hutu extremists, many of whom were close to President Habyarimana,
were strongly opposed to the peace agreement, even as Hutu moderate
opposition parties gained increasing support among the Rwandan population.73
To shore up his support among the Hutus, President Habyarimana soon sought
to again unite them against a common enemy-the Tutsis.74 In 1993, a training
camp for the Hutu militia was established, providing groups of 300 Hutus at a
time with courses "on methods of mass murder and indoctrination in ethnic
hatred."" The Rwandan authorities distributed six million dollars worth of
firearms provided by France to militia members and other Habyarimana
supporters; in addition, "machetes were imported en masse from China and
stored in secret caches throughout the country."76
In early 1994, the commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda
(hereinafter "UNAMIR"), Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent a cable to the
U.N. Headquarters warning that the Hutu hard-liners were planning a genocidal
massacre of the Tutsis.77 In the weeks following, he made repeated requests for
reinforcements and sought authorization to use force to seize the weapons
caches, but U.N. officials, still stinging from the death of U.S. soldiers in
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, refused these requests.78
This set the stage for the mass genocide that began in April 1994. Almost
instantly after Habyarimana was assassinated, Hutu soldiers and the newly
trained militia began to hunt down and kill Tutsi civilians and moderate
supra note 29, at 50; see also GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 89 (noting that France
continued to funnel huge arms shipments into Rwanda "right through the killings in 1994 ... [ilnitially,
Belgium and Zaire also sent groups to back up [Habyarimana's forces], but the Zaireans were so given to
drinking, looting, and raping that Rwanda soon begged them to go home, and the Belgians withdrew of their
own accord.").
71. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 99; MoRRIs & ScHARF, supra note
29, at 50-51.
72. GOuREvircTH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 99.
73. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 51.
74. Id. (quoting Gourevitch, After the Genocide, supra note 53, at 86.)
75. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52. See also The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 9
December 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex 165,
Final Report ofthe Commission ofExperts EstablishedPursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994),
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Final Report].
76. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52.
77. Id. at 52-53; GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 103-05.
78. See GOUREV1TcH, STORIES FROM RWANDA,supra note 2, at 105-06; MORRIS & SCHARF,supra
note 29, at 53.
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Hutus.79 Barricades were erected on major thoroughfares, at which members
of the Hutu Presidential Guard inspected identity cards and executed those who
had a Tutsi identity card or were perceived to have Tutsi physical traits.80
Tutsis were hunted down and killed through house-to-house searches, and
Tutsis who sought refuge at churches or hotels were often surrounded by
soldiers and massacred." Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were murdered, and
tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped and/or sexually mutilated.82
In the meantime, Belgium withdrew from the U.N. peacekeeping force
after a contingent of ten Belgian U.N. Peacekeepers were captured, tortured,
and murdered. 3 On April 21, 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a
resolution that ordered the retreat of all but 270 U.N. peacekeeping troops.84
The United States not only sought to avoid involvement with peacekeeping
missions but also urged others not to undertake missions that it wished to
avoid.85 When other countries began pushing for the return of U.N. troops, the
United States demanded control of the mission and then encouraged the
Security Council to delay the deployment of troops.86 By a strange coincidence,
the Rwandan government occupied a rotating seat on the Security Council at
this time.87
At the same time, French diplomats were depicting the massacre as a
"mass popular outrage" in response to the President's assassination.88 France
also encouraged the view that that the killing was an extension of the war with
the RPF, and that the RPF was either the greater offender, or that at most a two-
way genocide was taking place; "in short, that Rwandans were simply killing
each other as they were wont to do, for primordial tribal reasons, since time
immemorial."8 9 France also launched "Operation Tourquoise," which the
Security Counsel endorsed, and gave permission to use force. 90 "Operation
Turquoise" set up a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda, but many asked "safe
for whom?" 9' The operation did rescue at least 10,000 Tutsis, but thousands
more were killed in the zone under France's control.92 The Hutu government
79. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 53.
80. Id. at 54; see also Final Report, supra note 76, 1 69.
81. See Final Report, supra note 76, fT 69-72.
82. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 55.
83. See GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 114, 150.
84. Id. at 150.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 151.
87. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 60.
88. GOuREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 154.
89. Id.; see also id. at 156.
90. Id. at 155-56.
91. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 157.
92. Id. at 158.
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even moved its radio station into the French zone and continued to broadcast
incitements to kill Tutsis.93
Nevertheless, by mid-July, the RPF had pushed its way to the capital, and
hundreds of thousands of Hutus had fled into Southwest Rwanda and Zaire
(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 94 On July 18, the Hutu extremist
government fled the country and the RPF established a new coalition
government with the surviving members of the anti-Hutu power opposition
parties.95 Thus the genocide ended, but Rwanda was left with hundreds of
thousands dead and wounded, and hundreds of thousands of murderers and
accomplices.
2. After the Genocide: The International Community's Response
The international community had failed to prevent or stop the genocide,
but it nevertheless quickly turned to the question of what it might do to help
bring the perpetrators to justice.96 The Rwandan penal system had been
completely decimated, 97 and the new government-which now occupied the
Rwandan seat on the Security Council-began pressing for a war crimes
tribunal similar to the ICTY, set up the previous year.98
However, many on the Security Council were resistant to the idea of a
"costly international investigation and a tribunal which the United Nations
could ill-afford."" Such resistance was harshly criticized, and some suggested
that it smacked of racism.'°° As one commentator noted:
[H]ad the sequence of events between the Yugoslav and Rwanda
conflicts been different, it is by no means certain that a tribunal for
Rwanda would have been established. On the basis of international
93. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
94. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 162; see generally id at 156
(noting those fleeing included many who had been responsible for the killings and that they "were
indiscriminately received with open arms by UN and humanitarian agencies and accommodated as refugees
in giant camps."); see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 60.
95. SeeGOUREVTCH, STORIEs FROM RWANDAsupra note 2, at 162; MORRIs &SCHARF, supra note
29, at 58.
96. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
97. See Jose Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COmp. L. 359, 369
(1999) (noting that, after the genocide, there were "sixteen lawyers left alive" in Rwanda); see also Nicole
Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 406 (2001) (noting that "the genocide in Rwanda left the judicial system
virtually destroyed-approximately ninety-five percent of the country's lawyers and judges were killed,
exiled, or imprisoned").
98. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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responses to other situations, it has been suggested that the plight of
African victims would not generate the same outcry as the suffering
of Europeans. In other words, the Rwanda Tribunal was established
[only] because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslav Tribunal.01'
Or as the Prime Minister, delegate of the new Rwandan coalition
government, asked, "Was a war crimes court not set up in Germany? Is it
because we're Africans that a court has not been set up [for Rwanda]?"' 2
Thus, in November 1994, the Security Council established the ICTR.0 3
In a strange turn of events, however, Rwanda was the only member of the
Security Council to vote against the Resolution that created the Tribunal."°
Although it had initially requested its creation, as negotiations progressed
Rwanda objected to a number of the provisions in the Tribunal's governing
statute.'0 5 First, Rwanda objected because the ICTR would have jurisdiction
only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar year," which would
prevent the ICTR from fully investigating the activities that led up to the
genocide.'0 7 Second, Rwanda objected that the ICTR would be understaffed
and underfunded, with only a handful ofjudges and with the appellate body and
chief prosecutor to be split between the ICTR and the ICTY.' Third, Rwanda
objected to the fact that the seat of the court would be in Tanzania rather than
Rwanda, which would make it more difficult for the Rwandan people to follow
the court's proceedings."°
Finally, Rwanda objected to the fact that the Tribunal's statute prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty."0 This objection was tied to the fact that
the ICTR was never expected to try more than a handful of defendants, and that
it would focus on the regime elites who had the greatest role in organizing and
executing and the genocidal plan."' Because the Rwandan Penal Code
provides for the death penalty, "[t]hose most responsible for the killings" would
not face the death penalty, while lower-level perpetrators tried in the Rwandan
101. Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 501 (1996).
102. MoRRIs & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
103. Id. at 72; see generally Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33
LL.M. 1598.
104. See MORRIs & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 72.
105. See Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, in WAR CRiMEs: THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG 213 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) [hereinafter Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide].
106. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, at art. 7.
107. See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 107, at 213.
108. Id at 214.
109. See MoRRIs & ScHARF, supra note 29, at 68.
110. See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 109, at 214.
111. See CHUTER, supra note 22, at 221.
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courts might be executed.112 Similarly, Rwanda argued that the prison terms for
those convicted at the Tribunal should be served in Rwanda, and "not in some
posh facility in Europe.""'
These specific disputes also reflected Rwanda's broader frustration with
the international community. Many felt that Rwanda needed international
assistance to fit its unique situation, but instead the international community
applied a cookie-cutter approach by establishing a tribunal that was "essentially
a weaker, more impoverished replica" of the ICTY." 4 Moreover, whereas at
the time of the establishment of the ICTY there was little reason to expect
serious local prosecutions of war crimes perpetrators, the situation with Rwanda
was different--"local authorities were willing to prosecute and could have used
extensive international assistance to make such efforts more credible.""' 5
Instead, international resources that could have gone to rebuild the shattered
Rwandan justice system were diverted to the ICTR." 6 Thus some have argued
that the existence of the ICTR is more a reflection of internationalist priorities
than a genuine response to the needs of the Rwandan victims." 7
B. Cultural Relativism and the Rwandan Experience
This history-both of the Rwandan genocide and of the establishment of
the ICTR-illustrates several of the issues in the universalist/cultural relativist
debate discussed supra. In fact, both universalists and cultural relativists can
find support for their positions in these facts.
1. The Universalist Response
First, a universalist could point out that certain real or perceived elements
of Rwandan culture appear to have contributed to the genocide. For example,
Rwandans and non-Rwandans alike often speak of the culture of impunity that
112. Id.
113. MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note 29, at 68 ("[P]risons that house convicted criminals indicted by
the ad hoc tribunals have to meet minimum U.N. standards, and these standards are often higher than average
Africans would expect in their private homes."); see also CHtrER, supra note 22, at 221; Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 41, at 579 (noting also that many victims as well as
perpetrators of the violence in Rwanda are HIV-positive, and that prisoners of the ICTR have access to
medical care that is not available to most of the victims).
114. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 369-70; GouREV1TCH, STORIES FROMRWANDA, supra note 2, sit 252
(quoting one Rwandan diplomat as saying that "We asked for help to catch these people who ran away and
to try them properly in our own courts... [but instead] the Security Council just started writing 'Rwanda'
under the name 'Yugoslovia' everywhere.").
115. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 370.
116. Id. (stating that resources "reaching between $40 and $50 million a year" were going to the
international tribunal).
117. ld.at370.
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prevailed prior to 1994.1"8 Although this is more in the nature of
rhetoric-meaning simply that perpetrators of previous abuses had gone
unpunished-than an assertion of an actual cultural value, the use of the word
is nonetheless telling. Moreover, there does appear to have been a cultural
norm that encouraged inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda, especially when that
violence was orchestrated and ordered by community leaders." 9 This aspect of
Rwandan society is sometimes referred to as a culture of obedience: 20
[T]here had always been a strong tradition of unquestioning
obedience to authority in the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda. This
tradition was of course reinforced by both the German and the
Belgian colonial administrations. And since independence the
country has lived under a well-organized tightly-controlled state.
When the highest authorities in that state told you to do something
you did it, even if it included killing.'2'
To the extent that these can be considered cultural values or traits, a
universalist approach would argue, correctly, that these traits are not worthy of
protection.
In addition, as illustrated by the history of Rwanda discussed supra,
Rwanda is an example of "disruptive and incomplete westernization [and]
cultural confusion.. . " and thus cultural relativism arguments have less force
when applied to modem Rwandan culture. 122 Indeed, the supposedly ancient
tribal conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda are directly rooted in the
legacy of colonialism, and until "1959 there had never been systematic political
violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis-anywhere."'2 3 As one scholar
has pointed out, the "simplistic 'tribal war thesis' is often a reflection of
ethnocentrism, if not an expedient absolution from apathy in the face of
immense human suffering."'' 24 This version of ethnocentrism thus reflects one
118. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice andReconciliation in the Great Lakes Region ofAfrica: The
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 333
(1997).
119. See GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 123 ("During the genocide, the
work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every
citizen was responsible for its administration.").
120. See Akhavan, supra note 120, at 335.
121. PRUNIER, supra note 49, at 245; see also Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual
Punishment, supra note 41, at 568 ("[Un certain circumstances, those who commit extraordinary international
crimes are the ones conforming to social norms whereas those who refuse to commit the crimes choose to act
deviantly.").
122. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, supra note 18.
123. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 59.
124. Akhavan, supra note 122, at 329.
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aspect of the negative face of cultural relativism-the outsider dismissing
human rights abuses on the grounds that it is just their culture, so there's
nothing that we can do about it.
Similarly, with respect to the establishment of the ICTR, the universalism
argument directs our attention to the admonitions by Rwandans and others that
genocide in Africa is just as worthy of international adjudication as is genocide
in Europe. Indeed, we must avoid cultural relativism arguments in cases where
such arguments are nothing more than a way for the international
community-particularly the West-to avoid responding to horrors that take
place in cultures that do not more closely resemble our own.
2. The Cultural Relativist Response
The history of Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR provides support
for cultural relativism arguments as well. Cultural relativism is, at least in part,
a response to colonialism and the harm that comes from outside (particularly
western) influences in another culture. Given the fact that the Tutsi/Hutu
distinction and ultimate conflict was largely furthered through western
influence-based on then-current notions of race and ethnicity-Rwanda would
be justified in resisting further impositions of western values, even if those
values are now couched in terms of assistance rather than conquest. Moreover,
given the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the genocide,
as well as the cooperation of some western states with the regime that
perpetrated the genocide, Rwanda would be correct to greet any new offer of
western help with skepticism.
In addition, elements of moral imperialism (the "negative face" of
universalism) can be found in the Security Council's decision to create the
ICTR in spite of the objections by the post-genocide Rwandan government.
This decision may reflect the perception "that the Rwandan judiciary was
incapable of reaching just verdicts," and that "any trials that Rwanda might
hold ... [would be] beneath international standards."'25 This perception is
furthered by the fact that the ICTR has primary jurisdiction in any case that fits
under its mandate, meaning that it may require Rwandan (or other) domestic
courts to relinquish any defendant falling under its mandate to itsjurisdiction.'26
While this does not necessarily reflect insensitivity to specific Rwandan
cultural values, it does imply that the international community is a better judge
of Rwandan events than are Rwandans. This is questionable, in light of the
international community's actions leading up to and during the genocide; and
125. GOUREVITCH, STORIES FROM RWANDA, supra note 2, at 252-53.
126. See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, Rwandan Justice and the International Criminal Court, 5 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 354 (1999) [hereinafter Morris, Rwandan Justice].
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dangerous, as it may encourage the perception of Rwanda as lawless, tribal, or
primitive (a perception that universalists would also seek to avoid).
C. The Role of Culture in ICTR Trials and Decisions
By looking at Rwanda through the lens of the universalist/cultural
relativist debate, we can see that there are truths-and dangers-in both lines
of thought. This section will now turn to the question of what role, if any,
cultural sensitivity does or should play in the operation of the Tribunal. As
demonstrated by several cases issued by the Tribunal, I believe that it has
appropriately adopted a mild cultural relativist approach in its operations, and
that it has endeavored, where appropriate, to recognize and take into account
differences in the Rwandan culture when recognition of those differences has
assisted the Tribunal to do justice.
1. Cultural and Language Factors Affecting Witness Testimony
Several ICTR decisions have noted the difficulty of receiving and inter-
preting testimony from witnesses whose culture and language is foreign to the
Tribunal judges' own. The first case to discuss this issue was The Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, in which the trial chamber found the former Bourgmestre (mayor)
of Taba guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
crimes against humanity, and sentenced him to life in prison. 27
In assessing the evidence against Mr. Akayesu, the trial chamber specifi-
cally considered "cultural factors which might affect an understanding of the
evidence presented."' 28 Some of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that
most of the witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda, but this was not one of the
Tribunal's official languages. For example, the trial chamber noted that there
appeared to be contradictions between the testimony of several witnesses on the
stand and earlier statements by these same witnesses given to Tribunal
investigators. 29 The trial chamber explained these inconsistencies, in part, by
noting that "the interpretation of oral testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda
into one of the official languages of the Tribunal [French and English] has been
a particularly great challenge due to the fact that the syntax and everyday modes
of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are complex and difficult to
translate into French or English." 3' These difficulties, the Tribunal reasoned,
127. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 638-744 (Sept.
2, 1998); Cecile E.M. Meijer, The War Crimes Research Office Presents: News from the International
Criminal Tribunal, 9 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BREF 30, 32 (2004).
128. Akayesu, 130.
129. Id. 1140.
130. Id. 145.
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affected the pre-trial interviews as well as the interpretation of in-court
testimony.'3'
The trial chamber also noted that certain Kinyarwanda terms were infused
with special meaning that could only be understood within the context of the
Rwandan culture. For example, the basic meaning of the term inyenzi is
"cockroach."' 32 However, the term had also been used to refer to the incursions
of Tutsi refugees since the 1960s,'33 and it was later used by anti-Tutsi extre-
mist media to refer to all Tutsis.'34 Similarly, the term ibyitso, which literally
means "accomplice," evolved in the early 1990s to refer to all Tutsi.'35
Moreover, taking such linguistic nuances into account may be relatively
simple compared to the additional, broader cultural factors that the Tribunal
found were also affecting witness testimony. 36 For example, the Tribunal
received expert testimony that "most Rwandans live in an oral tradition in
which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, often irrespective
of whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by someone
else.'' 137 Thus during the examination of certain witnesses, it was "at times
clarified that evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was
in fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed."' 38 The expert witness
explained that this was common in the Rwandan culture, but also that "the
Rwandan community was like any other and that a clear distinction could be
articulated by the witnesses between what they had heard and what they had
seen."' 39 The trial chamber therefore "made a consistent effort to ensure that
this distinction was drawn throughout the trial proceedings."'"4
The Tribunal also received expert testimony that
it is a particular feature of the Rwandan culture that people are not
always direct in answering questions, especially if the question is
131. Id. Although not mentioned by the Tribunal, Chuter also argues that "not every society expects
ordinary people to volunteer evidence unless asked," and that the investigators may not have been thorough
enough in their questioning to elicit full responses, responses which would later come out in the court room.
CHUTER, supra note 22, at 157.
132. Akayesu, 148.
133. Id. ("Throughout the 1960's incursions on Rwandan soil were carried out by some of these
refugees, who would enter and leave the country under the cover of the night, only rarely to be seen in the
morning. This activity was likened to that of cockroaches, which are rarely seen during the day but often
discovered at night, and accordingly these attackers were called Inyenzi.").
134. Id. 149.
135. Id. 150.
136. Id. 155-56.
137. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 155 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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delicate. In such cases, the answers given will very often have to be
'decoded' in order to be understood correctly. This interpretation will
rely on the context, the particular speech community, the identity of
and the relation between the orator and the listener, and the subject
matter of the question."'
The trial chamber noted specific instances of this in the proceedings. For
example, several witnesses were reluctant or unwilling to state that the ordinary
meaning of the term inyenzi was cockroach, although all Rwandans know the
meaning of the word.'42 More generally, the trial chamber also attributed to
cultural constraints the "difficulty [of some witnesses] to be specific as to dates,
times, distances and locations."' 43
In light of these observations, the "Chamber did not draw any adverse
conclusions regarding the credibility of witnesses based only on their reticence
and their sometimes circuitous responses to questions.""' This is significant,
as it acknowledges that in many cultures such reticence or circuitous testimony
would affect a witness' credibility. Indeed, the judges' inclusion of this
discussion in the opinion reflects the fact that the judges themselves would-in
their home countries-likely have drawn a negative inference about these
witnesses' credibility.'4 5 However, in this case, an insistence on the type of
directness that the judges would normally associate with truthfulness might
have led them to discount truthful testimony and reach an unjust result. The
judges therefore correctly recognized that they must consider the cultural
differences between themselves and the witnesses before them in adjudicating
the case.
Similarly, in The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the trial chamber found
Georges Rutaganda, second vice-president of the youth wing of the
Interahamwe-the youth militia responsible for many of the killings-guilty of
genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to life in prison.'4 6
The trial chamber noted that it had:
taken into consideration various social and cultural factors in
assessing the testimony of some of the witnesses. Some of these
141. Id. 156.
142. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 156.
143 Id.
144. Id.
145. The Trial Chamber consisted of Presiding Judge Laity Kama from Senegal, Judge Lennert
Aspegren from Sweden, and Navanethem Pillay from South Africa. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T, Sentencing Decision (Oct. 2, 1999).
146. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence, 3 2, 11 (Dec. 6,1999);
see also Alexandra L. Wisotsky, News from the International Criminal Tribunals, 8 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BRIEF
18(2001).
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witnesses were farmers and people who did not have a high standard
of education, and they had difficulty in identifying and testifying to
some of the exhibits, such as photographs of various locations, maps
etc. These witnesses also experienced difficulty in testifying as to
dates, times, distances, colours and motor vehicles.'
47
The trial chamber also noted "that many of the witnesses testified in
Kinyarwanda and as such their testimonies were simultaneously translated into
French and English. As a result, the essence of the witnesses' testimonies was
at times lost.'
' 4
On appeal 149 Rutaganda argued that the trial chamber committed an error
of law "by improperly taking judicial notice of social and cultural factors."' 5
Rutaganda argued that "social and cultural factors are not 'matters of common
knowledge' in respect of which judicial notice should be taken" under the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that the judges "made generalizations
that were not corroborated by evidence or, especially, by expert opinion."'' 5'
Thus, the defendant argued, "facts that were noted as being matters of common
knowledge were in reality only matters of personal knowledge and stereotypes
that the various members of the trial chamber may have had on the Rwandan
people."'52 Rutaganda also criticized the trial chamber for applying the factors
in a general way, without indicating the specific witnesses to which they
applied.'53
The appeals chamber rejected the defendant's argument. It held that the
steps taken by the trial chamber could not be properly characterized as "judicial
notice, the underlying purpose of which is to dispense with future proof of
officially recorded facts that are indisputable."'' 54 Instead, the appeals chamber
reasoned that
the Trial Judgment only states an observation that obviously dawned
on the Trial Chamber as it heard the evidence given before it, namely,
the fact that some of the persons heard were farmers and people who
147. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 23.
148. Id. For instance, Witness A testified at trial that he had four children who died in the genocide
and one who survived. Id. In contrast, in a pre-trial statement he had stated that he had three children, all
of whom had died. Id. The trial chamber concluded that this inconsistency was not material, and that it could
be attributed to "difficulties of transcription and translation" relating to the pre-trial statements. Id. Thus
the trial chamber did not draw any adverse inferences from these inconsistencies. See, e.g., id. 292.
149. See generally Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment (May 26, 2003).
150. Id. 12,223.
151. Id. 1223.
152. Id.
153. Id. 1223.
154. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 225.
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were not sufficiently literate, and that this situation had repercussions
on the quality of their evidence.. .. '"
The appeals chamber also rejected the contention that the trial chamber
improperly took a general approach rather than indicating "in which cases and
to what extent, in its assessment, it applied the test based on the impact of socio
or cultural factors." '56 The appeals chamber concluded that the trial chamber
acted properly in setting out an introductory observation, and that it was not
required to "articulate every step of its reasoning for each particular finding it
makes."' 57 The appeals chamber also reasoned that the trial chamber had
provided some specificity about the witnesses to whom its general observation
applied, i.e., "farmers and people who did not have a high standard of
education....""'
The appeals chamber then used the example of Witness A, who "was born
in a rural prefecture and lived in Rwanda all his life, spoke only Kinyarwanda,
and was a mason by profession."'5 9 When asked to estimate a distance in
kilometers, the witness instead gave a distance based on his own visual assess-
ment. 60 The witness also had difficulty giving directions in terms of north/
south designations.1 6 The appeals chamber concluded that these difficulties
"must be taken into account," but that they "do not affect the testimony as a
whole or its credibility. ' 162
Thus, once again the Tribunal refused to hold the witnesses to a universal
standard of credibility, i.e., a standard that would conform more to the judge's
own cultural expectations. However, although the trial chamber probably
should not be required to name each instance in which it considered cultural
factors in evaluating testimony, it would nonetheless be better if the trial
chamber did so in most cases. Only then can the appellate division, the
defendants, the larger Rwandan community, and the international legal
community truly evaluate whether these were appropriate exercises in cultural
sensitivity, or whether at times the Tribunal may have seen cultural differences
where they did not exist.
155. Id. 1226.
156. Id. 1228.
157. Id.
158. Id. 1229.
159. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 1 229.
160. Id. The witness stated: "I lived on the hill and the airport was located on a different hill. You
can see the hill from us, as the crow flies, from our home." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. 1230. Interestingly, the appeals chamber did not address the issue of the inconsistency with
regard to the number of Witness A's children; see supra text accompanying note 150. Presumably, either
Rutaganda did not raise the issue on appeal, or the appeals chamber also accepted that the inconsistency was
a translation or transcription error.
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Specifically, Rwandans have an interest in ensuring that the Tribunal does
not characterize any cultural differences in such a way that they are perceived
as inferiorities. For example, it is unclear whether the lack of a witness' ability
to give directions in north-south designations is truly due to cultural differences
(e.g., this mode of direction is not used in some segments of Rwandan society)
or was due to the fact that a particular individual was not educated. In fact, the
appeals chamber appears to favor the later explanation, while also giving lip
service to the notion of true cultural differences that can affect witness
testimony.
Thus the trial chamber should endeavor in the future to be more specific
about the particular witnesses to whom it applies these standards, and in
relation to which part of their testimony. Nevertheless, the ICTR should be
commended for recognizing the cultural issues that are raised by its work, rather
than taking a radical universalist approach that could have interfered with its
ability to do justice.
2. Genocide and the Definition of "Ethnicity"
Cultural differences may also affect the application of international legal
concepts to specific fact situations. For example, the Akayesu decision
reflected the first time that an international court found an individual guilty of
genocide, but this was not a foregone conclusion as a matter of law. Article
2(2) of the ICTR's statute reflects, verbatim, the definition of genocide as
contained in the Genocide Convention.' Genocide "means any of[a series of]
acts ... committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group as such," including, inter alia, "killing
members of the group [or] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group."'"M The trial chamber found as fact that the defendant engaged in
these acts with the intent to destroy the Tutsi.' s Yet, as described supra, it is
debatable whether the Tutsis constituted a separate group, ethnic, racial, or
otherwise, at the time of the massacre.'66
Nevertheless, the trial chamber recognized that "in the context of the
period in question," the Tutsi and Hutu "were, in consonance with a distinction
made by the colonizers, considered both by the authorities and themselves as
163. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art. 2; see also Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1 494.
164. Akayesu, 1 13; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art.
2.
165. See Akayesu, 167-460.
166. Id. 1 122 n.56 ("[O]ne can hardly talk of ethnic groups as regards Hutu and Tutsi, given that
they share the same language and culture.").
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belonging to two distinct ethnic groups ... ,,'67 The trial chamber also noted
that "in a patrilineal society like Rwanda, the child belongs to the father's group
of origin," and that pregnant Hutu women were killed on the ground that Tutsi
men fathered the fetuses they carried. 6 Thus, because the victims were not
chosen as individuals or because they were RPF fighters, but rather due to their
membership in the Tutsi ethnic group, the trial chamber concluded that
genocide was committed "against the Tutsi as a group."' 69 The Tribunal
thereby adopted "a strikingly modem definition of [an] ethnic group that
accepts its constructed nature while acknowledging the power and potency of
ethnic self-identification."'
170
Similarly, in Rutaganda, the trial chamber stated that there were currently
no "internationally accepted precise definitions" of "the concepts of national,
ethnical, racial, and religious groups," and that therefore "[e]ach of these
concepts must be assessed in light of a particular political, social and cultural
context. 17' The court also held that, for purposes of applying the Genocide
Convention, membership in a particular group is a subjective concept-the
victim either perceives him/herself as belonging to a group and/or the per-
petrator perceives the victim as belonging to the group slated for destruction.1
72
Thus the trial chamber held that "in assessing whether a particular group may
be considered as protected from the crime of genocide, [we] will proceed on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account both the relevant evidence proffered and
the political and cultural context. ... 7' The trial chamber also agreed with the
Akayesu judgment that although the Tutsi population does not have its own
language or a culture distinct from other Rwandans, "there were a number of
objective indicators of the group as a group with a distinct identity."'' 74 These
included the identity cards that all Rwandans were required to carry, Rwandan
laws in force prior to 1994 that identified Rwandans by reference to their ethnic
group, and "customary rules ... governing the determination of ethnic group,
which followed patrilineal lines."'175 Considering both these subjective and
objective factors, the trial chamber concluded that the "identification ofpersons
as belonging to the group of Hutu or Tutsi or Twa had thus become embedded
167. Id.
168. ld. 121.
169. Id. 126.
170. Alvarez, supra note 99, at 360.
171. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 56.
172. Id.
173. Id. 58 (emphasis added).
174. Id. 1374.
175. Id.
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in Rwandan culture," and concluded that the Tutsi qualified as a stable and
permanent ethnic group under the Genocide Convention. 7
6
Thus in these cases the interpretation and implementation of a universal
norm-the prohibition against genocide-was informed and assisted by a
consideration of the specific cultural context in which a potential genocide
occurred. Conceivably, the Tribunal could have adopted a rigid, radical
universalist view that only ethnic groups as defined by objective western
sociologists would meet the definition under the Genocide Convention.
Instead, the Tribunal correctly recognized the fluidity of culture and context,
and did justice to the real-world experience of the Rwandan Tutsis.'7
3. Sentencing Practices
As discussed supra, the lack of a death penalty option at the ICTR was one
reason that the Rwandan government voted against the establishment of the
Tribunal. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of the ICTR sentencing
structure that are more sensitive to the Rwandan culture and judicial system.
Specifically, Article 23 of the ICTR Statute states that "[t]he penalty imposed
by the trial chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms
of imprisonment, the trial chamber shall have recourse to the general practice
regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda."'' 8
This again reflects a form of mild cultural relativism, in this instance built
into the ICTR Statute itself. Under this provision, two people, one in Rwanda
and one in Yugoslavia, could commit the exact same act with the exact same
mens rea, and both be found guilty of the same crime. However, if the
sentencing practices in Rwanda (which presumably reflect Rwandan cultural
preferences) were harsher than those of Yugoslavia, 79 the Rwandan defendant
176. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 1374-77 (emphasis added); but see CHUTER, supra note
22, at 84-88 (criticizing the ICTR's finding of genocide as a political decision that ultimately weakens the
legal definition of the crime); see also id. at 87 ("[i]n the period when the Genocide Convention was drafted
... it was generally assumed that 'nations' were genetically different from each other ... [Also, at that time]
ethnic groups were supposed to be primordial entities rigidly and permanently distinguished from each other.
More recently, as the debates about ethnicity have grown more complex, it is becoming clear that it is a
variable concept, constructed often by elites for their own benefit."). Thus while Chuter argues, perhaps
correctly, that "[t]his is not... what the 'crime of crimes' was supposed to be like [in the 1940s]," he
concedes that he is describing the initial western race science conception of the crime. Id.
177. Akayesu, 557 n.130. Similarly, the ICTR held that with respect to the crime of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, the "direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its
cultural and linguistic content. Id. Indeed, a particular speech may be perceived as 'direct' in one country,
and not so in another, depending on the audience.... On this subject, see above, in the findings of the
Chamber on Evidentiary Matters, the developments pertaining to the [expert] analysis of the Kinyarwanda
language..I.." Id.
178. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 105, art. 23 (emphasis added).
179. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
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could receive a harsher sentence for the same act. This might seem unfair to the
individual defendant, but a contrary result would arguably ignore the needs of
Rwandan victims to see justice done in a way that accords with their cultural
expectations.
A specific example of the ICTR's sentencing practice helps to illustrate the
point. In The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, the accused, a Belgian journalist
who moved to Rwanda and broadcast discriminatory and threatening remarks
against the Tutsis and others on Rwandan radio, pled guilty to incitement to
commit genocide. 8° During sentencing, the Tribunal noted Article 23's
requirement that it take Rwandan sentencing practices into account.' Under
Rwandan domestic law, perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity are
grouped into categories. Category one offenders are those who were "among
planners, organizers, supervisors and leaders" of the genocide, persons who
"acted in positions of authority," or "[n]otorious murderers" who "distinguished
themselves" "by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they
committed atrocities.' ' 2 Category two offenders are those whose acts "place
them among the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional
homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death."'8 3 Under
Rwandan law, the mandatory sentence for persons found guilty of category one
offenses is the death penalty, and for persons in category two it is life
imprisonment.' However, persons in category two or below can have their
sentence reduced by entering a plea of guilty.8 5
The Tribunal concluded that Ruggiu would most likely fall under category
two in the Rwandan system. The trial chamber then noted that, under Rwandan
law, those who pled guilty after prosecution for a category two offense receive
twelve to fifteen years in prison. 6 The Tribunal also noted, however, that it
was not required to conform to Rwandan sentencing practice, but was merely
obliged to "take account" of that practice. 7 "[W]hile the Chamber will refer
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art. 24, delivered to the Security Council, Annex, Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,1993) (containing an identical
provision to the governing statute for the ICTY requiring that in imposing sentence, that body "shall have
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.").
180. Prosecutor v. Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence (2000); see also
Wisotsky, supra note 148.
181. See Ruggiu, 127.
182. Id. 128.
183. Id. Category three offenders are those guilty of "other serious assaults against the person," and
category four offenses are those who "committed offenses against property." Id.
184. Id. 29.
185. Id. 130.
186. Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I41 30.
187. Id. 31.
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as much as practicable to the sentencing provisions under the [Rwandan] law,
it will also exercise its unfettered discretion to determine sentences.... ,,8
In considering the appropriate sentence for Mr. Ruggiu, the trial chamber
noted that "[t]he accused is a European with a moderate level of education, who
is inspired by a sense ofjustice."'89 The trial chamber also stated that
[d]efence counsel submitted that the accused was indoctrinated by a
biased picture of the socio-political situation in Rwanda. The
Chamber takes into account that the accused was not sufficiently
knowledgeable to be able to make informed assessments of the
situation... [T]he accused was a person of good character imbued
with ideals before he became involved in the events in Rwanda."9
The trial chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to two twelve-year sentences, to
be served concurrently. 9 '
The trial chamber was correct to conform Mr. Ruggiu's sentence to
Rwandan sentencing practices. However, the chamber's references to Ruggiu's
European background and seeming corruption by his visits to Rwanda are
deeply troubling. This language implies that the chamber was more lenient
with the defendant on the theory that, as a European, Mr. Ruggiu is the product
of a more just culture.'92 If true, this would be a gross mistake. Perhaps this is
an example where one positive cultural relativist notion (Rwandan victims
deserve sentencing consistent with their own cultural notions of justice)
balanced a negative cultural relativist notion (Europeans are more just and less
violent than Rwandans) to arrive at a sentence that, though light, was at least
consistent with Rwanda's own sentencing practices.'93
V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
At first glance, there would appear to be little room for cultural relativism
with regard to war crimes. Indeed, in responding to a particular situation,
188. Id.
189. Id. 162.
190. Id. 163,67.
191. See Riggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, at Part IV.
192. The judges who issued this judgement and Sentence were Presiding Judge Navanethem Pillay
of South Africa, Judge Erik Mose of Norway, and Judge Pavel Dolenc of Slovenia; see Riggiu, Press Release,
Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, New Compositoin of Trial Chambers (June 7, 1999), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREII1999/188.htrn.
193. But cf. Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An
Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 53 (2001) (evaluating the
sentencing practices of the ICTR and ICTY and concluding that in general these bodies were not giving
enough weight to Rwandan and Yugoslav sentencing practices).
[Vol. 12:1
international actors-particularly those from the West-should never ignore or
minimize these crimes simply because they occurred in a culture dissimilar to
our own. Thus claims for dissimilar treatment in war crimes prosecution on the
basis of culture should be treated with caution, particularly with regards to
Africa. The international community could easily hide its own neglect, or
regime elites could hide their abuses, behind a veil of cultural sensitivity.
Therefore, because the trend appears to be for the prosecution of war crimes by
international tribunals, these tribunals should apply to persons of all cultures
equally.
However, there is also room for caution. The establishment of the ICTR
by the U.N. Security Council probably went too far in embracing universal
values at the expense of the true needs of the Rwandan people. Specifically,
certain aspects of the Tribunal's statute appeared to contradict Rwandan notions
ofjustice. The absence of the death penalty, for example, raised the specter of
moral imperialism, especially in light of the fact that those found guilty at
Nuremberg were given the death penalty.94 Generally, the establishment of the
Tribunal over the opposition of the post-genocidal government will do very
little to further the rule of law in Rwanda or to assist in building the capacity
of the Rwandan judicial system.
As discussed supra, the ICTR has tried in its operations to strike a balance
between universalism and cultural relativism concerns. Nevertheless, the
Tribunal has not "made real contact with the populace affected by [its]
proceedings. [It is] perceived as distant and unconcerned with the effect of [its]
activities upon victims."' 95 The very fact that the Tribunal is struggling with
these difficulties should warn us against rushing to establish international
tribunals that will apply international law without prior input from or
knowledge about the affected culture. Judge Wald reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the ICTY:
My experience with the inner workings of an international court
suggests care. With careful self and public scrutiny, such courts can
responsibly perform important adjudication and accountability
functions that national courts in the thrall of leaders who are
194. See MORRiS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 5. If the United Nations strongly believes that the
imposition of the death penalty violates modem international norms of justice (or, put in cultural relativism
terms, that the death penalty is not a cultural value or is not a value worthy of international recognition), then
one possibility might have been to negotiate assistance that would have provided more long-term capacity
building for the Rwandan judicial system in exchange for the abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda's
domestic criminal law. Id. Of course, this solution would likely have met resistance from other members of
the United Nations who continue to impose the death penalty in their own domestic systems. Id.
195. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 192.
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themselves alleged war criminals cannot. However, they should be
reserved for just such extreme situations.196
At the time the Tribunal was established, Rwanda was no longer governed
by its previous genocidal government. Of course, Rwanda did need inter-
national assistance, and badly. Moreover, the presence of international judges
and other legal personnel can have a beneficial effect on war crimes prosecu-
tions. For example, "the presence of international judges can help to a) educate
local judges on international law and minimal standards of fairness, b) create
an impression of impartiality, and c) insulate local judges to some degree
against intimidation from their own governments....,19 Thus international
involvement in these situations can be useful and should not be completely
rejected. Nonetheless, in the case of the ICTR, it would have been better to
seek a compromise such that the Tribunal would have involved more
participation by Rwandans and better consideration of Rwandan needs.
Hybrid courts, or courts which have aspects of both international and
national courts, likely reflect the best balance between universalism and cultural
relativism concerns in this respect.' 98 Hybrid models have several advantages
over pure international models. They are generally cheaper to establish and
operate, and-key to the cultural relativism debate-they are "considered to be
politically less divisive, more meaningful to victim populations, and more
effective at rebuilding local justice systems."' 99 In addition, because hybrid
courts typically consist of both domestic and foreign judges, local judges may
be able to explain relevant cultural norms to their international colleagues, thus
lessening the need for costly and time consuming expert witness testimony and
decreasing the chance of error in interpreting cultural norms.
For example, the hybrid special court for Sierra Leone is prosecuting those
who allegedly committed war crimes in that country's civil war.200 The Sierra
Leone Tribunal differs from the ICTR model in several respects:
196. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 47, at 117-18.
197. See Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 194.
198. See, e.g., Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 47, at 118 ("[1] am happy to
see the newer proposed U.N. tribunals relying more on tribunals located closer to the countries involved and
composed in part, at least, ofjurists from these countries.").
199. Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searchingfor Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 245, 246 (2003).
200. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); see also Udombana, supra note
32, at 56; see generally Nancy Kaymar Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra Leone, 10 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMI. L. 117, 120 (2003) (estimating that between 100,000 and 200,000 people died during the ten-year
civil war beginning in 199 1).
[Vol. 12:1
Bostian
1) It is based on a treaty between the U.N. and Sierra Leone, as
opposed to the ICTY and ICTR which were established
pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII powers;
2) The Special Court has the ability to consider not only violations
of international humanitarian law, but also certain crimes under
Sierra Leonean domestic law;
3) While it has primacy over domestic prosecutions in Sierra
Leone, it lacks primacy over national courts of third party states;
and
4) Most importantly for our purposes, "unlike the ICTY and ICTR;
which are composed exclusively of international judges elected
by the U.N. General Assembly and a Prosecutor selected by the
Security Council, the Special Court is ... composed of both
international and Sierra Leoneanjudges, prosecutors, and staff.
1,201
More specifically, of the three judges who sit in each trial chamber of the
special court, one is appointed by Sierra Leone and two are appointed by the
U.N. Secretary General. Of the five judges who serve in the appeals chamber,
two are appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone and three by the
Secretary General. 2 The Sierra Leone government can, but is not required to,
appoint judges from Sierra Leone. 3 The Secretary General also appoints the
prosecutor for a four-year term 2 °4 who shall be independent from any govern-
ment, but the deputy prosecutor must be a Sierra Leonean.0 5 The prosecutor
may also have other Sierra Leonean or international staff.2 6 Thus the special
court is more inclusive than the ICTR in several respects, thereby recognizing
the value of participation by those most affected by the crimes under its
jurisdiction.
201. Udombana, supra note 32, at 84; see also Stafford, supra note 202, at 126.
202. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 86; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Annex art. 2, Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
203. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 88 (noting that the Sierra Leonean government's first
appointments consisted of one Sierra Leonean judge for the trial chamber, and one Sierra Leonan judge and
one judge from the United Kingdom for the appeals chamber); see also Press Release, The Security-General,
U.N., Appointments to Sierra Leone Special Court, U.N. Doc. SG/A/8/3 AFR/444 (July 26,2002), available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sga8l3.doc.htm.
204. See Udombana, supra note 32, at 90. (David Crane of the United States was appointed as the
Special Court's first Prosecutor in May 2002.).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Another advantage of the Special Court is the fact that it is located in
Sierra Leone.2"7 There are significant advantages to having the court on site:
it gives the Court better and timelier access to witnesses and evidence, makes
site visits possible without long delays in the trials, and may make victims and
witnesses more comfortable when testifying.20 8 It can also help strengthen the
legal system in Sierra Leone, by giving the government significant involvement
in the establishment and administration of the court, as well as by leaving
behind the actual physical structure of the court-no small matter in one of the
poorest countries in the world.209 In addition, it will give the local population
greater access to the court's proceedings, and allow local journalists to provide
current updates in native languages.2"'
Of course, a purely international tribunal could also be located within the
country where the crimes occurred, so this is not an inherent advantage of
hybrid courts over the ICTY/ICTR model. Nonetheless, the location of a court
in the country of origin reflects an important improvement in terms of the
universalism/cultural relativism debate; it allows the local population to accept
the court as part of the local culture, and it helps to lessen the perception of
outsider justice and moral imperialism while still involving the international
community in the process. The inclusion of domestic crimes within the court's
mandate should also be an advantage in this respect, as these laws may reflect
local culture more directly and fully than do purely international norms.
Of course, hybrid courts are not a panacea for all of the problems inherent
in war crimes prosecutions. Because of the participation of international
judges, hybrid courts will inevitably have the same language and translation
difficulties that plague any international tribunal.21' In addition, since hybrid
courts are more likely to apply a mixture of international and national law, they
will need to interpret domestic law correctly-a task with which the ICTR has
apparently had some difficulty.2" 2 Of course, the risk of error should be
lessened by the presence of at least some judges from the affected country on
the court, but these judges may have to take extra care monitoring the work of
their international colleagues.
It could also be argued that the inclusion of local judges on hybrid courts
will make the proceedings more biased (either in favor of or against the
defendants) and thus less likely to achieve legitimacy with the local or
207. Id. at 128.
208. Id.
209. Udombana, supra note 32, at 128.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Tom Briody, Defending War Crimes in Africa: The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone,
CHAMPION, Jan. - Feb. 2005 at 34. Cf. CHUrER, supra, note 22, at 207, 217.
212. See, e.g., Morris, Rwandan Justice, supra note 128, at 352-53.
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international communities.' 3 Or, put in the context of the cultural relativism
debate, the inclusion of local judges could further (or be perceived as
furthering) negative aspects of the local culture. This argument might have
extra force where, as in Rwanda, local judges would almost inevitably be a
member of one of the disputing racial or ethnic groups. However, this problem
would also be inherent in any domestic tribunal, and thus the presence of
international judges on hybrid courts should reduce any perceived or real bias.
Perhaps this is also a good reason to have a majority of the judges come from
or be appointed by third countries, as is the case with the special court for
Sierra Leone.
Hybrid courts have also suffered from funding difficulties, e.g., the Sierra
Leone Special Court was to be funded by voluntary contributions, a problematic
approach that can lead to serious budget shortfalls.2"4 However, this is not a
problem inherent in the hybrid system, and the ICTR and ICTY have also had
funding struggles. Rather, it reflects that fact that any court, in order to be
successful, must be given the resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. The
funding problem does, however, reflect the fact that more needs to be done to
convince the international community of the advantages of the hybrid system.
Although it may not look as inherently international as some tribunals (and thus
the international community may be more tempted to say "it's not our con-
cern")-in reality the hybrid model reflects a wise compromise between the
international and domestic systems, and is probably a better way for the
international community to spend its money.
The existence of the ICC does not moot the issue. Although the ICC will,
undoubtedly, be an important factor in war crimes prosecutions, due to various
factors (especially the resistance of the United States to the court) it appears
unlikely that it will become the sole international body to prosecute war crimes
in the foreseeable future.21 5 Thus hybrid tribunals may have an important
213. See Stafford, supra note 202, at 140.
214. See e.g., id. at 138-39.
215. In this regard, the United States took a very positive step when it did not veto the Security
Council's referral of war crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. See Press Release, Security Council,
U.N. Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31,2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/SC8351 .doc.htm; see
generally S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). However, it is unlikely that this signals
a major U.S. policy change toward the ICC. Not only has the U.S. government declared its intention never
to become a party to the ICC Statute, it has also taken various measures to weaken the court. See Letter from
John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y of State for Arms Control and Int'l Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to Gen. Kofi
Annan, Sec'y Gen., U.N. (May 6, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep't of State), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. These measures have included:
1) Pursing bilateral "Article 98" agreements-which prevent the surrender of any
American to the ICC-all over the world;
2) Enacting the American Servicemembers Protection Act, which, inter alia,
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role to play, and should be considered in any instance where the ICC can not or
does not assume jurisdiction over international crimes.
Nevertheless, the ICC will likely be a major force in the future of war
crimes punishments, and it should be aware of universalism/cultural relativism
issues as it pursues its mandate. As a pure international court, the ICC may
inherently tilt too far toward radical universalism ideas, as with the ICTR.2 16
However, because it is a treaty body, at some point the affected local govern-
ment (or the government of the defendant) will have agreed to its jurisdiction,
thus, hopefully, representing some consent by the local culture.217 In addition,
unlike the ICTR, which can require any national court to relinquish jurisdiction
over a defendant under its mandate, 18 the Rome Statute provides that cases will
be admissible only if national justice systems are "unwilling or unable
genuinely" to investigate or prosecute.219 In terms of the universalism/cultural
largely prohibits any U.S. court or agency from cooperating with the ICC and
requires the United States to cut off military assistance to ICC members who
have not signed an Article 98 agreement;
3) Enacting-as part of the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act-the
"Nethercutt Amendment," which prohibits peacekeeping and democracy-
building assistance to any country that is a party to the ICC but has not signed
an Article 98 Agreement; and
4) Blocking Security Council peacekeeping action until receiving assurances that
the ICC would not investigate or seek custody over peacekeepers from non-
state parties.
See American Servicemembers Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7433 (2005) (restricing U.S. accession
to the ICC); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-447, §574, 118 Stat. 2809, 3027-28
(2004) (limiting economic support to foreign governments that are a party to the ICC); S.C. Res. 1497, 7,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003) (delaying peacekeeping mission in Liberia until the United States
received a permanent exemption from ICC jurisdiction for non-state parties); S.C. Res. 1502, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1 502 (Aug. 26, 2003) (refusing to support a resolution condemning violence against humanitarian aid
workers in Iraq and elsewhere until references to the criminalization of these acts in the ICC Statute were
removed); Philip T. Reeker, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 25, 2003), available
at http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A2=indO3O8d&l=dosbrief&D=I &O=D&F=&S=
&P=255; Press Release, Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, Alternative Rep. to the U.N. for Special
Political
Affairs, Remarks at U.N. Headquarters on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 19, 2002) (on file
with the U.S. Mission to the U.N.), available at http://www.un.intusa/02_081.htm. (opposing the extension
of the U.N. mandate in Bosnia unless international peacekeepers were given immunity from ICC
prosecution); The American Non-Governmental Org. Coal. for the Int'l Criminal Court, Bilateral Immunity
Agreements (2002), http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration'-oficy-BIAs.html#recent (noting 92 Article
98 agreements signed as of July 13, 2004).
216. Note, for example, that unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is not required to take local
sentencing practices into account. See Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note
41, at 598.
217. See Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 12.
218. See Morris, Rwandan Justice, supra note 128, at 354.
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 17.
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relativism debate, this is an improvement, and should allow the court to avoid
many of the pitfalls that other international tribunals have encountered. Most
importantly, it gives the country affected the chance to implement justice
according to local customs and norms, yet it still gives the ICC the opportunity
to assume jurisdiction if the local efforts are nonexistent or merely sham
proceedings.
Finally, the ICC can strike the proper balance between universalism and
cultural relativism concerns by "working with local governments to get their
systems in shape rather than merely fighting off their efforts to resist ICC
jurisdiction.""22 The ICC can also work in conjunction with hybrid tribunals-
at least one scholar has proposed the establishment ofjoint initiatives between
the ICC and national or hybrid courts. 2 ' Finally, where it does assume
jurisdiction, the ICC can and should follow the lead of the ICTR in recognizing
and taking into account cultural differences when they arise.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, judges and others involved in international war crimes
prosecutions must be aware of the dangers of both radical universalism and
radical cultural relativism. They should attempt to strike a balance that will
recognize legitimate cultural differences-particularly when those differences
may make it more difficult to uncover the truth about what occurred-but
without ignoring the danger of using cultural relativism as a shield behind
which to hide atrocities. A mild cultural relativism approach is the best way to
accomplish these goals. This approach applauds the involvement of the
international community in war crimes prosecutions, regardless of the identity
of the victims. However, this approach also recognizes the value of cultural
sensitivity and encourages the international community to understand and work
with the culture of those whom it seeks to judge. The best balance can be
struck by establishing hybrid tribunals and/or by international tribunals
exercising jurisdiction only where the domestic courts are unable or unwilling
to do so. By following this approach, the international community can further
the cause of universal justice without alienating the very people it is designed
to serve.
220. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 32, at 194.
221. See Stafford, supra note 202, at 137-38.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Allied-overseen Nuremberg Trials in 1945, the legal measures
pursued by nations negotiating political transition and responding to the human
rights abuses of prior regimes ("transitional justice")' are subject to examination
by the watchful eye of the international community and international standards.2
Despite the development of a "universalizing" rule of law, the subsequent
interplay of internationalist and nationalist responses to transition reveal a
continuing tension between the Nuremberg model of retribution and appeals for
J.D./Master of Theological Studies dual degree candidate, May 2006, Duke University School
of Law and Duke Divinity School; B.A., Brown University, 2001.
1. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARv. HUm. RTS. J. 69 (2003).
2. See id. at 73 ("The period immediately following World War II was the heyday of international
justice. The critical turn away from the prior nationalist transitional responses and toward an internationalist
policy was thought to guarantee rule of law.").
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amnesty.3 Lately, as nations have sought a middle ground between retributive
justice and a "comprehensive policy of official amnesia,"4 truth commissions
have emerged as an increasingly popular model of restorative justice in times
of transition.' Whether confronting human rights abuses committed during
liberation conflicts6 or resulting from prior military regimes,7 the primary motif
of truth commissions is to narrate individual stories and acknowledge abuses
within the framework of a "jurisprudence of forgiveness and reconciliation"'
that abstracts discrete, local events into universally applicable themes. 9
Of these truth commissions, the chief model capturing the imagination of
the global community is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC).' ° The lion's share of the scholarship that exists concerning South
Africa's TRC revolves around its value as a form of restorative justice that
3. See id at 76 ("The profound and permanent significance of the Nuremberg model is that by
defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has become the standard by which all subsequent
transitional justice debates are framed. Whereas the [post-Nuremberg jurisprudence] simply assumed the
legitimacy of punishing human rights abuses, [in later years,] the tension between punishment and amnesty
was complicated by the recognition of dilemmas inherent in periods of political flux.").
4. John P. McCormick, Book Review, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 111 (1999)
(reviewing David Dyzenhaus, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE
APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998)).
5. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,436
n.509 (2002) ("[T]ruth commissions have been established in countries including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Philippines, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Uganda, and Uruguay."); Erin
Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERsP. 73, 76-77
("Because truth commissions eschew both criminal prosecution on the one hand and blanket amnesty on the
other, they are often referred to as a 'middle path' or 'third course' or 'golden mean."'); Carrie J. Niebur
Eisnaugle, Note, An International Truth Commission: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to
Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,224 (2003) ("Since [Argentina's creation of a truth commission
after its defeat in the Falkland Islands war,] more than 20 truth commissions have existed around the world
in the past 20 years.").
6. See Daly, supra note 5, at 77 ("[Tlhe Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was carefully
designed to attend to the particular ills that characterized South Africa at the end of the apartheid era.").
7. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 277, 288 (1998) ("The truth commission for Argentina 4the National Commission for
the Disappeared was set up by President Raul Alfonsin in 1983 after the fall of the military junta and was
able to carry out thorough investigations into torture and disappearances.").
8. Teitel, supra note 1, at 81.
9. See id. at 81-82 ("The truth and reconciliation project incorporated much of its normative
discourse from outside the law, specifically from ethics, medicine, and theology ... Both political activism
and scholarship sought to move outside contemporary politics and history to represent conflict in timeless and
universal terms.") (emphasis added).
10. See Daly, supra note 5, at 77 ("While there have been truth commissions in the past, none has
been as successful or has garnered as much international attention as South Africa's,"); id. at 112 ("[T]he
international response to the TRC suggests that it, more than any other recent experiment in transitional
justice, is the beacon to which other emerging nations are looking.") (emphasis added).
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emphasizes ideological virtues dujour such as reconciliation, 1" communitarian
values, 12 or confession.'" In overwhelming measure, these reports rely on this
significant baseline assumption: South Africa's TRC was a success.14 This
article proposes that a critical gap 5 exists between the ideological weight that
the TRC carries within the international community and the political realities
initiating and controlling the TRC's development.
In establishing a productive critique of South Africa's experience with the
TRC, this article seeks to penetrate past pure ideology to ask whether, in fact,
South Africa's story is a wholly successful one, and to question the merit of its
development into an international metanarrative. Through a more critical lens
with which to view the TRC and truth commissions in general, it becomes
possible to properly review the situation of other nations, such as Rwanda, who
are attempting to borrow pages from South Africa's now-universalized
narrative. Truth commissions may be the cinderella of international law's
transitional justice models, but demythologizing the responses to civil conflict
and ethnic unrest in Africa requires a look at the political realities that informed
each country's choice to move toward restorative or punitive justice. 6
11. See Mark A. Druimbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U L. REV. 1221, 1268 (2000) ("National reconciliation and individual rehabilitation are facilitated by
acknowledging the suffering of victims and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing
victims to tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire country, and imparting to the
citizenry a sense of dignity and empowerment that could help them move beyond the pain of the past.")
(citation omitted).
12. Id. at 1270 (describing how truth commissions may respond to mass human rights violations
by "offering individual therapy, solidarity with other survivors, a dramaturgical recovery system, and, in the
end, group catharsis") (citation omitted).
13. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 83 (suggesting that truth commissions created a "move from the
courtroom to the hearing room and [a] turn to discursive confessional testimonials" which "tended to eschew
judgment and instead aimed to move beyond legal notions of guilt and responsibility").
14. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 5, at 112 ("[T]he TRC ... demonstrate[d] that values other than
retributive justice can and should be promoted during times of transition... However, the TRC's success in
South Africa does nothing to predict the success of other TRCs elsewhere."); Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1268
("Although certainly not without its criticisms and controversies, the overall evaluation of the TRC has been
a positive one"); Donald W. Shriver, Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or Antagonistic
Servants of Public Justice?, 16J.L &RELIGION 1, 16 (2001) ("One of the great services of the South African
TRC to the formation of a new national political culture was its back-and-forth dialogue between victims and
perpetrators ... "); Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224 ("Out of all the truth commissions that have operated since
the surge began, South Africa's TRC has emerged as the best example of restorative justice ideals and
practices on a national level.").
15. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 85 ("Existing scholarship has not yet captured the prevailing dynamic
of transitional justice or its nexus with ongoing political change.").
16. See Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes Towards a More
Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 95 (2003) ("[T]here is no guarantee that what
worked in one country will be appropriate in another country with dramatically different social, political and
cultural assumptions.").
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In Part I, this article outlines the background to South Africa's TRC, and
subsequently critiques the prevailing international perspective on South Africa
as a successful model of the restorative justice ideology. By contrast, this article
argues that the animating principles for the Commission were political, rather
than ideological. Part II provides a brief outline of the TRCs structure, and sub-
sequently develops an intellectual history for the birth of the TRC as a restora-
tive justice metanarrative. Here, the discussion seeks to illustrate how the
reconciliation myth at the heart of the South African experience is precisely
that-a myth that resonates for a newly globalized community that is increas-
ingly responsive in a categorical way to restorative justice. In analytical
partnership with Part II, Part III examines the fundamental premises of truth
commissions, and in particular, the usefulness of past-oriented, confessional
methods of response to political transition. In particular, this portion of the
article engages with the most recent sociological scholarship and legal theory
to militate against the notion of revisiting the past as an ideological end and a
productive means of transitional justice. Finally, Part IV examines the current
situation in post-genocide Rwanda as a relevant case study. After providing
background to the human rights abuses in Rwanda, this article examines
Rwanda's present attempt at developing a Gacaca court system from the
rehabilitated critical lens of the South African experience.
11. CRITIQUING THE METANARRATIVE
A. Apartheid and Background to South Africa's TRC
A contextual understanding of South Africa's TRC requires a close exa-
mination of the definitive features of apartheid, a policy of "racial separateness"
that broadly distinguished "whites" ("Europeans") from "non-whites" ("non-
Europeans"), with the latter category encompassing the racial labels of
"African" (black), "colored," and "Indian."' 7 Unlike human rights abuses in
other countries or generations, apartheid was "a system of oppression that was
defined by law."' 8 The underlying push of apartheid was not the result of a mob
culture, unsupported by dominant governmental entities. Rather, with the elec-
tion victory of D.F. Malan and the Nationalist Party in 1948,'9 South Africa's
primary civil structures began to serve as a buttress for human rights abuses.2"
17. RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANsITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 4 (2000).
18. Daly, supra note 5, at 113.
19. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17.
20. See Daly, supra note 5, at 114 ("A strong legal framework, including all branches of
government, succeeding constitutions, and a vast array of laws duly passed by Parliament, supported this
[Vol, 12:41
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Ultimately, under the parliamentary sovereignty that typified the apartheid era,
members who were unrepresentative of the non-white majority2 could exercise
essentially unlimited power to enact laws which generated profoundly
oppressive measures against South African blacks.22
The political roots of apartheid have a deep historical reach, and for that
reason, understanding the development of the TRC requires examining how
oppressive ideals reified through the passage of time. During the period of
British occupation of South African territory in the early nineteenth century,
policies of separation became pervasive: blacks were segregated in their living
environments, places of employment, and education; political participation by
the black majority was forbidden or stymied by the white minority in power;
property ownership was largely only a possibility for whites.23 Moreover, when
the country's first parliament formed in 1910, enacted legislation continued to
reinforce the policy of inequity, including the passage of the Natives Land Act
of 1913, which precluded blacks from land transactions and paved the way
toward both political and practical dispossession of the black majority.24
Although South Africa's early colonial period nurtured a culture of racial
inequity, apartheid came to a head in legislative terms after the Nationalist Party
(NP) gained power in the mid-twentieth century. In a single decade
(1950-1959), laws were enacted to register every South African as a member
of a specific racial group,26 force black Africans to carry passes,27 restrict the
system of oppression."). However, while apartheid was not a haphazard system of government, its execution
was not without difficulty. Id. See KENNETH CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 21 (2000)
("[Apartheid] was a policy which saw many internal struggles and contradictions; it was revised over and over
again and these uncertainties, conflicts, failures and deviations, although often less visible than the continuities
and triumphs of Apartheid, were fundamental to its development.").
21. Daly, supranote 5, at 114.
22. See id. (observing that these legislated oppressions included: racial registration laws,
segregation laws, dispossession laws, removal laws, pass laws, suppression of expression and assembly laws,
detention laws, disenfranchisement laws, dis-employment laws, dis-education laws, anti-miscegenation laws,
and anti-injunction laws).
23. Cassandra Fox Charles, Truth v. Justice: Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Apartheid South
Africa, 5 ST. MARY'S L. REV ON MINORITY ISSUEs 81, 85 (2002).
24. Id.; see CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 12 ("[The] Land Act of 1913 ... limited black ownership
to 13 per cent of the country.").
25. See SPITz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 4 ("The National Party government's objective was
to make South Africa a country run by whites for whites only, and particularly for those of Afrikaner descent.
Its intentions, as well as the extent to which it sought to reserve the power of enforcement to the executive,
were quickly laid bare by its enactment of a series of laws.").
26. See id. ("The Population Registration Act of 1950 provided for the compilation of a register of
the entire population, designed to allocate every person in South Africa to a particular racial group.").
27. See id. ("[The Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952,] contrary to the
apparent meaning of its title, required all black Africans to carry detailed 'reference books', commonly known
as 'passes'.").
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right of black Africans to live in white urban areas,28 create separate political
and educational structures, 29 establish racially exclusive residential locations,3"
and prevent non-white South Africans from voting.3 Moreover, not only did
the National Party enact legislation to perpetuate apartheid, they also worked to
prevent opposition to the new legal measures.32 For example, the Internal
Security Act of 1950 prohibited listed individuals and organizations from pro-
moting "ideologies and activities opposed to white domination or apartheid."33
The likeminded Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 punished civil
disobedience with a three-year prison sentence.34 These and similar enactments
stymied the possibility of effective opposition by the African National Congress
(ANG) and other organizations critical of the apartheid legislation.35
Through the next thirty years, the political tension surrounding the issue
of apartheid increased steadily as the Nationalist Party sought to suppress an
increasingly violent reaction against apartheid, buttressed separatist policies,
and initiated only cosmetic reforms (which were largely enacted for economic
reasons).3 6 In particular, when H. F. Verwoerd served as the Prime Minister of
South Africa from 1958 to 1966, the tenor of apartheid resistance shifted toward
violence.37 After the police shot and killed sixty-nine people and wounded 180
others during what was intended to be a peaceful protest in March 1960 at
Sharpeville (the "Sharpeville massacre"), both the African National Congress
and the Pan Africanist Congress moved their organizations underground38 and
28. See id. ("Section 10 of the Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act of 1952 restricted the right of
blacks to live in the white urban areas to those who had been born there, those who had lived there
continuously for fifteen years, and those who had worked continuously for the same employer for ten years.").
29. Id. ("[The Nationalist Party tried] to resuscitate tribal forms of political authority in the
'reserves' . . . in the hope that black political and other aspirations could be accommodated there. Meanwhile
the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which transferred the responsibility for the administration of black education
to the Department of Native Affairs, initiated the establishment of separate education systems for whites and
blacks .... ').
30. See SpiTz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 4-5 ("The Group Areas Act of 1950 provided that
areas not already set aside for blacks could be made racially exclusive--with the adverse impact borne by
coloreds and Indians, who were forced to live in wretched and overcrowded locations.").
31. See id. at 5 ("In 1956 the government disenfranchised coloreds in the Cape, thereby removing
the last vestige of non-white political participation.").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. SPrrz & CtASALSON, supra note 17, at 5.
36. See id. at 9 ("The Nationalists came to recognize the economy's dependence on black labor, and
began a course of limited reforms designed to bring black workers into the state's economic infrastructure.").
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. Both organizations were banned by the government under the Unlawful Organizations Act
of 1960. Id at 7.
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created military wings.39 For many moderates, the 1960s ushered in a forcible
awareness that non-violent resistance may have gained the movement
international sympathy, but little substantive change.,
Although hostility between the two camps increased throughout the 1970s,
the Nationalist government successfully thwarted any active form of armed
rebellion through a series of authoritarian measures geared to sustain the
apartheid regime. 1 Under Verwoerd, the ideological voice behind the apartheid
state, the homeland system was created, which further reified racial segrega-
tion.42 The homeland process forced millions of blacks to exchange their South
African citizenship for citizenship specific to a homeland. 43 In creating home-
lands in the reserves, the government hoped to "absorb 'economically
superfluous' blacks" while allowing economically "'useful' blacks to remain
in the cities (although often in poverty)."
The development of the homeland system accentuated an intensifying rift
between those who were otherwise united against apartheid. In particular, the
liberation movement was divided with regard to whether dialogue with the
ruling civil power structures was necessary or productive.45 While Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the KwaZulu territory argued that participation in the
national political structures could prevent black homelands from being cast
aside with an unwanted independence and blacks from being stripped of their
South African citizenship, the ANC criticized his stance, arguing that
Buthelezi's Inkatha movement merely supported the political fiction of a
productive yet separate development.' The rift within the resistance movement
diverged most notably after the Soweto Uprising in June 1976.4' Largely the
product of a reaction against the mandate of Afrikaans as the language for state
education in black schools, a dramatically unsuccessful rebellion occurred in
which hundreds of protesters were killed and thousands injured or exiled.4" In
39. SPrrz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 7.
40. Id.
41. CHRIsTIE, supra note 20, at 27 ("[B]y the mid 1970s the armed struggle in South Africa had to
all intents and purposes ground to a halt. Little was seen or heard of the ANC during this period.").
42. SPITZ & CHAsKALSoN, supra note 17.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting an unnamed source).
45. See id. at 8 ("Several of the homelands, though slow to release themselves from Pretoria's
shackles, became progressively less subservient to the South African government and more interested in
bringing about an end to the apartheid system to which they owed their status. Others attempted to prop up
the system and their role in it.").
46. Id.
47. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 8-9.
48. Id. at8.
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the wake of the uprising, the resistance movement found itself at an internal
crossroads: while Buthelezi believed that black lives were needlessly wasted in
the attempt, the ANC emerged adamant to engage in a resuscitated armed
struggle.49 Indeed, until and throughout the formal negotiations between the
resistance leaders and the South African government in 1990, Nelson Mandela,
the deputy president of the ANC, affirmed that armed struggle was a legitimate
form of self-defense when confronted with morally repugnant government
structures." The division within the resistance merely underscores the
complexity of South Africa's political terrain during the grand apartheid years.
In the final decade of apartheid, although the Nationalist government
enacted a series of superficial reforms in response to a growing realization of
South Africa's economic dependence on the black population,5 those measures
could not conceal the increasingly apparent failures of the separatist system.
Acknowledging that South Africa had to "'adapt or die,"' P.W. Botha
inaugurated policies from the late 1970s into the 1980s that purported to
encourage "a united South Africa, with one citizenship and a universal
franchise,"52 but the developed measures merely perpetuated the existing
system. For example, although the 1983 Constitution created a tricameral
Parliament with distinct chambers for coloreds and Indians, these chambers
remained subordinate to the largely white President's Council.53 Likewise,
although some of the most egregious apartheid measures were repealed,
including prohibitions on mixed marriages and segregation on public
transportation, the ruling minority still denied the black majority the opportunity
for full rights. 4
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. See Peter N. Bouckaert, Note, The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa's Transition to a
Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 375, 386 (1997) ("I am in prison as the representative of the
people and your organization, the African National Congress, which was banned. What freedom am I being
offered while the organization of the people remains banned?... Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners
cannot enter into contracts.") cited in SHEIDAN JoHNS & R. HUNT DAVIS, MANDELA, TAMBO, AND THE
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: TiE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 1948-1990 at 215 (1991).
51. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 9 ("The Nationalists came to recognize the
economy's dependence on black labor, and began a course of limited reforms designed to bring black workers
into the state's economic infrastructure. Yet they never considered granting full political rights to blacks.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 10.
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The South Africa of 1985-1990 was in a perpetual state of emergency.55
Politically, the constitutional structure of South Africa and the demands of
popular will were at odds.56 Less than 20 percent of South Africa's population
could engage in the democratic political game, and a robust form of judicial
review was consistently rejected by the ruling party in South Africa throughout
the twentieth century. 7 Indeed, the concept of a bill of rights as a component
of a new constitutional order was anathema to anAfrikaanerdom tradition which
gave priority to the State over the interests of the individual.58 The legacy of
apartheid was not merely a government-enforced racism or segregated civil
power structures. In the socio-economic sphere, apartheid's repercussions were
devastating: income inequality in South Africa had reached catastrophic heights,
with the white minority (approximately 15 percent of the population) earning
on average eight times the income of the black majority (approximately 75
percent of the population); the top 5 percent of the population consumed more
than the bottom 85 percent; four white conglomerates held 87 percent of the
land and 95 percent of South Africa's productive capital. 9
In light of the incontrovertible problems South Africa was facing, when
F.W. de Klerk replaced Botha as the National Party Leader and State President
in August 1989, a period of "cautiously reformist policy" transitioned quickly
into a period pregnant with the possibility of more radical reform measures.6 '
Although many were surprised by De Klerk's responsiveness to systemic
changes,62 his willingness to dialogue with the resistance leaders-represented
55. See id. at I I ("In July 1985 President Botha declared a nationwide state of emergency which
gave the government even greater powers and discretion to implement detention without trial, to break up the
smallest gatherings, and generally to suppress political activity. The state of emergency was renewed each
June until 1990.").
56. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 135 (2000) ("Prior to the
enactment of the 1993 interim Bill of Rights ... there was perhaps no other country in the postwar world in
which the gap between popular will and constitutional arrangements was quite so wide.").
57. SPITZ & CHAsKALSON, supra note 17, at II.
58. Id.
59. Hirschl, supra note 56, at 136.
60. SpiZ & CHAsKALSON, supra note 17, at 13.
61. In part, the NP's willingness to entertain more radical reform was due to a withdrawal of support
from dominant global players such as the United States. During the Cold War era, South Africa garnered
international support by "characterizing its struggle with the liberation forces as a fight against communism."
See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 378. With the Soviet Union's collapse, the semiotic worth of South Africa
in stymieing communism diminished. See id. ("Stripped of its anticommunist cloak, the South African
government was exposed as an anomalous minority regime which brutally oppressed its majority African
population.").
62. See Sprrz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 13 ("Many observers were surprised, having
thought De Klerk to be conservative and suddenly finding him to be more radical than they had believed.").
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by his willingness to release Mandela and other prominent ANC and South
African Communist Party (SACP) leaders and enter into negotiations with
them--illustrated the diversity of opinion within the National Party.63 This
diversity was even more apparent in National Party members such as Roelf
Meyer, Leon Wessels, and Dawie de Villiers, whose leftist positions were
integral to the subsequent dialogues." As a result of the new leadership, the
mentality toward negotiations shifted. In a watershed speech during the opening
of Parliament on February 2, 1990, De Klerk declared: "[O]nly a negotiated
understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able
to ensure lasting peace." 5 With a changing of the guard, new leadership
realized the need for a new platform for negotiation.
B. The TRC as a Political Settlement
Effectively at a deadlock in 1990, both the National Party (NP) and the
African National Congress realized that some form of political settlement could
not be avoided." While the NP perceived a political re-ordering as the only
means of resuscitating a failing economy, the ANC viewed a settlement as a
requisite move toward dismantling white hegemony.67 The backdrop for these
negotiations was a series of dramatic reforms announced by De Klerk during his
momentous February 2, 1990 address to Parliament: the legalization of several
black liberation organizations (including Umkhonto) and the SACP, the release
of political prisoners (including the unconditional release of Mandela), and the
promise to develop a new, democratic national constitution through dialogue
between the NP and the newly-legalized organizations.68 In the Pretoria Minute
of August 7, 1990, the ANC formally suspended armed struggle, committed to
the negotiating table, and affirmed the bilateral commitment characterizing the
negotiations.69 The violence between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party
63. See id. at 14 ("[F]actional differences within the governing party were reflected in generational
differences. Many of the party's 'elder statesmen', including Botha, were reactionaries. Their rise within the
NP paralleled the evolution of apartheid from 1948. For Botha to have started major changes would have
amounted to a repudiation of his political heritage.").
64. Roelf Meyer in particular established important links between the National Party and the ANC;
see id. at 13 ("[Meyer's] constant line of communication with the ANC's Cyril Rampahosa--the Meyer-
Ramaphosa 'channel'-became an indispensable feature of the negotiated transition.").
65. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting Hansard, 2-9 Feb. 1990, cols. 1-2 (Cape
Town: Government Printer)).
66. See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 379 ("The ANC and the NP each came to the table with the
realization that they had reached a stalemate in their often bloody struggle for power.").
67. SPITZ & CHASKAI.SON, supra note 17, at 14.
68. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 387.
69. See id. at 388 ("We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone
on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. In this we do not pretend to be the only parties
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(IFP) continued and ground negotiations to a standstill in the townships.7"
However, with the mediating help of an interfaith group of church leaders led
by Frank Chikane, the government and ANC moved out of political deadlock
and signed the National Peace Accord in September 1991, a multilateral
commitment to pursuing peace.7'
Formally, what would be an arduous process of constitution-making began
at Kempton Park (outside Johannesburg) in December 1991 with the Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (or "CODESA I").72 As a foundational step,
CODESA I established a multilateral movement toward a common vision. In
the Declaration of Intent, a near-unanimous portion of the attendees pledged
their commitment to a "united, nonracial and non-sexist state [and] multiracial
democracy. '71 Moreover, the conference established five working groups
focused on the following topics: establishing a free political climate, developing
a constitution, forming a transitional government, reincorporating the home-
lands, and deciding time frames for the transition.74
When negotiations resumed in May 1992 through CODESA II, the
dialogue between the government and the ANC again grew tense as discussions
began to implicate questions of who would gain or retain power in the transi-
tional government. Although the two factions agreed on a number of principles,
deadlocking the negotiations was the issue of what number would constitute the
decision-making majority in the different regions.75 In the wake of a stymied
conference, violent incidents took place, including an attack on the ANC by IFP
hostel dwellers, an event which cost forty-nine lives and threatened the
negotiation process as a whole.7 6 Subsequent to this attack, the Ciskei Military
killed twenty-eight people ANC protestors who had entered the homeland.77
Faced with these examples of spiraling violence,78 South Africa solicited
involved in the process of shaping the new South Africa... All of us henceforth walk that road in consultation
and cooperation with each other.") (quoting TIMOTHY D. SisK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
ELUSIVE SOCIAL CONTRAcT 94 (1995)).
70. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 387.
71. Id.
72. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 18.
73. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 390.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 391 ("The ANC saw the issue [of the majority size for decision-making authority] in
light of its commitment to democratic majority rule and as an attempt to preserve minority privilege, and both
sides refused to budge.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 392.
78. See Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa's Truth andReconciliation Commission as an Alternate
Means ofAddressing Transitional Government Conflicts in aDivided Society, 18B.U. INT'L L.J. 57,61 (2000)
("The ferocity of the violence, both within South Africa and in the bordering countries, heightened the
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international intervention; ultimately, however, the international response did
not prove instrumental in the negotiation process.79
When productive negotiations did resume, they resumed as a result of
encouragement from a surprising comer of the discussions: Joes Slovo,
Chairman of the South African Communist Party and commander of Unikhonto,
ANCs military wing.8" Few people were ambivalent toward Slovo, a white
South African who was an established and controversial political voice. 8' In his
groundbreaking 1992 article, "What Room for Compromise?," Slovo argued
that the power imbalance between the South African government and the
resistance movement made an unconditional surrender by the ruling regime an
unrealistic goal.82  Rather, the "dangerous radical813 counseled compromise,
suggesting that the focus of negotiations should remain on "the acceptability of
the package as a whole," rather than "minor details" such as those which were
currently shackling productive dialogue among the factions.84 In his article,
Slovo outlined essential features85 which compromise could not diminish,
including: a mutually agreed upon compendium of constitutional principles, a
permanent constitution adopted by a sovereign, democratically-elected body,
and a specific plan for transition toward democracy.86 Yet, Slovo also suggested
areas in which compromise might be justified, such as a "sunset clause"
allowing for a discrete period in which power could be shared between the
regimes, an informal agreement resolving the regional power dispute, general
amnesty for past crimes, and employment benefits for civil servants and security
realization among the major parties that this stalemate might only be resolved through extreme bloodshed or
negotiation.").
79. See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 391-92 ("[T]he United Nations sent peace observers to work
with the National Peace Accord and Goldstone Commission structures, and urged other international
organizations to do the same ... However, in contrast to its interventionist approach in Yugoslavia and
Somalia, the United Nations seemed intent on forcing the parties in South Africa to formulate their own
solution to the problem.").
80. Id. at 392.
81. See id. ("[Among many white South Africans,] Slovo was seen as a dangerous radical and as
the ultimate traitor to his race. Conversely, few whites in South Africa could compete with Slovo for the love
and admiration he received from black South Africans.").
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 393.
85. See id. (Conversely, Slovo also listed "impermissible" features, including: a minority veto
applied to the writing of the constitution, a mandatory power-sharing regime, a permanent agreement
regarding the regional powers and boundaries, and any compromise which would perpetuate contemporary
racial imbalances.).
86. Id.
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personnel.87 Ultimately, through meetings in January and February of 1993 (the
"Kempton Park Talks"), Slovo's suggestions became the structural model which
was at the center of a tentative agreement between the once deeply divided ANC
and South African government. 8
With the resuscitation of the negotiation process, several factors
subsequently enabled the process to move more quickly toward conclusion.
First, after the assassination of Chris Hani, a popular ANC leader, Mandela
counseled for sobriety.89 Indeed, the assassination had the counterintuitive
effect of provoking the ANC toward a quicker resolution to the talks, including
the establishment of an April 27, 1994 date to the first democratic elections.'
Second, although the government and ANC sought external support for their
bilateral agreement in May 1993, the compromises proved untenable for right
wing extremists, who subsequently left the negotiating table,9' clearing the
political road considerably. 92 Third, the global community offered more explicit
support of the negotiation process and its resolution.93 Bearing witness to the
international awareness and endorsement of the transitional process ensuing in
South Africa, Mandela and De Klerk would share the Nobel Peace Prize in
1993.94
Although the formal negotiations inaugurated at CODESA I, CODESA II,
and the subsequent Kempton Park Talks were directed toward the construction
of a workable constitution, it is impossible to understand why the TRC was
defined as a political settlement without accounting for the politics of the
constitution-making. Although the TRC did not begin its hearings until 1996,
it was negotiated and is anticipated in the "postamble" to South Africa's Interim
Constitution, which states in relevant part:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty
shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated
87. Id.
88. See id. at 394 ("I[T]he National Executive Committee of the ANC adopted Slovo's proposals as
the strategic perspective which would guide the ANC through the negotiations, and returned to the negotiating
table.").
89. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 394.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 395 (Although the Inkantha Freedom Party (1FP) and the extremist white right left to
form the Freedom Alliance, opposed to the transition process, the violence which the Freedom Alliance incited
merely "inflicted [damage] on the image of the highly splintered right-wing movement.").
92. See id at 394 ("The walkout and the violence which ensued had the positive effect of
strengthening the center and allowing the remaining parties to resolve additional points of dispute more
quickly.").
93. Id. at 396.
94. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 396.
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with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts
of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall
adopt a law determining a firm cut-offdate, which shall be dated after
8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any,
through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the
law has been passed.95
The postamble to the Interim Constitution sought to provide a recapitula-
tion of the Constitution's proposals for the future of South Africa in lay terms
96
and was the product of negotiations similar to that which defined the entire
constitution-building process.
Despite being the product of one of the last nights of negotiation and
"tacked on" to the Interim Constitution, it would be historical revision to argue
from those facts that the postamble was politically an afterthought of the
negotiations process. 97 Rather, a central argument of this article is that the
political momentum (and, at times, deadlock) occasioned by the negotiations
process found a necessary resolution in the drafting of the postamble, and as a
result, predated the political settlement that was the TRC. The preceding
context of the negotiations as a whole-a process which spanned three years
and ten months, from February 1990 to November 19939s-provides the neces-
sary backdrop to the political tension preceding the drafting of the postamble
and the formal completion of the Interim Constitution. From the outset of the
negotiations during 1993, a central problem emerging across the negotiation
table was whether leaders in the Nationalist Party government were subject to
prosecution or extradition."
For those involved in the negotiation process, the question of legal
response to NP leaders was a live one, for at that point, apartheid had been
deemed in violation of international law."0 In its initial form, the Constitution
95. SPITZ & CHAKALSON, supra note 17, at 412.
96. See id. ("This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided
society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition
of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans,
irrespective of colored, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South
African citizens and peace, require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction
of society.").
97. Id. at 413.
98. Id. at 414.
99. See Geula, supra note 78, at 62 ("Whether the leaders of the NP government could be subjected
to prosecution or extradition under international law remained an open question.").
100. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEM]. PRoBs. 277, 291(1998) ("Although apartheid was an international crime there was no
suggestion from the United Nations, following the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy between
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contained no amnesty clause; indeed, ANC leaders were not only adamant in
their refusal to entertain the notion of blanket amnesty, but sought a closer
investigation of potential excesses on the part of the NP government.'" In
effect, the political terrain of both South Africa's history as well as the
immediate context of the negotiations process led the bargaining parties to a
standoff: in the period of the negotiations, because South Africa's situation no
longer presented a viable threat to international peace, an international criminal
tribunal (such as that created for Rwanda under the UN Charter's Chapter VII
powers) was not justified. z Moreover, while the new regime could decide to
prosecute NP leaders for their involvement with apartheid, prosecution would
have been politically untenable given the NP government's active presence
throughout the constitution-making process and transition period.'0 3 As a result
of the political landscape at the culmination of an already beleaguered series of
talks, only two alternatives remained: unconditional (blanket) amnesty or
conditional amnesty for specific individuals."°4 As the postamble illustrates the
result of political negotiation-and indeed, the means inaugurating South
Africa's democratic state-was the constitutional inclusion of conditional
amnesty for "political" crimes.0 5
III. THE BIRTH OF A METANARRATIVE
Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation as first and foremost a political
settlement need not eviscerate the TRC of its ontological worth. However, as
1990 and 1994, that those responsible for the worst features of apartheid should be brought to international
justice.").
101. Geula, supra note 78, at 61-62.
102. Dugard, supra note 100.
103. Id. at 291-92 (noting that the National Party likely expected to be "rewarded with places in a
government of national unity" functioning under an interim Constitution).
104. Id. at 292.
105. What constitutes "political objectives" for the purposes of conditional amnesty remains the
subject of great debate. See, e.g., Ronald Slye, Justice andAmnesty, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD:
REFLEIIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SouTH AFRICA 174, 179 (Charles Villa-
Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) [hereinafter LOOKING BACK] ("While all states accept in principle
the legitimacy of the political office exception, there is no consensus on the definition, interpretation, and
application of the exception."); Anurima Bhargava, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 1304 (2002) ("Determining whether an
act was associated with a political objective, or, articulated more broadly, how a political crime should be
defined, presented considerable difficulty to the Committee."); Emily H. McCarthy, South Africa's Amnesty
Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183, 213 (1997)
("Conceivably, [the political amnesty clause] gives the Committee the discretion to deny amnesty for certain
acts, even if they served a political goal, on the grounds that the 'political' act in question was too horrific or
disproportional to the goal pursued to qualify for amnesty.").
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this article argues, to understand the TRC outside its political context-and in
an artificial marriage to pure ideology-is to generate a metanarrative that may
ultimately prove a fiction, to the detriment of its advocates and adherents. This
article militates against that (pervasive) perception of the TRC, and instead,
seeks a more balanced perspective, one which can better gauge the application
(or non-application) of the TRC to the experiences of states engaging the
restorative justice question. In this discussion, the initial section will set out the
element of the TRC as they developed subsequent to the drafting of the Interim
Constitution. Subsequently, the discussion shifts to the international commun-
ity's reaction toward the South African experience, and analyzes whether that
experience has been justly interpreted. Under the thesis of this article, the
international community has not, in fact, portrayed the TRC in an objective
fashion, and instead, developed a restorative justice mythology that continues
to be perpetuated today.
A. Forming the TRC: Process and Elements
Although the formal legislation inaugurating the TRC was not enacted until
two years after the completion of the Interim Constitution, the outline for its
existence was foundationally negotiated through the series of political
compromises between the National Party and the African National Congress. 6
However, while the general concept-conditional amnesty-may have been a
negotiated and settled concept, the precise mechanism by which that amnesty
could be granted remained opaque.'0 7 Complicating matters was the realization
that a context-appropriate model for the TRC might prove difficult to find. A
pivotal player in the early discussions concerning the TRC, Minister for Water
Affairs Kader Asmal, articulated these difficulties: "[t]here is no prototype that
can be automatically used in South Africa. We will be guided, to a greater or
lesser extent, by experiences elsewhere, notably in those countries that managed
to handle this highly sensitive-even dangerous-process with success. But at
the end of the day, what is most important is the nature of our particular
settlement and how best we can consolidate the transition in South Africa."'
0 8
Although South Africa was not without precedent to consult in the creation
of its TRC, South Africa was distinguished as the first such attempt to officially
106. See LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SoUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL? 2
(2002) ("The whole notion of amnesty in the TRC ... was largely the outcome of various compromises that
had been hammered out between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) in the
transition period leading to the adoption of an interim constitution in 1993, with input from twenty-six
political parties.").
107. See id. at 3 ("Although amnesty had been agreed to in the interim constitution, the procedures
had been left open.").
108. Id. at 1 (quoting THE HEALING OF A NATION? 27 (Alex Boraine & Janet Levy eds., 1994)).
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invite public debate and engagement with the practical development of a truth
commission.'0 9 At the outset, when nongovernmental organizations, spiritual
leaders, and human-rights lawyers first began discussing the possibility of a
truth commission as a means of transitional justice for South Africa," the
creators of the Commission turned to prior truth commissions in Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador for practical guidance."' In fact, in 1994, the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) sponsored two conferences
which allowed delegates from Chile, Argentina, and eastern and central Europe
to narrate their own context-specific struggles in dealing with former members
of oppressive regimes." 2 These conferences served to increase the public
dialogue concerning the potentially problematic features of the truth commis-
sion model of restorative justice."3 For example, when considering the Latin
American examples, a problem that featured prominently in each situation was
difficulty in maintaining accountability for uncooperative perpetrators of
crimes." 4 Borrowing from the flawed histories of these prior truth commis-
sions, the creators of the TRC wanted to ensure the cooperation of those
involved in the human rights violations in South Africa's apartheid history." 5
Although South Africa's TRC was the first truth commission to be
established by Parliament rather than presidential decree," 6 the legislative
process remained a "patchwork of all the viewpoints of the country,""' and
others have maintained that the enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation Act
remained very much a settlement of political compromises." 8 On several
points, the legislative momentum could have ground to a halt. From May 1994
through March 1995, the parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice (whose
109. See GRAYB1LL, supra note 106.
110. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224 ("The idea that something like the TRC would be necessary
in order to help ease South Africa's transition from the system of apartheid to a democratic system was first
developed by nongovernmental organizations, religious leaders, and human-rights lawyers.").
111. Id.
112. GRAYBILL, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224-25 ("The creators of South Africa's truth commission
quickly realized that many of the truth commissions in Latin America failed to get the cooperation of the
perpetrators of crimes that had been committed. For example, Chile's truth commission, the Rettig
Commission, possessed no judicial powers. This lack of power meant that the commission could not establish
culpability or impose penalties.").
115. Id. at 225.
116. GRAYBILL, supra note 106, at 3.
117. Id.at2-3.
118. See id. at 3 ("The process reflects to a certain degree party political compromises and not so
much 'the will of the people."'); see also CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 81 ("The TRC was to some extent driven
by ANC directives and to some extent by various different groups within civil society.").
58 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
members spanned all the major political parties) met to hold public hearings
asking for recommendations concerning the draft legislation, debate these
recommendations, and drafting the legislation itself."9  Illustrating the
difficulties of the process, in March 1995, the Committee met daily and ulti-
mately invested 127 hours before tabling the draft to the National Assembly. 120
When Parliament passed the bill on May 17, 1995, nearly a year had elapsed
since its presentation. '
2
Among the several potential areas for political deadlock was the concern
over whether the amnesty hearings should be held in secret. 22 The National
Party objected early to the clause in the initial draft of the bill declaring that the
committee and sub-committee meetings would be open to the public.1 23 After
further deliberation, the bill was only accepted with a concessionary "secrecy
clause.' ' 124 To the NPs detractors, the clause constituted a desire to obfuscate the
history of what had occurred or avoid indictment, a violation of the Bill of
Rights, and an affront to both the victims and survivors of apartheid. 25 Rising
to the NPs defense, others argued that secrecy was necessary to protect
witnesses.126 However, faced with overwhelming external support of public
hearings,' 27 the Committee ultimately overturned the cabinet's decision to
include a secrecy clause and returned to a draft which allowed for public hear-
ings with provisional conditions on when in-camera hearings would be
allowed. 121
Further complicating the political process of drafting the Truth and
Reconciliation Act was the choice of commissioners. 129 After rejecting an initial
suggestion that commissioners be appointed by the president as inviting political
favoritism, most of the parties to the process agreed on creating a consulate
119. GRAYBILL, supra note 106, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 83.
123. Id. at84.
124. Id.
125. See id. ("[Plerhaps the most damning view of this attempt to make amnesty proceedings secret
was the fact that the people who had suffered would never really know who had ordered the violations in the
first place and how such things operated, whether in a systematic or haphazard way.").
126. Id.
127. See CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 84-85. ("The various NGOs and organizations were quick to
react to [the possibility of a secrecy clause] and in a press statement endorsed by 30 of them argued that
secrecy was contrary to the Bill of Rights and violated the rights of victims and survivors of the apartheid
regime, including the right to information and fair administrative proceedings.").
128. Id. at 85.
129. See id. ("How would commissioners be appointed? What kinds of qualities would a
commissioner require? What measures should be taken now?.").
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between the president and the cabinet to pick the members. 30  However, the
process by which the commissioners would be chosen remained unclear: while
the political entities involved in the negotiations sought to preserve democratic
participation in choosing members, the Non-governmental Organizations
(NGOs) (again exerting their influence) maintained that commissioners should
not be subject to a political appointments process, but rather, selected through
an evaluation of their personal qualities.'
3
'
Finally, the passage of the Truth and Reconciliation Act also required
navigating the problematic political waters of what constituted a "political"
crime for the purposes of the legislation.' Several criteria were proposed to
determine what might constitute a political crime: the "gravity" of the offense,
whether a "reasonable and proportional relationship" existed between an indivi-
dual's political objective and means used to attain that objective; and whether
the act was directed against the government, political opponents, or private
individuals. 3 3 The criteria were adopted from a list of principles compiled by
Carl Norgaard, then President of the European Commission on Human Rights,
who had researched the application of the political offense exception in
extradition law.' 34  However, the NP rejected these criteria, arguing that the
ANC were not subject to the same criteria, and that the principles, as applied,
would amount to a witch hunt on the part of the ANC. 5 These differences of
opinion resulted in political deadlock between the two parties, 136 and a com-
promise was not reached until the NP conceded to a contextual understanding
of the Norgaard principles. These principles were codified into section 20 of the
Truth and Reconciliation Act.'
130. Id.
131. See id. at 86 (The qualities suggested in deciding who should be a commissioner included: an
ability to make impartial judgments; moral integrity accompanied by a known commitment to human, rights,
reconciliation, and disclosure of truth; no high profile political involvement or affiliation; not a potential
applicant for amnesty within the bounds of the legislation.).
132. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 86.
133. Id. at 87.
134. Bhargava, supra note 105, at 1312.
135. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 87-88.
136. Id. at 88.
137. As codified, the Act suggests that the Committee consider the following principles in
determining whether an act was a political crime:
[T]he motive of the person who committed the act; the context in which the act took
place; the legal and factual nature of the act, including the gravity of the act; the object
or objective of the act, and in particular whether the act was primarily directed at a
political opponent or against private property or individuals; whether the act was
committed in the execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of a
political organization or the state; the relationship between the act and the political
objective pursued, and in particular the directness and proximity of the relationship and
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After years of apartheid-related human rights abuses, and drawing from the
postamble drafted at the culmination of years of negotiation, the South African
Parliament enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34
(or the Truth and Reconciliation Act) on July 19, 1995.13' According to its
stated objectives, the TRC would investigate the human rights abuses occurring
within a determined period after March 1, 1960, grant amnesty to those who
would "make full disclosure" within the given period, afford victims an oppor-
tunity to narrate the violations they suffered, and facilitate nation-wide healing
and reconciliation.' 9 As established, the TRC did not exist as a judicial body-
it possessed no power to punish or determine any form of liability, and indeed
could provide amnesty to those who might make full disclosure of such acts, if
those acts could be related to political objectives."4 The quasi-legal body was
composed of sixteen members, with Desmond Tutu, the Anglican Archbishop
of Cape Town, serving as chair. 4 ' Three committees established by the TRC
assess, respectively, human rights violations, reparations and possible rehabili-
tation, and justice.'42 Moreover, by its own legislative mandate, the TRC
committees only cover those "gross" violations of human rights which occurred
between March 1, 1960 (the Sharpeville massacre) and December 5, 1993 (the
date that the transitional government was established). With these elements, the
the proportionality of the act to the objective pursued.
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, available at http://www.polity.org.za
[hereinafter Truth and Reconciliation Act]; see also Bhargava, supra note 105, at 1312 [hereinafter Truth and
Reconciliation Act].
138. Truth and Reconciliation Act, supra note 137.
139. Id. at 1. In relevant part, the Truth and Reconciliation Act states:
[The objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are to:] [P]rovide for the
investigation and establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature,
causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period
from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or
outside the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or
whereabouts of the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who
make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political
objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period;
affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of
measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the
restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of human rights;
reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the making of
recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross violations of
human rights....
Id. (emphasis added).
140. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 90.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Truth and Reconciliation Act inaugurated the TRC after a process of negotiation
and political concession. From December 1995 until October 1998 (when a
3500-page final report was presented to President Nelson Mandela), the TRC
held hundreds of hearings, received the statements of 21,000 individuals, and
processed more than 7000 applications for amnesty.'43
B. Ideology
With Nelson Mandela at the helm, his new government, the Government
of National Unity (GNU) faced the daunting task of navigating the terrain of a
land that was defined largely by the ravages of apartheid policies.'" As
discussed above, although issues of national unity and reconciliation-which
have rightly captured the imagination of the global community-were crucial
to the vocabulary of the TRCs creation, the fundamental engine of the new
Constitution and the TRC was the political desire to ensure a peaceful transition
to democracy.'45 The driving factors in these negotiations were not simply truth
and reconciliation-both values were abstractions that, while derivative of a
peaceable negotiation's result, were subject to the political concessions
characteristic of the entire negotiation. However, today, a ten-year space has
allowed for a re-reading of the South African narrative. Few acknowledge that
the TRC was forged in the furnace of political dissention, and throughout its
hearings, was subject to internal and external controversy.'" Just as the focus
of the international community in the mid-1970s was on the particularities of
South Africa's oppressive apartheid regime, 4 7 today, the international focus is
on the semiotic weight of South Africa's TRC as a restorative justice success
story.'48 Significantly, there exists a "schism" between the response of South
143. Daly, supra note 5, at 122.
144. See Charles, supra note 23, at 82 ("The most pressing problem confronting the new government
was how to reconcile a country that had been tom apart for decades by apartheid.").
145. Id. at 82-83.
146. See Colleen Scott, Combating Myth and Building Reality, in LOOKING BACK REACHING
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 107, 108
(Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) ("To say that the TRC was controversial would be
a radical understatement. Thanks to the transparency of the entire process, it even generated controversy
outside the countly. Several of the South African political parties declined to accept the TRC officially.").
147. See Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Convention: Disturbing Background to the ICC
Debate, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 196 (2003) ("South Africa's apartheid system probably exhibited the most
systematic policy of racial discrimination practiced by any state in the world at the time and was roundly
denounced by almost every other state. It provoked particular fury among the newly independent states,
which, by the mid-1970s, constituted, the majority of the General Assembly.").
148. See, e.g., Frangois Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": the South African Alternative to
Corrective Justice in Transitions to Democracy, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS IN
RECONCIIATION91 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001) ("[Jlustas the architects of the South
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Africans and non-South Africans to the TRC-while the TRC enjoys an
exceedingly high international reputation, many South Africans themselves
remain "skeptical" of it benefits.'49 Describing the development of this
metanarrative early in the TRCs development, journalist Antjie Krog wrote, "It
is clear that the commission has taken on a moral life of its own and is willing
to oppose even the party that gave it birth."' 5° Ironically, a process geared
toward the cathartic reconstruction of a legitimate narrative and "exposing
reality"'51 can itself become subject to historical re-reading and revision.
The TRC's semiotic weight derives largely from its development within
intersecting spheres of politics and ideology. At the outset of the resistance
movement in South Africa, political and ideological goals existed in a functional
marriage. As Jakes Gerwel, former Director-General in the Office of the State
President describes: "[n]ational reconciliation was.. . concurrently imbedded
in the anti-apartheid and democratic struggle."'52  What makes productive
analysis of the TRC difficult is the conflation of political goals or concessions
(in the push toward a democratic state) with ideological guideposts (such as
national reconciliation). Therefore, a critique of the TRC as a developing
metanarrative needs to engage in some conceptual severance in order to parse
out the reasons for its constructed mythology.
In many ways, the reasons behind the formation of the TRC as a dominant
ideological metanarrative flow from its own legislative mandate to focus on
those gross violations of human rights that characterized decades of injustice
and oppression.'53 As a result of the limited range of actions implicated within
the terms of the TRC, those "gross violations" became representative of the
apartheid years.' Naturally, with the focus on such egregious acts, the TRC
was translated, for the global community, from a primarily political narrative
African strategy drew on experiences elsewhere, others have looked expectantly towards South Africa for a
precedent on dealing with past injustice in the transition to democracy.").
149. Daly, supra note 5, at 156. Daly observes further that outsiders may have the "luxury" of
focusing on the TRC's promise (rather than its shortcomings) because "they do not live with the problems of
quotidian life in South Africa and can think about how the lessons learned in South Africa can be used in other
parts of the world." Id. at 158.
150. Shriver, supra note 14, at 13 (citation omitted).
151. See Scott, supra note 146, at 11I ("The South African TRC was-and is-about peeling away
deceit and exposing reality.").
152. Jakes Gerwel, National Reconciliation: Holy Grail or Secular Pact?, in LOOKING BACK
REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTiONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOuTH AFRICA
277 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000).
153. Id. at 279.
154. See id. ("These limited categories of human rights violations, subsequently heard and publicized
by the TRC, had in a sense to symbolically carry the burden of that entire past of division, strife, conflict,
suffering, and injustice.").
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into a primarily ideological narrative.' The overall result of this new
metanarrative has been a conceptual shift, one which invited a move away from
the "statist" perception of the apartheid regime and the ensuing negotiation
process to "a more human substantive understanding based in social history and
biography."'156 Through public hearings that became the site for oral histories,
the TRC sidestepped its laborious birthright in the political negotiations process
and acquired a literary legacy and force.' The overall result was a Com-
mission that took on mythological proportions by adopting a universally-
applicable vocabulary for discourse. 5
Politically, the individuals who were involved in the TRCs development
amplified its construction as an ideological formula rather than its original
position as a "primarily formal measure in [the] overall political settlement."' 9
In particular, with Bishop Desmond Tutu' 60 and Dr. Alex Boraine 6' at the helm,
the Commission was naturally overlaid with vocabulary that traversed the
sacred and secular. 62 The ethos of forgiveness captured by the TRC fueled a
view of the Commission as having an almost scriptural intonation. 6' The public
155. See id. ("The pure horror of those narratives of suffering, degradation and the personal tragedy,
of human beings caught up and involved as victims and perpetrators, could not but have focused the national
attention and awareness on the deeply personal and emotional levels at which people in this society, given its
history, should (also) reconcile with each other and with themselves for their part in structured brutality.").
156. Id.
157. See Gerwel, supra note 152, at 280 ("It is in the construction of such a lineage of narratives of
national remembrance that the TRC may be found to have made its most lasting contribution. As an event
of story-telling, confession and forgiving, within a quasi-judicial framework, it represented a unique moment
in the country's history-an interstitial pause for a nation to acknowledge its unity and intimate inter-
connections also in perversity and suffering.").
158. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 83 ("Conflating public and private choices [in the restorative justice
model] signaled the breakdown and interconnection of the private and public spheres, a phenomenon
associated with globalization. The perceived democratic deficit has led to the pursuit of a universalizing and
legitimizing discourse.").
159. Gerwel supra note 152, at 280.
160. See Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The
Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 753, 785 (1998) (noting that the choice of Tutu as chairperson of the TRC has been subject to
criticisms that the TRC was dominated by "an element of clericalism").
161. Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War It Era
Japanese War Crimes, II TUL. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 59, 96 n.292 (2003) (At the time of his appointment as
Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, Dr. Boraine was a prominent '"former church leader."').
162. See Nancy J. Holland, "Truth as Force": Michel Foucault on Religion, State Power, and the
Law, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 79, 92 (2002) ("The reconciliation at issue [in South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission] remains... ambivalent between a socio-political rite of, if not forgiveness, at
least reintegration into the social fabric of the society, and religious salvation.").
163. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 229 ("The TRC best exemplifies how an international truth
commission focused on the theological goals of restorative justice would look and function.").
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hearings, in particular, re-framed the TRC as less an agent for political transition
and rather, an agent for spiritual rehabilitation. For those involved, Tutu's
leadership informed the tenor of the proceedings: "[Tutu] wept with the victims
and marked every moment of repentance and forgiveness with awe. Where a
jurist would have been logical, [Tutu did not hesitate] to be theological. He
sensed when to lead audience members in a hymn to help a victim recover
composure and when to call them all to prayer."'' Ultimately, the spiritual
vocabulary engaged by the TRC leadership helped amplify the TRCs
development into the restorative justice narrative. As a result, contemporary
elements of TRCs in different countries are instinctively associated with a
theological discourse.' 65
Moreover, economically, these are beneficial times for transitioning states
to be utilizing restorative justice ideologies. As a result of the popularity of the
TRC metanarrative in the global community, nations in transition may become
more influenced to pursue a restorative justice model since "they rely
disproportionately on international legitimacy and material aid."' 6 6 The effect
of these subtle economic pressures is not only a more categorical acceptance of
truth commissions, but also the perpetuation of a mythology which, as discussed
infra, may be ill-suited to meets its professed goals.
IV. SOUTH AFRICA TODAY-WHEN CONFESSION PROVES INSUFFICIENT
Since the metanarrative of the TRC turns largely on the presumption that
cathartic truth-telling and forgiveness could repair a nation broken by apartheid,
a productive critique of South Africa's TRC must also examine the effectiveness
of this model of restorative justice. Has the TRC made strides in the national
reconciliation it sought to inaugurate? This section of the article suggests that
the culture of confession modeled in the TRC and dominating contemporary
discourse concerning restorative justice is more cathartic' 67 than constructive.
The contemporary culture of restorative justice, and of current truth
commission models, is forward-looking, focusing on the future possibilities of
164. Id. at 230 (quoting Peter Storey, A Different Kind ofJustice: Truth and Reconciliation in South
Africa, NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, July/Aug. 1999, at 17).
165. See, e.g., Nahal Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 287, 293 (2003) ("Churches in Sierra Leone played a significant role in the peace negotiations through
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, so the choice of a religious leader for the commissioner may
resonate with the country.").
166. Daly, supra note 5, at 111-112.
167. See Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1225, 1265 (2003) ("Critical to the investigatory function of the TRC was the catharsis of personal storytelling
by survivors, witnesses, and wrongdoers. According to Archbishop Tutu and others, storytelling as the
articulation of suffering is therapeutic, rehabilitative, and educational; it was the first step toward forgiveness
and reconciliation.").
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forgiveness and reconciliation. In discussing the development of restorative
justice, Ruti Teitel notes: "[florgiveness became a distinctive form of political
apology, understood as an act of contrition in a realm of unity politics.' ' 68
Suddenly, personal rehabilitation is replete with political significance. 69  The
outstanding question, however, is to what degree confession and truth-telling are
effectively therapeutic measures.
If a proper critique of the Truth and Reconciliation is to develop, a
fundamental premise must be challenged: is this new, forcible re-encountering
of the past 7 ' a productive therapy? Although contemporary scholarship
concerning the TRC may assume otherwise,' 7' as a matter of "intellectual
historiography and human self-understanding," the notion of revisiting the past
in order to move forward is a value that is "under siege."' 72 Restorative justice
models are nominally attached to the legal sphere, yet truth commissions may
now engage a more metaphysical process.'73 The question of whether past-
orientation can be a successful means of nation-(re)building is critical today, for
six years after the final report of the TRC, many South Africans continue to
wonder "why the end of the rainbow seems so dull."'74
While the TRC established an express goal of promoting national recon-
ciliation, the process of individual applications created a confusing interface
between politics and ethics: while the limited number of cases seen by the TRC
naturally took on symbolic force in moral terms, the screening process was
defined by a legal definition of those acts which could claim a political
168. Teitel, supra note 1, at 84.
169. See Daly, supra note 5, at 86 ("In the TRC's understanding, reconciliation, through individually
experienced, has national ramifications.").
170. See Scott Veitch, The Legal Politics of Amnesty, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS
IN REcoNCIIATION 33, 36 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001) ("[L]aw is conventionally
future-oriented [and] retrospectively is shunned [because] law's normativity is bound up with the possibility
of obeying or disobeying its commands.").
171. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 5, at 132-33("The families of those unlawfully tortured, maimed or
traumatized become more empowered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become exposed to opportunities
to obtain relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety they might be living with for many long years, the
country begins the long and necessary process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and grief
into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and structural climate essential for [reconciliation].").
172. Teitel, supra note 1, at 86.
173. See id. at 87 ("The question remains whether there are any transitional justice baselines or any
threshold minimum beyond which historical, psychological, or religious inquiry ought to be characterized as
justice-seeking... The relevant inquiry is not a metaphysical enterprise, but rather must be understood in its
historical and political context.") (emphasis added); but see Daly, supra note 5, at 134 ("While justice and
healing are not synonymous, there is a certain commonality in the sense that both are concerned with
achieving a balance, within the body or the body politic.").
174. Daly, supra note 5, at 156-57 (observing that some South Africans themselves believe the TRC
to have produced "division and pain and very high but unfulfilled expectations of closure and healing").
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objective. The amnesty process developed according to an individual-by-
individual mechanism; for example, when thirty-seven ANC members sought
amnesty for human rights violations on which they did not elaborate, that
"blanket" amnesty was categorically denied.' However, the individualization
that characterizes the amnesty process has counterintuitive results. While the
individual narrative gains a certain moral force, particularly in light of hearings
which stressed the quasi-religious parables of oral histories, the overt language
of the hearings maintains an (arguably artificial) distinction between the legal
and ethical spheres by focusing on the language of actions "associated with a
political objective."' 76 Although the TRC panel ultimately considers the ways
in which expression of "moral aspects" as a component of the "process of
reconciliation in its broader context," the panel refuses to confer a judgment
based on the "moral appropriateness" of an action in its prior context.' The
argument of this article is that the TRCs legacy has been confused as a result of
two conflated contexts: the moral and legal spheres. The national reconciliation
for which the TRC was tailored cannot exist merely on symbolic or moral
grounds, which is the force of the TRCs legacy.
Confounding the TRCs pursuit of truth (as a necessary predecessor to
reconciliation)' 7 8-and thereby complicating the TRCs legacy--is the complex
interrelationship between truth and memory. In analyzing the amnesty process
instituted by the TRC, legal theorist Scott Veitch observes: "[T]ruth is not the
object to be uncovered in the contemporary hearings on amnesty, but rather
what is to be articulated is the truth of the manifestation of memory. Moreover,
this memory is not itself simply an object, since it is inseparable from the
performative process that recalls it as an event."'79 Effectively, the theoretical
complication of the TRC is that "truth," in all its assumed, capitalized grandeur,
is not necessarily an artifact of the past that can then be subject to forensic80
discovery. Rather, truth operates in tandem with an individual's disclosures,
and the process which constitutes memory is located in "no less than the
decision-making process of the amnesty panel."'' Ultimately, the process is
175. Veitch, supra note 170, at 38.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. See id. at 39 (observing that the TRC premised amnesty on the notion that truth was required
for reconciliation); see also Du Bois, supra note 148, at 92 ("'Reconciliation through truth"' was the lodestar
of the South African vision of transitional justice.") (quoting unnamed source).
179. Veitch, supra note 170, at 39 (emphasis original).
180. For a discussion of various definitions of "truth" examined by the TRC, see infra Part I1. My
use of the term "forensic" here is not intended to be conflated with a forensic concept of truth, which was
arguably dismissed by the TRC. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 97-98 ("The TRC itself discounted the value
of the forensic' notion of truth.').
181. Veitch, supra note 170, at 39.
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problematic because the amnesty hearings are dependent on what is essentially
"not the truth of the event but of its accounting... [which] from the point of
view of adjudication [is] unknown and unknowable."'' 8 2 Since the TRC panel
already possessed a distinct view on the events of apartheid,' the practical
result of the TRCs emphasis on full disclosure is an inevitably political re-
evaluation of the past events.'
Perhaps most fundamentally, the TRC is problematic in its assumption that
confession and truth-telling will produce a psychological benefit of reconcilia-
tion and a social benefit of nation-building without the "settled" quality of a
judicial decision or the requisite repentance of a theological process.8 5 As
Frangois du Bois, law professor at the University of Cape Town, observes: "[t]o
engage in the search for understanding is therefore to express a commitment to
the possibility of meaning. Hence, before the search can begin, that possibility
must be established."'8 6 Simply put, can nation-building, reconciliation, and
justice be legitimate results of truth-telling when "truth" itself is flexible in
meaning? According to the Final Report from the TRC, four notions of truth
are implicated in the public hearings: "factual or forensic truth; personal or
narrative truth; social or 'dialogue' truth and healing and restorative truth."'87
However, the ethos of the hearings, and in particular, the emphasis on oral
confession as preceding reconciliation, suggest that the notion of "healing and
restorative truth" was the guiding principle of the Commission's work.'
182. Id. at 40.
183. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 93-94 (noting that the question of how to approach the past
nearly derailed the initial transitional negotiations because it was a position of power to "control the past").
184. See Veitch, supra note 170, at 42 ("The explicit insertion of a conditional re-reading of the
events of the past requires a determinedly political assessment of the legal response."); Du Bois, supra note
148, at 107 ("[T]he TRC's truth was as conditioned by the network of power relationships that existed during
the transition as criminal trials would have been."). See Veitch, supra note 170, at 41 (noting that further
complications of political assessment of memory is inconsistency in application outcomes and that
inconsistency may result from judges who have naturally not been able to distance themselves from "assessing
qualitatively" the applications for amnesty).
185. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 96 ("(There is an underlying] suspicion that the search for truth
does not provide a way out of the dilemma of having to choose between, and deal with the draw-backs of,
impunity-allowing the past to rule the future--and victor's justice-allowing the future to harness the past
to its own ends.").
186. Id. at 97.
187. Id. (quoting TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 (1998)).
188. See id. at 98. ("It is difficult to see how the TRC could have concluded [that any notion ofjustice
would take priority over 'healing truth.'] ... It was meant to be neither a court nor a promoter of impunity.
Its task was not to establish guilt, but to establish responsibility. Since it could not judge or punish, it had to
diagnose and heal.").
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Another difficulty with conditional amnesty which focuses simply on "full
disclosure"1 89 of some politically-associated act is the divergence between
confession and repentance. Is repentance, and not merely confession, what is
required of a truly forward-looking attempt at reconciliation? In the dialectical
tension that exists between secular law and ethics, it often appears that
"repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse. '' 190
Aeyal M. Gross, law professor at Tel Aviv University, emphasizes that legal
discourse can indeed bear sociologically relevant fruit: "[d]uring transitions, the
law plays a pivotal role in shaping social memory through trials, investigations,
and TRCs. The preservation of a historical narrative during transitions is crucial
for addressing past events that have not been talked about, as well as for
informing the evolution of a more democratic society."' 91 However, the shaping
of a society's collective memory and the development of a coherent historical
narrative may not effect nation-wide reconciliation. 9 Problematically, these
notions of reconciliation and a truthful social memory are often conflated in
scholarly analysis.'93  For Gross, to "some small degree," repentance was
indeed a part of the TRC process, but "only under certain conditions and as part
of the forgiveness-repentance exchange."'" However, other studies have
suggested that indeed, truth may not lead naturally to either repentance or
reconciliation. 95 Capturing this perspective is the widow of resistance leader
Steve Biko, tortured to death by South African police during the apartheid
regime. Although ultimately unsuccessful, Biko's widow joined other indivi-
duals and organizations in petitioning that the statute establishing the TRC (and
its conditional amnesty) be declared unconstitutional. 96
Ironically, the TRCs emphasis on "healing and restorative truth" may have
subverted its own pursuit of nation-building and reconciliation. Reconciliation
in the abstract requires a communion of equal (as opposed to politically
imbalanced) adversaries: reconciliation thus argues for "the creation of some
189. See Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from
South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN,. J  INT'L L. 47, 69 (2004) ("'he South African process required publicly
acknowledging the past and exposing the offences of the apartheid regime.").
190. Id. at 47 (quoting J. M. COETZEE, DISGRACE 58 (1999)).
191. Gross, supra note 189, at 68 (emphasis added).
192. See id. ("[D]ealing with the past extends beyond the sphere of criminal responsibility and
personal impunity, encompassing larger questions that countries must address in times of transition.").
193. See id. at 68-69 (suggesting that the desire for "[n]ational [u]nity and (r]econciliation" is
conceptually equivalent to the mission of "fashion[ing] a new consensual memory of the past as one of
injustice").
194. Gross, supra note 189, at 72.
195. See generally PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH
CoMaissIoNs (2002).
196. Gross, supra note 189, at 75.
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commonality, the transcending of at least some differences."197 However, the
TRCs extension of conditional amnesty changed the rhetoric of the political
dialogue from that of "perpetrators and victims" to an amorphous group of
"confessors" of oral histories.'98 The TRC thereby struggled with competing
desires for a "healing truth" (which diminishes the distinctions between victim
and perpetrator) on the one hand and reconciliation (which presumes a
distinction between victim and perpetrator) on the other. As a result, the
Commission may have been fighting a losing battle in its attempt to inaugurate
lasting reconciliation. After the Final Report of the Commission was released,
the Report was subject to criticism by South Africans on either side, both of
which argued that the "truth" which the TRC was meant to unveil did not
emerge.'" Ultimately, the TRCs legacy is problematic: in its own Report, there
is a frank acknowledgment that "everyone who came before the Commission
did not experience healing and reconciliation."2°" Although certainly, the TRC
should not be held to unrealistic goals, this article has argued that its
fundamental premises were flawed, and therefore, substantiates a critique of the
metanarrative of this restorative justice model that now dominates the
international community.
V. CASE STUDY: RWANDA
A. Background on the Rwandan Genocide of 1994
While officials in South Africa sought to develop a tenable foundation for
the TRC, in central Africa, the country of Rwanda became the backdrop for
genocide of global proportions. Before one hundred days would pass, the
Rwanda of 1994 would be the stage for anachronistically primitive carnage.
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was singular in several respects: "the number
and concentration of deaths, the intensity of the killing, the extensive use of rape
as a form of ethnic violence, and the massive involvement of the Rwandan
population. 20' Although controversy surrounds every attempt at explaining the
197. Du Bois, supra note 148, at 103.
198. See id. ("[T]he truth required for reconciliation is one that restores to victims the dignity needed
to face perpetrators as equals, and accordingly, as the TRC realized, acknowledges victims as victims. This,
however, implies that the distinction between victims and perpetrators be kept alive, emphasized even.");
Gross, supra note 189, at 70 (noting that the conditional amnesty conferred by the TRC "risked creating
symmetry between the perpetrators of apartheid and its victims").
199. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 113 ( Although the criticism of the Report from different sides
in the apartheid struggle might tempt one to the satisfying conclusion that the TRC was impartial, it is vital
to note that the common ground established by the symmetry of these reactions lies in a shared rejection of
the TRC's truth.").
200. Id. at 12.
201. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
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triggers of the genocide, 2 all scholars concede that in the period from April 7
to July 17, 1994, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans2°3 were killed by
hundreds of thousands of their fellow Rwandans."6 Systematic in its progress
205
and brutally primitive 21 in its realization, the stark efficiency of the genocide
drew comparisons with the Holocaust. °7 In sum, approximately ten percent of
the Rwandan national population died within the span of one hundred days.2"5
Although precise reasons for the events of 1994 are difficult to delineate,
any productive analysis of the genocide must consider the importance of
ethnicity in Rwanda, and particularly, what some have argued as the long-
standing rivalry between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. 20 9
N.Y.U. J INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2002) [hereinafter Daly I]. As Daly notes, in the 100 days of the Rwandan
genocide in 1994, the approximated figure of one million Rwandans killed by hand corresponds to the death
toll in Washington, D.C. and New York on September 11, 2001, if those deaths occurred every single day for
3 months. Id. at355 n.1.
202. See id. at 358 ("Among the disputed issues are the numbers of people who killed and who were
killed; the extent of Hutu and Tutsi animosity before the genocide;... the role of European colonizers and
the Catholic Church in fomenting racial distrust; ... the role of the international community... ; and the
extent to which the genocide could have been prevented.").
203. Although most approximations of those killed during the 1994 genocide fall within this
(admittedly generous) range, the precise figure remains controversial. See, e.g., PHILiP GOUREVITCH, WE
WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROw WE WILL BE KILLED WTrH OUR FAMiiIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA
4 (1999) ("[A]t least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak
of a million deaths, and they maybe right."); Dmumbl, supra note i1, at 1222 ("[A]n estimated 800,000 people
were murdered in an attempt to wipe out the Tutsi inhabitants of Rwanda."); Maureen Laflin, Gacaca Courts:
The Hope for Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, 46 ADVOC. (IDAHO) 19 (2003)
("Over a span of just one hundred days in 1994, upwards of 1,000,000 people died in the genocide in
Rwanda.").
204. Daly IL supra note 201, at 361.
205. See Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1245 ("The Rwandan genocide was organized by the Rwandan
government, supported by local authorities, and undertaken by ordinary Rwandan men and women. The
violence did not arise out of anarchic chaos. Nor did it emerge from a general breakdown of norms governing
group and individual behavior.").
206. See id. at 1245-46 ("These killings were not depersonalized through physical distance or the
use of technology. Victims were butchered with machetes (pangs), sticks, tools, and large clubs studded with
nails (masu).").
207. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 203 ("[Tlhe dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times
the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.").
208. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1223.
209. See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System Dealing with the Mass Atrocities
of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 166 (2000) ("Since pre-colonial times, an ethnic, social, political, and
economic rivalry has existed between the Hutus and the Tutsis in central Africa."); but see Drumbl, supra note
11, at 1242-43 ("From an historical and anthropological perspective, ethnic cleavages in Rwanda are less
pronounced than in other regions where genocidal violence has taken hold ... Historically, both groups were
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Certainly, the vocabulary of ethnic classification existed during Rwanda's
colonial era, when both Belgian and European colonizers placed an administra-
tive premium on acknowledging group identities. 20 Among the controversies
surrounding the Rwandan genocide, however, is the extent to which ethnic
classification is a proper contextual frame. 21n  Regardless, whether conflict
between the Hutus and the Tutsi was a well-entrenched historical reality prior
to the latter decades of the twentieth century,2t 2 few contest that ethnic conflicts
reached a head after Hutu Juvenal Habyarimana seized the presidency in a 1973
coup d'etat.213 In particular, tensions increased during the latter years of
Habyarimana's presidency, when Rwandan government forces engaged in
sporadic armed conflict with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the army of
Tutsi refugees and expatriates.2 4 These tensions peaked into the one hundred
day genocide after Habyarimana's death in a plane crash on April 6, 1994.15
The ethnic discourse underlying the Rwandan genocide develops from a widely-
acknowledged belief that "the propaganda of the Habyarimana government and
its genocidal successor induced many Hutu to believe that the [minority] Tutsi
were about to attack them," and therefore, to engage in genocide was actually
a "preemptive strike. 21 6 It is uncontested that in the years prior to the genocide,
socially fluid, with intrasocietal divisions operating more along clan (ubwoko) lines than 'ethnic' lines.").
210. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167 ("For administrative purposes, the Belgian colonial rulers
established a system of national identification cards with the ethnic classifications: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The
European colonizers accentuate ethnic differences and solidified group identities through this categorization
... Additionally, ethnicity is recorded on Rwandan's identity cards and in the census.").
211. Daly, supra note 201, at 359.
212. Heated debate currently surrounds the question of whether there was historical animosity
between the Hutus and the Tutsis. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167 ("Hutus may have been resentful of the
favoritism Europeans showed the Tutsis during colonial times. From the early 1960s, when the Hutus gained
power, to the 1990s, ethnic violence erupted periodically. Massacres occurred in 1959, 1963, 1966, and
1973."). But see GOUREVrrCH, supra note 203, at 59 (noting that until 1959, there had "never been systematic
political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis--anywhere).
213. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167-78.
214. Laflin, supra note 203, at 19; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GACACA: AQuEsTIONOFJUSTICE
3 (2002), available at http://web.amnesty.orglibrary/index/ENGAFR470072002 (last visited Mar. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter QUESTION OF JUSTICE] ("[The one hundred days of genocide] occurred within the context of an
on going, albeit intermittent, armed conflict (October 1990 to July 1994) between the RPF and Rwandese
government forces ... Following the RPF invasion, and preceding the killings that occurred between April
and July 1994, local authorities-with government connivance-launched 17 large-scale attacks against Tutsi
in 12 communities, killing an estimated 2,000 individuals.").
215. Extremists among the Hutu accused the RPF of assassinating President Habyarimana. U.S.
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMEs AND GENOCIDE (1995), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandalhtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2004) (hereinafter
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES).
216. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1243.
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any collective identity that once may have existed in Rwanda was dissipated,
and a "ferocious acrimony" existed between the Hutu and the Tutsi.217
During the one hundred days of the Rwandan genocide, among the most
significant characteristics of the tragedy were the systematic manner of the
slaughter and the wide-spread contribution to its progress. Not only did
hundreds of thousands of Rwandans contribute to the deaths of Hutu opposi-
tionists and Tutsis, ls systematic encouragement from radio messages and
leaders from every social tier2 9 helped incite what was effectively a "populist
genocide."22 In a Special Report on Rwanda, the United States Institute of
Peace notes that typically, when countries experience violations of human rights
on the scale of Rwanda, that violence is most often sponsored by military and
political organizations, while "the rest of society [is free] to go about its
business with relatively clean hands.,, 22 1 However, by contrast, the Rwanda
genocide featured a "deliberate attempt to force public participation on as broad
a basis as possible, co-opting everyone... [and] inciting civilians to participate
in the massacre. '222 In a UN study following the genocide, a Special Rapporteur
to the UN Commission on Human Rights found the genocide to be "concerted,
planned, and systematic," citing: the government use of radio broadcasts to
incite ethnic dissension and violence, government distribution of arms to the
militias and civilians, the discovery of lists naming those to be executed, and the
speed with which the massacres were initiated after the April plane crash.2 23 As
a result, the reach of the genocide extended across every social line and every
vocational barrier.24 Although there was no forced recruitment into the militia,
young Rwandan males flocked into the ranks, creating what would become
500,000 active militia members.225 While armed forces and local police
engaged in the violence, professionals such as physicians and teachers were
often equally enthusiastic participants.226 Indeed, teachers figured prominently
217. Id. at 1244.
218. Daly, supra note 201, at 361-62; see Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative
Means to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 31 (2002) ("The high level of public
participation and complicity in the killings, attacks, rapes and pillages, is particularly disturbing. The
slaughter often took place in broad daylight within the perpetrators' local communities and was committed
against neighbors, friends and even family members.").
219. GOUREVITCH, supra note 203, at 115.
220. Daly, supra note 201, at 361.
221. AccouNTABILiTY IN WAR CRIMES, supra note 215.
222. Id.
223. Carroll, supra note 209, at 170.
224. See Daly, supra note 5, at 162 ("Most were murdered not by professional military personnel,
but by fellow citizens, neighbors, friends, teachers, priests, and even family members.").
225. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1247.
226. Id.
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in the genocide, with schools forming the backdrop for scenes in which Hutu
teachers would denounce Tutsi pupils to the militia or even murder their own
students.227 The Rwandan genocide, therefore, is a study in paradox: while the
scope of public participation might suggest a spontaneous and fierce combustion
of intra- and inter-tribal tensions, the execution of the campaign was the result
of measured, deliberate, individual and corporate choices.
Despite the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi deaths, the Tutsi-populated
Rwandan Patriotic Front seized control on July 18, 1994 and the fledgling
government began the process of repairing a nation fundamentally changed.28
In just three months of intense conflict, only 40,000 to 50,000 men and women
remained of the 350,000 inhabitants in the capitol city of Kigali.229 Without
running water, electricity, or a functioning government infrastructure, the
capitol was a shadow of its former self and emblematic of the systemic
problems occurring in the rest of the country as well.230 In fact, in the wake of
the genocide's ravages, the World Bank declared Rwanda the poorest nation on
earth.231 In a Special Report, the Organization for African Unity describes the
crippled state of Rwanda post-genocide: "Nothing functioned. There was a
country but no state. There was no money; the genocidaires had run off with
whatever cash reserves existed... There were no organs of government, either
centrally or locally. There was no justice system to enforce laws or to offer
protection to the citizenry., 232 The new government, therefore, faced a daunting
task: the rebuilding of a national infrastructure and the reconciliation of inhabi-
tants whose mutual history was characterized by distrust and political upheaval.
B. Development of the Gacaca Courts
While South Africa moved toward restorative justice through its TRC,
Rwanda chose to take a more punitive route, through three separate forums, two
more traditionally punitive and one seeking a middle-ground of sorts: the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR), the domestic criminal
justice system, and the Gacaca courts.233 Significantly, a retributive justice
227. Id.
228. ACCOUNTABILrrY FOR WAR CRMES, supra note 215.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. GOUREVITcH, supra note 203, at 270 (observing that in the wake of the genocide, 95 percent of
Rwandans lived on an average income of 16 cents per day, or 60 dollars per year).
232. Daly, supra note 201, at 366. (citation omitted).
233. Laflin, supra note 203, at 20. The United Nations established the ICTR through Resolution 995
in November 1994, but the first trial did not occur until 1997. Rosilyn M. Borland, The Gacaca Tribunals and
Rwanda after Genocide: Effective Restorative Community Justice or Further Abuse of Human Rights I (Fall
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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model was then applauded by other countries: "With the support of most of the
international community, including Amnesty International, the Rwandese
government opted for extensive prosecution, arguing that it wanted to end the
impunity that characterized Rwandese political culture. Justice, the new
government deemed, was the necessary and indispensable premise to national
reconciliation. 234 However, these measures have proven far from successful-
despite promises to ensure "individual criminal accountability" for perpetrators,
the ICTR had brought only a little over a dozen cases to judgment as of 2003,23s
the consistently weak judicial system in Rwanda2 36 suffered from severe backlog
in its case dockets,2 37 and despite much discussion over the Gacaca courts in the
last five years, the Gacaca system has yet to progress in implementation beyond
a few pilot projects.235 Moreover, the judicial crisis leaves Rwanda in dire
http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/sword/CurrntIssue/essayl.pdf. (last visited Oct. 06, 2005)
234. QUESTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, at 4.
235. See Borland, supra note 233, at I ("While the ICTR has made important strides for international
humanitarian law, including the first conviction of rape as a war crime, in general it has not met the needs of
the Rwandan people."); Victoria Brittain, Letter from Rwanda, THE NATION, Sept. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030901&s=brittain ("The United Nations Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, which sits in Arusha in neighboring Tanzania, is trying major genocide suspects but has been
plagued by internal bickering and inefficiency. It has completed only fifteen cases, and acknowledges that
it will be unable to complete the trials of the forty-nine suspects now under arrest before it ends in 2008.");
Ironside, supra note 218, at 32 ("The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ... secured fewer than nine
convictions in five-and-a-half years of operation, despite an annual budget of approximately $80 million [in
U.S. currency] and over 800 staff members.').
236. See Borland, supra note 233, at I ("Rwanda's legal system was basically destroyed during the
genocide; of approximately 785 judges practicing before the genocide, only 20 survived."); Laflin, supra note
203, at 20 ('The pre-genocide judicial system in Rwanda was extremely weak, suffering from limited
resources, insufficiently trained personnel, and a lack of judicial independence. The genocide totally
destroyed it. For over two years following the genocide the country was without a functioning legal system.
Not until the latter part of 1886 did the Rwandan judiciary become operational once again.").
237. See Borland, supra note 233 ("Within Rwanda, only about 5,000 of the more than 100,000jailed
as genocide suspects have been tried."); Brittain, supra note 235 ("The broken judiciary, rebuilt at record
speed, has begun trials, but it could never complete anywhere near 100,000 in this generation."); Ironside,
supra note 218, at 32 ("While the domestic genocide trials have made greater progress with its dockets, having
cleared an estimated 5,000 cases since 1996 ... [,] even if this pace were maintained, it would still take
upwards of 120 years to prosecute the estimated 110,000 to 130,000 alleged genocidaires who continue to be
held in overcrowded prisons and community lock-up cells throughout the country."); Laflin, supra note 203,
at 20 ("By the end of 2001, the country's domestic criminal justice system had conducted approximately five
thousand genocide-related trials, leaving approximately 125,000 suspects in jails or prisons designed to
accommodate only 15,000. It has been estimated that using the conventional court system would take over
two hundred years to try the cases of those already incarcerated for crimes related to the genocide. There are
simply not enough judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.").
238. See Laflin, supra note 203, at 21 ("Contemporary Gacaca courts are still in their infancy. In
June 2002, the country started a four-month pilot project with eighty courts. By December 2002, some 600
courts had opened. The goal is to have an estimated 10,000 courts in operation.").
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economic straits as well: "while the expense of feeding the detainees has been
shared thus far with the international community; donors have indicated that
Rwanda will have to bear an increasing amount of this burden in the future,
which it cannot afford." '239 Naturally, this economic pressure translates into the
politics of Rwanda's nation-building: like South Africa in the early stages of its
transition period, Rwanda's transition necessarily takes place under the watchful
eye of the international community.
Of the three proposed solutions, the Gacaca courts are distinct from the
ICTR and the traditional criminal justice system-an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, the Gacaca courts were first mentioned in 1998 after it
became increasingly clear that the other means of judicial resolution were
insufficient to try the over 100,000 detainees suspected of having participated
in the genocide. 2' The Gacaca system soon became a much-lauded, non-
conventional option, in similar fashion to the way in which the TRC became the
cinderella story of restorative justice for the international community.24' This
reaction is in contradistinction to the wariness of some Rwandan people. As
Anastase Nabahire, director of the genocide survivors group Ibuka242 observes:
"Gacaca is a compromise political solution, but at this point, it is all we have to
look forward to."243
Although the scholarship concerning the Gacaca courts has yet to be fully
developed,2" what is known is that it is a community-based form of alterative
239. Ironside, supra note 218, at 39.
240. L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C.
INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 385, 386 (2003).
241. See QUESTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, at 2 ("[The gacaca system is] an ambitious,
groundbreaking attempt to restore the Rwandese social fabric torn by armed conflict and genocide by locating
the trial of those alleged to have participated in the genocide within the communities in which the offenses
were committed."); Ironside, supra note 218, at 33-34 ("[un the context of post-genocidal Rwanda, Gacaca
may well be able to heal the deep wounds that continue to divide the country by ethnicity in a manner for
which Western retributive systems are not designed. Indeed, it is unrealistic, impractical and short-sighted
to rely solely on the ordinary criminal model with all of its due process guarantees to address mass
perpetration of crimes, particularly in a country whose judicial system has to be build ex nihilo and where
ethnic tensions continue to run high."); Radha Webley, Gacaca and Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda
1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), ("When I left for Rwanda, I was extremely hopeful. Most of the reports
and analyses I had read on the subject were overwhelmingly positive, both in relation to the potential of the
gacaca courts as a reconciliatory initiative and in relation to the process of reconciliation overall in Rwanda.").
available at http://www.hrcberkely.org/download/rport_wradha.pdf. (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
242. Ibuka means "remember" in Kinyarwanda. See Prevent Genocide.Org, Kinyarwanda and
Rwanda Links, available at http://preventgenocide.org/rw/links.html. (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
243. Borland, supra note 233, at 2.
244. See Tully, supra note 240, at 395 ("Relatively little is known about the practice of gacaca...
[which was] a community-based dispute resolution forum[] in pre-colonial Rwanda.").
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dispute resolution that developed in the pre-colonial period.2 45  The term
"Gacaca" connotes "lawn," which indicates the manner in which the members
of a Gacaca court would sit on the grass while listening to disputes brought
before the community.2" Significantly, the Gacaca courts consistently "main-
tained restitution and reconciliation as their primary aims." '247 Although
sanctions (such as compensation) were introduced for an offense, imprisonment
was not an option, and the sanctions were meant to educate the perpetrator
regarding the gravity of the offense as well as reintegrate the accused into his
or her community.2 48 In similar vein to the TRC, genocide suspects who confess
fully to their crimes will have their initial sentence halved; moreover, all
suspects tried in the Gacaca system may serve half of their sentence doing
community service rather than in prison. 9 Since many suspects have now
spent ten years in prison, many of those tried under the Gacaca system will not
remain imprisoned but may return to their communities. ° In its temporal
structure, the Gacaca system develops in four phases: first, raising awareness
and increasing knowledge about the law;25" ' second, election of judges from the
community; third, "confession, testimony, and reconciliation," and fourth,
reintegration of some prisoners back into the society through a work program. 2
Today, the Gacaca system is split into sections to adjudicate different categories
of crimes, with varying degrees of severity: at the lowest (village) level, the
court will only adjudicate property crimes (category 4 crimes); the sector and
district Gacaca courts will try more serious crimes (category 3 and 2 crimes);
those accused of ordering killings or rape (category 1 crimes) will be tried in
conventional courts.253
The restorative aims of the Gacaca system, as well as the community
atmosphere of the court system, defined the types of disputes relevant to the
courts. Traditionally, these disputes would concern "inheritance, civil liability,
failure to repay loans, thefts, . . . conjugal matters ... and minor criminal
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
248. Id.
249. Webley, supra note 241, at 5 n.5.
250. Id.
251. See Borland, supra note 233, at 2 ("One project ... involved producing and distributing films,
radio broadcasts and other media to help spread information aboutgacaca. In this project, Rwandans watched
a film about gacaca elections, more than 200,000 read a cartoon strip on the same topic, and an estimated 2.7
million people were exposed to radio messages about gacaca.").
252. Id.
253. Brittain, supra note 235. Although category I cases will not be tried in gacaca courts, gacaca
judges take testimony as part of the category I process. Borland, supra note 233, at 2.
[Vol. 12:41
2005]
offenses such as theft.,' 25 4 Notably, these community-based courts thus appear
to have been formed for the purpose of reinstating those accused of minor
relational offenses, as opposed to the inexpressibly violent crimes committed
during the 1994 genocide. Throughout the evolution of the Gacaca court system
from the pre-colonial period onward,255 the emphasis remained on disputes
"between family members or neighbors," while disputes with strangers were
more likely to be heard in state tribunals.256 Precisely since the Gacaca system
was not originally meant to adjudicate the types of crimes committed during the
1994 genocide, when the Transitional National Assembly of Rwanda adopted
Gacaca Law on October 12, 200, the current Gacaca system is conceptually
distinguished from the traditional practice. 7  According to the Rwandan
government, these Gacaca jurisdictions will try crimes that occurred between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.25' Ultimately, the goal is to have
10,000 Gacaca jurisdictions in Rwanda composed of individuals elected by the
immediate community,259 and judgments will be made either by consensus or
by majority voting.26°
C. The Politics of Reconciliation in Rwanda
On April 7, 2004, Rwanda remembered the ten-year anniversary of the
1994 genocide. However, despite the passage of a decade, Rwanda continues
to struggle in its attempts to rebuild a nation ravaged financially, politically, and
emotionally:
254. Tully, supra note 240, at 395-96.
255. See id. at 396 ("During the colonial period beginning in 1897, first the Germans and then the
Belgians introduced a more formal state-centered legal system in Rwandan society.... [L]egal pluralism
evolved with gacaca, on the one hand, as an indigenous procedure based largely on traditional values and
determining standards of individual and community behavior, and state laws, on the other hand, which were
based predominantly on the Belgian framework.").
256. Id. at 397.
257. See id. at 397-98. (In an attempt to distinguish the current gacaca concept from the traditional
concept, the Rwandan government often refers to today's system as "modernized gacaca" or "gacaca
jurisdictions.").
258. Id. at 398.
259. See Tully, supra note 240, at 398 ("Each gacaca jurisdiction will have a General Assembly, a
Bench, and a Coordinating Committee.... The General Assembly of each cellule [the smallest administrative
unit in the country] will then elect twenty-four people over the age of twenty-one of'high integrity.' Of these
twenty-four individuals, five will be selected to serve as delegates to the General Assembly at the Secteur level
and nineteen will remain to serve on the Bench at the cellule level. Out of those nineteen who remain at the
Cellule level, the Bench will elect five of its own members to serve on the Coordinating Committee.").
260. Id. at 399.
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There are 80,000 detainees in Rwanda's overcrowded prisons, some
of whom are allegedly innocent, [awaiting] a fair trial. In some cases,
their families and their home communities remain unconvinced that
they will get one. Victims and survivors of the genocide also wait for
justice and compensation for the human rights abuses they have
suffered. Women and girls, in particular, were left infected with HIV
or were left with permanent health complications and disease as a
result of the brutal sexual violence they suffered. There are hundreds
of thousands of Rwandese refugees who returned home involuntarily
in the aftermath of the genocide to an unknown future, [and] another
60,000 remain outside Rwanda unsure if they want to return and
afraid that their return may be forced.26'
For many, the Gacaca system seems to be the panacea after years of legal
backlog and lack of resolution concerning the crimes committed in 1994.262
Often, the language of accolade used in describing the possibilities of the
Gacaca system is strikingly similar to that used to describe the TRC in South
Africa.263 For example, in their 2001 text Restorative Justice and Civil Society,
Heather Strang and John Braithwaite write: "For such profound collective
wrongs as genocide and apartheid, the world is slowly learning that
undominated and state-assisted storytelling is needed, so that truth can lay a
foundation for reconciliation."'2" In its rhetoric, the Rwandan government has
261. AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF THE GENOCIDE AND WAR 1
(2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470082004 (last visited May 10, 2004).
262. See, e.g., Ironside, supra note 218, at 34 ("To date, criminal prosecutions have been the sole
method by which justice has been sought for post-genocidal Rwanda. This is premised on the perhaps
misplaced faith that accountability and reconciliation can only be achieved through a Western-conceived
adversarial trial model, and that individual criminal accountability pursued against a select few will
'exonerate' the collective."); Tully, supra note 240, at 413-14 ("lit is undisputed that the system of justice
that Rwanda has maintained for over five years has failed. With over 100,000 pre-trial detainees languishing
in over-crowded prisons and local cachots, a compromise is unavoidable.... In the face of this daunting
situation, the new gacaca jurisdictions have emerged as Rwanda's newest, and certainly most innovative, hope
for justice and reconciliation.").
263. See Brittain, supra note 235 ("Gacaca, with its emphasis on collective truth-telling as a means
toward reconciliation rather than summaryjustice and punishment, has more elements in common with South
Africa's traveling Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 1990s than with, say, Latin American versions
following dictatorships, such as Peru's."); Daly, supra note 5, at 167 ("The actual, if unrecognized, need for
reconciliation may be as strong in Rwanda as it is in South Africa, though it manifests itself quite
differently."); Can the Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice?, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS AssOC., Apr. 8, 2004, 2004
WLNR 7090283 [hereinafter Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice] ("[Robert Bayigamba, Minister of Culture,
Youth and Sports declares that the gacaca system was intended] to accelerate the process of knowing the truth
so that justice may be done.").
264. Borland, supra note 233, at 6 (quoting HEATHER STRANG & JOHN BmArrHwArrE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 11 (2001).
[Vol. 12:41
2005]
been quick to portray the Gacaca system as a beacon of hope for the future-
currently, national advertisement posters for the Gacaca system read "The Truth
Heals" and "depict a bright yellow sun rising over the hills of Rwanda with
villagers holding hands as they move from the dark toward the rising sun." '265
In part, this focus on restorative justice in Rwanda is a reaction against the poor
results from the retributive justice campaign initiated by the Rwandan
government after the genocide.266  The reaction of some scholars-and
particularly advocates of the TRCs ideology-has been to promote the
possibility of reconciliation in Rwanda. As Erin Daly, law professor at Widener
University, writes: "clearly, if Rwanda is to survive, reconciliation can not wait
200 years267 and must be promoted in conjunction with Rwanda's other
immediate needs. 268 In this portion of the discussion, this article seeks to
substantiate a critique of the Gacaca courts as undergoing a similar reification
into metanarrative status as the evolution of the South African TRC.269 Toward
that end, this article will examine the political and economic forces behind the
Gacaca courts, and conduct an objective analysis of the current state of that
system.
First, the question of whether the Gacaca courts will ever be functional is
a real one. Although the Gacaca court initiative began in June 2002, it has yet
to become operational beyond a few pilot models.270 In the first phase of its
implementation, a USAID-funded study found that "while awareness is high,
knowledge about the functioning of jurisdictions and the specific role of the
community is rather limited., 271 Moreover, as a result of several delays, training
265. Ironside, supra note 218, at 47.
266. See Daly, supra note 5, at 165-66 ("The government has embarked on an extensive campaign
of arresting and incarcerating suspects believed to have participated, in any way, in the genocide. The result
has been disastrous. It is estimated that 125,000 individuals are in jails or community 'cachots' (literally
hiding places) while only 3000 trials have taken place. Thousands are dying of disease and malnutrition while
the wheels ofjustice turn ever so slowly.").
267. Daly, supra note 5 at 166 (The Rwandan government estimates that at the current rate of
adjudication, it will take over 200 years to try all of the genocide suspects currently imprisoned).
268. Id. at 166-67.
269. Although there are substantial due process concerns with the gacaca system, this Article focuses
more narrowly on a theoretical critique of gacaca law. See Ironside, supra note 218, at 51-56 (analyzing
concerns for gacaca defendants, such as: the right to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal, the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense and consult with counsel, and the
right to review by a higher tribunal).
270. See Borland, supra note 233, at 3 ("As of November 2002, twenty-six pilot courts had begun
hearing testimony.").
271. Id. at 2 (quoting S. Gabisirege and S. Babalola, Johns Hopkins University, Center for
Communications Programs, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GACACA LAW IN RWANDA: EVIDENCE FORM A MULTI-
METHOD STUDY (2002), available at http://www.jhuccp.org/pubs/sp/19/English/19.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2005).
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of judges did not begin until April 2002.272 Pilot courts were not inaugurated
until July 2002; four years after the first mention of a Gacaca system,273 and
even afterward, community participation in the Gacaca courts have been lower
than initially predicted.274
On an ideological basis, it is possible to argue that the current
manifestation of the Gacaca court system is not the community-based,
traditional system that is being lauded by the international community.275 In his
on-site research for Amnesty International, Richard Haavisto describes latent
concerns about Rwanda's Gacaca court system, and in particular, the lack of full
community participation.276 When the pilot models began three years ago,
community members often failed to attend trials, or did not provide testimony
if they did attend.277 The initial interest in Gacaca law has "dropped markedly"
since the pilot models began, and often, weekly Gacaca meeting must be
canceled as a result of a failure to meet the one hundred person quorum
requirement. 278  According to Haavisto, fear is often a factor in dividing
communities and malcontent concerning the Gacaca courts: "Many of those
who might be willing to give evidence are afraid of retribution." '279 The
retribution factor is real, for while the TRC addressed crimes on the part of both
the resistance movement and the Nationalist Party, the Gacaca system only deals
with crimes committed by the "genocidaires," and not members of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, who gained control of Rwanda after the end of the 1994
genocide.28 Although the government has sought to affirm that witnesses will
272. Id at 3.
273. Id.
274. Id
275. See Ironside, supra note 218, at 59 ("[T]he Gacaca system's emphasis on restorative modes of
justice, through participative story-telling, atonement, public scrutiny, and reintegrative community service,
provide post-genocide Rwanda's best hope for progressing toward national reconciliation and some greater
sense of justice."); Webley, supra note 241, at 8 ("[U]niversal participation is one of the theoretical
underpinnings of the gacaca system itself, for such participation is seen as the central mechanism for making
the dual processes of justice and of reconciliation not only institutional projects but felt realities in the lives
of the Rwandan people.").
276. See Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
277. Id.
278. Webley, supra note 241, at 5.
279. See Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263 ("[Tjhere have been reports in the last few
years of killings and attacks on witnesses who were expected to testify in gacaca courts."); Borland, supra
note 233, at 3 ("Both inside and outside Rwanda, people of all ethnic groups fear the outbreak of renewed
violence. Some witnesses are afraid they will be attacked if they speak the truth."); Webley, supra note 241,
at 5 (describing one gacaca court where survivors refused to account for known genocidaires because the
murderers "had never been imprisoned but were still living in the community in question").
280. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263. U.N. consultant Robert Gersony found that "the
RPF had engaged in widespread and systematic slaughter of unarmed civilians." Id. The NGO Penal Reform
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be protected, "no clear security mechanism has been established to protect
community witnesses who testify'... and Rwandans have little reason at present
to believe they will be protected."28' One Rwandan woman, Mbezuanda, was
victimized by the Hutu militia, but remains terrified of testifying in a public
court because it will be "her word against the accused... there are no other
witnesses., 28 2 Concerned that the wheels of justice move far too slowly to
protect her, she believes that it would be dangerous to provide evidence:
"Maybe by the time it comes I will be dead.""2 3  With many in these
communities fearful of involvement and perceiving the tribunals themselves as
one-sided, there is little implicit confidence in the system.2" As Haavisto notes,
"The government has to create a climate which convinces people that there is
an equitable system of justice at work., 285 For the several thousand Rwandan
refugees currently in other countries, without a sufficient promise that they will
be protected, voluntary return is unlikely.
286
The possibility of a true "community"-based system post-genocide
becomes further complicated in light of the historical disconnect between the
community that experienced the persecution and that which is initiating the trial.
Causing a fundamental rift is the reality that an enormous part of the population
was involved in the genocide. As Elizabeth Onyango, of the non-governmental
organization (NGO) African Rights observes: "[i]n Rwanda you have a
situation in which a large part of the population participated in the genocide.
A select few might have orchestrated it, but they did it so cleverly that they got
a lot of the population implicated-and how do you try cases like this, all these
people? '287  Although it could be argued that despite reconfiguration, the
prosecutions are still taking place, the fundamental appeal of the Gacaca system
for the international community was not merely the prosecutions, but the
restorative ethos of the system. Will the "community" receive the perpetrator
back into its midst after he or she serves the maximum time required by Gacaca
law? The sentiments of at least one survivor toward the Gacaca system suggest
otherwise:
International noted in a recent report: "There is a growing disenchantment with the first phase of the gacaca
pilots: the number of participants is going down and many participants no longer express themselves during
the meetings. The enthusiasm of some people has diminished considerably when they realized that Gacaca
could not investigate the past." Borland, supra note 233, at 4.
281. Borland, supra note 233, at 3.
282. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id
286. Borland, supra note 233, at 3.
287. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
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They killed us, completely finished us. Some of them were arrested
and imprisoned, but recently they were released even though they had
killed us. We had assumed that they would be killed the same way
they killed us. So for us, we don't understand Gacaca... The people
who killed us are being released. Those who are not being released
we hear they will be imprisoned for life. There they eat, they live
alright and grow old like normal people. We don't see the benefits
for us in that process. They should have died the way we died.2"'
Another problematic feature of the Gacaca systems is the same as that which
underlies South Africa's TRC as well-the often-indistinguishable lines
between oral confession and memory, confession and truth. In Rwanda, like
South Africa and most other African nations, there is a long history of oral
tradition, where stories can be perpetuated for generations without written
record.289 As a result, "people tend to blur the lines between what they have
seen themselves, and what others have told them."29 The oral tradition can then
have a distinct impact on judicial proceedings, whether restorative or retributive.
For example, in the ICTR, lawyers have recounted stories of how intense cross-
examination of a witness can, days later, lead to the damaging revelation that
"he did not actually see the event himself.... But his wife's aunt did.""29 In the
Gacaca courts, similar problems can surface. Describing her experience at a
Gacaca court in the village of Kigese, journalist Victoria Brittain writes: "[a]s
the hours went on, contradictory stories were told, and witnesses and defendants
went off on irrelevant stories. Many times someone in the general assembly
rose to ask the chairman to keep the witnesses to the point."'2 92 Certainly, some
have argued that both the Gacaca system and the TRC allow for justice through
cathartic confession and the opportunity to offer a personal narrative: "[t]o have
your story of unjust suffering entered into a public record and thence into future
history-writing is to experience an increment ofjustice."'2 93 However,just as the
288. Webley, supra note 241, at 4.
289. See Rwanda's Slow Justice, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2001) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/from-our-own-correspondent/1338263.stm. (lastvisitedOct. 6,2005)
[hereinafter Slow Justice]; but see Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 271("[As Elizabeth Onyango
notes:] Rwanda is a society where people, because of all they've been through ... don't really speak up.
Gacaca does give people a chance to begin to talk about genocide.").
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Brittain, supra note 235.
293. Borland, supra note 233, at 10 (quoting Donald Shriver, Where and When in Political Life is
Justice Served by Forgiveness?, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFrER CIVIL
CONFLICT 28 (Nigel Bigger, ed., 2001).
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TRC struggles with the question of whether confession and repentance can be
fairly conflated, genocide survivors are equally wary of the sincerity of suspects
in the Gacaca system.294 As one woman noted, prisoners who had returned into
her community professed openly that if another genocide occurred, the "only
thing they would do differently is to make sure to kill all of the Tutsis."2 95
Ultimately, the dubious distinction between fact and fiction prolongs the judicial
process and complicates the possibility for reconciliation.
The notion of community-based reconciliation becomes complicated when
raising the question of whether "living together again," one of the catchphrases
of the Rwandan government's reconciliation rhetoric, is currently at work.29
The ostensibly restorative aim of Gacaca law manifest through a community
dialogue is a key political tool for the Rwandan government at a time when the
international community is heavily invested in the restorative justice model.
The Rwandan government has been vocal in its claim that the community-based
Gacaca courts are the centerpiece of a reconciliation process-as one
government official notes:
[Gacaca] is the biggest single investment in the reconciliation
process. As soon as the victims of genocide see punishment for the
perpetrators of genocide, they are ready to forgive. As soon as those
who are in prison are facilitated to get out, to be tried, and to be rein-
serted into community, to do community service as part of the
project, then you are building the bridges for conflict management,
you are building the bridges for reconciliation, things have started
gain. So gacaca is therefore tied to the reconciliation process, as soon
as both parties to this unfortunate divide see that justice is being
done.297
Officially, the Rwandan government insists that reconciliation is already
beginning in Rwanda, and that "reconciliation [is] a process that can be both
successfully engineered and successfully completed within a finite period of
time." 9 However, there is a fundamental disconnect between the government
rhetoric concerning the gacaca court system and how Rwandans view the
methods.29
294. See Webley, supra note 241, at 10 ("Many... feel that... requests for forgiveness, as well as
the confessions themselves, are wholly insincere, and emphasize that unless they are accompanied by true
remorse, they will mean nothing, and will not in any way contribute to the process of reconciliation.").
295. Id. at 9.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Jd. at 4.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Webley, supra note 241, at 4.
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A primary feature of this disconnect between the official perspective on
gacaca law and that of the Rwandan people is the fact that the gacaca courts are
explicitly state-run. Among many Rwandans, there is a prevailing suspicion
that the gacaca system is merely a "government-run attempt to deal with a six-
figure prison population., 3° The manner in which the gacaca system currently
operates is effectively "top-down," a factor that subverts the purposes of
reconciliation and nation-building at the heart of the government's rhetoric.
30 1
For example, at weekly gacaca meetings, armed security forces are often
present, and coerced participation is "a relatively frequent trend. 30 2 In their
involvement during the gacaca process, district, sector, and national-level
officials tended to be the voices driving the sessions, as opposed to merely
possessing an administrative role.30 3 Effectively, the gacaca courts are enacting
state-sponsored retribution rather than the restorative aims they profess. °4
It is necessary to ask, further, whether there is, in fact, a gacaca system in
Rwanda, or whether the pilot models are merely political mirages that will
enable a poor state to collect money and military support from the West without
moving any of the prisoners out. Since the gacaca system is being marketed to
the international community as traditional African justice, it remains somewhat
unassailable, because no external state will feel comfortable critiquing "African"
justice.'35 For example, while the public position of the United States on the
Gacaca systems has been categorically positive, the United States has a political
stake in promoting a nationally oriented and controlled justice for international
crimes as a position against international tribunals. Ironically, while the gacaca
system may be Rwanda's carrot for economic aid from the international
community, the gacaca courts themselves may prove a financial strain of the
communities they purport to serve, particularly since most individuals do not
receive compensation for their involvement." 6
300. Id.
301. Id. at 8.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Webley, supra note 241, at 10 ("[T]he government is actively manipulating the rhetoric of
reconciliation in ways that seem to have little to do with a desire to actually further the process of
reconciliation and that appear to have more to do with consolidating its own political power.").
305. But see Brittain, supra note 235 ("[G]acaca has come in for harsh criticism as unworkable from
some sections of the donor community. How can untrained and mainly illiterate peasants be trusted with the
judgment of tangled tales often involving their own relations? Where is the administrative capacity to process
100,000 dossiers or more? What will happen to the approximately halfa million new suspects, now at large,
named already in suspects' confessions during the gacaca process of the past few months? What does the
election as judges of some people known to have been active participants in the genocide say about the
fairness of the trials?").
306. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
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VI. CONCLUSION
At a time when nations rebuild and transition under the scrutiny of the
international community, a new pressure exists to model a transitional justice
that accommodates the political and ideological interests of other states.
Particularly because the judicial model of a broken state can rarely operate
without the economic backing and political involvement of other countries, it
is nearly impossible to conceptually sever the issues central to restorative and
retributive justice from political aims. Today, nations such as Rwanda and
South Africa showcase the extent to which restorative justice has captured the
approval of the global community. However, as this article argues, not only do
the politico-economic contexts of South Africa's TRC and the Rwandan gacaca
system powerfully shape each nation's restorative rhetoric, the ideological aims
of these models may ultimately prove insufficient tools for nation-building.
Since the inauguration of South Africa's TRC, a fundamental shift has
occurred in the international perspective on transitional justice-ajurisprudence
of forgiveness and reconciliation has emerged as a dominant motif. As this
article contends, while the emphasis on the restorative rhetoric of reconciliation
and truth-telling may be compelling, the current situation may be one in which
the reality of what restorative justice has effected may be in disjunction with the
popular response. Complicating the narrative ethos of reconciliation narratives
are a number of foundational questions: Whose story should be heard? Is a
changing story necessarily a fiction? Is the storytelling merely cathartic or a
symptom of repentance?
For South Africans, the TRC may have been a cathartic process of sorts,
but the metanarrative of restorative justice now accepted by most of the inter-
national community does not account for the less-reconciliatory political
realities which drove and continue to define the Commission's legacy. This
article has sought to warn of the dangers of a categorical acceptance of restora-
tive justice as a panacea, and establish a more productive critique of how these
metanarratives develop, and on what grounds.
The ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide recently passed, and it
is clear that Rwanda is a state that has been influenced by the restorative justice
metanarrative. While the gacaca system is a middle ground model-with both
retributive and restorative attributes-it is largely the restorative aims of gacaca
law that are being advertised internationally and nationally.
Despite the best of intentions, true nation-building and reconciliation will
only develop from a less categorical and more critical understanding of the
interplay of restoration, retribution, and the political state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The inauguration of a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of serious
crimes has raised anew the problem of enforcement of human rights in
international law. This article will commence with a brief mention of the origin
and nature of state's human rights obligations. Reference will also be made to
the implementation of international obligations with particular emphasis on the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the difficulties encountered in judicial
enforcement of international obligations in general. The peculiar social, political
and economic situation in Africa and the ingredients that feed the widespread
human rights violations in the region will also be raised. In conclusion,
suggestions for improvement will be proffered.
II. ORIGIN OF STATES HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS'
At the root of the difficulty, in the decisive enforcement of states
international human rights obligations are the absence of an effective central
authority, and the consensus method of building the international legal order.
The Peace of Westphalia 1648, which ended the Thirty Years religious war in
Europe effectively dismantled the absolutist, centralist powers of the Holy
Roman Empire, and transferred sovereignty to the different nation states.
LL.B (University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus), LL.M, Ph.D. (Johaness Gutenberg University,
Mainz, Germany); Research Fellow; Human Rights Center, University of Potsdam, Germany. Admitted to
the Bars of the State of New York and Nigeria. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented
at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. While every society in whatever level of development has, however nominal, notions of
freedom, human rights in its present documented form, as the cornerstone of peace and security in the world
today became a forceful idea after the Second World War. See also Philip C. Aka, Human Rights as Conflict
Resolution in Africa in the New Century, 11 TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 183 (2003).
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Within their jurisdiction, states could virtually do any thing, and deal with their
subjects in any way they liked without attracting any external question. But the
horrors of the Second World War, which ended in 1945 called to question this
unchecked and uncontrolled absolutist powers of the state-sovereignty. There
was a realization that massive human rights violations with open or tacit support
of the state in any part of the globe ultimately diminishes humanity in general
and may even have the unintended consequence of threatening the peace and
security of the world.2
While it is not necessary or even desirable to go back to this period of a
single, absolutist authority in the international legal order, attempt to strike a
balance has been made by placing obligations on states as a means of checking
their excesses. There is now a common standard below which no state is
allowed to fall without attracting the outrage of the world. At that point where
this outrage begins, exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction should stop.' This
common standard has been set through concepts such asjus cogens (peremptory
norms of international law), erga omnes (obligations owed the international
community as a whole), international crimes, which has been defined by the
International Law Commission in its draft articles on states responsibilities as
"breach by a state of an international obligation so essential for the protection
of fundamental interests of the international community."4 A state's obligation
to respect and ensure human rights is primarily inward directed. It is owed to
its subjects. The international community gets interested only when a states
conduct is so egregious as to threaten this fundamental interest of the interna-
tional community. This interest is nothing other than maintenance of peace and
security which is better secured by respecting human rights.
These concepts, jus cogens, erga omnes and international crimes share
more or less the same contents that dovetail into the present human rights
provisions. It is quite tempting therefore to rank all human rights equal because
of their dependence on one another. But certain acts are so egregious and mind
rending that they merit special attention. Through these concepts, some human
rights have been selected as super norms and given an extra protective status.
Genocide, slavery and racial discrimination, aggressive war, war crimes and
crime against humanity today form the red line beyond which none should
cross. These norms are final and admit of no derogation. Any breach of these
2. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20-40 (1948). See also
Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, VOL. 1 33 (Richard A Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969).
3. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y. INT'L L. 1, 46
(1946).
4. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6
May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 131 (Ch. MI), U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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norms is treated as an international concern whether this occurs in time of war
or peace, internally or extra-territorially. Therefore, not all human rights issues
fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The jurisdiction
of the ICC will be limited to only the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community. These, according to the Rome Statute are genocide,
war crimes, aggression and crimes against humanity. Crime against humanity
has been held to be intrinsically more serious than war crimes, for they are
deemed to be directed against the whole of humanity as its victim, thereby
injuring a greater interest than war crimes limited towards a restricted group of
people. Apart from its classical content such as murder, extermination and
torture, it now includes sexual offenses such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution and forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity.' These crimes whether committed in time of
war or a period of brief upheaval or during peace time, are equally punishable
as such. The drive to establish interstate-universal jurisdiction is based first on
the fact that some crimes are so heinous that they offend the interest of all
humanity-imperiling civilization itself.' This entitles any state to punish it on
behalf of the rest of mankind. Also, most massive and widespread atrocities are
often executed with open or tacit support of those. in control of states
instrumentalities of power. This makes it difficult if not impossible to prosecute
the perpetrators without an external intervention.
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 5-8, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
6. Kenneth C. Randal, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV., 785, 803
(1988); RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 404 (1987). The
international human rights law, serve as a moral imperative for all nations. Those specially selected norms
which fall underjus cogens, erga omnes and international crime entitles each state even when their citizens
are not directly involved, and even if the offense falls outside the states territorial jurisdiction to prosecute.
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d. 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), a Paraguayan police officer who participated in
torturing to death a citizen of Paraguay was sued under the Alien Torts Acts Claim by the relatives of the
deceased. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the 2nd Circuit in assuming jurisdiction said that "the torturer has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hosti humani generic, an enemy of all mankind." Id.
at 881. See also Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichman, 36 I.L.R 18, 26-57 (Dist. Ct.
Jerusalem, 1961). The abduction from Argentina and prosecution in Israel of Eichman was based on the
universal jurisdiction applied to erga omnes norms of which genocide, crime against humanity, which
Eichman as a Nazi henchman participated in, are part of. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 141-43 (1997).
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III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 7
Conceptually, all international courts and tribunals share some basic ele-
ments with national judicial organs. These are independent existence and
institutionalization of the organs, creation through a legal or political
instrument, laid down rules of procedure, duty of interpretation and application
of the law.' But in nearly every other respects international courts differ from
national legal institutions.
First is the issue of jurisdiction of the respective international court or
tribunal to handle the matter, and second is the problem of observation and
enforcement of the court's decisions. For example, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) generally accepted as the World Court, does not have mandatory
jurisdiction over any matter or party unless parties expressly submit to it. This
non-mandatory jurisdiction can bring about serious deadlock as seen in the
Nicaragua case, where the USA, after submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ,
refused further participation when judgment was rendered. The ICJ reiterated
also in the Monetary Gold case that it cannot adjudicate on the international
responsibilities of states without their consent.9
Criminal justice which involves the full force of state power is intricately
intertwined with sovereignty. States both great and small are for various
reasons generally reluctant to cede any of its powers in this area to another
entity, more so when this will mean submitting to an external judicial organ
with supranational powers. The stronger states do not want any limitation on
their powers, while the smaller, weaker ones such as African states fear external
control or interference in their domestic affairs. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) tried therefore to overcome this hurdle by assuming compulsory or
7. For an extensive coverage of enforcement of international obligations, see OBASI OKAFOR-
OBASI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND ENSURE HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2003). Other tools available in international law for the enforcement of states
obligations range from coercive measures such as threat of, or actual military intervention, use of force short
of war, reprisals and countermeasures. Intervention is mostly effective if it is embarked upon by a multilateral
and not unilateral force, and received a prior recommendation by the Security Council. Non-violent methods
of enforcement are economic pressure such as sanctions and trade embargoes, breach of diplomatic relations
which protests actions of a particular state, contentious judicial proceedings, which could end in imposition
of fines, forfeitures or reparation for the victim. There is also the very subtle but not ineffective method,
publicity, intended to hurt the international image of the state involved in atrocities.
8. Christian Tomuchat, International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted and/ or
Specialized Jurisdiction, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
307 (1974).
9. Corfu Channel Case, Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4-35 (Apr. 9); Case of the Monetary Gold Removed
from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.; U.K. v. U.S.) Preliminary Question, I.C.J. Reports (1954), 19, 35; see also
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
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mandatory jurisdiction over cases involving any state that has ratified the Rome
Statute. This compulsory jurisdiction is an attempt to avoid uncertainties and
secure the cooperation of states parties in strengthening world peace and
security.
Though this compulsory jurisdiction makes the court easily accessible, it
has inadvertently triggered suspicion as to which extent it can use this power to
jeopardize or limit the fundamental interests of any state. Behind the reluctance
of the U.S. government, for example, to ratify the statute, is the fear that its
service men could be targeted for frivolous and mischievous prosecution
intended to embarrass the only surviving super power. But this fear is
unfounded, because the ICC is targeting only international criminals of all
nations, and not from any particular country. Nonetheless, the supranational
application of the decisions of the ICC gives a hint of the primacy of
international law and the establishment of universal criminal jurisdiction which
can, at least legally, limit the global ambition of some powerful states.
However, this so-called compulsory jurisdiction is apparently not as
effective as it seems. In reality, the ICC does not have automatically inhering
powers to assume jurisdiction over any case. Original and automatic
jurisdiction belongs to the state whose subjects are either perpetrators or victims
of the offense, or the state in whose territory the offense was committed. Before
the ICC can assume jurisdiction, the state concerned must decline to prosecute,
lack the resources to prosecute, formally hand over the matter to the ICC for
prosecution, or when the Security Council requests it, to investigate a particular
situation and prosecute. Theoretically, it is therefore possible for the ICC to
exist for a very long time without entertaining any single case. If the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Republic of Uganda had the powers
and resources to apprehend and prosecute the rebels causing the mayhem in
their countries, they would not have requested the ICC for help in this regard.
They would have gone ahead and prosecuted to the relief of the world those
behind the atrocities in their countries.
The mere invitation and lodging of these complaints before the ICC alone
do not indicate a wide acceptance of the legitimacy of the court, or a positive
disposition towards it by all states. This cord might well be struck if the court
handles these two initial cases well. The court itself, critics and protagonists
remain apprehensive of the outcome. If it fails to deliver, its death knell might
well be sounded, as critics will point at the flaws, possible biases, and the
difficulties of erecting on a permanent basis an effective international criminal
jurisdiction. But if it presents itself well, it will earn the trust of all nations and
could be flooded with more cases. As we all know, atrocities deserving of the
attention of the court abound all over the world today. These first two cases if
properly handled will not only form the reference point for future cases before
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the court, but may even encourage national courts to cooperate with it in their
efforts to combat international crimes.
IV. WHO MAY BE PROSECUTED BEFORE THE ICC?
Even though classical international law recognized only states as subjects,
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals laid the present foundation of
directly burdening individuals with criminal responsibility even when acting on
behalf of their states. That a state can commit a crime was affirmed by the
Nuremberg tribunal. But a state as an abstract entity, such as Germany, cannot
be put in the witness box, prosecuted, convicted, sentenced to prison term, or
an entire population executed, just to punish an act of state considered an
international crime.'" Therefore the most prominent individuals or officials seen
as the extended hands of the state are prosecuted and punished, thereby reviving
the issue of the place of the individual in international law. Other ad hoc
international criminal tribunals like Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have
followed the same pattern of placing international criminal responsibilities on
individuals. This is a confirmation of the powerful statement by the Nuremberg
tribunal that, crimes against international law are committed by men, and not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."
Traditionally, the denial of subject status to individuals in international law
makes criminal prosecution of states difficult if not impossible. 2 But the
acceptance of the individual and other non-state actors as subjects of modem
international law has eased the process of punishing any international offense
committed. This is because, whether seen as an act of state or as a result of
individual volition, whenever a crime is committed, a particular person or a
group of persons that are identifiable and directly connected with the crime
would be held responsible. Also, the need to combat international terrorism,
hijacking of airplanes, drug trafficking, international money laundering have
helped to declare individuals who commit these offenses which have
10. Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely Yes, in STATE RESPONSIBiLrry IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 425 (Rene Provost ed., 2002).
11. However both Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals have been criticized as not being
international or truly representative at all. They were perceived as "victor's courts" for the purpose of
prosecuting the enemy and rendering only "victor's justice." KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPATIBILITY AND COOPERATION, COPENHAGEN 12 (2000). The International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia sitting at The Hague has convicted and sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment, Edmovic and Tadic, for offences ranging from war crimes, genocide to crime against humanity.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda sitting in Arusha (Tanzania) has convicted also for similar
offences and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment Jean Paul Akeyesu and Jean Kambanda.
12. The most convenient and effective tool for punishing renegade states was resort to a devastating
war, either by a more powerful state or a coalition of states against the recalcitrant state.
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cross-border effects, as hosti humani generis-common enemies of mankind.
And they could be prosecuted by any court on behalf of the international com-
munity or by an international tribunal.
However, placing an individual before a truly international court such as
the ICC helps to avoid the insinuation of victor's justice. Even after a bloody
internal ethnic war or crisis as witnessed in Rwanda and the DRC, an inter-
national judicial organ detached from the emotions and sentiments of the
situation leading to the crisis will be more able to be neutral and procedurally
just than a national court that is more likely to be vindictive. At least the ICC
cannot hand down a death sentence because the statute forbids it from doing that
even if it is inclined to. It would be more relied upon in establishing account-
ability. 3
With the acceptance of states, individuals and other non-state actors such
as rebel groups as subjects of international law, it has been possible for
President Museveni, acting on behalf of Uganda, to request for the criminal
investigation of a rebel group known as the Lords Resistance Army. This group
has been ravaging his country and causing mayhem and brigandage with the aim
of installing a Christian government based on the Ten Commandments. On the
same note, the young President Kabila had also earlier requested the
investigation and prosecution by the ICC of those who in the course of the long
drawn war in the Congo committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including those behind the recent massacre of about 200 refugees at
a camp near DRC's border with Rwanda. However, the ICC will be
investigating only crimes allegedly committed since its establishment in July
2002. Troops from all countries that participated in the five year war, especially
those from the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, and the rebel groups, such as the
Congolese Liberation Movement led by Jean Pierre Bemba who are alleged to
have committed massive rapes, forced labor and cannibalism in the northeastern
Ituri province will be targeted in the investigation." Because of the widespread
nature of the offenses, the duration and intensity of the crimes, most citizens
while accepting this limited intervention by the ICC regret the non-retroactive
application of the ICC statute. They complain that the period covered is too
limited and narrow, and will enable some big fish to escape the drag net. None-
theless, the punishment of even just a handful of the most visible perpetrators
of these atrocities will serve, if a symbolic purpose of assuaging the feelings of
their victims who want to see justice done.
13. Michael Reisman, Scenarios of Implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, in THE ROIE STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY,
BURLINGTON 281 (Marurio Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
14. Daniel Balint Kurti, Congo Looks to International Court for Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS WIRE,
June 2, 2004.
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How these will play out will be both interesting and revealing. Tradi-
tionally, prosecution of war crimes has always been directed against individuals
acting on behalf of the government. But in these two cases, governments that
have consistently been accused of committing atrocities are now accusing
individuals and organizations (rebel groups) of wreaking havoc in their
territories and thus deserving of international investigation, prosecution and
punishment. This is a new development in international criminal justice. The
absence of a global police force or an international prison facility requires the
cooperation of states in the implementation of the sentences. The experiences
of the ad hoc tribunals from Nuremberg, but particularly Yugoslavia and
Rwanda will be immensely beneficial to the ICC which is established to do the
same work, but only on a permanent basis. Most convicts of the Rwanda
tribunal are serving terms in the Arusha prison facility based on an international
agreement with Tanzania.
V. COMBATING AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Unfortunately, recent wars in Africa manifested on a grand scale all the
atrocities punishable under the Rome Statute. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
DRC and Uganda, the gory story is the same. People have been maimed,
mutilated, tortured, cannibalized, and women raped en masse, ignoring all
known rules of war. Both government and rebel troops are equally guilty of
these atrocities.
While helpful and complimentary, the ICC is not the best tool for com-
bating such massive crimes, which it has set out to enforce. As the ICC does
not have its own police, military or law enforcement agents, it therefore will be
relying on the assistance and cooperation of the states that have ratified its
statute in order to function effectively. Because of these institutional defects,
the court will have to work through the states in conducting investigations,
obtaining evidence and apprehending suspects. This makes it over dependent on
the states in order to function and is likely to be delaying the prosecution of
suspects, and delaying justice. 5 To reach a point whereby the ICC is called
upon to intervene is indicative of how bad a situation has become. Like curative
medicine, judicial enforcement of human rights arises after an injury has
occurred. But prevention as we all know is better than cure. In Africa,
addressing the factors that lead to these widespread human rights abuses will
work better than prosecuting a handful of the most visible renegades as
symbolic ofjustice being done.
15. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JusTIcE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 250 (2002).
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The effective enforcement of the judgment of the ICC requires consent,
complimentary efforts and cooperation of all states parties. This cooperation
should not be seen only in terms of states making available their prison facilities
for the detention of convicts. It should extend to helping Africa tackle its urgent
political, social and economic problems which persistence sustain the long
drawn African crisis that lead to these human rights abuses.
In spite of the nominal provision of fundamental human rights in virtually
all the constitutions of African states, violations persist with impunity. Observ-
ably, the human rights situation has been in continuous deterioration since the
different countries gained their independence. Wars, civil strife, ethnic tension
and clashes have all combined to cost Africa more than twelve million lives in
the last four decades. Factors responsible for these include, arbitrary colonial
boundaries that lumped together groups without consideration of their different
social and cultural differences, thus breeding distrust, tension and intermittent
violent clashes and civil wars. The absence of a reliable and functional demo-
cratic structure and over concentration of powers and resources on the central
government, by excluding certain regions makes them to resort to agitation for
autonomy, inevitably leading to violent clashes. In Africa, the root of all
massive human rights violations is political, and hardly judicial. Thus, the
solution requires not a judicial but a political means which takes into considera-
tions factors such as restructuring, political and economic empowerment of a
certain disadvantaged class or group. Unless the political, social and cultural
issues are addressed, the courts, including the ICC will not be able to provide
a lasting solution to the different abuses we are now witnessing in Africa.
During the trial of Jean Paul Akeyesu by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the evidence gathered revealed that there was a
premeditated intention, a centrally organized and meticulously executed plan to
annihilate a particular group of people-the Tutsis of Rwanda. And within few
months of the upheaval, close to a million people were killed. The Nigeria-
Biafra civil war claimed approximately the lives of more than three million
Igbo, mostly women and children. 6 From the coastal plains of Sierra Leone,
through the tropical forests of the Congo to the mountains of Uganda, millions
have perished because of unresolved political struggles. Neither the conviction
of Akeyesu by the Rwandan tribunal nor the prosecution of all those who bear
16. Aside from the simmering political tension in Nigeria in the mid-sixties, the immediate
precursor of the civil war was the general anti-Igbo uprising in the Northern part of the country which,
sweeping the region as a wave claimed the lives of about 100,000 Igbo and other indigenes of the then Eastern
Region. Several thousands more were wounded and property worth millions of Pounds destroyed. There were
no arrests and no prosecution. This led to a strong feeling that the Federal government tacitly or inadvertently
condoned the genocidal act, or was incapable of protecting the lives and property of its citizens. The feeling
of insecurity among Easterners, led to an agitation for a safer haven, which the political leaders of the then
Eastern region of Nigeria, called Biafra. Soon after, the Nigeria-Biafra civil war broke out.
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the greatest responsibility for the atrocities in Sierra Leone such as John
Koroma and Foday Sankor can effectively prevent a reoccurrence of similar
situation in the future. These issues require political solution. The solution will
start by institutionalizing an effective and functioning constitution, which will
not only guarantee fairness in the election of the leaders, but also check and
balance the powers of different governmental organs and prevent abuse. It will
regulate the relationship between the government and the people, and also
safeguard a meaningful participation of different ethnic groups in their
government and give them a sense of belonging. Observation and respect of
human rights is just one of the many obligations which customary international
law as well as conventions and judicial decisions have placed on states, and by
extension of the third party effect of fundamental human rights17 also on private
individuals. For example, as the fundamentals of human rights continue to
flourish in Europe, there is less and less likelihood of witnessing similar
upheaval that jolted the continent half a century ago and brought about
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals."8
17. Human rights as a right, privilege and immunity, which a state owes its subjects, run vertically
between the state and the subjects. However, there is a horizontal dimension to the enjoyment of these rights
which is known as the "third party effect" of fundamental human rights. This is a concept existing in German
constitutional mechanism and known as Drittwirkung. It is a process whereby private individuals, just like
the state are burdened with the duty to respect and observe the fundamental human rights of others.
Ordinarily, most human rights, especially of the first generation, are expressed in negative terms whereby the
state is only required to refrain from intruding into the private sphere of its subjects. It has been observed, that
even where the state restrains itself from breaching a citizens fundamental human rights, a private person can
violate those rights in a way that the state could have done. Thus, the state is called upon not only to respect
the rights of its subjects, but also to prevent private individuals from violating those rights, and will be held
responsible if it does not create a condition to prevent the violation of individual rights by private persons who
may not even be acting as agents of the state.
18. The inadvertence of Versailles to provide adequate support for the fragile democratic movement
in Germany after the First World War, the total absence of an economic recovery program and the frontal
umbrage caused by the punitive conditions of the armistice laid the unanticipated foundation for the Second
World War. Wisely avoiding the mistakes of the past, in Europe, the prosecution and conviction of the
principal Nazi officials was immediately followed by heavily financed economic recovery program for
Germany-The Marshall Plan. In addition, there was a conscious de-nazification of German political and
legal systems through deeply entrenched democratic process. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 was replaced
with the German Basic Law of 1949 (Grundgesetz) with its elegant but serious provisions for safeguarding
the dignity, rights and freedoms of every person. These political and economic developments are more
impacting in securing human rights and preventing future tragedies than the token imprisonment and
execution of few diehard Nazi henchmen. Today, neither Europe nor the rest of the world will by any stretch
of the imagination have reason to fear another Auschwitz, Dachau or Treblinka, or have angst that someday,
someone in Berlin, would march with military boots to Paris in order to settle a political difference by force.
The flowering of rule of law and democracy in Europe today has made such irredentist behavior both
anachronistic and unfashionable. Democracy and economic progress are just the best tools for securing
human rights. If similar efforts, as described above, are duplicated in Africa with the help of the international
community, a new day for human rights will surely dawn on the continent.
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While democracy may not be the panacea for all human rights abuses, it
has at least presented itself as the best form of government to check dictatorial
inclinations of leaders and helps at least prevent a society from descent into
wide spread human rights abuses. Democracy has the best enduring tool to
resolving every political issue, by taking into consideration each group's
opinion, hopes and fears. Therefore, while the ICC will remain relevant in
prosecuting the most visible perpetrators of human rights atrocities that touch
on and concern the interest of the international community, more attention
should continue to be paid to the factors that trigger off the abuses in the first
place. Professor Aka, in his proposal for resolving Africa's conflicts that cause
these abuses listed a comprehensive human rights model based on democracy
as a political system and integrating human rights education, economic progress,
political restructuring, attention to collective or group rights, and necessity for
external help as constituent elements. 9 Any realistic observer of Africa for the
past four decades will f'md no problem agreeing with this conclusion.
19. Aka, supra note 1, at 208.
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war that protect civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations; and
the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in
environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression,
extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of
regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak
State capacity to maintain law order".1
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks in London2 and Egypt' and other parts of the world
have once again reinforced the attention of the international community on the
problem of "terrorism."4 Earlier, the September 11 th attacks in New York and
Washington D.C. generated global attention to respond to terrorism and
countries launched a bevy of responses, including passing new laws that would
1. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change-A More Secure World Our SharedResponsibility, at 47,1 145, U.N. Doc A/59/565,
available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2005) [hereinafter More Secure World].
2. See London Under Attack, N.Y. TMES, July 8, 2005, at A22. See also Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Condemns 'Barbaric' London Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting Resolution
1611, U.N. DOC SC/8438 (July 7, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8438.doc.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2005).
3. See Security Council Condemns Weekend Terrorist Bombing in Egypt, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, July
27, 2005, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD= 15183&Cr=terror&Cr I (last visited Aug. 6, 2005).
4. This article does not go into a detailed discussion on the definition of terrorism. There may be
greater consensus for the definition of terrorism given the U.N. Secretary General's report, "In larger freedom:
towards development, security, and human rights for all," in which he observed: "I endorse fully the High-
level Panel's call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already
proscribed by conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act." The Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General - In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
For All, at 26, 91, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005, available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO5/270/78/PDF/NO527078.pdOpenElement (last visited Aug.
6, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]. But in his report, he has also observed, "It is time to set aside
debates on the so-called "State terrorism".' Id. Even to support the definition of terrorism that is proposed
by the Secretary General, I don't think this statement is necessary. It is important to recognize that experience
has demonstrated that states have used anti-terrorism laws to suppress dissent and to discourage democratic
movements and also to resist human rights accountability. These activities of suppression may sometimes
rise to the level of "State terrorism" and/or "State-sponsored terrorism" when the violence committed by the
state apparatus reaches alarming levels and innocent civilians have been victimized. But the question is
whether these acts should come under the ambit of the definition of terrorism or if they should remain within
the existing frontiers of international law. This is a different debate not addressed in this article. For further
reading, see Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 357 (2003).
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strengthen the anti-terrorism legal framework, tightening immigration policies5
and raising the bar of suspicion on allegedly disloyal persons.6 These laws have
had wide implications for human rights and civil liberties.7 There are signs that
even academic freedom is threatened due to the war on terror.' A number of
writings on this subject are concerned with the consequences of anti-terror laws
on human rights.9 These writings have pointed out how the so-called "war on
terror" has systematically compromised human rights and undermined
international law and how they can be resisted.1" The grave examples of breach
of international law and international human rights law to contain terrorism
include, but are not limited to, the detention of people in Guantanamo Bay 1
who are suspected by the U.S. to be terrorists and also the systematic abuse of
prisoners in Abu Ghraib. 12 Even more recently, questions concerning the
rendition of alleged terrorists to countries where they may encounter abuse or
torture and the jailing of terrorists by the US in Europe have caused
controversy. 13
5. See generally Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" In Our Midst Post-9/1 1:
Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683 (2005).
6. See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of
Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002).
7. See generally Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the
Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INTL L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 89 (2001).
8. See Michael A. Olivas, The War on Terrorism Touches the Ivory Tower--Colleges and
Universities After September 11: An Introduction, 30 J.C. & U.L. 233, 235-6 (2004).
9. See Editorial, Terrorism and Human Rights, EuR. H. R. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (2005). See also Tracy
Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing the Constitutionality of the Patriot
Act, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 75 (2003).
10. For an important article on the subject, see Harold Hongju Koh, "The Spirit of the Laws'"
Focus: September 11, 2001-Legal Response to Terror, 43 HARV. INT'LL.J. 23, 29 (2002). See also Upendra
Baxi, The "War on Terror" and the "War of Terror": Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive Incumbents, and the
"New" International Law - Prefatory Remarks on Two "Wars", 43 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 7 (2005).
11. See Dianne Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 263 (2004).
12. DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO GROUND TRUTH: INVESTIGATING
U.S. ABUSES IN THE WAR ON TERROR 1 (2004).
13. For further reading, see THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
LAW APPLICABLE To EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS (2004), http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf
(last visited 8 Dec. 2005).
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Human rights NGOs like Amnesty International14, Human Rights Watch 5
and Human Rights First 6 (earlier known as Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights) have written and compiled numerous reports on this subject. 7 Even at
the U.N., the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has
recognized that the war on terror should not disrespect human rights and that in
our zeal and enthusiasm to fight terrorism and to protect national security'8,
human rights and civil liberties 9 cannot be compromised.20 There is, of course,
another issue that is not well covered in media or legal literature- civilian
casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq as a consequence of the war on terror. The
civilians reported killed by military intervention in Iraq, minimum: 23,456 and
maximum: 26,559. These figures grossly demonstrate the futility of war and
large scale victimization that it effects on the families of the civilians who are
killed, which, in military terms, is called "collateral damage."'"
To further add to the existing discourse, the U.N. Secretary General con-
stituted a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which submitted
its report in late 2004 known as "A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility," in which the problem of terrorism has been further outlined and
a number of recommendations have been given.22 The Secretary General, while
preparing for the Meeting of the Heads of State and Government that was held
14. Amnesty Int'l, Rights at Risk, Amnesty International's concerns regarding security legislation
and law enforcement measures, Al Index ACT/30/001/2002, Jan. 18, 2002, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engACT300012002?OpenDocument [hereinafter Rights at Risk].
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORIsM: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
WORLDWIDE: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE 59TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMIsSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-Il (2003), available at www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-
bck.pdf.
16. DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN & PRITI PATEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BEHIND THE WIRE: AN UPDATE
TO ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS (2005).
17. See generally Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: The threat of a bad example:
undermining international standards as "war on terror" detentions continue, AI INDEx AMR/51/114/2003,
Aug. 19, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ndex/ENGAMR511142003; see also Amnesty
Int'l, United States of America: Restoring the rule of law: The right of Guantinamo detainees to judicial
review of the lawfulness of their detention, Al INDEX AMR 51/0931/2004, June 16, 2004, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510932004?open& of-ENG-USA.
18. See Sandra Coliver, Commentary to: The Johannesburg Principles on National Security,
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 12 (1998).
19. See The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 3 (1985)
20. See generally David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 247 (1996).
21. For further information, see Iraq Body Count Homepage, http://www.iraqbodycount.net (last
visited Aug. 6, 2005).
22. More Secure World, supra note 1.
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in New York in September 2005 to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the
passing of the Millennium Declaration, submitted a report to the General
Assembly in March 2005 entitled "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All."'23 However, this was not sufficiently
followed up in the outcome of the Millennium Summit in September 2005.24
The present article firstly provides an overview of how both terrorism and
global efforts to contain it violate human rights, undermine the rule-of-law, and
systematically destabilize governments, societies and people. This part will
focus on the problem and the need for the international community to seriously
address terrorism with a view to solving it or at least reducing the incidence of
attacks. 2
5
Second, the article provides a critical appraisal of the report of the U.N.
High-Level Panel and its potential use to garner greater support from the inter-
national community for responding to the threats in a unified and compre-
hensive manner.
Third, the article will critically examine the report of the U.N. Secretary
General, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All," presented to the U.N. General Assembly in March 2005 with
a view to understanding its broader implications for ensuring security, pro-
moting development, and protecting human rights.26 The key question is
whether it has successfully challenged the contemporary discourse on the "war
on terror ' 27 and "national security strategies", or merely reinforced these statist
notions by over-emphasizing the role of the state.
Fourth, the article examines the need for understanding the problem of
terrorism in a holistic manner so that human security, 28 human development, and
human rights are all put into the rule-of-law framework.29 This means that all
strategies that are intended to ensure collective security3 and development
23. In Larger Freedom, supra note 4.
24. See 2005 Word Summit Outcome, Sept. 15, 2005, U.N. Doc A/60/L. 1, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/msummit/millenni/2005/0913thirteenth.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
25. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: The "War on Terror",
4 SCHOLAR 209 (2002).
26. Priyankar Upadhyaya, Human Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Third World Concerns,
33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 71 (2004)
27. See Upendra Baxi, The "War on Terror" and the "War of Terror": Nomadic Multitudes,
Aggressive Incumbents and the "New" International Law, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 7 (2005).
28. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26.2 INT'L SEC. 87-102 (2001).
29. See ELLEN SEIDENSTICKER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,
HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2002), available at
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/0206harvard.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2005).
30. Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455 (1996).
2005]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
ought to be within the rule-of-law framework.3 The rule-of-law framework
should be applicable both in the domestic as well as international arenas.32
Fifth, the article will examine the role of international institutions,
including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in
developing responses to terrorism33 and whether the U.N. Secretary General's
proposal of a smaller Human Rights Council to replace the present bigger
Human Rights Commission can help in formulating more effective strategies.
This section will also examine whether there is a need for a paradigm shift34 in
responding to terrorism, particularly when the responses ought to be within the
rule-of-law framework so that they do not generate further insecurity in certain
communities. This may further exacerbate the threats leading to exploitation of
these situations by people who are determined to commit violence against
civilians to fulfill whatever goals, political or otherwise, they have in mind."
Sixth, the article examines the role of non-governmental organizations and
domestic and international civil society movements in relating security to
development and human rights.
The article recognizes that terrorism is a human rights violation. The
responses to terrorism should be steadfast and the international community
should be determined.36 The international legal framework for counter-
terrorism efforts needs to be strengthened.37 There is no doubt that there is a
real problem here.38 Unfortunately, global responses to terror threats have not
made the world a more secure place. Rather, it may be argued that countries
have become far less secure than they were when the worldwide 'war on terror'
began. Even a 2003 report by Amnesty International had observed that the "war
on terror" has made the world a more dangerous place and created divisions
which make conflict more likely.39 And definitely, it is clear that the
31. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Preemptive and Preventive Use of Force, Collective Security, and
Human Security, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7 (2004).
32. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. (2002).
33. Human Rights and Terrorism, C.H.R. Res. 2004/44, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 60th
Sess., U.N. Doc. EICN.4/RES/2004/44 (2004).
34. See Diane P. Wood, The Rule-of-Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. 0HR. L. REv. 455 (2003).
35. See generally Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International
Law Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461 (1992).
36. See generally Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Combating Terrorism, 26 WASH. Q. 163 (2003).
37. See generally M. CherifBassiouni, Legal Control oflnternational Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented
Assessment, 43 HARV. Irr'L L.J. 83 (2002).
38. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/48/267/Add. 1 (Sept. 21, 1993).
39. Warning Over War on Terror, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/2943192.stm (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
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misunderstandings among people belonging to different religions have
worsened since then. It is important that the international community take stock
of the situation and, as underlined in the U.N. Secretary General recent report,
take steps to ensure "larger freedom." There is a need for a paradigm shift in
the approach to responding to terrorism and it ought to include the need for
development policies as well as human rights protection, all within a rule-of-law
framework.4 1 This is the only way by which we can begin to solve the
problem.42 Given the fact that roots of the problem of terrorism lies in certain
historical and political issues that have survived for many years and have been
systematically manipulated by people with vested interests, the international
community needs to be mindful of the challenge. This is not just a law
enforcement issue- even though some law enforcement strategies can help in
preventing and investigating terrorism-related crimes. The core problem is much
more than that, and this is where the question of "larger freedom" assumes
significance. Larger freedom includes the need for our societies to move
towards guarding themselves from threats to human security that go beyond the
problem of terrorism-risks posed by poverty and other forms of impoverish-
ment, unemployment, corruption and lack of state capacity to manage natural
disasters and infectious diseases, lack of since efforts to tackle global warming
and climate change etc.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Terrorism is a serious problem that has affected numerous countries for
many years. However, the problem of terrorism received international attention
and serious global scrutiny only after the 9/11 attacks in New York and
Washington D.C. In fact, this sudden attention to a problem that has been
prevailing for many years has been the subject matter of criticism by some
countries and its people.4" There is an emerging global consensus that terrorism
affects people in a serious manner and violates the freedom from fear. The
randomness of a tube station or roadside bomb has a very powerful scare-
40. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 4.
41. See Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule-of-Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L REV 1691
(1999).
42. For understanding the official approach of the U.S., see WHiTE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
43. For example, the problem of LTTE in Sri Lanka and the violence in Kashmir are glaring
examples of attacks against civilian population by armed groups engaging in a political struggle. See
generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-SRI LANKA (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/dri/rls/hrrpt/2004/41744.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005)
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message attached- practically anyone who is unlucky to be present at the spot
of attack can be killed or seriously injured. A society that fears cannot achieve
the kind of goals its people want to achieve. Whenever there is a terrorist
attack, victimizations take place." The direct consequences of terror attacks
are: one, terrorist attacks result in victimization of the people who get killed,
injured or otherwise affected by the actual attacks themselves; two, the family
members of those victims of terror attacks are also affected because of their
loved ones being directly involved; and thirdly, the society in which the terrorist
attacks took place becomes a victim whereby people who live in that society
begin to live with a sense of fear and a lack of freedom to pursue their goals.
Some of the indirect consequences of terror attacks are: first, the
contemporary responses to the problem of terrorism has been to strengthen the
law enforcement and intelligence machinery so that stringent measures are
imposed on society, including passing of draconian laws that violate human
rights, civil liberties and compromise privacy rights; second, the occurrence of
racial profiling and hate crimes against people belonging to certain religious and
racial groups;45 third, rule-of-law is undermined both domestically and
internationally due to certain responses adopted by governments with a view to
ensuring national security, including use of torture and other extreme measures
in interrogating suspects; and fourth, development takes a back seat.
Once a terrorist attack takes place in a country, regardless of the human
consequences of these attacks, the entire preoccupation of the legislative,
executive, and the judicial apparatus of a country tends to focus on this problem.
This is because terrorism challenges the state's legitimate monopolization of
violence and threatens its claims to be the protector of citizens. Micro and
macroeconomic problems, poverty in poor countries, third world debt, and even
other major issues that affect humanity at large, like global warming and climate
change, tend to become secondary, and resources that would have been
otherwise directed at solving these issues are diverted towards fighting
terrorism. Sadly, the amount of resources (financial and human) that are put into
tackling the problem of terrorism have not even closely matched the results
gained in terms of ensuring greater security. Sometimes, the strategies used to
fight terrorism may actually incite greater threats. While it is possible that many
potential terrorist attacks may have been averted, given the fact that the
approach has not helped in providing a sense of greater security, there is a need
44. The responses to terrorism by the law enforcement agencies also produce victimization. For
example, the world witnessed the shooting of an innocent Brazilian electrician in London mistaken to be a
terrorist suicide bomber. See Glenn Frankel, Man Shot Dead by British Police Was Innocent Brazilian
Citizen-Bystander Mistaken for Suspect in Failed Bomb Attacks, WASH. POST, July 24, 2005, at A24,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/23/AR2005072300987.htnl
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
45. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
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for a serious reassessment. The possibility that anti-terror crusades enrich and
fortify conservative elements that thrive on real and imagined threats makes this
a complex issue of misappropriation of causes by vested interest groups.
There is also a tendency to label acts of terrorism, at times, in a whimsical
manner depending upon the country in which such acts took place or the alleged
organization or individual who carried out these attacks. The problem becomes
even more acute when one of the permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council is involved. This kind of labeling of acts of violence against civilian
population as "terrorist acts" does not go well with countries that are not
economically and politically powerful and there is a feeling of disenchantment
centering on whose lives matter more and whose matter less. It is not possible
to develop a true global consensus against a problem as serious as that of
terrorism until and unless the powerful countries take stock of their policies and
address these issues in an objective and fair manner.
Unfortunately, the so-called "war on terror" that was pursued in
Afghanistan' and Iraq47 has brought with it problems of legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention"' and also the legality of the Iraq war, prompting the
U.N. Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan to call the Iraq war "illegal. '"'
Multilateralism cannot work selectively and hence, the global war on terror is
also not working effectively. Professor Ramesh Thakur, Senior Vice Rector of
the United Nations University and Assistant Secretary General of the U.N.,
observed quite rightly that: "...Washington cannot construct a world in which
all others have to obey universal norms and rules, while it can opt out whenever,
as often, and for as long as it likes on such norms concerning nuclear tests, land
mines, international criminal prosecution, climate change, and other regimes."5"
Double standards in world affairs have reached an all-time high in the current
unipolar system.
It is important to understand that this is an area of law and public policy
where law (domestic and international), politics (domestic and international),
46. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Use ofArmed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533 (2002).
47. See generally Mohammed Ayoob, The War against Iraq: Normative and Strategic Implications,
in WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Thomas G.
Weiss et al. eds., 2004).
48. Paust, supra note 46.
49. See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3661134.stm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); For an interesting article
on the human rights implications of the Iraq war, see Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the War in Iraq,
4 J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2005).
50. Diplomacy's Odd Couple, the US. andthe UN, UNU UPDATE (July-Aug. 2002) (The Newsletter
of United Nations University and its network of research and training centres and programmes), available at
http://update.unu.edu/archive/issuel9_2.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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ethics, and international governance come into contact with each other and the
challenge is to bring the common humanity of the international community to
address the problem. It is notable that, at least in a rhetorical sense, this
common humanity was brought together in passing the Millennium Declarat-
ion51 in 2000.52 It is another matter that states have failed to fulfill the commit-
ments that were made and are far from actually fulfilling the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs)." The intentions and resources of the states to
recognize and pursue the MDGs54 ought to be put in place.
III. REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE
The U.N. Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan constituted a High-level Panel
on global security threats and reform of the international system on November
3, 2003." The panel was "tasked with examining the major threats and
challenges the world faces in the broad field of peace and security, including
economic and social issues insofar as they relate to peace and security, and
making recommendations for the elements of a collective response." 6 In the
Executive Summary to the report, the panel observed that "there are six clusters
of threats which the world must be concerned with now and in the decades
ahead: war between States; violence within states, including civil wars, large-
scale human rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious disease and
environmental degradation; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime."5 The fact that the
panel recognized these clusters of threats demonstrated the importance of taking
a holistic perspective on threats that are affecting humanity. Further, it also
brought to the forefront the need for collective action within the U.N. as the
relevance and importance of each of these threats may vary from country to
51. See G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. DOc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000), available at
www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
52. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation
of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 1 39, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/282
(Aug. 27, 2004).
53. For a comprehensive understanding the human rights issues relating to the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), see Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human
Rights andDevelopment Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS.
Q. 755 (2005).
54. See generally UNITED NATIONS, U.N. MILLENNIJM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
55. More Secure World, supra note 1.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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country and society to society. 8 Discussing the policies for prevention of
threats, it was quite rightly observed that, "Development has to be the first line
of defense for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.
Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen
States' capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and proliferation.
Development makes everyone more secure. There is an agreed international
framework for how to achieve these goals, set out in the Millennium
Declaration59 and the Monterrey Consensus, but implementation lags."'
The recognition of development as a key issue and as a first line of defense
against threats, including terrorism, is significant for a number of reasons.
There have been many debates on this issue in the context of understanding the
causes of terrorism." Discussing the causes of terrorism, in the chapter on
economic factors, Red Robert Gurr observed, "...structured inequalities within
countries are breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and
terrorism specifically." 2 The fact of the matter is that development can help in
creating more equal societies which are less fertile grounds for breeding
terrorism. While lack of development may certainly not be an excuse for
terrorist acts, it certainly is a contributing factor. The issue of development cuts
across all six clusters of threats mentioned in the report. It has the potential to
act as a strong deterrent against all sorts of threats and to provide a collective
security system. But the real problem comes when states tend to choose among
the threats they perceive to be most urgent from their perspective or,
alternatively put, to prioritize them. Any attempts to do such random choosing
of the threats, thereby giving more attention to some threats and ignoring others,
will ultimately affect the capacity of the international community to develop a
collective security system.63 While the thematic representation of the threats
and their relationship have been well presented in the report, the report could
have also underlined the need for individual states not to engage in choosing
58. See generally, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, And Sovereignty: The Grand Themes
of UNReforn, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619 (2005).
59. See U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at
www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportChapterOFrontmatter-highres.pdf(last visited Nov. 16,
2005)
60. More Secure World, supra note 1.
61. See generally J.M.B. Porter, Osama Bin-Laden, Jihid, and Sources of linternational Terrorism,
13 IND. INT'L & COMi. L. REV. 871 (2003).
62. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM, THE INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT ON DEMOCRACY,
TERRORISM AND SECURITY, THE CLUB DE MADRID SERIES ON DEMOCRACY AND TERRORISM 20 (2005),
available at http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-I.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
63. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996).
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their own certain threats and addressing them, while ignoring those of others.
Treating terrorism as a zero-sum-game leads to a lose-lose scenario for all
except the terrorists. The summary of recommendations for addressing the
threat due to terrorism is quite comprehensive and helpful.6"
IV. REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, "IN LARGER FREEDOM:
TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL"
In March 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, submitted a report to
the U.N. General Assembly entitled: "In Larger Freedom: Towards Develop-
ment, Security and Human Rights for All." '65 The core philosophy behind this
report is clearly reflected in the words of the Secretary General in a statement
to the General Assembly in which he observed, "What I am proposing amounts
to a comprehensive strategy. It gives equal weight and attention to the three
great purposes of this Organization: development, security and human rights,
all of which must be underpinned by the rule-of-law." 66
The geo-political context in which the report was presented provides scope
for bringing together the heads of state and government to see each other's
viewpoint on important issues affecting the international community. The
Executive Summary of the report notes:
The world must advance the causes of security, development and
human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will
not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy
development without security, and it will not enjoy either without
respect for human rights.... Hence, the cause of larger freedom can
only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global collaboration
among states.
67
64. On the problem of terrorism, the summary of recommendations of the high-level panel report
observed that the United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote a
comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including: (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or
facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule-of-law and
democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized
crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse; (b) Efforts to counter extremism and
intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate; (c) Development of better instruments
for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and
human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence -sharing, where possible; denial and
interdiction, when required; and financial controls; (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment
and operations; (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defense. In Larger Freedom, supra note
4, at 82-83, lI 38(a)-(e).
65. Id.
66. U.N. Secretary-General, Statement to the General Assembly (Mar. 21, 2005),
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/sg-statement.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
67. In Larger Freedom, supra note 4.
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It is important to note that the report of the Secretary General developed
the concepts of 'collective security' and 'cluster of threats' as observed in the
High-level Panel's report.68 However, this report goes further. It provides a
philosophical and practical coherence to the notion of collective security by
drawing from the U.N. Charter's words, "larger freedom." While human rights
and development69 have been discussed before, the inclusion of security into the
focus of the attention of the international community is desirable, but is not
without debate.7 ° The notion of "larger freedom" has itself been contested in the
past and traces of such contest can be seen in the debates that prevailed during
the passing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)7" and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights
(ICESCR).7 2 We have come a long way since the time when grave doubts were
expressed about whether there can be anything like economic and social rights.
The integral understanding of civil and political rights (CPR) and economic and
social rights (ESR)73 is, in my view, recognizing the notion of "larger freedom."
Another facet of "larger freedom" is the recognition of different types of threats
to humanity and the need for preventing those threats, with a view to ensuring
the three freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live
in dignity. The report has provided an elaborate discussion on each of these
freedoms and how national strategies and global action need to be tuned to
ensure that each of those freedoms is fully protected.74
In the section on freedom from fear, the report underlines the need for a
"shared assessment" of threats and a "common understanding" of the
68. See Jennifer Moore, Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal Framework
for Coordinated Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43 (2004).
69. See Hans-Otto Sano, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration
of Human Rights and Development, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 734 (2000).
70. PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 122-66 (2004); Peter Uvin, On High Moral
Ground: The Incorporation of Human Rights by the Development Enterprise, 17 PRAXIs 1 (2002), available
at fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/xvii/Uvin.pdf; Hugo Slim, A Response to Peter Uvin: Making Moral Low Ground:
Rights as the Struggle for Justice and the Abolition of Development, 17 PRAXIS 1 (2002), available at
fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/xvii/Slim.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
71. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. DOc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
72. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976).
73. Report of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights to the Economic and Social
Council, I 10, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. DOC. E/2002/68 (May 20, 2002).
74. See Shashi Tharoor, Are Human Rights Universal?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (June 2002), available
at www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=890&lang=l&m=series (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005).
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obligations of the states.75 Like the High-level panel report, the U.N. Secretary
General's report takes a broader approach to threats and observes:
The threats to peace and security in the 21st century include not just
international war and conflict, but terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, organized crime and civil violence. They also include
poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation,
since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these
threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of
them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international
system.76
This argument is very important. Through it, the U.N. Secretary General
is trying to speak to countries which perceive their own understandings of threat
perceptions to be most important and urgent. However, the difficulty lies in
making states hear, understand, and appreciate this. The fact is that non-
recognition of different threats can potentially result in the undermining of
States as the fundamental unit of the international system. But this does not
give any space, whatsoever, to the international civil society and the global
society movements that have, in recent times, seriously contested the state-
centric international system. Further, it is conceivable that this argument will
not be accepted by powerful states, who in their unilateralist approach to
international governance will continue to function with their own national
interests in mind. There is no doubt that the notion of collective security is the
only way by which we can begin to solve the problem of terrorism at a global
level. The fact that Annan emphasizes the upholding of larger freedom through
development, security, and enforcing human rights for all ought to be well
received.77 But moving beyond the powerful rhetoric of this argument,
contemporary state practice of powerful states like the U.S.A. and U.K.
demonstrate little support to this notion, besides giving lip service.
The report has observed that:
The strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be
based on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting
to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds
and materials; it must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must
75. In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, at 24, 175.
76. Id. at 24-5, 1 78.
77. See generally Mac Darrow and Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture and Conflict: A Califor Human
Rights Accountability in Development Cooperation, 27 HuM. RTs. Q. 471 (2005).
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develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human
rights.78
There can be few disagreements on these five pillars, but the key issue still
remains as to how the powerful states are going to prioritize the attention that
needs to be given among the five pillars. For example, it is a well known fact
that the U.N. Secretary General's fifth pillar, "it must defend human rights",79
has taken a significant beating due to the war on terror. There are numerous
instances of the war on terror compromising human rights and civil liberties.8"
V. RESPONSES TO TERRORISM WITHIN THE RULE-OF-LAW FRAMEWORK
The response to terrorism ought to be based on a holistic and inter-related
understanding of human security, human rights, and human development-and
all within the human rights and the rule-of-law framework.8' This is a
significant challenge and herein lays the core of the problem.82  The
contemporary nature of threats in the form of catastrophic terrorism caused by
suicide bombers or others who are systematically engaged in committing similar
acts are indeed acts of terrorism.8 3  The domestic and international legal
framework that is being put in place in the form of responses to terrorism is
desirable." But what is not acceptable is when individual states resort to
unilateral actions that are not justified within the international law framework,
or commit acts that violate the Geneva Conventions or the Convention Against
Torture.85 Further, the counter-terrorist legal framework should not violate
78. In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, at 26, 1 88.
79. Id.
80. See generally, Kenneth Roth, The Fight against Terrorism: The Bush Administration's
Dangerous Neglect of Human Rights, in WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 247, 113-131 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 2004).
81. For further reading, see Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: Unintended Consequences
of the War on Terrorism, in WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 247, 98-112 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 2004).
82. See generally Paul Hoffmnan, Human Rights and Terrorism, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 932 (2004).
83. For an international relations perspective on terrorism, see Shashi Tharoor, September 11, 2002:
Understanding and Defeating Terrotism One Year Later, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9 (2003).
84. For a critical perspective on responses to terrorism, see Martha Crenshaw, Unintended
Consequences: How Democracies Respond to Terrorism, 21 FLETCHiER F. WORLD AFF. 153 (1997). See also
Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment and War, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1217 (2002) (discussing
past acts of terror and the United States' response to them).
85. For an extensive discussion of the question as to what constitutes terrorism, see Gross, supra
note 7. See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (Dec. 10, 1984). The
Convention covers all "persons" and is not limited to categories of detainees such as prisoners of war. Id.
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international human rights norms and the domestic constitutional and human
rights guarantees." There is a specific challenge that is being posed to
international human rights law.17 Besides the fact that these actions undermine
the moral legitimacy of states, they also undermine the institutional legitimacy
of the United Nations. The rule-of-law framework,88 both domestically and
internationally, cannot have different types of rules and principles depending
upon the powerful nature of the country involved. Individuals and states ought
to abide by the rule-of-law framework. 9 Further, use of force should not be the
sole response as it is given to believe in the war on terror. Individual states,
while passing counter terrorist legislation, ought to take into consideration the
human rights implications and its potential for abuse by law enforcement
authorities." Writing about the reference to war on terror, Mrs. Mary Robinson,
Former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights observed:
That the language of being "at war with terrorism" was used from the
beginning has direct, and nefarious, implications. It brought a
subtle-or not so subtle-change of emphasis in many parts of the
world: order and security became priorities that trumped all other
concerns. As was often the case in the past during times of war, the
emphasis on national order and security frequently involved
curtailment of democracy and human rights.... Questions arise as to
when, if ever, this war on terrorism will be won. Are we, as the
novelist and commentator Gore Vidal9 has characterized it,
embarked on a Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace?92
86. See Terrorism and Human Rights: Preliminary Report Prepared by Ms. KalliopiK. Koufa, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (June 7, 1999), available at www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn4/sub2/e-
cn4sub2_99_27.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); see also Terrorism and Human Rights: Progress Report
Prepared by Ms. Kalliopi K Koufa, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (June 27, 2001), available at
www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn4/sub2/e-cn4sub2_O 1_31 .pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
87. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,
15 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 101, 120-21 (2002); and for a response, Hillary Charlesworth, Author, Author!: A
Response to David Kennedy, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 127 (2002).
88. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule-of-Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1997).
89. See generally Rights at Risk supra note 14.
90. For understanding this discussion in the context of India, see C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights
Implications of National Security Laws in India: Combating Terrorism while Preserving Civil Liberties, 33
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195 (2005).
91. GORE VIDAL, PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE (2002). This was referred to in Mary
Robinson, Foreword, in WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 247, xvii (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 2004).
92. Mary Robinson, supra note 91.
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The fact that young people in different parts of the world are ready and
willing to die for a cause (however legitimate or illegitimate it may be) seems
there is something fundamental that has gone wrong. It is not acceptable to
justify these actions because of certain policies that have impacted certain
people or populace belonging to particular religions. But the fact of the matter
is that killing innocent civilians cannot be justified for any cause, including as
a response to the killing of innocent civilians. Further, suicide bombing poses
a specific type of danger that is not being properly responded to.93 Under these
circumstances, there is a more urgent need for the international community to
help in building societies which are based on principles of democracy, good
governance, and human rights and development so that they do not serve as
recruiting grounds for terrorists.
Further, the war on terror should be limited by principles of the rule-of-law
and human rights.' Unfortunately, there have been numerous instances
(ongoing) that have not given any encouraging signals that even otherwise,
responsible countries have resorted to such measures that have violated
principles of international law, international human rights law, and international
humanitarian law. In all these matters, enforcement remains a key problem.9"
The U.N. Secretary General has quite rightly brought to the attention of the
international community to this issue in his report, when he observed that:
Terrorists are accountable to no one. We, on the other hand, must
never lose sight of our accountability to citizens all around the world.
In our struggle against terrorism, we must never compromise human
rights. When we do so, we facilitate achievement of one of the
terrorist's objectives. By ceding the moral high ground, we provoke
tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among precisely those
parts of the population where terrorists find recruits.'
In other words, hawkish responses feed into the loop of violence and are
exactly the kind of appetizers hoped for by terrorists. He has clearly underlined
the need for counter-terrorist measures to be in conformity to human rights, and
recommended to the Commission on Human Rights the appointment of a special
rapporteur to specifically deal with this issue.
93. Scott Atran, Mishandling Suicide Terrorism, 27 WASH. Q. 67 (2004).
94. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THENAMEOFCOUNTER-TERRORISM: HuMAN RiGHTS ABusEs 10-11
(2003), available at www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
95. See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397
(1999).
96. In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, at 27, 94.
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The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, a U.S.-based NGO in its
September 2003 report entitled, "Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and
Security for the Post-September 11 United States" quite rightly asserted:
The United States' detachment from its own rule-of-law principles is
having a profound effect on human rights around the world. Counter-
terrorism has become the new rubric order under which opportunistic
governments seek to justify their actions, however offensive to human
rights. Indeed, governments long criticized for human rights abuses
have publicly applauded U.S. policies, which they now see as an
endorsement of their own longstanding practices.97
What we are witnessing is all-round degradation of the rights environment, led
at the forefront by the most powerful state.
The rule-of-law that is being discussed is two-dimensional. First, it is the
domestic rule-of-law which the counter-terrorist measures ought to conform to.
This means that the legislation being passed to counter terrorism and other
policies that are being implemented worldwide (e.g., the shoot-to-kill policy in
the U.K.) ought to conform to domestic legal, constitutional, and other human
rights legislation. They should also conform to the judicial decisions that have
interpreted the law, providing the scope of its enforcement. Further, whether
the particular counter-terrorist measures are in conformity to the legislation
ought to be determined by an independent judicial tribunal. The countries
should also establish human rights commissions" and/or other commissions
such as the Independent Commission for Police Complaints, which can receive
complaints against the law enforcement authorities. It is important that counter-
terrorist measures do not discourage civil society activism and other forms of
genuine criticism or other forms of legal and non-violent resistance to draconian
laws and policies. These are part of the protection of the domestic rule-of-law
framework.
The international rule-of-law framework is protected on the basis of
countries adhering to the principles of international law, international human
rights, and international humanitarian law. It is unfortunate that contemporary
history has numerous examples when international rule-of-law has been
undermined. There is a responsibility on the part of all nations, including the
most powerful ones, to once again reiterate that respect for the rule-of-law
should be the basis by which peace and security can be ensured. Other.vise,
97. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND
SEcuRrrY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES V (2003) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE].
98. For a critical perspective on National Human Rights Commissions (NHRCs), see C. Raj Kumar,
National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights,
19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 259 (2003).
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hypocrisy becomes institutionalized in the international system where words
become meaningless if unsupported by actions.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in the same report that was
previously discussed, gives the negative consequences of not respecting the
rule-of-law and observed:
The U.S. government can no longer promise that individuals under its
authority will be subject to a system bound by the rule-of-law. In a
growing number of cases, legal safeguards are now observed only so
far as they are consistent with the chosen ends of power. Yet, too
many of the policies that have led to this new norm not only fail to
enhance U.S. security... but also exact an unnecessarily high price
in liberty. For a government unbound by the rule-of-law presides
over a society that is something less than free."
In a similar vein, recently, in a statement entitled "On Terrorists and Torturers"
issued by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to mark
the Human Rights Day 2005, she observed: "The law provides the proper
balancing between the legitimate security interests of the State with the
individual's own legitimate interests in liberty and personal security. It must do
so rationally and dispassionately even in the face of terror. For even though it
may be painted as an obstacle to efficient law enforcement, support for human
rights and the rule of law actually improves human security. Ultimately, respect
for the rule of law lessens the likelihood of social upheaval, creating greater
stability both for a given society and for its neighbors. Pursuing security
objectives at all costs may create a world in which we are neither safe nor free.
This will certainly be the case if the only choice is between the terrorists and the
torturers". I°°
VI. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN ENSURING LARGER FREEDOM
'Larger freedom' can be ensured only if development, security, and human
rights are assured for all. This means that the international institutions which
are working to deal with different issues need to be empowered so that they are
in a position to respond to different types of threats. The reform that is being
suggested both in the High-level Panel's report and the U.N. Secretary
General's report are indeed positive developments. The U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights will have an important role to play. Already,
99. LAWYERS COMMrrTEE, supra note 97.
100. Louise Arbour, Statement by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewO 1/3B9B202D5A6DCDBCC 12570DO0034
CF83?opendocument (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
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this office' has taken efforts in the past to bring in greater attention to the
economic and social rights and also issues relating to extreme poverty 2 and the
right to development.' 3
The UNDP has also played an important role in developing rights-based
approaches to poverty reduction and other issues relating to development and
governance."° Relating to development and security, both human rights are
something that can have a significant impact on the work of the U.N. Office for
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. While there are special rapporteurs
for some of these issues, it is time that the commission takes this matter to the
domestic human rights machinery. In particular, it will be very helpful to
involve the national human rights institutions (NHRIs).
The international human rights framework and other international legal
frameworks, when it comes enforcing international law in the states, need to
rely on the domestic enforcement machinery. It is here that the national human
rights institutions and/or similar commissions come to play an important role.
The NHRIs can take initiatives at the domestic level in relating the notion of
"larger freedom" to the domestic constitutional, human rights, and legislative
measures that are in place. As discussed earlier, there are profound human
rights implications of counter-terrorism measures and draconian laws that are
being passed in different countries. If the concept of 'larger freedom' is being
discussed at the domestic level, then it is possible to prevail upon the states that
we need to move towards human security from our narrow and traditional
understanding of state or national security. This is not to undermine the existing
importance of the state, but rather to further strengthen the capacity of the state
to respond to a variety of threats. In this regard, impact of such an approach
will have good effect on both developing and developed countries.
In developing countries, which are also taking counter-terrorism measures,
there will be a better understanding of the causes of terrorism and also more
viable and sustainable responses to terrorism with a view to expanding freedoms
by ensuring development and human rights. This will relate well with the
efforts of the international community to achieve the MDGs within a timeframe
and help in fulfilling the mandate of the Special Rapporteurs on the Right to
Development and Extreme Poverty and Human rights, both of which are
101. Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, C.H.R. Res. 2004/23, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum.
Rts., 60th Sess., I 10(e), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/23 (2004).
102. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Draft Guidelines: Human Rights
Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, 13 (2002), available at
www.unhchr.ch/development/povertyfinal.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005)
103. G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186-87, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
104. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, POVERTY REDUCION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
PRACTICE NOTE (2003), available at www.undp.org/poverty/practicenotes/povertyreduction-
humanrights0603.p1lf. (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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inextricably connected to the idea of 'larger freedom.' As far as developing
countries are concerned, it will provide a firm basis for promoting multila-
teralism in the efforts to counter terrorism, and this effort should go along with
the efforts to respond to other threats. The fact of the matter is that both
developed and developing countries need to work together in creating a more
secure world. Collective security means that there is need for partnership at all
levels and most importantly, to realize that security, development and human
rights-are all related to each other and indeed help in reinforcing each other.
Unilateralism cannot work under the rubric of war on terror. There is no doubt
that for the fight against terrorism to succeed, there is a need for seriously
empowering the role of international institutions in a genuine manner. It is
important for the U.S. to understand this; Shashi Tharror, U.N. Under Secretary
General for Communications and Public Information, in an article in Foreign
Affairs observed:
The U.N., from the start, assumed the willingness of its members to
accept restraints on their own short-term goals and policies by
subordinating their actions to internationally agreed rules and
procedures, in the broader long-term interests of world order.... The
U.N. was meant to help create a world in which its member states
would overcome their vulnerabilities by embedding themselves in
international institutions, where the use of force would be subjected
to the constraints of international law. Power politics would not
disappear from the face of the earth but would be practiced with due
regard for universally upheld rules and norms. Such a system also
offered the United States-then, as now, the world's unchallenged
superpower-the assurance that other countries would not feel the need
to develop coalitions to balance its power. Instead, the U.N. provided
a framework for them to work in partnership with the United States.'l 5
VII. ROLE OF NGOs1 6 AND THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY MOVEMENTS
The non-governmental organizations have an important role to play in the
fight against terrorism, particularly with regard to activism.0 " The role of civil
society is important and should be seen in the light of judicial protection of
105. Shashi Tharoor, Why America Still Needs the United Nations: The Power ofLegitimacy, 82 FOR.
AFF. 5 (2003), available at http://www.shashitharoor.com/articles/foreignaffairs.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
106. See Jurij Daniel Aston, The United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations:
Guarding the Entrance to a Politically Divided House, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 943, 948 (2001).
107. Wendy Schoener, Non-Governmental Organizations and Global Activism: Legal and Informal
Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537 (1997).
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human rights as well as constitutionalism."8 There are a variety of NGOs
worldwide who are working in various issues relating to terrorism. These
include not only international human rights NGOs, but also a number of grass-
root organizations, religious groups, voluntary groups, aid organizations, and
others. As discussed in previous sections, the challenge posed by terrorism is
significant and that it is impossible for states and even the inter-governmental
organizations to respond adequately. At the community level, the NGOs play
a very important role, whether it is to educate the populace about the problem
of terrorism or to prevent and dissuade people of different faiths to resort to
violence of any kind. This violence may be used either to achieve a legitimate
political goal or as hate crimes against people belonging to a particular religion,
region or race.
There have been numerous reports of hate crimes or other sorts of attacks
against people belonging to the Muslim religion in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks
in the U.S., and there are already reports of similar instances in the U.K. after
the London bomb attacks. While these were by and large sporadic instances,
these raise serious concerns not only among the members of the particular
religious community, but also others. In this regard, the NGOs can play a very
important role, particularly in educating those people who are involved in
interacting with diverse members of the society. NGOs also provide aid and
relief during post-conflict situations. It is important that the international
community recognize the role of NGOs and to empower them so that they can
perform their functions better."°
One of the strongest and most powerful ways by which the 'war on terror'
was challenged, in particular the war against Iraq, was the development of
vibrant international civil society 1° movements worldwide protesting against
the war."' Nelson Mandela has said in this context that the world has two
superpowers, the United States and world public opinion. While these efforts
were not successful, it provides a strong and clear message to the countries that
were engaged in the war in the name of its own people, that there are a vast
majority of its citizens who are not in agreement with the decision to go to war.
108. See C. Raj Kurnar, Moving Beyond Constitutionalization and Judicial Protection of Human
Rights: Building on the Hong Kong Experience and Civil Society Empowerment, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 281 (2003).
109. For a critical perspective, see Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs, 10 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2003).
110. See generally Gordon A. Christenson, World Civil Society and the International Rule-of-Law,
19 HuM. RTs. Q. 724 (1997).
111. Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, The Paradox of Civil Society, 7 J. DEM. 38, 38-52 (1996).
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An empowered civil society is in a position to make the government of the day
re-examine its policies and decision and in some circumstances change it." 2
VIII. THE WAY FORWARD
The problem of terrorism has indeed received global attention. The
responses it has generated are truly significant and have a profound impact on
law, politics and society. At the same time, it is important for the international
community to come to terms with the fact that whatever strategies that were
evolved for fighting terrorism by pursuing the "war on terror" are just not
working. All indications are that the violence has been continuing in the
battleground of the war on terror e.g. Iraq and also Afghanistan. The fact of the
matter is that it is important for the international community to embrace the
U.N. Secretary General's report "in larger freedom" and to accept his recom-
mendations in entirety. However, accepting his recommendation is one thing;
moving towards a paradigm shift in pursuing the "war on terror" is another
thing.
A number of issues need to be considered. It is important that the inter-
national community distinguishes two aspects of terrorism-related violence.
The first aspect relates to terrorism in the form of individuals and/organizations
involved in criminal acts, organized crime, money laundering, including
corruption and using these resources, including connections, for engaging in
terrorist activities. The issue of corruption is also a very important dimension
to counter-terrorism efforts, insofar as it is related to organized crime, money
laundering and other crimes." 3 Corruption affects state capacity to deal with
various threats including terrorism. It definitely can compromise state security
and it is important to examine corruption from the standpoint of its implications
for human rights1 4 and the rule-of-law. "5 This aspect is clearly criminal and the
approach ought to be to use the domestic and international law enforcement
machinery to ensure that the people who are engaged in these activities are
punished.
112. See generally Dana R.Fisher & Jessica F. Green, Understanding Disenfranchisement: Civil
Society and Developing Countries' Influence and Participation in Global Governance for Sustainable
Development, 4 GLOBAL ENVNT'L POL.65, 65-84 (2004).
113. See generally C. Raj Kumar, Corruption and Human Rights - Promoting Transparency in
Governance and the Fundamental Right to Corruption-Free Service in India, 17 COLuM. J. ASIAN L. 31
(2003).
114. See C. Raj Kumar, Corruption in Japan: Institutionalizing the Right to Information,
Transparency and the Right to Corruption-Free Governance, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2004).
115. See generally C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Approaches of Corruption Control
Mechanisms-Enhancing the Hong Kong Experience of Corruption Prevention Strategies, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 323 (2004).
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There is another aspect to the problem of terrorism- a need for greater
caution, creativity and political judgment. This concerns the growth of religious
fundamentalism and extremism that is being advocated to achieve certain
causes. Here, the battle takes place in the minds of youths in many parts of the
world and it is clearly an ideological issue, which is given a huge dose of
religions extremism. The result is there is a proliferation of thinking, and even
discourse, advocating certain acts and/or glorifying, and at times tolerating, acts
that are patently unacceptable to humane conduct. The traditional law enforce-
ment approach of dealing with crimes, including crimes relating to terrorism,
will not be entirely successful. There is a need for greater engagement within
the community and in particular to involve the right thinking members of the
particular religious community. The change has to come from within and an
environment ought to be created in which violent acts of any kind are not
tolerated. But for this change to come within, the international community and
in particular the powerful countries have to take responsibility for their actions.
Respect for international law, international human rights law and
international humanitarian law should be emphasized so that multilateralism
remains the approach to fight global terrorism. International institutions need
to be empowered. The fight against terrorism should take place at different
levels. While the international community takes efforts to ensure greater
security, it is also important to understand security much beyond national
security. Along with this, efforts need to be taken to address development
issues, including third world aid and debt. The partnership between developing
and developed countries should be based upon a sense of common humanity
where threats of all kinds are jointly addressed. Thus, national security
strategies should bear in mind that human security threats are much wider and
that countries formulating these strategies should bear in mind the notion of
'larger freedom." This will ensure that security and development are achieved
within the human rights framework.
Domestically, it is important to recognize that the fight against terror
should not take any undue priority to the neglect of other equally important
issues relating to development and governance." 6 The counter-terrorist laws
and practices that are being developed should be based upon greater respect for
human rights and that should be within the rule-of-law framework. Further,
there is a need for strengthening the working of national human rights
institutions, courts and other related departments so that the goal is to achieve
larger freedom and in the process, ensure security, development and human
rights. The domestic constitutional commitment and laws and regulations ought
116. See generally Saladin AI-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on
Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1999).
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to be protected in the fight against terrorism so that civil liberties are not
undermined.
It is important that the international community recognizes global terrorism
as a problem that needs to be tackled by the people themselves, as much by the
states. After all, it is civilians who suffer the most from this phenomenon, not
faceless bureaucrats or uniformed soldiers. Just as there has been a fair amount
of success in seeking partners in development in the form of collaboration with
people in developing countries by organizations like the UNDP, even in the
fight against terror, there is a need for partnership. This partnership can be with
both domestic and international NGOs as well as civil society movements.
Worldwide, there are a significant number of people who are ready to join hands
with governments to legitimately fight against terrorism. But for this fight to
be morally coherent and universally acceptable, it should be based upon prin-
ciples and not make citizens accomplices in militarist build-ups. The inter-
national community ought to speak in one voice along with the international
institutions so that terrorism of any kind is not condoned in one part of the
world, while condemned in another.
Larger freedom is about ensuring people a variety of choices in their life.
These choices are possible only if their security, development and human rights
are assured. Values of love, non-violence and fraternity, are essential to the
progress of societies and for the common good of the humanity. The present
state of anti-terrorism efforts have given little assurance to people who are
perpetually in fear of insecurity, who are living without any hope for develop-
ment and whose human rights are violated day in and day out.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeepers, and peacekeeping, have had a special place in society since
the time of the Bible,' and indeed have taken on a new, international dimension
since the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations (U.N.). 2
Unfortunately, since the creation of the United Nations peacekeepers (U.N.
peacekeepers) as a reality of international conflict intervention,3 a disparity in
* M.A. Candidate, Politics; J.D., 2005, Albany Law School of Union University; B.A., Politics,
B.A., History, New York University. The author would like to thank Professor James T. Gathii for his
direction and enthusiasm in the writing of this article. She is grateful to her parents for their unending
encouragement and support in this and everything; to her transatlantic advisor, John Harrington; to Onchan;
and her family and friends. Special thanks and recognition go to the Board and staff of the ILSA Journal of
International and Comparative Law, especially Jenny Adelman, for their interest in and work on this article.
The author welcomes comments on this article to arharrington@gmail.com.
1. Matthew 5:9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.").
2. See MICHAELP. SCHARF, THELAW OFINTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS 1-10 (2001) (describing
the Allies' efforts to create and implement a functional international organization, known as the United
Nations (U.N.), in the wake of their victory in World War If).
3. Id. at 477-524 (outlining the administrative and legal governance of U.N. peacekeepers). See
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how one defines peacekeepers has been created. For laymen, Webster's
Dictionary defines "peacekeeping" as "the preserving of peace."4 For lawyers,
Black's Law Dictionary does not define the term outright, but defines the
concept of "peace" at law as "[a] state of public tranquility; freedom from civil
disturbance or hostility."5 However, for an increasingly visible number of
people living in the areas to which U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed,
peacekeepers are defined in other terms: rapists,6 patrons of prostitutes,7 child
pornographers,' molesters,9 absentee fathers,' ° tormentors," spreaders of
contagion and disease, 2 to name some of the most egregious. Indeed, the U.N.
itself defines the multi-national contingent which it deploys as peacekeepers 3
to trouble spots across the globe not only as humanitarians, but also as "boys,'
'4
using the idea of "[b]oys will be boys"'" to justify supplying the peacekeepers
with pouches of condoms along with their uniforms and official status. 6
also GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PEACEKEEPERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-3 (2004) (describing the recent expansion of the peacekeeping function
of the U.N. in terms of troops and monetary expenditures).
4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, www.m-w.com/peacekeeping (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1166 8th ed. (2004).
6. See, e.g., Nick Wadhams, UN. Probes Sex Abuse Allegations in Congo, AP ONLINE REGIONAL
-AFRICA, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30. 2005).
7. See, e.g., 1d.; Leyla Linton, Report: UN. Troops Exploited Congo Girls, AP ONLINE REGIONAL
- AFRICA, Jan. 8, 2005, available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
8. See Mark Turner, Call to act over sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 18, 2004, at 7.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Thalif Deen, Politics: UN. Battles Sexual Abusers in Congo Peacekeeping, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (IPS), Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://ipsnews.net/index.asp (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005).
11. See Edith M. Lederer, UN. Seeks Police for Congo Peacekeeping, AP ONLINE REGIONAL -
AFRICA (Feb. 2, 2005) (describing the "sexual exploitation" alleged to have occurred at the hands of the U.N.
peacekeepers in the Congo), available at http://www.ap.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
12. Brit Hume, Bush Tells Syria To Leave Lebanon, FOx SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 2, 2005 (Fox News
ran a four-part series on the U.N. peacekeeper abuse allegations.) (hereinafter Fox SPECIAL REPORT).
13. See UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, PEACE AND SECURITY SECTION,
THE SURGE IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (2005) (detailing the rise in U.N.
peacekeeping activities and the member states which participate in the multi-national peacekeeping forces),
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkodpko/pub/exhibition (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
14. Colurn Lynch, UN. Faces More Accusations of Sexual Mlisconduct; Officials Acknowledge
'Swamp'of Problems and Pledge Fixes Amid New Allegations in Africa, Haiti, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005,
at A22 (describing a U.N. official in Cambodia's response to sexual abuse allegations in Cambodia in 1990
as "[b]oys will be boys").
15. Id.
16. Tobias Kuhlmann, Educating Peacekeepers about AIDS, U.N. CHRONICLE - ONLINE EDITION,
Mar. 1, 2004 (explaining the condom distribution under the logic of "[w]ith many of them [peacekeepers]
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On a basic humanitarian level, the above should shock readers of any
nationality and profession. To lawyers, however, especially those concerned
with international law, the above should serve as a wake-up call for the need to
change the legal parameters of multi-national peacekeeping. American lawyers
should be particularly concerned with U.N. peacekeeper abuses because of the
role of the United States in creating the U.N., 7 and the close ties between the
largely United States (U.S.) written U.N. Charter 8 and the current, inferential
concept of the acceptability of peacekeeping which has grown out of it.
The goal of this paper is not merely to critique the U.N. and its handling
of the current peacekeeper abuse allegations, as such a critique would only serve
half of the problem. Rather, this paper will use the past and current
understandings of the U.N. Charter, peacekeeping, international law, and
military justice to suggest several options for handling both the current
allegations facing U.N. peacekeepers, especially those in the Congo, and for a
fundamental change in the peacekeeping mission, apparatus, and law in the
future.
Part II of this paper will examine the origins of the concept of peace-
keeping. It will go beyond the current and past concepts of U.N. peacekeeping
to explore the plain language of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and the way
in which it was originally interpreted-namely to substantiate a standing U.N.
military force and centralized command with no mention of peacekeeping
activities per se.
Part III will discuss the current allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the
Congo and elsewhere, as well as the vague allusions to decades of peacekeeper
abuse found in sources from across the world and the political spectrum. Also
included in this Part is the U.N. reaction to the allegations and the above
mentioned condom distribution system in effect for U.N. peacekeepers. Finally,
this Part will discuss the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
through U.N. peacekeepers and the lax testing requirements in place for
peacekeepers both before and during their active duty.
Part IV will discuss the current laws in effect regarding peacekeepers.
Perhaps the simplest part of the inquiry, this discussion will illustrate that U.N.
peacekeepers are essentially shrouded in protection from their home countries.
The iniquity of this system will be examined, looking at the inequality of
military justice available against peacekeepers based on their country of origin.
young and sexually active, often deployed to or from regions with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, and by
profession inclined to risky behavior, some consider the peacekeepers to be 'more likely to contract or
transmit the virus than the average population"), available at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue1/0104p55.asp (last visited Sept. 30. 2005).
17. See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 1-10.
18. Id.
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Part IV will then examine the current International Criminal Court (ICC) statute
and discuss why the extension of the ICC crimes and procedures to
peacekeepers would not be an effective way to ensure either prosecution of
peacekeepers for individual abuses or eligibility for prosecution at all. To set
the framework for the discussion in Part VI, this Part will also include a basic
outline of the sanction power possessed by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).
In contrast to the legal morass presented in Part IV, Part V will describe the
current status of the United States Code of Military Justice (USCMJ) and what
prosecutions of peacekeepers would be allowed under it. A comparison of the
procedural aspects of a prosecution under the USCMJ and the ICC statute
provisions will be made as well.
The culmination of this paper is Part VI, in which the author presents
several possible options for addressing the current U.N. peacekeeper abuse
allegations and for changing peacekeeping in the future. It is the author's belief
that, in light of past attitudes of U.N. officials towards peacekeeper abuse
allegations and the current spate of corruption allegations plaguing the U.N. and
its administration, the U.N. is an inappropriate organization to handle the
peacekeeper abuses. To deal with the immediate allegations, the author
recommends that the UNSC direct (and send trusted representatives to oversee)
the creation of secure peacekeeper compounds, as well as promulgate rules
creating new positions of overseers of peacekeepers who are representatives
from at least two of the five permanent UNSC members based on their relative
contribution. The author's reasoning for this suggestion, outside of the basic
sense of responsibility for the U.N. forces which is imparted to the permanent
members of the UNSC under the U.N. Charter, is her very strong belief that
U.S. taxpayers, who are protected by concrete laws regarding such crimes as
rape and molestation, would not want their money to go towards the further
subsidization of peacekeepers who can prey on victims without a guaranteed
recourse. In addition, the author highly advocates the use of economic sanctions
against any countries which have contributed peacekeepers implicated in the
abuse and have failed to prosecute, or failed to vigorously prosecute, those
implicated peacekeepers. These sanctions should be followed up by removal
of the home countries' currently stationed peacekeepers, and blacklisting of
these countries from future peacekeeping missions, if vigorous criminal
prosecution of the errant peacekeepers is not made by the home countries.
To address the future of peacekeeping, the author then proposes a reading
of the Chapter VI provisions of the Charter closer to the original interpretation
that these provisions evince the intent to create a military apparatus attached to
the UNSC and under its ultimate control and authority. This reading would
allow for the creation of a separate, standing military and peacekeeping force
which would be under the joint command of at least two of the five permanent
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UNSC members. While this in and of itself is not a new idea, the author then
proposes that the recruitment and staffing of this force would not come from
voluntary participation by U.N. member countries, but rather from international
recruitment similar to that used by the American military. In this way, the
peacekeepers would be under the control and law of the force itself and not their
home countries. Given the many problems with the ICC statute as applied to at
least the current peacekeeper abuses, the author would further propose that the
most compatible military laws of the five permanent members (in all likelihood
the U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.)) be used and applied to the peace-
keepers in this force.
The conclusion of this paper, Part VII, restates the problems and sugges-
tions discussed and offered throughout the paper. It also expresses the author's
belief that peacekeeping as a concept offers many benefits, but that these
benefits are outweighed by any types of abuses. The problem of the U.N.
peacekeepers illustrates that international law is flawed in its attempts to create
legal consensus throughout the world, with the ultimate result being that
peacekeepers who prey on those they are assigned to protect are not subject to
the same justice. In this situation, it is imperative that the countries which
founded the U.N., particularly the U.S., provide structure to the peacekeepers.
Lawyers facing conflicts of law issues will ultimately always have to choose
one law over the other; if this works for commercial transactions then it should
certainly work for the protection of people.
II. CHAPTER VI AND PEACEKEEPING HISTORY
The primary mandate of the U.N. is set out in Chapters V and VII of the
Charter.19 These provisions make it the stated aim of the UNSC to "maint[ain]
international peace and security,"2 and to take action when there are perceived
threats to international peace and/or security.2" A great deal of scholarly work
has focused on when a threat would rise to the level of endangering either
international peace and/or security, but, in recent years at least, there has not
been as much focus on the military provisions of the Charter set out in Chapter
VII.
22
19. U.N. CHARTER chs. V, VII.
20. Id. art. 24.
21. Id. ch. VII.
22. Id.; The author posits that this dearth of literature is due to the documented trend of interpreting
the Chapter V11 provisions as solely authorizing peacekeeping activities through inferential and, it has been
argued, practical readings of the Charter. See generally ERIUA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY CouNcIL (STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW) (2004). Concededly, part of the
reason for the inability to enforce the literal Chapter VII provisions stemmed from the Cold War. Id.
However, it is interesting to note that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
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These provisions are the backbone of the inference that there should be a
U.N. peacekeeping force established and maintained by the UNSC, however this
is only an inference.23  A literal reading of the plain language of the Charter
leads one to believe that the goal of the framers of the U.N. Charter (which is
to say the framers of the U.N. itself) was to create a standing military body,24
under joint command,2" to serve at the ready if necessary to protect that stated
mission of the U.N.26 On the heels of World War II, the victorious powers had
seen their share of war and destruction,2 7 and certainly peacekeeping and
stabilization in the wake of war as well, yet the only literal provisions in the
Charter are for the standing military idea.28 Unfortunately, there are no
interpretative aids for divining the intent of the drafters of the U.N. Charter with
regard to these provisions, however it is not a stretch of the imagination to
suggest that the intent was to create a standing military which would provide a
War there was no push to re-evaluate the understanding and application of Chapter VII, rather, there has been
a push towards more peacekeeping activity and missions in the years since the end of the Cold War. Id.; see
also UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, TIMELINE OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 1948-2005 (documenting a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations
undertaken by the U.N. from the mid-1980s/early 1990s onward),
http://www.un.orgDepts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005); Peacekeeping
Resurgence, U.N. CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 2000.
23. See DE WET, supra note 22 (charting the growth and development of the peacekeeping concept
out of inferences in the Chapter VII provisions); UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, Q&A -MEETING NEW CHALLENGES, WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING (stating that the basis for the
power to establish and implement peacekeeping operations through the U.N. is because "ft]he Charter of the
United Nations gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to
maintain international peace and security"), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q I.htm (last visited Apr.
22, 2005); Fifty Unforeseen Years, U.N. CHRONICLE - ONLINE EDITION, Sept. 22, 1998 (admitting that the
U.N. Charter does not explicitly call for peacekeeping operations and positing that "[t]he Security Council
presumably paused for detailed deliberation when, in 1948, it established the first peacekeeping mission,
which built on the intent, if not the letter, of its assigned responsibility"), available at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue3/398p39.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 47 ("There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and
assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its
disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."). This works in conjunction with the article
43 provisions requiring that the members of the UNSC provide military forces and other resources to the
UNSC for the international peace and security mission. Id. art. 43.
25. Id. art. 47 ("The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Counsel or their representatives.").
26. Id. ("The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.").
27. See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994) (providing details
of the horrors inflicted on the world by the Nazis who were tried at the Nuremberg tribunal).
28. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
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host of services to the U.N. and the world population as a whole,29 as a standard
national military would do. Using this interpretation, peacekeeping would not
need to be elaborated or inferred because it is part of standard military
procedure;3° the corollary to this is that there is no elaboration of a separate
peacekeeping force, implying that all services were to be under the auspices of
a joint command that was to be associated with the UNSC.3"
Regardless of how one interprets the actual language of the U.N. Charter
provisions, once the Cold War started it was accepted that the concept of a
standing military force under a joint command would not be feasible. 2 In this
climate, the U.N. Charter provisions were re-examined, and found to infer the
idea of a peacekeeping mandate which would grow to become the current U.N.
peacekeeping force,33 also known colloquially as the "blue helmets" due to the
color of the uniforms used. 4
At present, there are 67,392 deployed peacekeepers from 103 countries
stationed in various political and military hot spots throughout the world.35
When conceptualizing the makeup of this peacekeeping force many, including
the author, initially assume that there is some form of obligation on the part of
U.N. members to provide troops and personnel to serve as peacekeepers. In
truth, however, the provision of troops and personnel is entirely voluntary on
the U.N. member countries, 36 which are compensated by the U.N. for these
29. Id. ch. V (providing the UNSC, and particularly the permanent members of the UNSC with the
onerous task of the "maintenance of international peace and security'); Id. ch. I (listing, among the methods
for maintaining international peace and security, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace").
30. For example, part of the current U.S. mission in Iraq is to keep the peace and rebuild the country,
however there are no specified "peacekeepers" tasked to this purpose; rather, the military itself embraces these
responsibilities as part of its standard protocol and mission.
31. At law, there are many methods for the interpretation of statutes, depending on the context and
the question. Many of these are based on U.S. law and tradition, and therefore would be potentially
problematic to use when attempting to interpret the U.N. Charter. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001).
However, using a textual cannon not based in these laws and traditions does not present the same conflict.
Therefore, the author bases the analysis of the Chapter VII provisions on the interpretative cannon ofexpressio
unis, meaning that "the enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the legislature had no intent
of including things not listed or embraced." Id. at 824.
32. See DE WET, supra note 22.
33. Id.
34. See Wadhams, supra note 6.
35. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, ONGOING PEACEKEEPING
MISSIONS SINCE 1948, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
36. See Linton, supra note 7.
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troops and services.37 A persistent problem for U.N. members which provide
troops and services is recouping payment for these provisions." The troops
provided are military personnel within their home countries and, as will be
discussed further in Part IV, are subject to the jurisdiction of their home
countries for prosecution should the event occur.
39
Over the course of their history, U.N. peacekeepers have served in every
conceivable situation, and indeed many have lost their lives in the course of
peacekeeping activities.4 ° In the spirit of these activities, the U.N. peacekeepers
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988,"' and are honored by the U.N.
with a yearly ceremonial day of recognition and commendation.42 Perhaps this
is the most disturbing contrast given the current abuse allegations, as various
sources have reported that U.N. peacekeepers have been implicated in sexual
abuse scandals and activities since their inception.43 As with the composition
of the peacekeeper missions themselves, these abuse allegations are a truly
global phenomenon, with new and old allegations coming from Cambodia to the
Congo to Haiti to name only a few.44 Indeed, in 2004, only months before the
37. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, Q & A - How ARE
PEACEKEEPERS COMPENSATED?, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q7.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
38. Id. (explaining some instances in which compensation for volunteering peacekeepers has been
withheld, and the financial hardships developing countries face when they provide volunteer peacekeepers
to the U.N. and are compensated afterwards).
39. See Linton, supra note 7; Deen, supra note 10 (citing the U.N.'s own report--"[t]here is a...
presumption that peacekeeping personnel who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse that constitute
crimes under generally accepted standards (for example rape or sexual relations with young children) are not
normally subjected to criminal prosecution, whether it be by court martial or by trial before a national criminal
court, which would have been the inevitable result has they committed such acts in their home countries.").
40. Examples ofpeacekeeper deaths in action are spread throughout the course of missions over the
last 50 plus years. For detailed statistics, see UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING-FATALITIES, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities (last visited Apr. 22,
2005). For recent incidents of peacekeeper deaths in action, see DRC president condemns killing of UN
peacekeepers, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 2005 (stating that nine peacekeepers were killed
in an ambush attack in the Congo).
41. 1988: UN Peacekeeping Forces: 'The Imperial Soldiers '(Nobel Prize), U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept.
1,2003.
42. UN Peacekeeping Missions: Best Way of Ensuring Sustainable Peace, M2 PRESSWiRE, May
25, 2004.
43. See Linton, supra note 7 ("Charges of sex abuse and other crimes have been lodged against U.N.
peacekeeping missions around the world for decades. Officials have found it difficult to crack down because
the United Nations doesn't want to offend the relatively small number of countries that are willing to provide
peacekeepers.").
44. Victoria Engstrand-Neascu, News Feature: Predators in Congo sometimes wear uniforms,
DEUTSCHE-PRESS AGENTUR, Jan. 11,2005; Joseph Loconte, The UN. Sex Scandal, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
Jan. 3, 2005 (citing a history of allegations ofpeacekeeper abuse in Kosovo, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone
as well as the Congo); Peter Moszynski, NGOs in Sex for Food Scandal, NEW AFRICAN, Apr. 1, 2002
Harrington
first Congo abuse stories started to surface, there was a public admission by a
U.N. official that there were sexual abuses by peacekeepers assigned to the
border area of Ethiopia and Eritrea.45
Thus, the history of the U.N. peacekeepers is one of questionable
interpretation and activities as well as humanitarian awards and missions. What
is most bothersome to this author is that the history of the peacekeepers has such
a pronounced dichotomy between saving people and countries and acting as
criminals. No matter how the U.N. Charter provisions are interpreted, the word-
ing evinces the idea that some kind of security force was necessary to protect
the world from the ravages of war and human atrocities, and indeed many
peacekeepers have given their lives for this goal. However, those charged with
carrying out the administrative charge created by the U.N. Charter have failed
to protect both the intent of the U.N. Charter's framers and those who fird
themselves in the midst of war and chaos, and have allowed the peacekeepers
to become victimizers.
III. ALLEGATIONS, CONTRACEPTIVES, AND HIV / AIDS
The primary abuse allegations addressed in this paper are the sexual abuse
allegations made against the peacekeepers, as these represent the gravest breach
of the duty of peacekeepers and represent an utter disregard for the sanctity of
human life, particularly the lives of young girls. It is important to note,
however, that in the days prior to the writing of this paper there have been
increasing questions regarding the use of force by peacekeepers,' and whether
force is used outside of the sanctioned self-defense realm.47 This issue
highlights the need for a central military law governing peacekeepers of all
nationalities, as such a system would allow for a more immediate adjudication
of such allegations and would ensure that those peacekeepers involved would
be uniformly investigated, and either exonerated or prosecuted under the same
legal principles and terms.
(identifying that, as early as 2002, reports regarding U.N. peacekeeper abuses of young children were
surfacing to NGOs such as Save the Children in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia).
45. Cathy Majtenyi, Radio Scripts-Correspondent Report 2-315770, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS,
May 10, 2004 (explaining that the official admitted to some of these allegations in an effort to undermine
public complaints from Eritrean officials regarding peacekeeper conduct).
46. Hemisphere Briefing: Haiti: U.N. Peacekeepers Accused in Dispute, SUN-SENTINEL (FT.
LAUDERDALE, FL.), Mar. 6, 2005 (detailing Haitian government officials' allegations that peacekeepers
stationed in Haiti inappropriately fired on an unarmed crowd of pro-Aristide protesters).
47. See id.
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A Allegations Against The Peacekeepers
A young girl, out gathering coal for her family to use as they try to sustain
themselves in the middle of a war, encounters a soldier on her errand." In
seconds she goes from coal bringer to rape victim at the hands of the solider,
who cavalierly walks away from his deed.49 Worse yet, it is possible that this
girl could face reprisals from her family if she tells them of the crime. Another
young girl, roughly the same age as the first, prostitutes herself to a man in a
uniform. ° She is not a troubled teen, she is not a runaway, she is merely trying
to get an egg so that her family might have something to eat for dinner."
A young mother looks at her baby unsure of how to provide for it or how
it will be accepted in her village. The father, a man in a uniform from another
country and another race, has left and she cannot find him." Those who worked
with him refuse to help her or her baby survive, let alone find the father. 3
Another mother, just seventeen years old, looks at her child and her husband in
horror as she finds out that the soldier who attacked her gave her HIV/AIDS and
she, unknowingly, has passed the disease on to her husband and newborn
child.'
These vignettes might sound as though they are a combination of stories
from various recent wars and tortured movie plots, however in reality they are
the stories of many women who have made allegations of various types of
sexual abuse against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo. These stories are not
uncommon, and indeed typify what the U.N. describes as the problem with
placing troops like peacekeepers in a wartime setting: social upheaval and
instability, coupled with the economic position of the peacekeepers, creates an
environment where peacekeepers can easily prey on those they should be
protecting.55
The allegations of abuse in the Congo are actually more sordid and
distasteful than the above vignettes, and implicate not only the peacekeeping
forces but also the U.N. administration sent to the conflict areas with them.56
48. Fox SPECIAL REPORT (Steve Harrigan reporting), supra note 12.
49. Id.
50. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44 (noting that these acts usually take place in local hotel
rooms).
51. See id. (explaining that many young girls in the Congo were enticed into prostitution for a few
eggs, some bread, or some chocolate).
52. Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
56. See Thomas P. Kilgannon, Outside View: Peacekeepers or Predators?, UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 15, 2005 (noting a portion of the U.N.'s Congo investigation report which blames the
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An official's computer files were screened and found to contain pornographic
images of the official with local children." The same official was caught in a
sting operation started by local authorities in which he attempted to engage in
sexual activities with a local, very underage girl. 8 He could not be prosecuted
by the local authorities, as he was deemed to fall under the peacekeeper
exception, and was not prosecuted by his home country for his crimes either.5
On the point of age, to date the youngest reported victim of abuse at the hands
of the peacekeeper was seven years old at the time of the alleged abuse.' Under
the terms of peacekeeper protocol before these allegations came to light,
peacekeepers were forbidden to have relations with anyone who was under 18
years old.6
The Congo allegations were the result of both an internal U.N. investiga-
tion62 and news exposes by U.S. news programs "20/20 's and "Fox News. ' '64
The allegations make concrete the stories of victims through these accounts,
both in news and on television, and it is easier to estimate the types of offenses
the peacekeepers are alleged to have committed. However, there have been
numerous allegations of abuse at other missions over the history of the U.N.
peacekeeping operations which are not as detailed and provide murkier waters
for lawyers looking at potential criminal charges.65 Since the Congo allegations
have surfaced, however, there has been more discussion of the past allegations
in the media, and indeed an allegation made by a Haitian woman was picked up
sexual abuses perpetrated by peacekeepers in the Congo in part on "the absence of any programs for off-duty
peacekeepers").
57. Id. (stating that a French official was implicated in an online pedophile operation).
58. Sex! Shocking Sex at the U.N.!, INVESTOR'S BusINESS DAILY, Feb. 24, 2005, at A13 (explaining
that the sting operation allowed the Congolese police access to the official's house, thus allowing them to
discover that he had taped his activities with children and that he had filmnaking equipment set up in his
bedroom).
59. See generally Kilgannon, supra note 56.
60. See Fox SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
61. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
62. See Deen, supra note 10 (explaining that the report, created under the watch of Jordanian Prince
Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, a Jordanian representative to the U.N., "says there is a widespread perception
that peacekeeping personnel, whether military or civilian, who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse
rarely if ever face disciplinary charged for such acts").
63. See Kilgannon, supra note 56 (crediting the 20/20 investigative team sent to the Congo with
uncovering many important incidents of peacekeeper misconduct).
64. See FOX SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
65. See, e.g., Congress Probes UNPeacekeepers 'Misconduct in Congo, VOICE OF AMERICANEWS,
Mar. 1, 2005 (citing a top U.N. official as admitting that the allegations of peacekeeper misconduct are not
limited to the Congo mission).
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by the media in the days after the initial Congo story broke.6 While the
peacekeepers in the Haitian allegation were cleared of rape charges, 67 they were
nonetheless found to have engaged in prostitution with the woman in question,68
which constituted a breach of the peacekeeper policies and resulted in the
peacekeepers being publicly sent back to their home countries.69
B. Conflicting Messages
As stated above, the U.N. has maintained a prohibition on sexual relations
between peacekeepers and locals under the age of 18,70 and does not condone
peacekeepers engaging in prostitution." What the U.N. does condone, and
indeed accommodate, is easy access to condoms for peacekeepers,72 going so
far as to provide them with pre-filled pouches when they are being briefed for
their mission assignments.73 The official reasoning for this program is the
health and safety of the peacekeepers while they are on their assignments, using
the logic that these are typically young men, and that "[b]oys will be boys."74
The pouches are accompanied by the distribution of cards detailing how to
protect oneself from contracting HIV/AIDS;75 these cards are conveniently
printed in over 10 languages for easy understanding.76 These cards have a
twofold purpose, the education of peacekeepers and the education of those
living in the areas to which the peacekeepers are sent.77 Interestingly, despite
the attempts to educate the peacekeepers and provide them with protection, the
U.N. does not require potential peacekeepers to be screened for HIV/AIDS
before they are sent on peacekeeping missions.7" While HIV/AIDS pre-
screening is standard practice in at least the armed forces of the U.S. and U.K.,79
66. UNPeacekeepers in Haiti ClearedofRape Allegations, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb.
25, 2005.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 44.
71. See, e.g., UN. peacekeepers in Haiti cleared, supra note 66.
72. See Kuhlmann, supra note 16. Interestingly, the peacekeepers profiled in the Kuhhnann article
are those bound for Eritrea where, as mentioned above, at least one U.N. official has recently admitted that
there were instances of sexual abuse involving peacekeepers and local girls. Id
73. Id.
74. Lynch, supra note 14.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kuhlmann, supra note 16.
79. Id.
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it is not necessarily the standard practice in the other U.N. member countries
willing to volunteer troops as peacekeepers."0 The lack of pre-deployment
screening of peacekeepers by the U.N. is particularly disturbing when one notes
that in recent years many of the peacekeeping missions have been comprised of
troops from countries where HIV/AIDS infection rates are rising at catastrophic
rates,"1 and affecting a large portion of the population.
However well intentioned the peacekeeper pouches might be, they appear
to have limited success rates in stopping either the transmission of HIV/AIDS
to the local populations or the fathering of children with women from the local
population.12 Turning to the HIV/AIDS transmission issue, at least one study
has charted an alarming correlation between the deployment of U.N. peace-
keepers from countries with high and steadily increasing HIV/AIDS infection
rates and an increase in the rates of locals infected by HIV/AIDS after the
arrival of the peacekeepers. 3 The poignant vignette above of the new mother
discovering that she and her entire family are infected because of an act by a
U.N. peacekeeper' is a dreadful example of this trend, and sadly is not a rare
story in the Congo."5 Given the availability of both the empirical evidence and
human tragedies, the U.N. policy of voluntary HIV/AIDS testing is even more
disturbing and calls the peacekeeping administration into further question. 6
Turning to the local pregnancy issue, there are media accounts and internal
investigation data to support the conclusion that instances of U.N. peacekeepers
fathering children with local women, or girls, and then leaving without
assuming any parental role or financial responsibility are far from rare. 7 Not
only do these peacekeepers fail to take any responsibility or make any financial
accommodations for their children, the U.N. fails to do either of these as well.88
To conclude, the abuse allegations have done more than undermine the
U.N. administration and the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. These
abuses, alleged though they are at present, if true, have taken childhood from
countless young girls- and in some instances boys- and replaced it with physical
and psychological pain and torment. Many of these young victims face social
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
83. Benny Avni, Monitoring HIV in U.N. Peacekeepers, THE NEW YORK SuN, Jan. 24, 2005, at 7.
84. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
85. Id.
86. See Avni, supra note 83.
87. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
88. Id.
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ostracism both now and in the future as a result of what happened to them. 9
The women who have peacekeeper-fathered children find themselves in much
the same predicament, and are forced to struggle even more for survival after
the arrival of the peacekeepers than before the peacekeepers arrived in the
area." And those who contracted HIV/AIDS from the peacekeepers face a
myriad of consequences and problems as a result of their infection. Some, like
the young woman in the vignette, are faced with the knowledge that they and
their families are condemned to live with, and likely die from, the disease.9
Others will not know that they are ill until their health deteriorates, and could
potentially pass on the disease further. Still others will know their status and
have to try to be productive members of their society and hope that they will not
be shunned by their families and community because of the disease and the way
it was contracted, while at the same time struggling to find medical treatment
if available. None of these scenarios arise out of a quest for peace, and all that
they do is engender hatred and suffering, undermining the concept of the U.N.
in general, as well as peacekeeping, and also undermining the likelihood that
U.N. peacekeepers will be allowed in the area again should they be needed. In
no way can these abuses be seen as maintaining international peace and security,
and indeed in many ways these abuses are the same as the atrocities which were
deemed to pose a threat to peace and security occasioning the deployment of the
peacekeepers in the first place.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACEKEEPING
A. Current Law Affecting Peacekeepers
Just as peacekeeping missions are manned by troops from around the
world, so too is the law pertaining to peacekeepers global in its composition.
The global quality of applicable law is due to the fact that, in such instances as
peacekeeper sexual abuses or other misconduct, peacekeepers are not subject to
the laws of an international body, but rather are to be tried, if at all, in their
home countries and under the military law of their home country.92 The most
the U.N. administration can do in such a situation is to strip the peacekeeper of
89. Exploitation of Women by UN Peacekeepers in Congo Widespread, THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA,
Jan. 8, 2005.
90. Id.
91. See Fox SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12.
92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF, 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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his position and send him back to his home country.a3 Indeed, the U.N. itself
does not make it a practice to chastise the member countries which send abusive
peacekeepers because of the fear that it will lose a source of volunteer
peacekeepers if it offends the sending nation.'
Once in the home country, the peacekeeper is then subject to the military
laws of his country, which include the use of discretion in the decision of
whether to prosecute the peacekeeper.95 A problem for both the home country
in making its decision regarding prosecution and the U.N. administration in
evaluating the extensive nature of the abuses, is the local language barrier,96 as
well as the difficulty of trying a case where the victim is in a far away and
impoverished nation, and not likely to testify before a court even if she could
be brought there due to the potential familial and societal reprisals and ostracism
she could face.9"
The problem with the state of the law as it relates to peacekeepers is not
limited solely to the above, however, as there is also a grave and constant
possibility of uneven administration ofjustice against peacekeepers at the same
mission, charged with the same crimes, who are from different countries which
have different military laws or different propensities for prosecuting
peacekeepers. 9' An example from the current Congolese abuse allegations is the
difference between the fate of a French peacekeeper implicated in the abuse who
went to trial in France when he was returned," and two South African
peacekeepers who are still being held, but who have not been tried." ° In
addition, different national legal systems have different concepts of pre-trial
rights and procedure, due process and fair trials, and jury use, leading to
different outcomes for the same crime.' The author would argue that, to those
93. See Linton, supra note 7.
94. Id.
95. Following the initial U.N. investigation of the Congo mission, it repatriated three men: a French
support staff member and two Moroccan peacekeepers. Turner, supra note 8. Due to the differences in law
and public policy between the two countries, however, only the Frenchman was put on trial. Id.
96. The multi-national quality of the peacekeeping missions, as well as the destitution of many areas
where peacekeepers are stationed and the very real possibility that the victimized children have not been able
to attend school and learn a common language with the peacekeepers due to the hostilities in their country can
easily lead to a language issue.
97. See, e.g., Editorial: Peacekeepers as Abusers, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Dec. 24, 2004
(providing, as an example, a twelve year old Congolese girl who is reluctant to tell ever her family what
happened to her at the hands of a peacekeeper, stating "I didn't tell my mother because she would beat me.").
98. See generally KNOOPs, supra note 3 (explaining the applicability of current law to U.N.
peacekeepers).
99. See 'Exploitation of Women by U.N. Peacekeepers in Congo Widespread, 'supra note 119.
100. Id.
101. See WtLIM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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who created and ran the Nuremburg trials as a model of international criminal
law, this very fact would be offensive.
Additionally, as soldiers in the national army of their home country prior
to their peacekeeping assignment, there is a very strong likelihood that
peacekeepers are familiar with the crimes and punishments used in their military
courts. The author further submits that this is dangerous in that a peacekeeper
from a home country with a nascent military and military law, or one who
knows that sentences for sexual abuses are relatively light, or one who knows
that there is a precedent of not prosecuting errant peacekeepers, will take
comfort in that knowledge and feel less inhibited in his abuses, safe in the
knowledge that he will not face serious charges at home. If nothing else, this
undermines international peace and security in already troubled areas, and
presents the very prescient threat that the local population will be victimized by
a peacekeeper with such knowledge.
B. Problems With Extending the ICC Statute to Peacekeepers
The creation of the current ICC statute has codified many of the serious
and yet esoteric crimes created at Nuremberg, such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity." 2 By providing lawyers and litigants with actual definitions
of these crimes, including elements, the ICC statute has both clarified the state
of international crimes on a grand scale and made the ability to prosecute
peacekeepers for abuses essentially non-existent.' 3 Doubtless there will be calls
to subject U.N. peacekeepers to the jurisdiction of the ICC for abuses and do
away with the home country military law rule currently in place. However, a
closer look at the ICC statute reveals that there is a very small likelihood of
successful prosecution of individual peacekeepers under the statute." Further,
should a loophole be found, or should the statute be amended to allow for
individual prosecutions of peacekeeper abuses, the structure of the ICC
procedures' 5 is such that the ICC is not the proper place to try the peacekeepers.
71-137 (2001) (explaining the many substantive and procedural differences in trial rights which had to be
reconciled between member states in drafting an ICC statute which the majority could agree on).
102. See generally PERSICO, supra note 27 (describing the criminal charges brought against the Nazi
regime by the Nuremberg prosecutorial staff).
103. See Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2 (defining the crimes which the ICC has the jurisdiction
to prosecute).
104. Id. (providing for individual prosecution of crimes which are part of a concerted effort or plan,
rather than those which are indiscriminately carried out for personal gratification or other non-concerted
reasons).
105. Id. pts. 4-8. (providing the framework of the court apparatus, pre-trial procedure, trial procedure,
and appellate rights and procedures).
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As a threshold issue, it is very true that both war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the ICC include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape.0 6 This
is certainly a laudable and appropriate provision, as sexual crimes and abuses
are a sad and disturbing part of conflicts past and present; the problem is that as
much as these provisions are a prosecutorial resource for such political actors
and their underlings who have devised, ordered, and committed such grave
crimes as those set forth in the ICC statute, these are not generally applicable to
the peacekeepers based on the facts available at the present time. The problem
with these provisions is that they require, if not a specific mens rea, at the very
least that the actions be part of a larger plan targeted to the population in general
rather than individuals in it.107 This is more akin to a RICO conspiracy charge
under U.S. law,10' with the caveat that those being prosecuted all need the same
mens rea and knowledge predicate of targeting a certain population for harm
and destruction. 09
Under such a provision, in order to be prosecuted, peacekeepers would
have to be found to have been part of a concerted and organized effort to rape
or otherwise sexually abuse the local population with the goal of harming the
population as a whole." 0 However widespread the abuses are, it is highly
unlikely that there was a specific U.N. protocol or plan to perpetrate sexual
abuses on the local populations of the mission areas; it is also improbable that
there was a specific plan in place at the mission level by U.N. staffers and
administrators to do the same thing. The ICC statute is written in such a way
that it would appear to turn a blind eye to the abuses because it provides no
basis for prosecution ofpeacekeepers for war crimes or crimes against humanity
unless the abuses were committed as an overall part of a plan to target the local
106. Id. pt. 2, art. 8 (b)(xxii) (defining a qualifying offense for a war crime charge as "[c]omitting
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,. . . enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Convention."); Id. pt. 2, art 7 (g) (defining a
qualifying offense for a crime against humanity charge as "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.").
107. Id. pt. 2, art. 8 (b) (requiring that a war crime charge occur in a situation of international or, in
certain circumstances, national conflicts in which international law provisions and expectations apply); Id.
pt. 2, art. 7 (limiting the application of the crimes against humanity charge to situations where "any of the
following acts [including sexual violence]... [are] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack").
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000). In contrast with the ICC mens rea and knowledge
requirements, a person can be charged under RICO for acting in concert with others towards an illegal goal
even if the knowledge of the goal and the other participants is not within the person's possession. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c).
109. Cf. id.; Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2, arts. 7, 8.
110. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 2 arts. 7, 8 (providing the mens rea and concerted action
requirements, as well as the elements which comprise various crimes of sexual violence under the ICC
statute).
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population for abuse,"' and it would appear unlikely that any of the U.N
administrators, commanders, or staffers could be prosecuted for the same
reasons. "12
Assuming that there is a way to read the ICC statute to allow the
prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers individually for sexual abuses, or that the
statute was amended to give the ICC prosecutorial jurisdiction over these cases,
there are still several critical procedural flaws in the statute. First, not all U.N.
member states are signatories of the ICC statute, and thus there would be an
unequal prosecution of peacekeepers, akin to the current situation, if the ICC
were used as a venue only for those peacekeepers whose home countries were
ICC signatories."' Second, given the way that the ICC statute is written and
construed, the primary power of the court in getting a case to trial lies with the
Prosecutor, who has much more power than his prosecutorial counterparts in
many other countries, including U.S. civilian and military courts."4 Such a
prosecutorial structure creates a situation which is ripe for over-discretion by the
Prosecutor, and is even more dangerous when one considers that the Prosecutor
can be from any country, including the home country of the peacekeeper." 5
Third, as mentioned in the above section, the ability to have victims, or
eyewitnesses, come forward to testify is hampered by the language, distance,
and social gap." 6 A corollary to that is that, unlike some adjudicative bodies
such as the U.S. military courts,"' the ICC statute does not grant the ICC the
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Rome Statute, supra note 92; UNITED NATIONS, RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME
STATUTE (providing a list of countries which have and have not ratified the ICC statute), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/engishinternetbible/partL/chapterXVlItreatyl.asp (last visited Apr.
22, 2005) (hereinafter RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE).
114. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 2, art. 15 (allowing the Prosecutor ultimate discretion over
which cases to bring to the Pre-Trial Chamber). Also, as the Pre-Trial Chamber is implicated in the
prosecutorial decisions made, the allowance that the Prosecutor can still receive information a case which the
Pre-Trial Chamber has said it cannot officially investigate (which can be argued to be a quasi-investigation
in the first place), can be seen to implicate double jeopardy. Id. The double jeopardy implication can be seen
to arise from the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber is composed solely ofjudges, which lends an official judicial
element to an opinion issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber which is not of the same low-level implication as
judges deciding whether to grant arrest warrants. Id. at pt. 4, art. 39.
115. The qualifications for election to the Office of Prosecutor are set forth in the ICC statute, as are
prohibitions against certain activities on the part of the Prosecutor and his staff. Id. at pt. 4, art. 42. While
there are provisions requiring the recusal of the Prosecutor in certain cases, these provisions address current
and past conflicts, including whether the Prosecutor had dealings with the same case or parties in another
court, but are silent on shared nationality, ethnicity, or religion as a disqualifying factor. Id.
116. See supra Part lL.
117. 10 U.S.C. § 847 (2000) (granting U.S. military courts subpoena power and making the failure
or refusal to appear in court pursuant to subpoena or other method of requiring personal presence in court "an
offense against the United States").
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ability to subpoena or otherwise compel witnesses to testify before the court."'
While the image of forcing a young victim in front of a foreign court is not
particularly attractive, the inability to compel the presence and testimony of
witnesses, aide workers, other U.N. officials, and peacekeepers, or those who
might have learned of the abuses through pictures or other descriptions, is a flaw
to any prosecution and turns the prosecution into a he-said/she-said battle. Add
to this the possible inability of young victims to positively identify their attacker
beyond a reasonable doubt, and peacekeeper prosecutions at the ICC seem
doomed to an uncertain, and inequitable, outcome under the procedural
requirements set forth in the ICC statute regardless of their viability under the
terms of the current crimes and elements codified in the ICC statute.
Ultimately, the ICC is not the proper jurisdiction for prosecution of
peacekeepers on abuse charges of any type, and particularly sexual abuses. The
ICC statute was created to codify the tradition of prosecuting those accused of
political and military-political atrocities which started with the prosecutions at
Nuremberg and evolved from that point." 9 It was not created to try individuals
for their separate crimes, apart from their complicity in a larger plan to harm or
destroy a population."0 Also, it is the author's belief that the ICC was intended
to be used as a body for prosecution of internationally condemned ideas and
beliefs, such as those which emerged from the conflicts in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as reflected in the crimes and criminal elements codified in the ICC
statute.' If this is true, then the prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers at the ICC
would be inappropriate because the ideas and beliefs espoused by the U.N. vis
a vis peacekeeping as a whole are not likely to be viewed as morally or legally
reprehensible, and thus are not within the realm of the intent to try a system, or
organization, as well as the individual members of it.
118. The ICC statute requires that requests for persons, documents, and other information go through
the member state. Rome Statute, supra note 122, pt. 9. There are several problems with this. First, if the
accused is a resident of a non-signatory state to the ICC statute, or the pertinent information is located in a
non-signatory state, the ICC statute would not appear to have any force or effect to bring the person or thing
before the court. Id. Second, although the statute repeatedly mentions that the member state "shall" cooperate
with requests for the extradition of people and production of documents, there is no penalty provision for
failing to comply or withholding information from the ICC. Id. Third, and most important for the purposes
of this paper, is the fact that NGOs, such as the U.N. and therefore U.N. peacekeepers acting in that capacity,
are not signatories to the ICC statute. See RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 113. This
would mean that, unless the ICC statute were to be amended or revised, the ICC could not ask the U.N. to
produce persons, documents, or other information; if the ICC did make such a request, there would be no
requirement that the U.N. comply. Id.
119. See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 771-847 (describing the motivating factors which led to the
creation and implementation of the ICC statute and the ICC).
120. Rome Statute, supra note 92, pt. 2, arts. 7, 8.
121. Id.
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V. THE USCMJ As APPLIED TO ALLEGED PEACEKEEPER OFFENSES
In contrast to the above description of the ICC statute and jurisdiction,
were any implicated peacekeepers to be Americans (at present this is not the
case), they would be subject to a well defined and precise trial, both in the
elements of the crime itself and the trial and prosecution.1
22
Unlike the ICC, U.S. military courts function to prosecute military
personnel in all manner of crimes, from those relating to their commands or
actions while on duty2 . to criminal acts involving non-military personnel.'24
The system functions to separate military personnel from standard civilian
justice and govern them according to traditional laws regarding combat
situations and situations in which U.S. personnel who are currently serving in
the armed forces find themselves.'25 The prosecution of a soldier for acts
amounting to war crimes is not an indictment of the U.S. military, its ideas and
goals, but rather of the individual, or, in some occasions of a chain of
command. 1
26
In terms of prosecuting the alleged sexual abuses by peacekeepers, the
USCMJ would allow individual prosecution of soldiers for child abuse,'27
cruelty and maltreatment, 128 rape,129 sodomy, 30 conduct unbecoming of an
122. See generally 10 U.S.C § 101 etseq. (2000) (providing the text of military law and the USCMJ).
123. Id. § 801 et seq. (codifying the USCMJ, which applies to duty-related violations and conduct
as well as soldiers' activities when they are not on duty but are still enlisted in U.S. military service).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 802 (enumerating the many classes of persons subject to the USCMJ, including active duty
officers and military personnel, reservists, cadets and others training to be officers, retired military personnel
still receiving some kind of compensation or hospitalization treatment from the U.S. military, those
incarcerated after a previous court-martial, staffers of various government agencies and organizations who
are working in conjunction with the military, prisoners of war, persons from political entities other than the
U.S. who are assigned to U.S. military units abroad (unless these persons are exempted by treaty), to name
just a few)).
126. See generally id. § 801 etseq. (providing the crimes under which persons subject to the USCMJ
can be charged, as well as the elements necessary for a conviction on these crimes).
127. Id. § 843 (detailing a "child abuse offense" under the USCMJ as "an act that involves sexual or
physical abuse of a person who has not attained the age of 16 years and constitutes" rape, sodomy, aggravated
assault, "indecent assault, assault with intent to commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, or indecent acts
or liberties with a child).
128. Id. § 893 ("Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or
maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."). The terms
of this statute could be applied to peacekeepers on the theory that those in the affected areas to which the
peacekeepers have been dispatched are "subject to [their] orders" both because of the need for the locals to
cooperate with the peacekeepers to obtain services and protection from the U.N. and because of the ability of
the peacekeepers to use force against those who do not follow their orders and are seen as posing a threat to
the peacekeepers and the peace in general.
129. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). The definition of rape provided under the statute is very broad, and the
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officer and a gentleman (a crime which could be applied to the abandonment of
children fathered in the course of peacekeeping), 3 ' and sexual harassment. 3
All of these charges are made against the individual,'33 and the USCMJ also
provides the basis for an accessory after the fact prosecution should it be alleged
that a member of the peacekeeping staff became aware of the abuse after it was
committed and yet did nothing to report it or otherwise stop such abuses from
happening.'34 In this way, the USCMJ would allow for fair prosecution of the
individual, and hold the rest of the mission accountable for knowledge of abuses
after the fact, while not in any way indicting (whether in fact or implication) the
mission and idea of the U.S. military as a whole or, by extension, the
peacekeeping mission as a whole if applied in that context.
Turning to the more procedural aspects as the USCMJ, the accused has the
knowledge that the prosecuting officer is a member of the military as well, and
does not have the same all-encompassing powers as an ICC Prosecutor. 35
Additionally, the USCMJ does not require judicial approval of an investigation
affirmative defense provided in the statute-mistake as to the age of the victim-would not apply to the
peacekeeping allegations in the Congo because there is a reasonability requirement for the belief that the
woman involved was of legal age. Id. Given the very young age of the accusers, it is highly unlikely that such
a defense would be feasible or successful in a court-martial.
130. Id. § 925. Again, this is a very broad statute in terms of the definition of the crime and the
degree to which the act must have been carried out before a charge can be brought. Id.
131. Id. § 933 ("Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
132. Id. § 1561 (2000). This statute is interesting for the purposes of the peacekeeper discussion for
two reasons. First, the definition of sexual harassment, while limited to the workplace, could be applied to
any local women who might have been employed by or in the peacekeeping mission. Id. Second, this statute
is equally applicable to military personnel and civilians alike, thus providing double protection for any local
women (or indeed any peacekeeping officials or other personnel) against unwanted attention and advances.
Id.
133. See id. §§ 843, 920, 925, 933, 1561. The only exception to this is a provision in 10 U.S.C. §
1561, the sexual harassment statute, which makes the commanding officer or supervisor guilty of a crime if
sexual harassment reports are not investigated or ignored, or such behavior is exhibited in front of the
commanding officer or supervisor and no action is taken. Id. § 1561. However, the statute does specify the
method in which complaints against an individual are to be handled, and makes it clear that sexual harassment
is a crime under the USCMJ that is punishable by court-martial. Id.
134. Id. § 878 ("Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense punishable by this
chapter has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his
apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
135. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-835 (2000) (providing the requirements ofpre-trial procedure in cases which
are subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial).
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before it occurs, 36 as is the case with the ICC statutory provisions. 37 The
accused also is given the right to counsel who is also a military officer and is
versed in the laws of the military itself.3 ' In terms of witness production, the
USCMJ specifically allows the military courts to legally require witnesses to
appear before the court and testify, 39 under threat of prosecution if they do not
in fact appear."4
The USCMJ and military courts have a long history due to their age and
continued use throughout U.S. history, and a concise history of cases illustrating
the above points is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is important
to note such a history, as it allows prosecution for acts such as the alleged
peacekeeper abuses, and thus provides both the prosecution and the defense in
such a situation with guideposts for trial and appeals, as well as with a standard
body of law which can be relied on and which is not in flux due to the volatile
nature of the subject matter and political climate, as could be the case with the
ICC. 141
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE PEACEKEEPING APPARATUS
The current abuse allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo
present two interrelated yet distinct situations which need to be addressed in
order to assure that there is justice for the unwilling victims of abuse and a
legitimate and respected body to assist in peacekeeping activities in the future.
Each of these situations will be addressed separately.
A. Short Term Changes and Solutions
The short term goal of the UNSC, particularly the permanent members who
gave rise to the U.N. in the beginning, must be to provide the victims of abuse
with counseling and medical assistance, as well as the promise that there will be
justice for them. These steps are not only humanitarian gestures, they are
136. Id. Under the USCMJ, a full investigation must be made into the allegations prior to any
proceeding in front of a military judge. Id. In fact, before a trial can be ordered the investigatory body must
clear the charges and the results of the investigation with a staff judge advocate. Id. § 834.
137. See supra Part IV B.
138. 10 U.S.C. § 832 ("The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to
be represented at that investigation [where the determination of whether to proceed with a formal charge and
court-martial request is made] by counsel.").
139. Id. § 846 ("Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses to appear and testify and
to compel the production of other evidence shall be similar to that which courts of the United States having
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue.").
140. See id. § 847 (making it a violation of the USCMJ to fail to appear or produce evidence when
the court-martial or other military court has subpoenaed the witness or the evidence).
141. Seesupra Part IV B.
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indeed necessary to preserve some semblance of credibility for the
peacekeeping concept and the U.N. as a larger entity.
The provision of counseling and medical assistance to victims is a weighty
task given the fear and reluctance of victims, especially children, to come
forward, and should be the task of trained child psychologists and other mental
health professionals with documented experience. The author suspects that the
best candidates for this job would be female doctors, as the trauma of seeing
male doctors who remind the victims of their attackers could be
counterproductive to the attempted medical assistance. Counseling and medical
assistance must also be made available to the families of the victims so they can
understand the trauma suffered by their family member, and, where appropriate,
receive medical assistance and treatment themselves. Further, the peacekeepers
who fathered children with local women must be found, if possible, through
such measures as mandatory DNA tests, and made to take care of their children
and the women with whom they fathered children. If identification is not
possible, lifetime care for these women and children should be provided by the
U.N. itself. The author proposes that the counseling, medical treatment, and
palimony be funded by the nations which contributed abusive peacekeepers.
It is clear from the evidence that, while the U.N. investigation of the
alleged abuses was being conducted, further abuses were being committed by
peacekeepers in the very areas under investigation.'42 Not only does this evince
both questionable judgment and a sense of being above the law on the part of
the abusive peacekeepers and members of the mission administration, it also
implicates the faith one can have in reformation of peacekeeping missions with-
out some additional oversight. Therefore, the permanent members of the
UNSC, or at least two of these members, should send envoys from their own
military corps to oversee the conduct of the peacekeepers, as well as the creation
of secured missions where the comings and goings of the peacekeepers would
be heavily monitored. Evidence from victims indicates that a frequent method
of enticing women and children to prostitute themselves was with the promise
of obtaining payment in food, which they would use to feed their starving
families. 43 With this in mind, the peacekeepers should not be allowed to have
access to excess food or other supplies, and access to facilities where food and
other commodities are stored must be under heavy surveillance at all times.
Legally, the home countries of abusive peacekeepers must actively
prosecute the peacekeepers, and the U.N. must repatriate these peacekeepers to
their home countries so that the prosecutions can start. Although the victims
will still be forced to deal with uneven justice based on the nationality of their
abusers, they must still be given the fullest possible justice allowed under the
142. UN. Peacekeepers Abused Women, Claims Watchdog, MORNING STAR [U.K.], Jan. 8,2005.
143. See supra Part ll A.
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legal system of their abuser. To that end, it is imperative that the U.N. release
to the public at large the identities of the home countries of the abusers, and put
pressure on these countries to vigorously prosecute the abusive peacekeepers.
Indeed, these countries should be subject to economic sanctions and removed
from eligibility to send any further peacekeepers (as well as forced to recall all
current peacekeepers) should they fail to prosecute the abusers to the fullest
extent allowed under their legal systems. While this might sound excessive,
countries which are heavily dependent on the U.N. and its subsidiary agencies
for commercial, infrastructural, humanitarian, and other aide are not likely to
ignore the threat of a sanction, regardless of their past precedents in prosecuting
allegedly abusive peacekeepers.
To say that these suggestions are anything more than remedial and stop-
gap measures would be clearly erroneous, however in the short-term, such
measures are a good option because they validate the rights of the victims and
the ideal of the preservation of peace and the importance of humanitarian
actions and policies upon which the U.N., and later the U.N. peacekeeping
missions, was founded.
B. Long Term Apparatus Changes
Peacekeeping missions in the abstract are a vital expression of the ideas
and goals of the U.N., and the humanitarianism of its members. The key to the
future of peacekeeping missions is to re-examine the original provisions of the
U.N. Charter before the peacekeeping mandate was inferred into the Chapter VI
provisions.' In so doing, the theme of a separate military force under the joint
command, and ultimate control, of the UNSC emerges as the intent of the
framers of the Charter.'45 Certainly it seems unlikely that a separate U.N.
military would come to fruition as the fighting force of its member states,
especially when these member states are frequently those going to war with
each other and/or committing humanitarian atrocities against groups of
people.'46 However, it is the author's position that if the concepts of the Charter
were combined with the inference of a peacekeeping force, there would be a
peacekeeping apparatus which would be effective, structured, and able to punish
and prevent abuses like those seen in the Congo.
By creating a joint command premised on the Joint Chiefs of Staff model
used by the U.S. military, there would be a greater deal of accountability and
coordination between the mission commands. Under this structure, member
144. See supra Part I.
145. Id.
146. For example, Iraq was, and still is, a member state of the U.N. Even were there to be general
consensus regarding the need for force, the possibility of having such a force take action against the member
state could easily become fractious.
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states would not volunteer their soldiers for peacekeeping duty, rather the U.N.
military force would actively recruit both interested civilians and current
military personnel from around the globe to join the force. This would require
that the recruits forsake the laws of their home country, whatever it might be,
and agree to be subject to the jurisdiction of the military court for the force, thus
solving the uneven justice problem and preventing the possibility of legally
savvy peacekeepers being more likely to commit abuses knowing that they will
not face severe punishments in their home country's military court.
In terms of the military law used, as between the laws of the permanent
members of the UNSC the most similar legal systems are those of the U.S. and
the U.K., and accordingly, for stability and ease of adapting these laws to the
force, those should be used as the code for the U.N. military force. This would
reconcile the issues with the current legal status of peacekeepers and the
application of the ICC statute to U.N. peacekeepers with the guaranteed
prosecutorial abilities and procedural benefits found in the USCMJ.'47 By
adopting laws which have cases establishing precedent, the lawyers involved in
the prosecutions on both sides would have a better knowledge and
understanding of how to argue their cases, and judges would have a far better
understanding of how to apply statutory law.
Along with the U.N. military force there would have to be a recruitment
and screening process for all civilian staff members, and an office specifically
for the oversight of peacekeeper activities and interaction with the local popula-
tions must be created and well staffed. This office should be charged with,
among other things, educating the local community about the proper and
improper actions of peacekeepers, and how and where they should report any
instances of inappropriate conduct by the peacekeepers. All of these sugges-
tions would rather obviously require funding, which the author submits should
not go directly through the U.N., especially in the wake of the oil-for-food
scandal.148 Rather, the permanent UNSC members alone should fund the U.N.
military force with contributions which are commensurate to their contributions
as of 2005. As a corollary, the contributions of each of the permanent UNSC
members would then be significantly reduced to accommodate the funding of
the peacekeeping operation. Since one of the primary tasks assigned to the
permanent UNSC members is the maintenance of "international peace and
security," and since this task requires a robust peacekeeping and military force,
the permanent members' first financial responsibility should be the creation and
147. See supra Part V.
148. See Phil Hirschkorn, Texas Businessman Indicted in U.N. Oil-For-Food Probe, CNN.cOM, Apr.
15, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/14/oilfood.indictment/index.html (last visited Apr.
22, 2005).
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maintenance of an organized, legally accountable, and morally respected U.N.
military force.
In terms of the troops themselves, recruits must be carefully screened and
vetted before they are allowed to become peacekeepers. Key among the
screening processes must be the mandatory taking of an HIV/AIDS test before
and during deployment. In the event that any fathering issues should arise,
pictures of the peacekeepers must be maintained on file, and all deployed peace-
keepers and accompanying personnel must be required to give a DNA sample
prior to deployment. Should any peacekeeper alter his appearance while
deployed or prior to deployment, he should be required to resubmit a photo-
graph. These measures do tend to go into some of the private realm which civil
libertarians, especially in America, tend to hold dear, however, in order to
rehabilitate the peacekeeping idea and ensure that it can exist in a functional and
helpful way, these steps must be taken. The world, and particularly the victims,
must be assured that such allegations of abuse by peacekeepers do not occur
again.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of a U.N. peacekeeping force evolved from a
somewhat questionable interpretation of the U.N. Charter to both win the Nobel
Peace Prize and to become known for truly abominable sexual abuses of those
it was charged with protecting. This dichotomy has been in no way helped by
the uneven legal fates which await abusive peacekeepers when they return to
their home countries. The idea of using the ICC to prosecute these errant peace-
keepers does not provide the victims with a real chance at having substantive
charges brought against the peacekeeper who abused her, and does not provide
either the prosecution or the defense adequate procedural and fairness safe-
guards before and during the trial. In contrast to these substantive and proce-
dural issues with using the ICC statute stands the USCMJ-a well-established
legal system that would allow for prosecution of peacekeepers as individuals
and contains crimes which fit those allegedly committed by the peacekeepers,
while guaranteeing procedural adequacy and fairness to the prosecution and the
defense in a less politically charged atmosphere than the ICC. The USCMJ
does not investigate or prosecute the ideas of the institution which created and
deployed the peacekeepers, rather it investigates and prosecutes those peace-
keepers who have violated the law. In so doing, the individual is brought to
justice, while the institution itself can point to the prosecution of an errant
member as evidence that it too condemns the act and that the act is not a part of
the value set and goals advanced by the institution. This protects the contribu-
tions of those members of the institution who truly believe in its goals and have
fought and sacrificed for the institution, at the same time that it protects future
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local populations from facing the prospect of allowing in potential predators or
not electing to allow in peacekeepers who might otherwise save their society.
The suggestions made in this paper aim to reconcile the two elements
present in international peacekeeping missions, especially where there are
problems within the mission: humanitarianism and law. One can have humani-
tarianism and no law and generate a system much like the current U.N.
peacekeeping system, which is besmirched by the horrid allegations of abuse
made against peacekeepers, and leaves a legacy of uneven justice for victims.
One can have law and no humanitarianism and end up with a dusty book of
statutes sitting in a library, an ancient relic never used because there was never
sufficient societal interest in the concept to create a peacekeeping force to
govern. Or, one can combine the two and have a system that benefits humanity
not only through its acts but also through its assurances of even and fair justice.
That is the combination which will allow the idea of international peacekeeping
to flourish.
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"We must build a United States of Europe." Winston Churchill'
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1. Winston Churchill, Speech at Zurich University (Sept. 1946); See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the dust settled from World War II, Winston Churchill declared the
need for Europe to integrate economically and politically. Integration promised
not only peace, but the means by which Europe could remain a world power.
The European Union (EU) is considered by many the answer to Europe's post-
war condition.2 The creation of a common market in 1992, a single monetary
unit in 1999, and the latest induction of Eastern European countries in 2004
demonstrate the success of the EU.3 With the impending ratification of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,4 it is clear that the European
Union has evolved from a mere free trade agreement5 to an economic and
political union.' Fundamental to the formation of an integrated Europe has been
the creation of a common legal system.'
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (West Group 2d ed. 2002) (1993) (giving context to
Churchill's speech); See also JOHN CHARMLEY, CHURCHILL'S GRAND ALLIANCE 248 (1995).
2. A Divided Union, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2004, at 14 [hereinafter "A Divided Union"].
3. JOHN VAN OUDENAREN, UNITING EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION I I
(Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. 2d ed. 20 05) [hereinafter UNITING EUROPE]; see generally BERMANN, supra
note 1 ; The EU at a Glance, http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005)
("[The EU] has helped to raise living standards, built a single Europe-wide market, launched the single
European currency, the euro, and strengthened Europe's voice in the world.").
4. See generally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
1; see also A Divided Union, supra note 2, at 10.
5. The seeds of the EU were planted in 1952 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Treaty (ECSC). BERMANN, supra note 1, at 5. France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries
designed the ECSC Treaty to ensure that Germany would not develop a supply of weapons. Id
6. See Reinhard Zimmermann, The "Europeanization" of Private Law Within the European
Community and the Reemergence of a European Legal Science, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73 (1995) (referring
to the movement towards integration with the passage of the Single European Act, the Maastrich Treaty, and
stating "[o]bviously, therefore, the political will exists to advance the process of European integration on an
economic, political, and cultural level; and it appears to be perfectly appropriate to facilitate this process by
striving towards legal unity."); see also CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS, 6 (2004) ("The history of the EU lends support for neo-functionalism as an explanation for the
integration process - in less than fifty years the EU has moved from being merely a coal and steel community
to now a major economic and monetary union.").
7. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 121 (2001) ("The
feasibility of a coherent European economic system inevitably depends on a coherent European legal order,"
quoting Eric Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 29 (1964)); see also George Tridimas & Takis Tridimas, National Courts and the European Court of
Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125,
127 (2004) ("Uniform interpretation of law reduces distortions of competition and promotes economic
efficiency");
Historical experience has demonstrated that a common market or free trade area cannot
operate smoothly without certain generally recognized rules and procedures, without
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The task of unifying European nations with different languages, legal
systems, and sordid pasts represents a significant hurdle to achieving harmoni-
zation of laws.8 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) through Article 234 (ex
Article 177) of the Treaty of Rome," the preliminary ruling procedure, has been
the main facilitator in the legal integration of Europe. l° Although grounded in
the civil tradition, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 234 bestows its decisions
with the power of precedents. Thus, by borrowing from the common law
tradition, the ECJ has created a system of integration by adjudication. This
comment seeks to illustrate the evolution of the European legal system as a part
of the evolution of the European Union, and the ECJ's key role in the
harmonization of laws via Article 234.
Part II provides a background on the ECJ. Part III introduces Article 234
and explains how the preliminary ruling system functions. Part IV analyzes the
ECJ's expansion of jurisdiction by giving its decisions the power of precedent
through Article 234. Part V addresses how Member States allowed for this
expansion of power. Part VI concludes by discussing the evolution and
harmonization of the European legal system as part of globalization.
a core of common legal institutions and convictions .... Legal unification has also
always been both stimulus for and consequence of political unification, and as a
cultural phenomenon it serves to strengthen the feeling of provincial, national or
supranational identity.
Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 73; Geoffrey Garret, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court
of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998).
8. See UNrrING EUROPE, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that "the EU of today has twenty-five members
and twenty official languages using two alphabets, the Greek and Roman. Economically, culturally, and
socially it is far more diverse than the Carolingian Europe of 1957."); see also Curran, supra note 7, at 121.
("Scratching the surface of the European Union's legal system might bring into view a juridical Tower of
Babel, due to the clash of discordant legal cultures between the two principal, divergent legal systems
coexisting in the European Union: namely, the common-law and civil-law systems."); see also Zimmermann,
supra note 6, at 65 (noting that "for the past two hundred years or so there have been, in principle, as many
legal systems (and, consequently, legal sciences) in Europe as there are nation states.").
9. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7 1992, U.J. (C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 3
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
10. Francis G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The
European Court of Justice, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 547, 550 (2003) ("It is probably true to say that, over the first
thirty years of the EEC, the case law of the ECJ made a more significant contribution to European integration
than any other development over that period."); see also Matthew T. King, Comment, Towards a Practical
Convergence: The Dynamic Uses ofJudicial Advice in United States Federal Courts and the Court of Justice
of the European Communities, 63 U. PrrT. L. REV. 703, 723 (2002) ("Article 234 (then 177) 'is essential for
the preservation of the community character of the law established by the treaty and has the object of ensuring
that in all circumstances this law is the same in all states of the Community,"' quoting the ECJ's opinion in
Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr, 1974 E.C.R. 33)).
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II. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The Treaty of Rome created the ECJ in 1957 to resolve disputes
concerning the European Community (EC) Treaties and assist national courts
in the uniform application and interpretation of EU laws." The ECJ is charged
with the duty of interpreting treaties and making sure that Member States
comply with EU law.'2 "The over arching obligation of the ECJ is, in this view,
to pursue the primary objective of the EC Treaty as set forth in the Preamble:
'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.'"13
The ECJ holds four powers:
1) judicial review;
2) answering preliminary questions under Article 234;
3) answering administrative questions regarding EU personnel;
and
4) reviewing decisions of the Court of First Instance (CFI).14
This discussion focuses on the second power, the preliminary ruling procedure
under Article 234, which represents the majority of the ECJ's work. 5
While it might seem natural to draw an analogy that the ECJ is to the EU
what the Supreme Court is to the United States, "the Treaty of Rome did not
provide for the establishment of a Supreme Court.' 6 Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, which hears appeals from lower courts, the ECJ does not hear
appeals from lower courts because there are no lower courts, with the exception
11. Kevin Andrew Swartz, Note, Powerful, Unique, and Anonymous: The European Court of
Justice and Its Continuing Impact on the Formation of the European Community, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
687, 691 (1994).
12. See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 58 ("Article 220 (ex 164) of the EC Treaty gives the Court the
responsibility for 'ensur[ing] that the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."').
13. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 701 (1999) (quoting
preamble of EEC Treaty: "The internal market is the cornerstone of that 'ever closer union,' and together
they constitute the very purpose-the 'telos'-of the EC.").
14. See generally BERMANN, supra note 1, at 58-71 (giving a detailed account of the ECJ facts, such
as terms of judges, the composition of the court, and the Court of First Instance (CFI)). The CFI was created
in 1988 to deal with the overload in the ECJ's docket). Id. at 65. It primarily hears cases dealing with private
litigants, whereas the ECJ handles cases between Member States and EU institutions. Id. at 66. See also
Justice Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization: Changing Relationships Among
European Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 1045, 1049-1051 (2000) (giving a simple explanation
and background to the ECJ and how it works).
15. Breyer, supra note 14, at 1049; see also BERMANN supra note 1, at 352 (noting that referrals
compose about half of the ECJ's case docket).
16. Tridimas, supra note 7.
of the CFI. 7 "This is hardly surprising since the Community was not born as
a federation but rather as a sui generic supranational entity with an open-ended
integrative potential."' 8
Because the other EC institutions exercise powers of execution and
legislation to enforce the Treaty of Rome, it was "imperative that there should
be some mechanism to ensure the uniform application of Community law
throughout the Member States."' 9 The possibility of national courts rendering
different interpretations of the EC Treaties impedes the goal of economic and
legal harmonization.2 ° The only way for the EU to overcome 150 years of
different constitutions and civil codes was to give the ECJ the power to overrule
the national courts and establish a precedent that national courts would be
obliged to follow.2 "That is, the EC relied on its adjudicative authority to give
content, on a case-by-case basis, to the common market norms set forth in the
Treaty., 22 Through Article 234's preliminary ruling procedure, the ECJ was
given "unifying jurisdiction. '23
m. ARTICLE 234
A. General Description
Article 234 provides:
1) The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
a) the interpretation of the Treaty;
b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of
the Community and of the ECB;
c) The interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by
an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
2) Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of
a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that
a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon
3) Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decision
17. See BERMANN supra note 1, at 65-70 (addressing the creation of the CFI to deal with the ECJ's
overloaded docket).
18. Tridimas, supra note 7.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Lindseth, supra note 13, at 662-63.
23. Tridimas, supra note 7.
Gierczyk2005]
158 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:153
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.24
Article 234 is a procedural device that "enables the ECJ, on request of
national courts, to provide rulings on the interpretation and validity of Com-
munity law."2 A preliminary ruling occurs when a national judge is confronted
with a question demanding the application of EU law that is unclear.26 Once the
ECJ answers the question, the national court is bound by the ECJ's
interpretation and "must apply the Court's ruling to the facts of the case."27
Theoretically, the ECJ's ruling is only binding on the parties and the court
that submitted the question.2" However, in practice, the ECJ's pronouncements
"are cast in general terms and have been held by the Court to apply to future
cases."2 9 As one scholar notes:
[D]espite the absence of a formal rule of stare decisis binding the
Court of Justice itself, Article 234 rulings constitute binding prece-
dents for national courts in later cases. Like other Court of Justice
rulings, they allow Community law to acquire a determined meaning
throughout the territory of the Community, and thus promote legal
certainty and unity. °
Article 234 is easily considered the "most important procedural rule of the
Treaty"' because it not only "facilitates dialogue between national courts and
the ECJ, 32 but also "provides a meeting point between Community and national
law. '33
24. EEC Treaty, supra note 9, at art. 234.
25. Tridimas, supra note 7.
26. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 354,
27. Swartz, supra note 11, at 692-93.
28. Case 52/76, Benedetti v. Munari, 1977 E.C.R. 163; Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrcken, 1969 E.C.R. 165.
29. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 354; see also Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse
Belasting-sadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 61 (discussing the Da Costa ruling by the ECJ, which in effect initiated
a system of precedent infra note 51).
30. Id.
31. Tridimas, supra note 7; see also Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 323 (1999) [hereinafter EVOLUTION OF EU LAW] (stating that Article 234 is
considered the "crown jewel" of the ECJ's jurisdiction); Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of Community Courts
Reconsidered, 36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 555, 559 (2001) (describing "the ECJ's jurisdiction over preliminary rulings
under Article 234 ... is regarded as the jewel in the Crown of the existing regime.").
32. Tridirnas, supra note 7.
33. Id. at 127-28.
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B. How Article 234 Functions
A national court makes the initial determination of whether a question of
Community law is pertinent to the case.34 "The national court must consider
whether or not the answer to the EU law question is necessary to formulate a
decision in the case before it makes a discretionary referral under Article
234(2)."" Once the national court submits a question to the ECJ, regardless if
the question is mandatory or not, the ruling is binding on the referring parties
and court. 6
According to Article 234, national courts may ask for a preliminary ruling
in only two circumstances: "1) a discretionary reference under Article 234(2);
and 2) a compulsory reference under Article 234(3)."" The following
discussion addresses the differences between these two scenarios.
A mandatory referral occurs when a question of EU law is presented and
no judicial remedy exists under national law. 38 The only exceptions are: "1) the
issue is irrelevant; 2) the Court has already addressed the question; or 3) the
correct application of EC law is obvious. 39 Mandatory referrals may come
from lower national courts when no judicial remedy exists.4°
Under an Article 234 preliminary ruling, the ECJ's role is simply to clarify
the meaning of EU law and leave it to the national court to apply the law to the
case at hand. 4' Although the ECJ is to limit its analysis to EC law, the ECJ
typically makes it clear how the national court should rule.42 The decision made
34. See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of
the European Court of Justice and the Court's Latest Challenge, 18 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 833, 847 (1996) (noting
that "[t]he ECJ 'will refuse to accept a reference where it considers that the procedure is being abused by
artificially contrived proceedings designed for the purpose of having Community law points decided").
35. See id (explaining that "[t]he ECJ wants the national court to consider the following when
deciding whether to make a discretionary referral to the ECJ: '(i) establish the facts first; (ii) define the
national law context of the Community law question; and (iii) explain the reasons why the question needs to
be answered."').
36. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 127-28.
37. White, supra note 34, at 846.
38. Id. at 847 (citing Article 234(3)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 848.
41. Id. at 846.
42. John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative
Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North America and
Western Europe, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); see also Lindseth, supra note 13, at 663 (stating that "[d]espite
the fact that national courts retained ultimate decisional power in a formal sense, often ECJ interpretations
under the preliminary reference procedure effectively mandated a particular decision significantly constraining
the effect of the Member State law in question.").
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by the ECJ on the referred question is binding on the court and parties who
made the reference. 3
While in theory this ruling is applicable only to the case at hand, "when an
issue has been previously decided by a preliminary ruling in a similar case, the
earlier ECJ decision has a legal effect. '"4 Thus, if parties A v. B have a question
answered via preliminary ruling, that ruling will apply to parties C v. D if they
have the same or similar question.45 Consequently, national courts will research
ECJ jurisprudence before submitting a preliminary reference question to the
ECJ. 6 If they find a ruling on a same or similar question, they will apply the
principle laid out in the ECJ decision and cite the decision as precedent.47
Section D, infra, discusses the ECJ case law which developed a precedent based
legal system.
For many European civil countries, the practice of citing previous deci-
sions as precedent is in itself a new precedent.48 Only on very rare occasions
does a French national court cite a previous decision to answer a question posed
by a set of new parties, let alone citing the decision of another court.49 The
practice of national courts citing ECJ rulings as precedent is a revolutionary
concept.5 The result of citing precedent is the creation of a body of
jurisprudence that has "independent supranational meaning, even on issues
raised before national tribunal."'"
C. Purpose behind Article 234
Article 234 Preliminary Ruling procedure "is the cornerstone of the
structure designed to secure a common meaning for Community law in all the
Member States. -52 Article 234 performs three important functions: "[f]irst, it
43. Tridimas, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44. Fitzpatrick, supra note 42; see also BERMANN, supra note 1, at 354 (stating "though preliminary
rulings only answer the questions put by a national court in a particular case, they are cast in general terms
and have been held by the Court also to apply to future cases.").
45. Interview with Isabel Fernhndez de la Cuesta, EU Law Specialist, in Houston, Tex. (Jan. 8,
2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Fernndez de la Cuesta].
46. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing Case 144/86, Gubisch
Maschinenfabrik KG v. Giulio Palumbo, 1987 E.C.R. 4861, which was applied by a national court in Spain).
47. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing Case 144/86, Gubisch, 1987 E.C.R.
4861, applying the concept of lispendens as defined by the ECJ in a Spanish court).
48. Interview with Fernindez de la Cuesta, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Fitzpatrick, supra note 42 , at 1.
52. King, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
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ensures uniform interpretation of Community Law;"" second, "it ensures the
unity of the Community legal order and the coherence of the system ofjudicial
remedies established by the Treaty;" '54 finally, "it facilitates access to justice:
it makes it clear that Community law is to be applied not only by the ECJ but
also by national courts, thus enabling citizens to enforce their Community rights
in the national jurisdictions.""
D. Case Law Developing Article 234
1. Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingadminstratie56
"The Da Costa case, therefore, initiated what is in effect a system of
precedent. 7 In Da Costa, the ECJ was confronted with a case raising a question
that had already been answered by the ECJ in a preliminary ruling.5" Da Costa
alleged the unlawful increase of a customs duty as prohibited by Article 12 of
the EEC Treaty.59 The Commission requested that the preliminary reference be
dismissed because the question posed by Da Costa had already been decided by
a previous judgment.60 In response, the ECJ held that a national court is able to
refer a matter to the Court, however, if the case does not raise some new factor
or argument, the existence of an earlier ruling will dispose of the case.6,
In Da Costa the ECJ made it clear that national courts could and should
rely on previous decisions by the ECJ as a form of precedent.62 This implies
that under the preliminary ruling system, "the ECJ directly influences national
law through opinions delivered in the context of private disputes before national
53. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also King, supra note 10 (stating "Legal harmony is the
primary benefit, and goal, of having all Member States refer Community issues to the ECJ."); Laurence R.
Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J.
273, 291 (1997) (noting that "[tihe ostensible purpose of this provision was to ensure uniformity of
interpretation of the treaty by ensuring that six (now [nineteen]) sets of national judges did not develop
divergent interpretations of the treaty and Community secondary legislation.").
54. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also Vladimir Shifin, Article 177 References to the
European Court, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 657, 658 (recognizing that the "uniform interpretation of
Community law is necessary for uniform application of Community law.').
55. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128.
56. Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa, 1963 E.C.R. 61.
57. Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 440 (3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Craig & De Burca, EU Law].
58. Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa, 1963 E.C.R. 61.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id
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courts. 63  In addition to influencing national laws, the Court shapes and
develops Community laws via the preliminary ruling system.'
2. Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health
61
If Da Costa initiated the system of precedent, then CILFIT v. Ministry of
Health"6 served to reinforce it.67 The CILFIT decision made it "clear that a case
can be relied on even if the ruling did not emerge from the same type of
proceedings, and even though the questions at issue were not strictly
identical."" In CILFIT, a textile firm claimed that the obligation to pay certain
Italian duties violated an EU regulation.69 The Ministry of Health urged the
Italian national court not to submit a question to the ECJ because they claimed
the matter "was so obvious as to obviate the need for a reference."70 However,
because no judicial remedy existed under the Italian Court, the question became
a mandatory referral under Article 234(3). 71  The Italian Court requested a
preliminary ruling on the matter.72
The ECJ responded by addressing the issue of an acte clai7 and "gave
guidance on the relevance of its prior decisions. 74 In relevant part, the ECJ
ruled that "where previous Decisions of the Court have already dealt with the
point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led
to those Decisions, [and] even though the questions at issue are not strictly
identical,"75 national courts may rely on those decisions.76
63. Fitzpatrick, supra note 42.
64. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 352.
65. Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
66. Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
67. Id. See also CRAIG & DE BIrRCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450 (stating that "[t]he decision
in CILFIT to reinforce precedent was surely not unintentional." Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.).
68. Id. at 442.
69. Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. See generally CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at451 (describing the basic concept
of the acte clair as a doctrine created by national courts which states that ifa question of EU law is clear they
are not required to submit that question to the ECJ); see also id. at 448 (discussing the acceptance of doctrine
of the acte clair as part of the "give and take"' between national courts and the ECJ... by "the ECJ accepting
the acte clair doctrine, but placing significant constraints on its exercise" it "hope[d] that national courts
would play the game and only refuse when matters really were unequivocally clear.").
74. Id. at 441.
75. Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, E.C.R. 3415.
76. Id.
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However, according to Article 234, preliminary rulings are only to bind the
parties and court that present the question." While the ECJ did not
affirmatively state that previous decisions are binding on future parties in a strict
sense, it basically said, "[w]e, the ECJ are not going to change our mind on the
interpretation of EU law, so if you, national court, do not have a new question,
we are going to give you the same answer as before.""8 The CILFIT decision
reinforced the notion of a uniform interpretation of EU case law.
In CILFIT, the ECJ expanded its authority under the Treaty of Rome, ex
post, by directing national courts to treat their previous decisions as precedent."9
By making its previous decisions binding on national courts, the ECJ is
effectively rewriting the Treaty and explicitly giving its decisions the power of
precedent.80
IV. How THE ECJ GREW POWERFUL VIA ARTICLE 234
A. Overview
The shifting of supremacy in the ECJ legal system flourished with ECJ's
interpretation of Article 234."1 Through the ECJ's reading and application of
Article 234, the ECJ expanded its own power by promoting a stare decisis-like
application of its rulings and strengthened the EU institutions by interpreting
EU treaties beyond their originally intended scope. 2 This expansion of power
77. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (outlining the limits of Article 234 preliminary
ruling under the EEC Treaty); see also CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450 (noting that
"[t]hose rulings were now to have authority for situations where the point of law was the same, even though
the questions posed in earlier cases were different, and even though the proceedings in which the issue
originally arose differed.").
78. Interview with Fernndez de la Cuesta, supra note 45.
79. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAw, supra note 57, at 450 (noting that "by expanding the
precedential impact of past decisions, the ECJ thereby increased the authoritative scope of its past rulings.").
80. Id.
81. EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 31, at 330.
82. See Lindseth, supra note 13, at 635.
Although purportedly an entity possessing only enumerated powers, the scope of the
Community's normative authority has steadily increased since its inception in the
1950s, partly due to explicit transfers from the Member States, but more importantly
due to an expansive interpretation of Community competences by the Community
institutions themselves, notably the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Id See also lann Margalit Maazel, Mulloche v. Netherlands: A Marshallian Discourse on Modern Europe,
35 UWLA L. REV. 1, 25 (2003) (stating that "given the power to define the Community's sphere of
competence, the ECJ has as yet under our analysis no historical, structural, or textual basis to interpret this
sphere broadly."); Aashit Shah, The "Abuse of Dominant Position" Under Article 82 of the Treaty of
European Community: Impact on Licensing ofIntellectual Property Rights, 3 CFI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 41,
71 (2003) ("The ECJ has often been criticized as being activist and interpreting treaty provisions beyond its
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was necessary for the harmonization of laws in Europe and reflects the
evolution of a legal system to meet the demands of economic integration."
The ECJ accomplished this task in the following ways: 1) it transformed
an international treaty into a constitutional treaty by developing a body of
precedent; 2) it created fundamental principles of EU law by interpreting the EU
Treaties beyond their originally intended scope; and (3) it transferred power in
three arenas: i) from the governments of the Member States to the institutions
of the Community; ii) from the executive and the legislature to the judiciary;
and iii) from higher national courts to lower national courts."
B. Transforming an International Treaty into a Constitutional Treaty
The ECJ transformed an international treaty into a constitutional treaty by
creating precedent via Article 234's preliminary ruling system.5
Successful constitutional courts turn constitutions into constitutional
law, that is they convert a text enacted at a given historical moment
into a continuous, collective stream of case law ... in regard to the
ECJ, the reference here is not to the much-proclaimed and much-
disputed judicial conversion of the Treaties from the realm of
international law to that of constitutional law, but to the building of
a large body of ECJ law that has become self-generating.86
judicial parameters."); Joseph R. Wetzel, Note, Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the European
Union: Resolving the Conflict and Confusion Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2823, 2830 (2003) ("The ECJ's broad interpretations of treaty provisions, particularly EC Treaty
Article 234, suggest the Court's willingness to assert itself on the supranational stage.").
83. See Shah, supra note 82 ("The ECJ has been at the forefront of the European integration
movement and has deepened and expanded the original Community principals to maintain the effectiveness
of EC law."); see also Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2831 (noting that "[t]he ECJ gradually has developed its
power and influence with the aim of promoting uniformity in Community law, thereby contributing to further
integration within the EC.").
84. See infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text.
85. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 53, at 292 (noting that "the ECJ's success has been such that
it has been widely credited with transforming the Treaty of Rome from an international instrument into the
'constitution' of the European Community."); see also Sally J. Kenney, The European Court of Justice
Integrating Europe Through Law, 81 JUDICATURE 250 (1998).
Since its creation in 1952 under the Treaty of Paris to hear cases for the Coal and Steel
Community, the European Court of Justice has transformed itself from an international
to a constitutional court, holding European Community law to be supreme and, in
many cases, directly effective in member states.
Id.
86. See EVOLUTION OF EU LAw, supra note 31, at 326 ("The European Court of Justice's decisions
have changed an international treaty into a constitution").
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Instead of having an international instrument in which Member States
would apply at their own discretion, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 234
secured the application and harmonization of community law.87 According to
one scholar, it is ironic "that Article 234 puts the ECJ in a weaker position than
a supreme court in a federation," and yet, "the preliminary reference procedure
has proved to be the main procedural route through which the process of the
constitutionalization of the Community has taken place."88
C Integration by Adjudication
"One of the most important developments in European law today is
the emergence of a common private law within the European
Community.... Yet, legal science has barely started to notice that the
face ofprivate law is about to be fundamentally reshaped. "89
Through the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 234, the ECJ has
developed a precedent based system achieving "integration by adjudication."
While no formal stare decisis system exists, "there is '[n]o doubt [that] a trend
towards recognition of Community precedents is gaining momentum."'9 1 As
one scholar states:
The very prevalence of the European Court of Justice as a source, if
not, as many would say today, as the most important source, of legal
authority in the European Union, has created a system with an
increasingly common-law-like component of stare decisis. European
judges, like their common-law brethren, and, unlike their civil-law
brethren (at least in the latter's official role), create law, fashioning
it with each judicial decision, such that legal norms are judicially
created for future application to similar future cases.'
The development of Article 234 jurisprudence "can be seen as a historical
record of legal integration."93 The emphasis placed on ECJ preliminary rulings
87. Id.
88. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128.
89. Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 104 (emphasis added).
90. Lindseth, supra note 13, at 664.
91. Swartz, supra note 11, at 694 (quoting D. Lasok & J.W. Bridge).
92. Curran, supra note 7, at 72.
93. Thomas de la Mare, Article 177 in Social and Political Context, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW
215 (Paul Craig & Grianne de Burca eds., 1999). Preliminary rulings "allow Community law to acquire a
determined meaning throughout the territory of the Community, and thus promote legal certainty and unity.".
Id. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 354.
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"demonstrates [a] natural evolution in supranational law, even one based on
civil law principles."
Fashion Ribbon Co. v. lberland S.L.95 represents an example of a national
court citing an ECJ decision as precedent. In that case, the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain cited the Gubisch v. Palumbo96 decision when defining the concept of
lispendens.97 The Gubisch decision occurred in 1987.98 Sixteen years later, in
a commercial dispute in Spain, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain cites Gubisch to
define the legal concept of lis pendens. The practice of national courts citing
ECJ preliminary rulings exemplifies the development of precedent and
harmonization of laws.
D. Building Blocks of the EU Legal System
Through the preliminary ruling system, the ECJ has expanded the scope of
its jurisdiction and laid the foundation of EU law.'O As former Judge Pescator
of the ECJ notes: "'[t]he decisions of the Court which have made the most
94. Charles, H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 52 (2003);
see also Lindseth supra note 13, at 638. Commenting that:
In the three decades following the EEC's establishment in 1957, the Member States
largely acquiesced in the Court's effort to elaborate autonomous supranational norms
through the development of such fundamental doctrines as direct effect, supremacy,
and implied powers, each of which helped to lay the legal foundation upon which
subsequent political integration could build.
Id.
95. Tribunal Supremo, 1943/2001 (Madrid 2003) (a motion demanding exequatur of an arbitration
award pursuant to the New York Convention) [hereinafter Fashion Ribbon Co.].
96. Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861. In Gubisch, an Italian citizen
was trying to enforce the validity of a contract against a German national. Id. Gubisch also filed a suit in a
German national court stating that the contract was invalid. Id. Both the German and Italian court had
different definitions of lis pendens, which determined whether the contract was enforceable or not. Id. The
Italian court submitted to the ECJ a preliminary question on what the definition of Us pendens was under
Article 21 of the Convention. Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861. The ECJ
recognized that "the concept of lispendens is not the same in all the legal systems of the contracting states"
and "a common concept of lispendens cannot be arrived at by a combination of the various relevant provision
of national law." Id Instead of choosing between the Italian or German definition of lis pendens, the ECJ
ruled that the definition of lis pendens from now on would be the ECJ's interpretation of Article 21 of the
Brussels Convention. Id. (referring to the ECJ's definition of lis pendens). Lis pendens "covers a case where
a party brings an action before a court in a contracting state for the recession or discharge of an international
sales contract whilst an action by the other party to enforce the same contract is pending before a court in
another contracting state." Id.
97. Id.
98. Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861.
99. Fashion Ribbon Co., 1943/2001.
100. White, supra note 34, at 848 ("The ECJ has used Article 177 to develop several unique concepts
of EU law.").
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conspicuous contribution to the development of Community law have been
delivered [by the preliminary ruling].'" The doctrine of direct effect, primacy
of Community law over national law, protection of fundamental rights, and the
principles of competition law and social law have all been developed by the
preliminary ruling system.'0 2 This analysis will focus on the doctrines of
supremacy and direct effect, which are considered the "'twin pillars of the
Community's legal system."" 3
1. Supremacy of EU Law
Unlike the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the
European treaties contain no express rule that EU law is superior to national law
in the areas in which the EU has competence.'" However, if such a rule did not
exist how could harmonization of laws occur if "in a case of conflict, domestic
law was determinative"? 05 In Costa0 6, "the ECJ handed down a landmark
ruling which gave the laws of the EC supremacy over those of the Member
States."' 7
In Costa v. ENEL,0 8 an Italian Constitutional Court found an EC Treaty
invalid because it conflicted with subsequent Italian legislation. The legisla-
101. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 352; Lindseth, supra note 13, at638.
102. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 352; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 53, at 291-92.
103. Craig, supra note 31, at 560 ("[T]he reference procedure laid down in Article [234] must surely
be the keystone in the edifice; without it the roof would collapse and the two pillars would be left as a desolate
ruin, evocative of the temple at Cape Sounion - beautiful but not of much practical utility.").
104. See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 269 (noting that "[t]he closest approximation is EC Treaty
Article 10 (ex 5), which imposes on Member States a general obligation of loyalty to Community law... ");
see also Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional
Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 229, 229-30 (1997). Commenting that:
The supremacy of Community law flows from the fact that the Community is a system
of attributed or enumerated competencies. The Community has no inherent legislative
or executive power; its institutions have no power to adopt an act unless they are
authorized to do so by a Treaty provision. If no there is no legal basis for a legislative
act in the EC Treaties, national law comes into. Thus, national law is superseded by
secondary Community law only the latter is compatible with the EC
Treaties-Community law not grounded in a Treaty provision is incapable of
superseding national law.
Id. at 232.
105. Grimm, supra note 105.
106. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale per I'Engeria Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.
107. Swartz, supra note 11, at 695.
108. Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.
109. See Swartz, supra note 11, at 695-96 (noting that "the Italian constitutional court found that as
part of its domestic law, Italy had the power to create laws which contravened the Treaty of Rome.").
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tion permitted the Italian government to nationalize the electric company."0
According to Costa, an Italian citizen who refused to pay his electricity bill,
nationalizing the electric company violated EC competition law. "' The Italian
Court reasoned that "because the Italian Legislature had created a law which
conflicted with part of the Treaty of Rome, it was the Treaty rather than the later
Italian law which had to give way."" 2
Relying on the wording of Article 189, the ECJ ruled that the EC's treaties
were "directly applicable" to the Member States, and that the terms of the
treaties were "binding in [their] entirety" on them.' 3 As the ECJ stated in its
opinion, "[t]he executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State
to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. . ."' By invoking the spirit of the
Treaty, the ECJ overruled a Member State's highest court and "established
[early on] the supremacy of EC law over national law and guaranteed its own
place as an important institutional wing of the EC.""' 5
The new EU Constitution codifies the supremacy of EU law, a legal doc-
trine created purely by ECJ case law." 6 Unlike civil law courts whose power
is defined and constrained by a legal code, the ECJ developed legal principles
to satisfy the demands of a supranational legal system." 7 In this regard, the
ECJ's behavior resembles a common law court and represents a significant
example of the evolution of the European legal system to meet the demands of
harmonization."'
110. Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.
111. Id.
112. Swartz, supra note 11, at 695-96.
113. Id
114. BERMANN, supra note 1, at 270.
115. Swartz, supra note 11, at 695-96; see also Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2832 (discussing the
evolution of the primacy principle in the SpA Simmenthal v. Comm 'n of the European Communities, 1979
E.C.R. 777, case which ruled "that national courts must apply Community law in its entirety and eliminate
any national laws that conflict with Community law.").
116. Roger J. Goebel, European Union Law: Overview: The European Union in Transition: The
Treaty of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455, 496
(2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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2. Doctrine of Direct Effect-Giving Private Litigants a Voice
The second pillar of the EU legal system is the doctrine of direct effect."9
In its essence, the doctrine of direct effect allows Community regulations to be
self-executing, thus, creating rights for individuals in Member States without the
passage of legislation typically required to enforce rights under a Treaty. 2 ' The
doctrine of direct effect declares that "there are certain Treaty provisions that 1)
are precise enough to be directly effective, 2) are unqualified, and 3) require no
discretion in their application by the court."' 2 ' Any national law which conflicts
with any of these Treaty provisions must be set aside by Member States.122 The
Treaty provisions that are "sufficiently precise and unconditional so as to confer
legal rights upon that individual"' 23 also have direct effect on Member States
and are enforceable by individuals in their national courts. 24
In addition, the ECJ has ruled via Article 234 that if a Member State fails
to implement a directive after the allotted time period, the directive is still
directly applicable. 25  The court articulated that these "directives have direct
effects in national courts in the sense that they can be relied upon against the
state or state bodies .. . irrespective of whether the directive has been
implemented.' ' 26  This ruling in effect gave private citizens judicially
enforceable rights under EU law.
Perhaps the greatest transfer of power via the ECJ's interpretation of
Article 234 was the doctrine of direct effect, which granted individuals and
corporations the right to enforce EU law in their national courts. 27 "As in the
119. See CRAIG & DE BURcA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 258 (discussing the Van Gend en Loos
decision which initiated the doctrine of direct effect).
120. See EvOLUTION OF EU LAw, supra note 31, at 330 (declaring that "[tihe Court's great
bootstrapping operation was, of course, its case law creating 'direct effect' so that the Treaties and the
secondary laws made under them came to have the kind of 'supremacy' that occurs in federal, constitutional
states rather than in international organization operating under international law"); see also BERMANN, supra
note 1, at 271 (stating that Article 249 is the legal basis of direct effect).
121. Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415. (noting that "[iun
order to find liability, the court must determine that I) the directive in question provides individuals with
rights, 2) these rights are identifiable in the directive itself, and 3) a causal link exits between the state's breach
and the individual injuries."). See also White, supra note 34, at 850.
122. White, supra note 34, at 848.
123. Breyer, supra note 14, at 1050.
124. White, supra note 34, at 848.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting John Temple Lang, New Legal Effects Resultingfrom the Failure of States to Fulfill
Obligations Under European Community Law: The Francovich Judgment, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 4
(1992/1993)).
127. See Karen J. Alter, Who are the "Masters of the Treaty?": European Governments and the
European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121, 126 (1998) [Hereinafter Alter 1] (noting that by "using the
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United States, individuals are the 'principal 'guardians' of the legal integrity of
Community law,' through the Article 234 preliminary ruling procedure. 't 28
This right not only enhanced the validity of the EU as a recognizable
international institution, but it gave individuals a democratic voice in a system
that leaves little room for individual say.'29
As the ultimate recipients of the benefits of a common legal system, the
ECJ gained a potent ally in the harmonization of laws by empowering private
litigants.
130
From the earliest of days of the Community, individuals have been
drawn in to the process of making the common market a reality in
their own States when the Court of Justice (quietly) developed
fundamental principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community
law. In this way the Court has created an alliance between itself and
individuals, thereby circumventing the Member States and the
Community legislator.'
3 1
direct effect and supremacy of EC law as its legal crutches, the ECJ does not itself exceed its authority by
reviewing the compatibility of national law with EU law in preliminary ruling cases."); see also Tridimas,
supra note 7, at 128 (stating that the combination of "the mechanism of preliminary references with the
doctrines of primacy and direct effect enables individuals and companies to assert Community rights in
national courts").
128. Maazel, supra note 82, at 19 (citing J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403, 2414 (1991)).
129. See Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2834. Stating that:
Through its judgments in response to preliminary reference requests, the ECJ has
enhanced individual rights in areas where Community law affords better protection
than the national law of some Member States, such as equal pay for women. By
subjecting Member States' actions that affect fundamental rights to judicial review
under EU standards, Article 234 has become a vital tool for fundamental rights
improvement.
Id. See generally Lindseth, supra note 13, at 633-35 (describing the "Democratic Deficit" that is inherent in
national and supranational institutions); see also Breyer, supra note 14, at 1053 (commenting that many
European believe the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit").
130. See Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2834 (discussing "[tihe social legitimacy resulting from the
Court's image as a valuable ally to the individual against the Member State's national governments
substantially enhances the ECJ's ability to promote fundamental rights within the European Union."); see also
Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128 (noting that "individuals may use Community law as a 'shield', i.e. to defend
themselves from action by the national authorities which infringes Community rights, and as a 'sword', i.e.
to challenge national measures on grounds of incompatibility with Community laws."). Allowing private
litigants a voice is something that is not permitted by all free movement treaties, as evidenced by Article 2022
of North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 699.
131. BERNARD, supra note 6, at 17.
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Individual litigants with "an economic stake" in the formation of a common
market were "the primary source of demand for law rulings."' 32
Allowing private litigants to raise claims in national courts regarding EU
law permitted the ECJ to address Member States' infringement, enlarging the
scope of the ECJ's power and undermining Member States' sovereignty. 33
"[T]he preliminary reference procedure provides an opportunity for individuals
and, indeed, national courts to question governmental action. The ability of a
national government to control which cases are sent to the ECJ is thus
undermined."' 3' Instead of relying on Member States or the Commission to be
the enforcers of EU law, individuals and companies with an economic interest
in integration allowed the ECJ to address a wide breadth of legal issues
pertaining to the goal of economic harmonization. 35  "In this manner, the
system of preliminary ruling has been transformed into a mechanism of
enforcing EC law and implementing legal integration.' ' 36
Francovich v. Italy' established the principle giving private litigants the
power to raise claims against a national government for failing to implement a
directive that granted individual rights under EU law. 131 It was not uncommon
for governments to resist implementation of an EU directive by either not
transposing the directive on time, executing it incorrectly, or not implementing
it at all.39 Through the Francovich decision, the ECJ demonstrated "the urgent
132. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 142.
133. Alter I, supra note 127, at 127 ("The transformation of the preliminary ruling system
significantly undermined [M]ember [S]tates' ability to control the ECJ. It allowed individuals to raise cases
in national courts that were then referred to the ECJ, undermining national governments ability to control
which cases made it to the ECJ.").
134. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128. "[O]ffering individuals and companies the possibility of
challenging national law increases the ability of the ECJ to pursue its most preferred policies, while it
simultaneously decreases its dependence on the governments of the member states and the Commission to
raise an infringement cases.". Id. at 137.
135. See id. at 128 (stating that "[aireas of policy that were thought to be under the exclusive remit
of the Member States can now be considered, and indeed influenced, by the ECJ, bringing about a distinct loss
of national sovereignty.").
136. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also Alter l, supra note 127, at 129. Noting that:
Although the Court likes to pose modestly as "guardian of the Treaties" it is in fact an
uncontrolled authority generating law directly applicable in Common Market member
states and applying not only to EEC enterprises but also to those established outside
the Community, as long as they have business interests within it.
Id.
137. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
138. Id.
139. Melanie L Ogren, Francovich v. Italian Republic: Should Member States be directly liable for
nonimplementation of European Union Directives?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 583, 604-05 (1994) (noting that
"although [M]ember [S]tates may have accepted the rule of law of the EEC Treaty and the holding of SpA
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need for enforcement and implementation of EU directives by [M]ember
[S]tates."' 4°
In Francovich, the Italian State failed to implement a directive on the
protection of employees in the event of the employer's insolvency.' 4' Member
States were directed to set up a fund for compensating workers affected.
4 1
Plaintiff's employers went bankrupt, leaving plaintiff with no remedy.'43 The
Italian courts requested a preliminary ruling on the issue.'" In response, the
ECJ ruled "that governments must compensate individuals for the loss caused
to them resulting from the nonimplementation of directives, even those without
direct effect.' '145 Thus, the ECJ laid down the general principle that Member
States are liable for the consequences of not implementing directives which
create individual rights. '
The underpinning rationale of the Francovich decision is that by failing to
enforce individual rights recognized under EU law, EU law will be
undermined.147 "In order to meet the goals outlined in the EEC treaty, directive
compliance must be enforced if the system of the European Union that has been
created by its members is to reach its true potential.' 4' The European Union
was created by Member States to derive the benefits of economic and political
harmonization.'49 Signatories to the EEC Treaty must recognize that they chose
Simmenthal [1979 E.C.RI 777] in practice [M]ember [S]tates fail to adhere to those rules.").
140. Ogren, supra note 139, at 604.
141. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; see also Christoph U. Schmid, Pattern
of Legislative andAdjudicative Integration of Private Law, 8 COLuM. J. EuR. L. 415, 461 (2002) (discussing
the Francovich case).
142. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Garret, supra note 7, at 168-69.
146. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; see also White, supra note 34, at 850.
Stating that:
In deciding whether the employees should be compensated, the ECJ noted that the EEC
Treaty, now the EC Treaty, 'created its own legal system, which is integrated into the
legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. The
subjects of that legal system are not only the Member States, but also their nationals.'
Thus, the Treaty and community law impose obligations on individuals, member
nations, and community institutions.
Id.
147. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357. "The full effectiveness of Community
rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals
were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a
Member State can be held responsible.". Id.
148. Ogren, supra note 139.
149. THE EUROPEAN UNIONATAGLANCE, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited
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to surrender some of their sovereignty to derive these benefits.' ° "This
recognition implies an empowerment of the European Court of Justice in the
enforcement of the goals of the European Union."''
E. Expanding the Scope of its Jurisdiction
The key to the ECJ's increase in jurisdiction has been through treaty
amendments and an expansive reading of the EU Treaties.'52 The ECJ handles
cases on issues of the environment, direct taxation, public policy, arbitration,
and fundamental human rights, to name a few.'53 With more matters coming
under the ECJ's jurisdiction, its power to harmonize law is increasing. As
United States Supreme Court Justice Breyer states in reference to the
preliminary ruling system, "one might believe, or at least plausibly argue, that
EC law, as interpreted by the ECJ, slowly but surely will come to dominate
national law in many areas of European life.' 54
A prime example of the ECJ extending its jurisdiction is the Eco Swiss
China Ltd. v. Benetton International NV decision which defined the notion of
public policy and redefined procedures for making an arbitration agreement
enforceable. 55 In Eco Swiss, the ECJ ruled that certain types of arbitration
Feb. 13, 2005) ("[The EU] has helped to raise living standards, built a single Europe-wide market, launched
the single European currency, the euro, and strengthened Europe's voice in the world.").
150. Id.; see Ogren, supra note 139 (discussing the benefits of belonging to the EU).
151. Ogren, supra note 139. "Without directive compliance, the EU essentially loses its gamut of
control, and unification and harmonization between member states become meaningless ideals. Francovich
v. Italian Republic is an attempt by the European Court of Justice to urge compliance with EU (d]irectives.".
Id. at 605.
152. See BERMANN,supra note 1, at 63-65 (discussing Treaty of Nice giving the ECJ the right to rule
on issues of fndamental rights).
153. Interview with Isabel Fermindez de la Cuesta, supra note 45.
154. Breyer, supra note 14, at 1051; see also Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 104 (stating "[t]he
process of harmonization and unification of private law on a European level appears to be irreversible today;
and it is likely to gain an ever greater momentum."). The implications for international companies, especially
US corporations doing business with European countries, is an increasing demand for lawyers who understand
EU law and are familiar with the ECJ rulings; see also BERMANN, supra note i, at 3. ("As those engaged in
international transactions take increasing interest in the development of Europe-wide policies, so the
international legal community has taken a parallel interest in the workings of the relatively young but
sophisticated Community legal system.").
155. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055.
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agreements are void against public policy.'56 Accordingly, if any one of the four
freedoms is hampered, the agreement is void against public policy.'
Before Eco Swiss, various definitions of public policy existed in Europe.1
5 8
Each nation had a distinct definition written into their civil code.159 With the
Eco Swiss decision, the ECJ ruled that Member States could still have their
definitions of public policy, but in order to comply with EU law their definition
must at a minimum abide by the ECJ's definition of public policy. 6
The Eco Swiss decision demonstrates the ECJ's goal of the uniform
application of EU law, by requiring parties to an arbitration agreement to meet
the ECJ's definition of public policy.'6' The implication of this decision is that
when parties are drafting arbitration agreements, they will look primarily to ECJ
jurisprudence, not the New York Convention, if they want their arbitration
agreement to stand in a European court.'62
F. Garnering the Support of National Courts
The preliminary ruling system is dependent on national courts cooperating
by submitting questions of EU law to the ECJ. 6 3  The preliminary ruling
156. See id; see also Chistoph Liebscher, Arbitral & Judicial Decision: European Public Policy
After Eco Swiss, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 81, 83 (1999) (explaining that Benetton submitted a petition to the
national court asking it to annul the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitration agreement violated
Article 85 (now article 81) since it contained a market-sharing clause.). Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time
Ltd, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055. Susana S. Ha, The effects of Nullity ofArticle 81(2) EC, LUND U.: MASTER OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS PROGRAMME LAw, 16 (2003). "Article 81(1) and 82 [of EC Treaty] establish, in general
terms, a prohibition of practices which may distort trade between Member States" Id. at 4. If an agreement
violates Article 81, it is considered void under Article 82. Id.
157. Liebscher, supra note 156, at 83 (quoting the ECJ: "[a]rticle 81 constitutes a fundamental
provision which is essential for the tasks of the Community, and, in particular, for the functioning of the
internal market .... [A]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article are to be automatically
void.").
158. Interview with Anibal Sabater, Foreign Legal Consultant, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., in
Houston, Tex. (Jan. 8, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Anibal Sabater].
159. Id.
160. See Ha, supra note 156, at 13 (quoting the ECJ's holding "that Article 81 EC constitutes 'a
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment for the functioning of the internal market'
and is to be considered 'a matter of public policy."').
161. See id "The ECJ reiterates that it is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that
the rules of Community law are given a uniform interpretation, irrespective of the circumstances in which they
are to be applied." Id. See also Ha, supra note 156, at 14 (noting that in this ruling, the ECJ "recognized the
importance of Article 81 EC in the accomplishment of the internal market.").
162. Interview with Anibal Sabater, supra note 158 (The New York Convention is the main treaty
on the enforceability of arbitral awards).
163. See Tridimas, supra note 7, at 142.
procedure begins and ends with national courts.' Without their support, the
ECJ's power under Article 234 could not have been established.165 By national
courts submitting questions to the ECJ and then applying the ECJ's interpreta-
tion of EU law, EU law becomes "nationalised."'
'
Consequently, the acceptance of preliminary rulings as precedent by
national courts "has [had important] implications for the more general relation-
ship between national courts and the ECJ."'67 As noted by some scholars:
In so far as ECJ rulings do have precedential value, they place the
Court in a superior position to national courts. The very existence of
a system of precedent is indicative of a shift to a vertical hierarchy
between the ECJ and national courts: the ECJ will lay down the
legally authoritative interpretation, which will then be adopted by
national courts. 61
The transfer of power from national courts to the ECJ in essence created a
hierarchy with the ECJ at the top of that system.'69 While national courts,
especially the Supreme Courts, could have felt threatened by this transfer of
power (and many in fact were), 7 ° the empowerment of the ECJ served to
empower the judiciary of many Member States. 7 '
The ECJ transferred power from the executive and legislative branches to
the judiciary by making "national courts... [the] enforcers of Community law
in their own right."' 72 "When the ECJ has decided an issue, national courts can
then apply the ruling without further resort to the ECJ. The national courts are,
in this sense, 'enrolled' as part of a network of courts adjudicating on
164. Craig, supra note 31, at 560; see also Shifin, supra note 54. "Disputes involving Community
law never come directly before the Court of Justice, but rather before the courts and tribunals of Member
States." Id.; Tridimas, supra note 7, at 142 (stating that "demand becomes effective only when national courts
refer to the ECJ, which is the ultimate source of supply [of preliminary references].").
165. See Tridimas, supra note 7, at 134 (explaining that "In short, the co-cooperation of national
courts is a sine qua non for the success of the preliminary reference procedure .... Legal integration and the
implementation of ECJ jurisprudence has relied on the willingness of national courts to refer cases to the
Court.") (emphasis added).
166. Craig, supra note 31, at 560.
167. CRAIG & DE BuRcA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 442.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 450 (stating that "the ECJ [is] at the apex of that network").
170. See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the empowerment of lower national
courts by Article 234).
171. See generally Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an
International Rule of Law in Europe 34 (2001) [Hereinafter Alter II].
172. CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450.
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Community law...,,73 Politicians who attempt to use extra legal means to
circumvent ECJ law are faced by national courts applying ECJ rulings. 74 Thus,
by reinforcing their own legitimacy, national courts bolstered the ECJ's
legitimacy. This system of precedent also serves as an "important symbolic
[function] which flows from the recognition that the national courts are part of
a real Community judicial hierarchy."'75
While the cooperation of national judiciaries was necessary for expanding
the ECJ's preliminary ruling power, it was the enlistment of lower national
courts that solidified the ECJ's prominence. Because lower national courts are
permitted to make preliminary references under Article 234,76 lower courts
could bypass their country's Supreme Court and thereby influence policy issues
at the highest level. " This is described as "judicial empowerment."'7 8 The
rationale behind this theory is:
In a national setting without access to the supranational legal system,
the national court has few, if any chances, to see its ideal point
implemented, since the higher national authority will reverse it on
appeal or by new national legislation. When the national court is
given the option to refer the case to the ECJ and apply its ruling, the
set of interpretations that can be applied in practice changes
dramatically. 79
173. Id.
174. Alter I, supra note 127, at 133; see also EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 31, at 144-45
(stating that the support of national judiciaries "was critical in limiting the ability of national governments to
simply ignore unwanted legal decisions from the international ECJ"... and reiterating that "the ECJ has
changed the weak foundations of the EU legal system, with the help of national judiciaries").
175. CRAIG&DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450.
176. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing the institutions and circumstances
which permit submission of preliminary questions to the ECJ).
177. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 135.
178. Id. (citing J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2426 (1991)).
179. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 141-43 noting that:
The ability of national courts to influence policy is much weaker in the national context
of each [M]ember [S]tate than in the supranational context of the EC, where national
courts implement the authoritative interpretations of the law given by the ECJ. The
rulings of national courts can be overturned and altered more easily by higher national
authorities than the rulings of the ECJ can be altered by the equivalent authorities of
the EC.
Id. AccordWeiler, supra note 128, at 2426 (stating that "Lower courts and their judges were given the facility
to engage with the highest jurisdiction in the Community and thus have de facto judicial review of
legislation.").
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Article 234 served to empower lower national courts, securing the cooperation
of national courts in the application and "the very development of the
Community legal order."'"8
V. MEMBER STATES REACTION
A. Background
"It is fair to say that when the Member States opted for an ECJ, they
thought that Luxembourg would be far closer to the Hague than the District of
Columbia."' 8' Historically, the ECJ was created to deal only with the review of
EU law, not the interpretation of national laws.'82 Member States intended to
create a court with limited jurisdiction to protect their national sovereignty.'83
However, through Article 234 the ECJ "transformed the preliminary ruling
system from a mechanism to allow individuals to question EC law into a
mechanism to allow individuals to question national law."'' As one scholar
states, "[t]he accretion of power by the European Court of Justice is arguably
the clearest manifestation of the transfer of sovereignty from nation-states to a
supranational institution, not only in the European Union but also in modem
international politics more generally."'8 5 Despite this dramatic shift in power,
Member States and their national courts "have bowed to the ECJ's
requirements, and have accepted the Court's jurisprudence. '
How is it then that Member States, which created the ECJ, allowed the
Court to expand its jurisdiction beyond its originally intended reach?'87 As
180. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 134.
181. EVOLUMTON OF EU LAw, supra note 31, at 331 (emphasis added).
182. Alter I, supra note 127, at 125 (stating "Article 177 challenges were to pertain only to questions
of European law, not to the interpretation of national law or to the compatibility of national law with EC
law."). See id. also noting:
The ECJ was created to fill three limited roles for the [M]ember [S]tates: ensuring that
the Commission and the Council of Ministers did not exceed their authority, filling in
vague aspects of EC laws through dispute resolution, and deciding on charges of
noncompliance raised by the Commission or by member states. None of these roles
required national courts to funnel individual challenges to national policy to the ECJ
or to enforce EC law against their governments. Indeed, negotiators envisioned a
limited role for national courts in the EU legal system.
Id. at 124.
183. Id. at 122.
184. Id. at 126; see also Tridimas, supra note 7, at 137 (noting that the transformation of "the
preliminary ruling system into a mechanism for the enforcement of EC law has conferred considerable
autonomy to the ECJ and freed it from being subservient to the national governments that set it up.").
185. Garret, supra note 7.
186. Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2833.
187. Alter L supra note 127, at 122.
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discussed earlier, the enlistment of national courts, especially lower courts,
greatly assisted in the expansion of the ECJ's jurisdiction. 8 ' In addition to their
cooperation, various other factors influenced the acceptance of ECJ precedent
without arousing the suspicion and retaliation of Member States.8 9 These
factors include: 1) low profile decisions by the ECJ; 2) different timelines for
politicians and judges; 3) the difficulty of changing or amending the EC Treaty;
and 4) denying an ECJ ruling is like denying membership to the EU.' 90 While
this list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates some of the more important reasons
behind Member States accepting the ECJ's expansion ofjurisprudence. 9'
B. Low Profile Decisions
Some theorists speculate that "by limiting the material impact of its
decisions, the ECJ could minimize political focus on the Court and build
doctrine without provoking a political response, creating the opportunity for it
to escape [M]ember [S]tate oversight."' 92 Much like the judicial tactic used by
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,93 the ECJ built powerful legal
doctrines by introducing the concept but not wielding its power.' 9 As
188. See supra notes 162-180 and accompanying text (discussing the cooperation of national courts
in referring preliminary questions to the ECJ and applying their decisions as precedent); see also id. at 122
(discussing that with national courts sending cases to the ECJ and applying ECJ jurisprudence, interpretative
disputes were not easily kept out of the legal realm, and that national courts would not let politicians ignore
or cast aside as invalid unwanted decisions).
189. See generally Alter I, supra note 127, at 129-35 (discussing how the ECJ escaped Members
States' control).
190. See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Tridimas, supra note 7, at 137-38 (discussing the principle agent relationship as
another factor in how the ECJ grow powerful without Member States noticing).
Borrowing from the economic theory of the principle-agent relation the ECJ is seen as
an institution (agent) to which sovereign states (principals) have delegated authority
to interpret the law and thus facilitate transnational co-operation between the member
states. However, given the powers granted to accomplish its functions, the institution
may take a life of its own and serve its own interests by pursuing its most preferred
policies rather than those of the principals. In practice this takes the form of advancing
pro-integration policies that would not have been favored by some of the member state
governments.
Id.
192. Id. at 133. See also Garret, supra note 7, at 155 (stating that "[t]he best way for the Court to
further this agenda is through the gradual extension of case law (that is, the replacement of national laws and
practices by ECJ decisions as the law of the land in EU member states)."). Id.
193. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
194. See Alter , supra note 127, at 131 relating that:
A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes
before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle but suggest that it
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demonstrated in the Da Costa decision, "the ECJ declared the supremacy of EC
law.. . , but it found that Italian law privatizing the electric company did not
violate EC law."' 95 By laying the foundation of the EC legal system in an
incremental fashion, the ECJ was able to develop a foundation which challenged
the sovereignty of Member States, but did not arouse their suspicion until it was
too late.'96
C. Different Time Lines for Politicians and Judges
The different time horizons for political and judicial careers also greatly
affected the Court's ability to cultivate legal principles. 97 Because the political
system is subject to a much shorter time frame, the national judiciaries are less
politically vulnerable. 98  "By making sure that ECJ decisions did not
compromise short-term political interests, the judges and the Commission could
build a legal edifice without serious political challenges."' 99 The material
impact of ECJ decisions mattered more to politicians than their doctrinal
significance."
D. To Deny an ECJ Decision is Like Denying Membership to the EU
In relation to the other EU institutions, the ECJ is considered perhaps the
most popular of the four institutions.2"' As a neutral third party enforcing the
is subject to various qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should
not be applied to the particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is now
established. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the
qualifications can then be whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed.
Id. (citing TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITY 78-79 (2nd ed. 1988)).
195. Alter I, supra note 126, at 131 (citing Tridimas, supra note 7).
196. See Lindseth, supra note 13, at 664 noting that:
Integration by adjudication was effective in part because it appealed to rule of law
sentiments among Member States officials, even where they were otherwise hostile to
specific decisions. It gave integration a distinctly incremental feel, not necessarily a
bad thing while the new regulatory regime was trying to legitimate itself.
Id.
197. Alter L, supra note 127, at 142-43.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 131.
200. See id. at 143 (stating that by taking advantage of the political fixation on the material
consequences of cases the ECJ was able to construct legal precedent without arousing political concern).
201. Interview with Anibal Sabater, supra note 158 ("If you have a conversation on the street with
Europeans about the EU, most will speak highly of the European Court of Justice. This is because the ECJ,
unlike the other Community institutions, represents a neutral third party willing to adjudicate interests on
behalf of individuals.").
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rights of private citizens created under the EC treaties, the ECJ is perceived as
an unbiased enforcer ofjustice.202 "'No member has ever flatly rejected a Court
ruling: to do so would be tantamount to denial of membership of the EC.'
2 3
In addition, Member States who flout the authority of the ECJ face political
repercussions.0 4 Member States who do not abide by an ECJ ruling are
"single[d] out," perceived as "uncooperative," and are forced to face their
"domestic courts which apply the ECJ rulings."205
E. Difficulty in Reversing or Curtailing the ECI's Power
After Member States realized the omnipotence of the ECJ's jurisdiction
under Article 234, it was too late to curtail its power. Overturning an ECJ
decision is very difficult.2" It requires not only the passage of new legislation,
but cooperation among Member States.2 7 "[C]hanging the constitutional
provision or changing the role and the functions of the Court requires treaty
revision," something which can only be accomplished "by unanimity and
ratification by each [M]ember [S]tate.""2 ' The challenge of achieving unanimity
in overturning or revising an ECJ decision or power makes such action
impractical.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the signing of the EU Constitution in October of 2004,209 the EU is
moving towards the recognition of a supranational institution. The evolution of
the European Union requires the evolution of its legal system. Inherent to the
success of this process has been the ECJ's development of precedent through
the preliminary ruling system under Article 234.10
202. Id.
203. Swartz, supra note 11, at 694 (quoting Colchester & Buchan).
204. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 138.
205. Id.
206. See id. See also Alter L, supra note 127, at 135 (stating that "[t]he only choice left for politicians
is to rewrite the EU legislation itself.").
207. See Tridimas, supra note 7, at 138.
208. Id. (noting that "[t]he latter implies that the threat of revising the Court's mandate may lack
credibility and diminish its value"); see also Alter I, supra note 127, at 136. "In order to change the treaty,
[M]ember [S]tates need unanimous agreement plus ratification of the changed by all national parliaments.
Obtaining unanimous agreement about a new policy is hard enough. But creating a unanimous consensus to
change an existing policy is even more difficult." Id.
209. EU leaders sign new constitution, BBC NEWS, Oct. 29 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3963701.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
210. See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text (giving an overview of the ECJ's development
of a precedent based system).
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By engaging the support of national courts, private litigants, and creating
a body of case law, the ECJ propelled the EU's mission of economic
harmonization forward.2 ' With the duty to harmonize the laws of twenty-five
different nations, "the legitimation of precedent can ... be defended on the
ground that there was not, in reality, any other choice for the ECJ. 21 2
The ECJ's development of precedent represents the natural evolution of the
global legal system. 1 3 As argued by one scholar, "the first steps toward a global
legal culture will be dominated by some blending of civil law and common
law. 21 4 It is quite possible that the ECJ's development of precedent through
Article 234 represents "the tentative emergence of a common private law for the
European Community.
' 21 1
211. Lindseth, supra note 13, at 663.
212. CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450.
213. See Miriam Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained? Some Reflections on the
Bundesverfassungsgericht's Bananas Judgment, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 109,110 (2002) (stating that "the project
of European integration and sovereignty... at the micro-level represents an illustration of the effects of the
macro-level of globalization.").
214. Koch, supra note 94, at 3.
215. Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 72.
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I. THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
A. Introduction
This paper provides a comparative framework to analyze the extent to
which five major democracies Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany,
and France-incorporated the subject matter jurisdiction Articles of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute") through their
domestic legislative processes while ratifying the Rome Statute, and what, if
anything, the United States can interpret from the five distinct approaches. By
examining what deviations the states made from the wording in the Rome
Statute, how variant the deviations are, and what the rationale for such
variations are, a picture will emerge which could provide guidance to the United
States, were it to aspire to incorporate the Rome Statute crimes into the federal
criminal code, amend Title 18 of the United States Code, and thus assure United
States primacy over the International Criminal Court ("ICC") complementarity
jurisdiction. Through the use of comparative analysis, it is plausible to reason
whether it would be feasible for the United States to build off the examples,
close the gaps in the United States Code,' and ultimately ratify the Rome
Statute. There appears to be a balancing act inherent in the ratification of the
Rome Statute.2 On one hand, there is the Rome Statute itself which details the
requirements for incorporation into the ICC regime, the meaning and purpose
of which must be included in the domestic code of the ratifying states in order
to obtain jurisdiction over the ICC crimes.3 While, at the same time, there are
political and legal considerations all of which require the governments to
modify the wording of the Rome Statute's Articles to conform to the states'
individual circumstances. 4 However, too great a deviation from the meaning
1. See Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes within the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 421 (2001) (discussing the gaps in the federal
criminal code as they pertain to federal jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War
Crimes).
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Jennifer Schense &
Donald K.Piragoff, Commonalities and Differences in the Implementation of the Rome Statute, in NATIONAL
LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 245 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003) (discussing the
differences of each state's approach depending on unique legal, constitutional and due process criteria).
3. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8 (covering the crimes of "Genocide," "War Crimes," and
"Crimes Against Humanity").
4. Id. The Rome Statute is therefore somewhat analogous to a model treaty in that the Articles do
not have to be incorporated verbatim into the domestic legal code of the ratifying state. The practical
impossibility of the exercise, due to the vastness of criminal codes worldwide, requires that some flexibility
be expected. The interesting question is how much flexibility will be allowed before the domestic statute falls
outside the meaning and purpose of the Rome Statute. It should prove very interesting to observe how the
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and purpose of the Rome Statute's Articles could produce a situation whereby
the applicability of the treaty would be called into question. The balancing act
between the intended purpose and meaning of the Rome Statute and the unique
domestic requirements could presumably be too great for some countries, and
subsequent ICC and domestic court decisions will analyze these instances as
they arise and the ICC jurisprudence matures. It would be reasonable to assume
that the ICC would take the unique circumstances of each country into
consideration when called upon to interpret the implementing legislation, in
essence, passing judgment over whether the state in question has the legal
capability to genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution pursuant to
Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute.
The international community assembled through the auspices of the United
Nations in December of 1989' to voice its concern about worldwide impunity
for hostis humani generis,6 and began to conceptualize a permanent judicial
organ focused on the most heinous crimes that exist.7 Instead of fashioning ad
hoc tribunals for different instances of grave crimes that focus on specific
regions or conflicts, as was done in Rwanda, the Balkans, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, or even a hybrid court, and as we are currently witnessing in
young court handles the instances where certain countries have strayed too far outside the boundaries of the
Rome Statute. This scenario gives rise to many complex questions beginning with whether the state actually
ratified the treaty.
5. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 340-44 (2003); see also KRISTINA
MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 13
(2000).
6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. Patrick Zahnd, How the International Criminal Court Should Help Implement International
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HuMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 43 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International
Criminal Court In Historical Context, 99 ST. LOUIs-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55; The preamble of the
Rome Statute states:
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the
world, Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation, Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes....
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with
the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole....
Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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Cambodia, a more permanent solution was conceived, one which ultimately
became the constitutive agreement for the ICC known as the Rome Statute.
In June and July of 1998, plenipotentiaries from around the globe met in
Rome for five weeks with the single purpose of formulating a multilateral
agreement that would end impunity for the perpetrators of the most heinous
crimes, bringing the hope of justice to those who suffered and those who
continue to suffer, from the most wretched acts of humankind.9 To make the
multilateral treaty-drafting exercise even more difficult, it was ultimately
decided that no reservations were allowed to be lodged. l The disparate
ideologies that many states have had in the past to multilateral agreements were
generally quelled by their ability to register their disagreements with
reservations which are included in the treaty document. The Rome Statute was
to be different, however, and debates occurred regarding a state's ability to
lodge formal reservations," as is permitted by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 2 In the end, the states were left with lodging merely
understandings. 3 The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, with the
8. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
9. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 55.
10. David J. Scheffer et al., Panel: The Foreign Affairs Consequences of America's Absence, 8
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 17, 39 (2003) (stating that "one of our great defeats in Rome, was the fact
that we failed to get a reservations clause into the treaty."); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 84 (2002) (stating "[T]he United States opposed such
a prohibition prior to and during the Rome Conference."); see also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 120
(stating plainly that no reservations are to be allowed; similar to the debate regarding treaties of this nature,
i.e., Convention against Torture, etc., the argument is posited that, how could anyone have a reservation about
the "clear illegality" of such acts.).
11. As a rule, no reservations may be made to the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art.
120. However, a state may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute
for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes
referred to in Article 8 (War Crimes) when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on
its territory. Id. art. 124 (Transitional Provision). This provision is a compromise achieved by the Rome
Conference at the expense of ensuring that one state supported the Rome Statute. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1999). This compromise is justified by
the fact that the "group of like-minded states" succeeded in obtaining support in prohibiting the possibility
of making reservations to the Statute. Id. This compromise, being a result of very hot debates, is one of the
most important principles of the Statute. Id.; see also MERAB TURAVA, OPEN SOCIETY--GEORGIA
FOUNDATION, ANALYSIS OF COMPATIBILITY OF THE GEORGIAN LEGISLATION WITH THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001), available at http://www.osgf.ge/interlaw/ICC -O0.htm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2005).
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 19-21, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
336-7 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13. The importance of noting the distinctions between the two is crucial. A reservation binds the
reserving states' obligations of a treaty with regard to all signatory states. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-120 (4th ed., 2003). An understanding merely creates legal obligations for the
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sixtieth ratifier at a seemingly unprecedented pace.' 4  Currently, there are
ninety-eight countries that have ratified the Rome Statute. 5
The Rome Statute was indeed an amalgam of the states' disparate ideo-
logies with a single purpose, to constitute a permanent forum for the inter-
national community to bring the worst of criminals to justice. The ICC was
going to be a place to end impunity for only the most heinous crimes. Many
states prior to ratifying the Rome Statute, including the United States, did not
have the domestic legal framework in place to either exercise jurisdiction at the
national court level, or their criminal codes were silent or incomplete with
regard to the underlying criminal offences. The necessity for legislation,
entitling states' domestic jurisdiction, so that their courts could be an appro-
priate forum was made evident in Rome. Germany had expressed the possibility
that the ICC may promote the beginning of a harmonization process of
international criminal law amongst states. 6 These gaps in jurisdiction have
allowed for the imperfect administration of justice and, in certain situations,
have not created mandatory activation ofjurisdiction or prosecutorial authority.
The Rome Statute was supposed to propose a cure for this inequality and be the
world's court for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggres-
sion.
Each state's ICC implementing legislation is ripe with political, legal, and
distinctive domestic concerns. By distinguishing the states' final legislative
products, the United States can begin to conceptualize not only what sections
of the Rome Statute have been modified through states' domestic legislation,
seeing what issues are generally in play, but also to see whether the United
States can replicate the dual successes of other democracies, protecting
individual national interests and becoming a member of the ICC regime.
Passing legislation which would incorporate Articles 5 through 8 of the
Rome Statute into the United States' federal criminal law would not mandate
United States cooperation with the ICC. Congress can propose atrocity crime
legislation which does not mention the Rome Statute or the ICC. The Rome
Statute is not a self-executing treaty and, therefore, would still require the
reserving state to its own treaty obligations. Id. Had the United States been able to lodge a reservation to the
Rome Statute, that accordingly did not defeat the object or purpose of the statute itself, ratification of the
Rome Statute might have already occurred. Id.
14. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see also COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
STATE SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS CHART (2005),
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (containing
the most up to date tally of ratified states) [hereinafter SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS].
15. SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (The Dominican Republic ratified the Rome
Statute on May 13, 2005, bringing the total number of States that are parties to the Statute to 99; 139 States
are signatories).
16. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 249.
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advice and consent of the United States Senate and a presidential signature
before the United States would belong to the group of ratifying member states
and be subject to the demands of the court. 7
Only by passing criminal laws that would guarantee United States federal
courts jurisdiction over ICC crimes does the United States effectively protect its
national interests because, pursuant to Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute,
the United States would be willing and able to genuinely carry out the
investigation or prosecution. 8 This would effectively make the case initially
inadmissible to the ICC. Currently the United States is not technically capable
in all circumstances to supplant the ICC's jurisdiction and take full advantage
of complementarity.
Section II examines the domestic legislative attempts by five western
democracies to implement the Rome Statute. By focusing strictly on the
divergences from the text of the Rome Statute and any possible constitutional
impediments to implementation, certain reoccurring themes make themselves
evident. The United States can benefit from such an examination because the
issues that other democracies struggled with can be recognized as either unique
to the state in question or inherent to all constitutional democracies. As a result,
the dilemmas can be either avoided as unique to the state in question or the
solution can be approached in a similar fashion as the other successfully
implementing states.
Section III discusses United States' interests in and fears of the ICC
regime. Were the ICC to become, as the plenipotentiaries in Rome envisioned,
the world's court for atrocity crimes, there are succinct benefits to United States
participation. For example, the future administration of the court will not be
influenced directly by the United States, nor will the United States be able to
contribute to state parties' proposals for additional ICC subject matter
jurisdiction.
Section IV comparatively examines the approaches of the other states and
applies their individual experiences to the current state of United States law. It
is plausible to assume that many of the issues that arose during the
implementation processes of the various states would translate in some form or
other into issues which might arise, were the United States to attempt to
implement the Rome Statute.
Lastly, Section V examines the differing approaches of implementing
legislation of four states side-by-side with the Rome Statute. The annexes in
this section were collected by the author as an aid to the reader and is the
17. Malvina Halberstam, International Human Rights and Domestic Law Focusing on U.S. Law,
with some Reference to Israeli Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.L. 225,234 (2000).
18. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17-18.
author's own effort at correlating the various national statutes with the Rome
Statute.
II. FIVE STATES' APPROACHES TO RATIFYING THE ROME STATUTE
A. Canada
Canada has the unique distinction of being the first country to adopt
comprehensive domestic legislation effectively ratifying the Rome Statute.' 9
The Canadian Parliament passed the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act ("CAHWCA") on June 29, 2000,20 and ratified the Rome Statute on July 7,
2000.21 Subsequently, the CAHWCA entered into force on October 23, 2000.22
Dissimilar to the United States process of treaty ratification, the Canadian
constitution mandates that any treaty obligation, in which Canada would like to
enter, must first be entirely legislated through the parliamentary process before
the treaty can be signed.23 It is for this reason that Canada did not sign the
Rome Statute before its parliament had the opportunity to fully legislate the
contents of the treaty.24
All of the ICC crimes were incorporated into Canadian domestic law under
the CAHWCA.25 Canada did more than merely incorporate the ICC crimes by
reference to the Rome Statute into its criminal code,26 which was done for a
couple of reasons that will be discussed. Canada went further and made the
CAHWCA more extensive by including, for example, retrospective jurisdic-
tion 27 and the crime of using chemical weapons," a crime which was absent
19. EUR. CONSULT. Ass., Progress Report by Canada and Appendix, Doc. No. 11 (2001)
[hereinafter Progress Report by Canada]; Darryl Robinson, Implementing International Crimes in National
Law: The Canadian Approach, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 45-54
(Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
20. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24 (Can.) [hereinafter
CAHWCA]; Robinson, supra note 19, at 45.
21. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TABLE 1: IMPLEMENTING THE ROME STATUTE (2002),
http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chartl.pdf.
23. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix
1985); see also Robinson, supra note 19, at 46.
24. SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8; CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4.
26. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4.
27. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 11 (g) (Eng.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
28. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999).
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from the Rome Statute.29 A state can take full advantage of the complementarity
jurisdiction and be in compliance with Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute,
regarding the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, by
simply making reference to the Rome Statute Articles 5 through 8 in its imple-
menting legislation.30 Incorporating the Rome Statute's crimes by reference, as
the convention declares, does not impede the continued development of custo-
mary international law.3
Canada had previously focused its legislative competence on war crimes
and crimes against humanity.32 In 1987, the Canadian Parliament promulgated
domestic law to enable the state to prosecute war crimes and crimes against
humanity whether or not they occurred within Canadian territory.3 3 Previously,
Canadian jurisdiction was mostly based on territoriality.34 The extraterritoriality
of the 1987 law could extend globally with regard to the criminal acts, as long
as the alleged criminal was on Canadian territory and subject to Canadian law
and apprehension regardless of his/her nationality. 35 The reality of prosecuting
an individual based on the Canadian war crimes statute proved to be insufficient
and required additional legal framework to be incorporated for legitimacy
purposes. The Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v. Finta held that prosecu-
ting an individual in accordance with the 1987 law, for such a serious crime and
for one which contained such a grave stigma in the international community,
required that the prosecutor incorporate the international as well as the domestic
29. Elaina I. Kalivretakis, Are Nuclear Weapons Above the Law? A Look at the International
Criminal Court and the Prohibited Weapons Category, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 683, 686-87 (2001). The
crime of using chemical weapons covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention was in Article 8 of the Rome
Statute until the final week of the Rome Conference when it was decided to drop the provision in order to end
the negotiation standstill which had occurred between the Arab/developing countries, who wanted to include
the use of nuclear weapons in the Rome Statute, and those countries, of which the United States and Canada
were included, who wanted to include the use of chemical weapons. The negotiated compromise was to drop
all modem references to weapons based on treaty law. Therefore, it is not surprising that Canada went ahead
and included the provision in their implementing legislation.
30. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8 (The Rome Statute is arguably referencing established
customary international legal principles; those states that had not codified those crimes could do so by making
reference to the appropriate Articles in the Rome Statute).
31. Id. art. 10.
32. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 7 (3.71 H3.77) (1985) (§§ (3.76) and (3.77) repealed 2000)
(Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Criminal Code].
33. Id.
34. William Schabas, Canadian Implementing Legislation for the Rome Statute: Jurisdiction and
Defences, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 35-44 (Matthias Neuner ed.,
2003); see also Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 32, § 6(2) (providing exceptions to the territorial
jurisdictional rule for extraordinary cases).
35. See Canadian Criminal Code, note 32; Schabas, supra note 34, at 35-44.
elements of the crime. 6 The bar which the Canadian Supreme Court set was
accordingly high, one which is plausibly too high for a prosecutor to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt."
With the Finta holding as a marker, Canada looked to its inclusion in the
ICC regime as not only a means to amend its criminal code but as an oppor-
tunity to integrate the lessons learned from Finta and include retrospective
jurisdiction." While Canada did not have to amend its constitution to incor-
porate the ICC crimes,39 it did decide to broaden the domestic reach of its courts
by utilizing the tool of retrospectivity which allows the Canadian courts to
prosecute an individual if the commission of the alleged crime was recognized
by customary international law at the time it was committed.4" In contrast,
Canada decided not to make the ICC crimes retroactive, as some provisions of
the Rome Statute are manifestations of the recent developments of customary
international law,41 possibly in an attempt to assure constitutional protections
and safeguards.
The CAHWCA provides its own definitions of the ICC crimes.42 These
definitions are, however, largely consistent with the Rome Statute. Compare the
two:
CAHWCA §4(3)
[G]enocide means an act or omission committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons, as such,
that, at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes
genocide according to customary international law or conventional
international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations,
whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the
time and in the place of its commission.43
36. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Eng.).
37. Id.; Robinson, supra note 19, at 47.
38. Finta, I S.C.R. at 701.
39. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 4(3) & 6(3); Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
40. See id. § 6 & 7(5); Section 6(1) states "Every person who, either before or afier the coming into
force of this section, commits outside Canada..." and Section 7(5) states "Where an act or omission
constituting an offense under this section occurred before the coming into force of this section .. ." Id.; Rome
Statute, supra note 2, arts. 11, 24.
41. Robinson, supra note 19, at 49.
42. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 4(3), 6(3); Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
43. Id. § 4(3).
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ROME STATUTE ARTICLE 6
For the purpose of this Statute, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group."4
Due to Canada's decision to mandate the prosecution of crimes
retrospectively, simple reference to the Rome Statute would not suffice. A
temporal element had to be included in the definition of the crimes to
incorporate the law and make it applicable to the time of the commission of the
crime.45 Also, the CAHWCA references the Rome Statute's inability to
encumber the development of customary international law.' This added
element synchronizes the Canadian approach with its treaty obligations,
intending to give its courts jurisdiction retrospectively while not stopping the
development of customary international law.
Canada did have a substantial constitutional hurdle to negotiate in its
legislative process to incorporate Article 28, "Command Responsibility," of the
Rome Statute.47 It is insightful to further examine the mechanism Canada
utilized to mold the intention of Article 28 with its constitutional jurisprudence
and the drafting of the CAHWCA due to the possibility that the United States
could encounter a similar dilemma in the incorporation of Article 28, or other
Articles of the Rome Statute, though most likely not in a constitutional context.
The crime of "Command Responsibility" as delineated in the Rome Statute
contains a disjunctive mens rea test, allowing for either an objective or
subjective test for mental culpability (emphasis added).48  The Canadian
44. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
45. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 4, 6.
46. Id. § 4(4) (For greater certainty, crimes described in Articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 of Article
8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary international law. This does
not limit or prejudice in any way the application of existing or developing rules of international law).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28.
48. Id. ("That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
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constitutional practice (Charter of Rights and Freedoms)49 requires strict
subjectivity for a crime that would reflect the "high degree of moral stigma
society subscribes to those convicted of such crimes."5 Therefore, the test of
"either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" as
contained in the Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i) had to be amended.5
In Regina v. Vaillancourt, the Canadian Supreme Court outlawed vicarious
criminal liability for such serious crimes as murder, when the mens rea
requirement is merely subjective.52 In response to this quandary, the Canadian
Parliament fashioned a new crime, "Breach of Responsibility by a Superior,"
which pertains to both military and civilian commanders, as required by the
Rome Statute, Article 28(a) and (b).53 A person found guilty of the Canadian
crime of "Breach of Responsibility by a Superior" can possibly receive the same
sentence as someone who has been found guilty for direct commission of an
Article 5 crime.54 This assures the required Article 28 result.5 s
Canada was able to secure the inclusion of Article 28 of the Rome Statute
by utilizing its Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence as a guide, and
securing the adherence to the Canadian Constitution (Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) but not diverge too greatly from the purpose and meaning of Article
28 of the Rome Statute.
Under the CAHWCA, a military commander or superior would be guilty
of an Article 5 crime if a military commander either "failed to exercise proper
control over a subordinate" and, as a result, an Article 5 offence was com-
mitted56 or "knew, or was criminally negligent in failing to know" that a
subordinate is "about to or is committing" an Article 5 offence,57 including
consciously disregarding evidence that clearly indicated that an Article 5
offence was being committed or was about to commit such an offence and
"failed to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures to
should have known .. "); Progress Report by Canada, supra note 19, at 3.
49. Canadian Charter, supra note 27.
50. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 701.
51. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(a)(i).
52. Regina v. Vaillancourt [1987] S.C.R. 636 (Eng.); Robinson, supra note 19, at 52.
53. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28 (including explicitly both a military, under Article 28(a), and
a civilian under Article 28(b), component regarding Command Responsibility); see also CAHWCA, supra
note 20, § 5.
54. CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 5(3) ("Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1),
(2) or (2.1) is liable to imprisonment for life").
55. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 77-1(b) ("A term of life imprisonment when justified by the
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person ... !).
56. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 5(l)(a)(i), 7 (for offences occurring outside of Canada).
57. Id. §§ 5(l)(b), 7 (for offences occurring outside of Canada).
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prevent or repress the commission of the offence or of further offences," or
submit the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
5 8
Military commanders and others would be liable also for having attempted to,
committed, conspired, counseled, or been an accessory to any Article 5 crimes
outside of Canada."9
The CAHWCA was able to solve the constitutional dilemma by
circumventing the disjunctive mens rea test in Article 28 of the Rome Statute
and creating a new law which gave equal effect of Article 28 but fit within the
established constitutional confines delineated in Regina v. Vaillancourt and
Regina v. Finta. Also, the punishment for the crime of breach of "Command
Responsibility" can be life imprisonment, identical to that of the Article 28 of
the Rome Statute, adding credence to Canada's adherence to the Rome Statute
in general.
The ICC has complementary jurisdiction with the Canadian legal system.'
The ICC can obtain jurisdiction only if Canada were to have jurisdiction over
the offence (or suspect) and were unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute
an alleged crime or suspect.6 The Canadian jurisdiction is, however, subject to
both a presence requirement and a consent requirement. 62  There cannot be a
trial in absentia; however, an investigation can occur without the detention of
a suspect of the alleged crime.63 The Attomey General's written consent is
required before a prosecution can proceed.'M Also, the CAHWCA prescribes a
58. Id.
59. ld. § 6(l.1).
60. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. I ("[the International Criminal Court] shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions").
61. Id. art. 18(3) ('The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to review by
the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change
of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation."
Article 17(l)(a), states that, "[tihe case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution .....
62. CAHWCA, supra note 20, §§ 9(2)-<4).
63. Id. § 9(2) ("For greater certainty, in a proceeding commenced in any territorial division under
subsection (1), the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to requirements that an accused appear at and be
present during proceedings and any exceptions to those requirements apply").
64. Id. §§ 9(3),(4) (Procedures and Defences section) (No proceedings for an offence under any of
sections 4 to 7 of this Act, or under section 354 or subsection 462.3 1(1) of the Criminal Code in relation to
property or proceeds obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an offence
under this Act, may be commenced without the personal consent in writing of the Attorney General or Deputy
Attorney General of Canada, and those proceedings may be conducted only by the Attorney General of
Canada or counsel acting on their behalf. . .No proceedings for an offence under section 18 may be
commenced without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada).
Hatchell
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the intentional commission of an
ICC crime and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment in any other case."
Finally, as prescribed in the Rome Statute, there are no immunities' and
no applicable statutes of limitation67 for the Rome Statute Article 5 crimes" in
the CAHWCA. Canada can, as the United States continues to do, enter into
bilateral "Article 98 Agreements," even though the enforceability and requisite
verbiage is still open for judicial interpretation.69
In sum, Canada had, prior to the Rome Statute, domestically legislated
crimes against humanity and war crimes into their criminal code.7" The
subsequent difficulty Canada had with effectively prosecuting individuals under
the new laws allowed for Canada to take advantage of the Rome Statute to build
upon the experience and revamp their criminal code. Furthermore, Canada
decided to broaden its jurisdiction qf ICC crimes through the use of
retrospection and, as a result of that decision, incorporating the ICC crimes by
reference to the Rome Statute was not possible. A temporal element had to be
included which reflected the decision to utilize retrospectivity. The crime of
using chemical weapons was incorporated in the CAHWCA. This crime was
absent from the final version of the Rome Statute and is evidence of the highly
politicized and heavily negotiated nature of the Rome Statute.
As some of the Rome Statute is reflective of more recent developments of
customary international law, Canada prudently decided to forgo the use of
retroactivity, allowing for past acts to be judged by the customary law that
governed at the time of the commission of the crime. Lastly, Canada negotiated
through the Rome Statute's requirements of "Command Responsibility" using
its constitutional jurisprudence as the guide. The Canadian Supreme Court had
found vicarious criminal liability for serious crimes, like murder,
unconstitutional and required subjective mens rea requirements for adjudication.
65. Id. §§ 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 5(3), 6(a), 6(b), 7(4), 15(l)(aHd), 15(1.1), 15(2), 15(3), 15(5).
66. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27; CAHWCA, supra note 20, § 3.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 29; see generally CAHWCA, supra note 20.
68. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.
69. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, US BILATERAL IMMUNITY OR SO-
CALLED "ARTICLE 98" AGREEMENTS (2003), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/0606usbilaterals.htm (Among other rationale, some legal
scholars and those involved in the Rome Conference negotiations have declared that the United States Article
98 agreements are contrary to the language of Article 98 itself. The proposed agreements attempt to amend
the terms of the Rome Statute by ostensibly canceling out the concept of 'sending state' from Article 98(2).
'Sending state' indicates that the language of Article 98(2) is intended to cover only SOFAs, SOMAs and
other similar agreements. SOFAs and SOMAs reflect a division of responsibility for a limited class of persons
deliberately sent from one country to another and carefully addresses how any crimes they may commit should
be addressed) [hereinafter Article 98 Agreements].
70. See Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 32.
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Therefore, Canada fashioned a new crime with subjective criteria to assure that
the stigma that a conviction for such a heinous crime would carry has sufficient
due process.
B. Australia
On January 9, 2002, Australia's legislation which domestically imple-
mented the Rome Statute came into effect without requiring amendments to the
Australian constitution." The International Criminal Court Act of 2002 ("ICC
Act") and the International Criminal Court ("Consequential Amendments") Act
of 2002 ("ICCCA") were passed by parliament on June 27, 2002.72 Australia
then ratified the Rome Statute on July 1, 2002, becoming the seventy-fifth state
to ratify. 7" The ICC Act is mainly focused on the procedural elements, such as
cooperation, arrest, and extradition between Australia and the ICC, and is
therefore less important for the purposes of this discussion.74
The more pertinent act is the ICCCA which not only codified the elements
of each crime in painstaking detail and the corresponding maximum sentences,
but also, inter alia, made the necessary modifications to the Australian Criminal
Code.75 The ICCCA contains all the major crimes in Articles 5 through 8 of the
Rome Statute except Article 8(2)(b)(xx).76 The subsection makes reference to
71. See Rome Statue, supra note 2; See International Criminal Court Act, 2002, No. 41 (Austl.)
[hereinafter Australia ICC Act]; Hon. Darryl Williams, Commonwealth Attorney General, Speech to
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law regarding the International Criminal Court: The
Australian Experience (Aug. 3 0, 2 0 0 1 ),
http://www.ag.gove.au/agd/WWW/attomerygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches-2001_SpeechesTheIntern
ational _CriminalCourt:_TheAustralianExperience (in a speech by the former Australian Attorney-
General, Darryl Williams (1996-2003), he stated "The constitutionality of the proposed legislation giving
effect to the ICC is one of the issues raised by some critics of Australian ratification. The Government has
satisfied itself that ratification of the Statute and enactment of the necessary legislation will not be inconsistent
with any provision of the Constitution").
72. See Australia ICC Act, supra note 71; International Criminal Court (Consequential
Amendments) Act, 2002, No. 42, at 2 (Austi.) [hereinafter Australia ICCCA Act] (an act to amend the
Criminal Code Act 1995 and certain other acts in consequence of the enactment of the International Criminal
Court Act 2002, and for other purposes).
73. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; See COALrrION FOR THE ICC, AUSTRAUA (2005)
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/oceania/australia.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
74. See Australia ICC Act, supra note 71.
75. See Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72.
76. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xx) ("Employing weapons, projectiles and materials
and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which
are inherently indiscriminate in violation of international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons,
projectiles and materials and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in
Articles 121 and 123 .. .
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an annex to the Rome Statute which was not included in the final version of the
Rome Statute and was supposed to delineate certain "weapons, projectiles and
materials, and methods of warfare" in accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(xx)."
The first substantive provision of the ICCCA, subdivision B, begins with the
crime of genocide, Article 6 of the Rome Statute.7' This marks the first time
that the crime of genocide is established in Australian law, although there had
been previous legislative attempts to do so by the Australian Parliament.79
There are five offences of the crime of genocide as it appears in the Rome
Statute, and the ICCCA mirrors both the elements and the offences."0
However, the ICCCA does not require that the genocidal conduct take
place in a "manifest pattern of similar conduct," as is required in the Elements
of Crimes. l Intent alone suffices for prosecution." The lack of this element
should ease the burden of the prosecution to convict an alleged perpetrator.
Also, it solidifies the fact that complementarity jurisdiction can not only be
invoked by Australia, making conviction easier for Australian courts than for
the ICC, but that any prosecution would be upheld by the ICC in accordance
with Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute.
Subdivision C of the ICCCA creates the criminal offence of crimes against
humanity and follows Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 3 The detailed subsections,
beginning with 268.8, flesh out the elements of each crime. 4 The only devia-
tion from the Rome Statute appears with the unique approach that Australia took
regarding the crime against humanity of the "forced disappearances of persons"
by dividing it into two parts thus broadening the reach of the crime beyond that
of the Rome Statute.85 The two sections differ with regards to the person who
refuses to acknowledge the criminal act of "forced disappearance." 6 Section
268.21(l)(e) places the judicial focus on the government or organization
responsible for the forced disappearance, while section 268.21 (2)(h) focuses on
77. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
78. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ B; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
79. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Australia's Legislation for the Implementation of the Rome Statute,
in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 70, 71 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6; See Australia ICCCA, supra note 72.
81. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES,
ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
82. Id.
83. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(a)-(k); see also Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§
C 268.8-268.23 (Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a)-(k) corresponds to §§ C 268.8-268.23 of the Australia ICCCA
Act).
84. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ C 268.8-268.23.
85. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7-1(i); Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ C 268.21;
McCormack, supra note 79, at 71.
86. Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72, §§ 268.21(1),(2).
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the 'perpetrator' of the forced disappearance who refuses to acknowledge the
forced disappearance." By bifurcating Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute, it
assures that the crime will not go unpunished by simply denying either actual
complicity in the criminal act or the official condoning of such acts by a
representative group."8 This complies with the general tenor of ending impunity
in the Rome Statute.
Australian history, similar to that of the United States, evidences episodes
of unjust dealings with the indigenous population of that continent. 9 This may
explain in part the motivation of the Australian Parliament to not make the
crime of genocide retrospective in its application, as Canada decided to do, but
rather apply the new law going forward as of July 1, 2002. Article 6(e) of the
Rome Statute criminalizes the forced transferring of children of one group to
that of another group. 9° The Australian government has in the past taken
children of aboriginal Australians and placed them elsewhere in an attempt to
acculturate the indigenous Australians. 9'
Australia had attempted to employ the tool of universal jurisdiction as it
pertained to criminal prosecutions of non-Australian citizens for crimes
perpetrated against non-Australian citizens, specifically Nazi war criminals who
had taken residence in Australia after the Second World War.92 Australia went
so far as to grant universal jurisdiction over the crimes in the Rome Statute to
the Australian courts.93 Again, this may have been done to assure primacy over
any case in which the ICC may have an interest. The Australian Attorney
General is required to give his written consent before a prosecution can proceed,
however, investigation in absentia may occur.94
In sum, Australia first codified the crime of genocide in the ICCCA by
duplicating the offences in the Rome Statute, but the ICCCA does not require
that the genocidal conduct take place in a "manifest pattern of similar conduct,"
as is required in the Elements of Crimes.95 The crime of forced disappearances
87. Id.
88. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(i).
89. See generally Michael Legg, Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial
Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 387 (2002) (discussing history of
indigenous Australians).
90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(e).
91. See Legg, supra note 89, at 389.
92. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 n.91 (1991).
93. See generally Australia ICCCA Act, supra note 72.
94. Id. pt. 3 (allows for a suspect to be arrested, charged, remanded to custody or released on bail
before the AG's consent is obtained).
95. ELEMENTS OF CRuMES, supra note 81.
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was divided into two crimes, with each focusing on the mens rea of distinct
suspects, either governmental perpetrators or individual (non-governmental)
perpetrators.96 Finally, universal jurisdiction was granted for all crimes in the
Rome Statute, however, there is no retrospectivity jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide. It would appear that the deviations from the Rome Statute were to
assure the Australian courts jurisdiction over crimes in which the ICC could
have an interest and to possibly ease prosecutors' burdens for prosecution.
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom government had proclaimed its intention to be one
of the first sixty states to ratify the Rome Statute.97 Making good on this pledge,
the United Kingdom signed the Rome Statute on November 30, 1998, then
subsequently ratified it on October 4, 2001, becoming the forty-second state to
do so.9' As with dualist nations, until necessary domestic legislation is passed,
a foreign treaty cannot be ratified. Further, the United Kingdom legal system
does not allow self-executing treaties. Therefore, the United Kingdom ratifica-
tion process does not allow for any international treaty obligations of the
sovereign to be ratified until domestic legislation codifying the treaty obliga-
tions is passed through the parliamentary process.99
The United Kingdom had an arguably more simplified legislative route to
maneuver in order to ratify the Rome Statute due to its lack of any formal
constitution. There were no insurmountable hurdles which would require
modifying the fundamental source of domestic law. This does not mean,
however, that the United Kingdom legal system is amenable to any and all
proposed legislation. The United Kingdom common law has defined the
boundaries of its society for centuries.
The United Kingdom passed the International Criminal Court Act ("ICC
Act") in 2001,"° which applies predominantly to England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland, 0! paving the way for ratification. Scotland adopted its own ICC Act
the same year1 °2 due to the fact that the Scottish Parliament has autonomy over
the drafting and inclusion of criminal statutes for its territory. The
96. Id.
97. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Progress Report by the United Kingdom, Doc. No. 31 (2001) [hereinafter
Progress Report by U.K.].
98. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
99. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 248.
100. See International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. ICC Act]; John A.
Gilbert, The United Kingdom's Approach to Implementation of the Rome Statute, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 55 (Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
101. See Progress Report by the U.K., supra note 97.
102. International Criminal Court (Scot.) Bill, 2001, (S.P. Bill 27A).
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parliamentary process comprises debates in both houses, the Commons and the
Lords, approval by both houses, and royal consent.
The United Kingdom took a pragmatic approach to ratifying the Rome
Statute. According to John A. Gilbert, a Grade 7 in the Home Office's Criminal
Policy Group, the United Kingdom's "aim has been to assure that the offences
under the Rome Statute can be effectively and successfully prosecuted in our
domestic courts."' 3
The United Kingdom incorporated the ICC crimes, in large part, by simple
reference to the Rome Statute Articles 6 through 8 crimes, 4 and included the
possibility of the crime of aggression in Article 9.'05 The ICC Act does not
define any of the crimes in detail, but refers judges to the ICC Elements of
Crimes.'0 6 Many of the crimes, however, had already been codified by the
United Kingdom Parliament, and the concern was whether the incorporation of
those crimes, pursuant to the wording of the Rome Statute, would suffice for
ratification purposes.'0 7 The United Kingdom was apparently cognizant while
drafting the law for fear of not implementing the Rome Statute in its entirety
and thus included the mention of Article 9 in its implementing legislation.
The United Kingdom broadened its extradition law through the ICC Act
2001 by empowering its judicial system to extradite a suspect who has been
accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, to a
third-party state who has universal jurisdiction over the alleged crime even
though the United Kingdom may not have jurisdiction.'0 8 The United Kingdom
did this by adding to section 51(2)(b). This eliminated the criterion of dual
criminality, which attaches a criminal specter to any person who is either a
United Kingdom citizen, resident, or is somehow subject to United Kingdom
103. Gilbert, supra note 100, at 57.
104. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 50, 51.
105. (1) In this Part- "genocide" means an act of genocide as defined in Article 6, "crime against
humanity" means a crime against humanity as defined in Article 7, and "war crime" means a war crime as
defined in Article 8.2.
(2)(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes adopted in accordance with Article 9....
U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 50 (the crime of aggression is referred to in subpart (2)(a)).
106. (2) In interpreting and applying the provisions of those Articles the court shall take into
account-
(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes adopted with Article 9, and
(b) until such time as Elements of Crimes are adopted under that Article, any relevant
Elements of Crimes contained in the report of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC
adopted on 30th June 2000.
UK ICC Act, supra note 100, § 50(2).
107. See Progress Report by the U.K., supra note 97.
108. See U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 71-73 (these sections deal with extradition); GLBERT,
supra note 100, at 61.
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service of process jurisdiction,"°9 and has allegedly committed any of the ICC
crimes outside the United Kingdom, but is considered a crime.
Also, sections 52 and 59 of the ICC Act give United Kingdom courts the
ability to extradite indicted suspects for crimes ancillary to genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity."0 Ancillary crimes are defined in sections
55 and 62 of the ICC Act as:
1) Aiding and abetting;
2) Counseling or procuring the commission of an offence;
3) Inciting a person to commit an offence;
4) Attempt or conspiring to commit an offence;
5) Assisting an offender; and
6) Concealing an offence."'
Section 72 of the ICC Act, which closes the door on harboring
international criminals for good, is an innovative approach to assure rule of law
worldwide." 2 The ICC Act also removes the dual-criminality extradition rule
so that states which have a broader criminal jurisdiction can extradite a suspect
from the United Kingdom." 3
The consent of the Attorney General is required before any prosecution can
commence." 4 Interestingly, the United Kingdom did not incorporate the general
principles of law, like defenses, because there is very little divergence between
the United Kingdom criminal provisions and those in the Rome Statute which
correspond.' ' However, Article 28 of the Rome Statute, "Command
Responsibility," is replicated."'
D. Germany
For historical reasons, Germany had a moral obligation to not take a
passive role in implementing the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute and the ICC
are the direct progeny of the Nuremberg Tribunal which was convened as a
result of the Nazi war of aggression and the perpetration of atrocities during the
109. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 51(2)(b).
110. Id. §§ 52, 59.
111. Id. §§ 55, 62.
112. Id.§ 72.
113. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others EX Parte
Pinochet Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others EX
Parte Pinochet, [1999] A.C. (appeal taken from Q.B.) (discussing the dual criminality rule).
114. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, §§ 53(3), 60(3).
115. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, pt. 3, 4 (numerating the rights of the accused suspect during the
investigative stage); GILBERT, supra note 100, at 59.
116. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 65; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28.
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Second World War." 7 Germany should be commended for its ICC imple-
menting legislation, as it generally broadens the scope of German jurisdiction
for both its courts, and with regard to specific criminal acts. It has, since the
Berlin Conference, manifestly supported the implementation of the Rome
Statute, evidenced by the subsequent amendment to its constitution allowing for
the extradition of its nationals to other competent judicialfora." 8 Germany also
declared that the ICC may promote the beginning of a harmonization process
of international criminal law amongst states." 9  With its implementing
legislation, Germany not only recognizes its international treaty obligations by
incorporating language from the Geneva Convention and the Optional Protocols
into the code, but has made a concerted effort to legislate a modem and
functional legal framework to assure that the types of crimes that had been
committed by past German governments never occur again or at least do not go
unpunished. 12
0
Germany ratified the Rome Statute on December 11, 2000, becoming the
twenty-fifth ratifying state.' 2 ' The legislature in Berlin passed the new German
Code of Crimes Against International Law ("CCAIL"), called in German,
V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch, which entered into force on June 30, 2002.122 Prior to
the enactment of the CCAIL, Germany had not codified such crimes as crimes
against humanity and war crimes as such. However, Germany had previously
codified the crime of genocide in 1955 when Germany ratified the Genocide
Convention.'23 The only change made in the 1955 Genocide Convention was
to update the antiquated terminology so as to bring the CCAIL into line with the
Rome Statute, more common usage of terms, and move the crime into the part
of the criminal code dealing with crimes against international law. 1
24
German lawmakers decided to utilize the CCAIL drafting exercise to
codify only those crimes and principles of international criminal law that were
117. DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ix-xi (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
118. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 249; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.).
119. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 254.
120. Id.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14.
122. See Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes against International Law, 2002, (Germany)
[hereinafter German CCAIL Act]; see COALITION FOR THE ICC, GERMANY (2005)
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/europecis/germany.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
123. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (Germany's accession occurred on Nov. 24, 1954) 119 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
124. Id.; see also Andreas Zimmermann, Main Features of the new German Code of Crimes against
InternationalLaw, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 140 (Matthias Neuner
ed., 2003) (updating such terminology in the crime of genocide by switching durch ihr Volkstum besimmt, a
group determined by their nationality, with ethnische Gruppe, an ethnic group).
novel to the German Code, not completely revamp the criminal code."2 5 Some
of the deviations from the Rome Statute which were incorporated into the
CCAIL broaden the scope of German jurisdiction. For example, section 6(1)
of the CCAIL mandates that the killing of a single member of a protected group
can constitute genocide if the perpetrator acted with the requisite mens rea.126
The Rome Statute, on the other hand, in Article 6(a), clearly states that there
must be multiple killings for it to be considered genocide, as it says, "[K]illing
members of the group . ,,"t27 By lowering the actus reus threshold for
genocide and correctly focusing on the mens rea of the perpetrator, additional
indignity, violence, and inhumanity is not required to be visited upon more than
one person before an ICC crime is committed.
Germany availed itself of universal jurisdiction prior to the incorporation
of the CCAIL.128 However, with the inclusion of the CCAIL into German law,
the principle of universal jurisdiction would apply to all criminal offences
against international law included in the CCAL even if there is no linkage
between Germany and the crime.129  This specification, as Germany had
proposed at the ICC Preparatory Committee negotiations in 1998,130 is
commendable and truly an example of universal jurisdiction. The prosecutors
are given wide discretion whether to investigate an ICC crime due to the fear
that German courts would be continuously congested with extraterritorial claims
in search of a credible judicial forum. 3' Germany supercedes not only its
fellow ICC brethren-states, but the Rome Statute itselP32 with regard to the
reach of German jurisdiction as it pertains to the ICC crimes.
125. See German CCAIL Act, supra note 122; Matthais Neuner, General Principles oflinternational
Criminal Law in Germany, in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 105
(Matthias Neuner ed., 2003).
126. German CCAIL Act, supra note 122, § 6(1).
127. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(a) (emphasis added).
128. The four Geneva Conventions include: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (Germany had already availed itself of universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide and for
the crime of murder against "protected persons" as defined in the Geneva Convention.) [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions].
129. German CCAIL Act, supra note 122, § 1.
130. See generally Johan D. Van der Vyver, Personal Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L REv. 1 (2000).
131. Neuner, supra note 125, at 107.
132. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2 (There is no specific requirement of universal
jurisdiction for signatory or domestic ratification purposes).
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Many of the German deviations from the Rome Statute are due to
considerations focusing specifically on the preference of using language that
had been previously utilized in the German criminal law and therefore can
successfully prosecute those suspected of committing ICC crimes. 133 This may
be accomplished because it requires less judicial interpretation and may reflect
administrative ease for prosecutors and defense counsel. As new terminology
is incorporated, judicial interpretation is, at times, required to parse out the
meaning as it is applied to a specific circumstance. With no ICC interpretations
currently available and no jurisprudence to build upon, the German courts
would rely on German usage as well as international judicial usage. The
uncertainty of definitional meanings may cause some to question the judicial
findings and ultimately the due process rights granted suspects. Therefore,
balancing the use of well-established terminology in domestic jurisprudence and
the inclusion of novel legal principles is crucial in the domestic debate regarding
domestic legislation incorporating the Rome Statute.
Other language diverges from the Rome Statute as a result of German law
makers questioning the developmental stage of certain customary legal
principles. 34 As the Rome Statute evidences intense negotiation, it may not
reflect the current state of customary international law. Germany apparently
decided to forgo any negotiated regression and to bring its criminal code up to
date with customary international law, understanding presumptively, that
codifying the current state of customary law, it would not prejudice or hinder
the continuing development of customary international law for domestic
prosecution purposes. 135
Finally, deviations from the Rome Statute apparently were calculated to
encompass those international legal obligations, embodied in the Genocide
Convention and Geneva Convention and Optional Protocols, which were not
incorporated into the Rome Statute. 136 One can assume that in some parts of the
CCAIL, treaty language was chosen over the Rome Statute language because
Germany wanted to broaden, not narrow, the scope of the CCAIL.'37 This does
not only assure Germany's capability to benefit from complementarity over any
ICC case, but it stands as an indicator to the international community of
133. Neuner, supra note 125, at 136.
134. Zimmerman, supra note 124, at 139 (discussing that the German CCAIL brings Germany's
criminal code up to date with customary international law).
135. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 10.
136. Rome Statute, supra note 2; Zimmerman, supra note 124, at 138; See also Geneva Conventions,
supra note 128; Genocide Convention, supra note 123.
137. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2 (The Rome Statute was heavily negotiated and
therefore certain provisions may reflect more of a political compromise than the current status of customary
international law.).
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Germany's commitment to the rule of law and ending impunity for those who
choose to ignore it.
E. France
French ratification of the Rome Statute experienced a major obstacle which
could have derailed French involvement in the ICC, and had it not been for the
stalwart desire and will of the French to link themselves to the concept of the
ICC, this hurdle may have proven insurmountable. Although most treaty
obligations in civil law states become part of the national law when ratified,
France holds its constitution above any international legal obligation and
requires a constitutional amendment for any conflicting treaty obligation.'38
France, which is a civil law state, may submit any possibly conflicting treaty
obligation to the constitutional court for interpretation.'39
France signed the Rome Statute on July 18, 1998, and due to the constitu-
tional dilemmas which subsequently arose, almost two years transpired before
France was able to ratify the statute, which ultimately occurred on June 9,
2000.40 Subsequent to the official expression of the French government of its
intention to ratify the Rome Statute and its initial signature in 1998 at the Rome
Conference, both the French President and the Prime Minister requested on
December 24, 1998, that the French Constitutional Court issue a ruling on the
constitutionality of the Rome Statute.'
4
'
The constitutional court held that not only was Article 27142 of the Rome
Statute in direct contradiction to the protections provided for by Articles 26,141
138. Schense & Piragoff, supra note 2, at 238.
139. Id. at 248.
140. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; SIGNATURES &RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (showing when
France ratified the Rome Statute).
141. CC decision no. 98-408DC, Jan. 22, 1999, J.O., available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/langues/anglais/a98408dc.pdf (the Constitutional Court's Decision regarding the
incompatibility of Article 27 of the Rome Statute and the French Constitution) [hereinafter Const. Council].
142. Irrelevance of official capacity:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of
a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27.
143. La Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958 CONST. art. 26 (Fr.) (No Member of Parliament shall be
prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried in respect of opinions expressed or votes cast in the
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68,' " and 68-1 of the French Constitution for officials and heads of state in the
official capacity,"' but that Articles 17 and 20 together,'46 and Article 99(4)147
of the Rome Statute had to be addressed by the French legislature due to
conflicts between French constitutional principles and the authority of the ICC
as granted by the Rome Statute.
The French Constitutional Court found that the constitution, which strictly
forbade any judicial organ other than the French High Court of Justice to indict
the President of the Republic, had to be amended prior to ratification. 4 The
President of the Republic enjoyed an absolute immunity which the Rome
Statute would not recognize. 49 The constitutional spotlight also fell upon the
members of the French Parliament. 5 ° The constitutional court, focusing on the
immunities enjoyed by French Parliamentarians with respect to the opinions
they espouse and the votes which they cast, held that Article 27 of the Rome
exercise of his duties. No Member of Parliament shall be arrested for a serious crime or other major offence,
nor shall he be subjected to any other custodial or semi-custodial measure, without the authorization of the
Bureau of the assembly of which he is a member. Such authorization shall not be required in the case of a
serious crime or other major offence committedflagrante delicto or a final sentence. The detention, subjection
to custodial or semi-custodial measures, or prosecution of a Member of Parliament shall be suspended for the
duration of the session if the assembly of which he is a member so requires. The assembly concerned shall
convene as of right for additional sittings in order to permit the preceding paragraph to be applied should
circumstances so require.) [hereinafter France Const.].
144. France Const., supra note 143, art. 68 ("The President of the Republic shall not be held liable
for acts performed in the exercise of his duties except in the case of high treason. He may be indicted only
by the two assemblies ruling by identical vote in open ballots and by an absolute majority of their members.
He shall be tried by the High Court of Justice.").
145. France Const., supra note 143, art. 68(1) (Members of the Government shall be criminally liable
for acts performed in the exercise of their duties and classified as serious crimes or other major offences at
the time they were committed. They shall be tried by the Court of Justice of the Republic. The Court of Justice
of the Republic shall be bound by such definition of serious crimes and other major offences and such
determination of penalties as are laid down by statute.).
146. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17, 20; Articles 17 and 20 taken together of the Rome Statute,
according to the French Constitutional Court, would allow the ICC to:
[Liegitimately take jurisdiction based on a single application of a law of pardon or of
domestic rules regarding prescriptions. In such cases, France apart from any
unwillingness or inability of the State, could be forced to arrest and hand over a person
to the Court for the sole reason that the acts are covered, according to French law, by
pardon or prescription.
Olivier Barrat, CSIL Beijing Symposium on the Comparative Study of the International Criminal Law and
the Rome Statute, Ratification and Adoption: The French Perspective 2 (2003).
147. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 99(4).
148. See Const. Council, supra note 141.
149. See id. 15.
150. Id.
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Statute violated this constitutional safeguard.' The court held that Article 26
of the French Constitution did not allow for members of parliament to be
arrested for a serious crime, "nor be subjected to any other custodial or semi-
custodial measure without the authorization of the bureau of the assembly of
which they are a member," and that, "such authorization is not required in the
case of a serious crime or other major offence committedflagrante delicto.' 52
Regarding the concept and function with which "complementarity" would
play in the administration of jurisdiction between the ICC and France, the
constitutional court held that restrictions to the principle of "complementarity"
were defined and based in the rule pacta sunt servanda, a concept which is
"clear and well-defined.' ' 53
The constitutional court also found that the powers of the ICC Prosecutor,
as prescribed by the Rome Statute, were usurping the fringes of national
sovereignty; specifically that the ICC Prosecutor is empowered to act on French
territory without oversight of the national authorities." 4 To some pundits, the
infringements on the French Constitution were quasi-ethereal, for example, the
attack on the constitutional principle of "the essential conditions of the exercise
of national sovereignty" due to the ICC Prosecutor's unconstrained powers."' 5
Ultimately, France chose a legislative path which circumvented the
constitutional obstacles it faced. By an overwhelming vote of 858 to six, France
amended its Constitution, inserting a new Article, Article 53-2, which states,
"[t]he Republic recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the
conditions articulated by the treaty signed on July 18, 1998."I6 The French
approach is apparently stated so as to thwart the necessity of creating an
exception to specific constitutional Articles.'57
Arguably, there remains a fundamental hurdle still to negotiate regarding
the approach which the French took to incorporate the obligations contained
within the Rome Statute. It seems that there has been no conclusive judicial
determination regarding whether the French amendment will ultimately create
constitutional inconsistencies, but one can reasonably assume that as the
151. See id. 15.
152. Id. 16.
153. See Const. Council, supra note 141; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Issues Raised with Regard
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by National Constitutional Courts, Supreme Courts
and Councils of State, at 1 (Jan. 2003).
154. See Const. Council, supra note 141.
155. See France Const., supra note 143; Barral supra note 146, at 2.
156. France Const., supra note 143, art. 53(2); Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility
and the International Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 9 (2001).
157. Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, CDL/2000/104 (Jan. 15, 2001).
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circumstances arise, the French courts will sort out the hierarchy and procedures
for meeting the obligations contained within the Rome Statute.
Appending the constitution by simply inserting language which "recog-
nizes the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the Rome Statute" may signify
that conditions contained within the Rome Statute have been elevated to those
with constitutional primacy. Accordingly, all obligations under the Rome
Statute would have the full weight of the constitution behind them. This may
create inherent contradictions and inconsistencies within the French constitu-
tional practice.
According to French law, the French Constitution reigns as supreme law
on French territory, but mandated inaction in accordance with constitutional
tenets may require action under the Rome Statute.'58 For example, since the
French constitution has higher standing than international treaties, those who
enjoy immunity as prescribed under the constitution and cannot be prosecuted
in French courts may have to be extradited to the ICC upon its exercise of
jurisdiction over the individual for alleged criminal acts.'59 Thus, what was an
absolute immunity guaranteed by the constitution is now merely an abdication
to the ICC of custody and, in effect, is no immunity at all. The constitutional
inconsistency is, however, in accordance with the obligation to strip immunity
of persons suspected of committing an ICC crime.
Although the approach the French utilized suffices to ratify the Rome
Statute, subsequent French and ICC jurisprudence will detail the adequacy of
the approach taken by the French government.
HI. THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE
A. Discussion of United States'Interests
The approaches that the five countries took in legislating their unique
versions of the Rome Statute are paradigmatic of a multilateral non-self-
executing treaty which does not allow for any reservations, and certain legal
obligations can supersede historically established constitutional tenets. Each
state had to create an amalgam of domestic criminal law, due process and
procedure, and merge it with an internationally negotiated treaty full of political
compromise and customary international law.
The United States can assume that many of the issues that arose during the
legislative implementation processes of the various states would translate in
some form or other into issues which might arise, were the United States to
attempt to implement the Rome Statute. Ancillary to this exercise is the
158. See France Const., supra note 143.
159. Barrat, supra note 146, at 4.
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knowledge of what issues have raised concern amongst the states about the
Rome Statute and their inclusion in the ICC regime. Gleaning this insight is
both beneficial and time-saving for Congress. The major issues, with which all
or most of the states had to grapple, were:
1) Whether to use previously legislated attempts of ICC crimes or to
utilize the language provided by the Rome Statute due to the
possibility of not fully implementing the Rome Statute;
2) How to reconcile a state's granting of immunity for the leading
political decision makers and Article 27 of the Rome Statute,
Irrelevance of Official Capacity;
3) Whether to implement retrospective jurisdiction to the ICC
crimes;
4) Whether to apply universal jurisdiction to the ICC crimes; and
5) The extent to which the domestic courts of each country would be
able to effectively and successfully prosecute those accused of ICC
crimes.
What all states had in common was a cognizance of not fully implementing
the Rome Statute resulting in their inability to take advantage of complemen-
tarity jurisdiction and thus exposing themselves unnecessarily to ICC jurisdic-
tion. Articles 17(1) and 18 of the Rome Statute are the jurisdictional linchpins
of the Rome Statute and, accordingly, they should also be the main focus for the
United States, regardless of whether the United States decides to ratify the
statute and become a signatory member state. 160
Article 18 is the general roadmap for admissibility and complementarity.161
Article 18 defines the steps that are required for both the prosecutor and the
state when a situation has been deemed reasonable to investigate.1 62 Article
17(1) lays out a test for which, if met, states can guarantee primacy on a case by
case basis within the ICC jurisdiction. 63 In effect, the two Articles make the
ICC a court of last resort. Only if a state is shown to be unwilling or unable to
genuinely investigate or prosecute a case can the ICC acquire primary
jurisdiction.
To assure primacy of United States jurisdiction over ICC crimes and
effectively eliminate the ICC's ability to prosecute persons from the United
States, the United States would have to create legislation to close the gaps in
160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1), 18.
161. Id. art. 18.
162. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 18(1) (The meaning of "state" here is meant as the state that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned, as it is used in Article 18(1) of the Rome
Statute.).
163. Id. art. 17(1).
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title 18 of the United States Code. This would presumably protect United States'
interests by securing its ability to prosecute all persons including United States'
nationals who have allegedly committed certain ICC crimes overseas where
United States federal jurisdiction is currently absent."6
In accordance with Article 18 procedures, were the prosecutor to decide to
continue with an investigation or prosecution after having deferred to the state,
the prosecutor would have to bring the issue before the pre-trial chambers of the
ICC to remove the case from the state's jurisdiction.'65 By closing the
jurisdictional gaps in the United States criminal code, and if the ICC Prosecutor
were motivated by anti-American propagandizing, as the United States has
argued is a possibility, it is reasonable to suppose that the pre-trial chamber
would be unsympathetic to the prosecutor's concerns were the United States to
have in place domestic legislation that left no room for doubt.
The purpose of the ICC is not to try individual and isolated crimes, as
discussed above, but as the preamble to the Rome Statute states, its focus is on
the adjudication of such grave criminal acts that threaten the peace, security, and
well-being of the world, and to end the impunity for the perpetrators of grave
crimes."6 As the United States continues with the "war on terror," the ICC is
poised to focus the global spotlight of truth and justice on the perpetrators of
human calamity.
Regardless of whether the ICC will prove to be the premier venue for the
prosecution of terrorists worldwide, the incorporation of the ICC crimes into
United States law would be an adept tool for the prosecution of terror suspects
in United States courts. The ability to reach globally, to all nationalities, to
extradite according to law, would serve as a moral victory for the United States
and the rule of law. The termination of global impunity for terrorists that escape
justice by hiding behind the protections of state-sponsors of terrorism is one of
the rationales put forward by the current United States Administration for the
invasion of Iraq.
The systematic attacks perpetrated against the United States on September
11, 2001, would have been within the ICC's jurisdiction, had the ICC existed
at the time. Difficulties in obtaining personal jurisdiction of suspected terrorists
have proven on occasion to be an insurmountable hurdle for the international
administration of justice, as evidenced by the Lockerbie suspects.' 67 Since it
164. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 436-38. (discussing the United States' difficulty in prosecuting
international perpetrators of genocide, such as Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein's Lieutenants in federal court due
to the lack of federal jurisdiction for the crimes they had allegedly committed).
165. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 18.
166. Id. pmbl.
167. See generally Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints,
INTERNAT O NAL LAWYER (2000).
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appears as if the "war on terror" will continue for the foreseeable future,
empowering the United States to advantageously utilize the rule of law to bring
suspects to justice should be given serious consideration. It may even revitalize
the international perception of current United States foreign policy.
Although the United States during the Clinton Administration may have
touted the necessity and desire to establish a permanent international criminal
court,"' it would appear that the United States is the single largest impediment
to the legitimacy of the ICC.'69 Even though the United States actively
participated and even took a leading role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute,
the United States stands almost alone in its rejection of the ICC.'70 Since the
Rome Statute was finalized at the end of the 1998 conference, the United States
has attempted to redress issues which Ambassador David Scheffer, the United
States lead negotiator at Rome, called "fundamental flaws in the Rome
Treaty."'' The United States has also legislated policy to undermine the ICC.'72
Presently, there are no prospects that the United States will sign, re-sign, or
ratify the existing text in the future. 73 Reflective of the current administration's
policy on the ICC, Congressman Vito Fossella (R-NY, 13th District) warned
that the establishment of the ICC to prosecute war crimes could be used by
168. HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
EXPERIENCE 188 (1999); David Scheffer, The United States and the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 203 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000);
see also President's Remarks Honoring Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda, 34 WEEKLY COMp. PRES.
DoC. 13 (Mar. 30, 1998); see also STERLING JOHNSON, PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: HEGEMONiC INSTABILITY
OR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw? 1 (2003).
169. Bassiouni, supra note 7 (stating that the greatest source of uncertainty for the ICC is the current
United States position); BALL, supra note 168, at 188.
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 2; see SIGNATURES & RATIFICATIONS, supra note 14 (There are
98 countries that have currently ratified the Rome Statute.); other countries that voted to reject the Rome
Statute were Israel, Iraq, Qatar, China, Libya, and Yemen. Human Rights Watch, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, http://www. hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
171. See USUN Press Release, David J. Scheffer, Statement on "The International Criminal Court"
(Oct. 21, 1998), available at http://www.un.int/usa/98_179.htm.
172. See Article 98 Agreements, supra note 69 (legislation undermining the ICC); see 'American
Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2001, 107th Cong. § 857 (2001) [hereinafter ASPA]; U.S. Threatens to
Cut Aid to Countries That Support the ICC, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Dec. 7, 2004,
http://www.humanightsfirSt.org/media/2004_alerts/ij_1207_icc.htm (threats to withhold financial payments
to countries who support the ICC).
173. David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
12, 121 (1999) ("Having considered the matter with great care, the United States will not sign the treaty in its
present form.").
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terrorist nations and enemies of the United States to thwart the war on
terrorism. 74
The importance of United States participation in the process is exemplified
by the leading role it had during the Preparatory Commission.'75 Subsequent
review conferences will remain the places where the United States can
participate and influence the future development of the court. By making the
political decision to not participate in the ICC, the United States voluntarily
relinquishes its ability to directly influence the court as it matures. The United
States, for example, will not be able to participate in the important decisions
regarding proposing judicial candidates, the ICC Prosecutor, or general court
staffing.
176
Also, the United States may not have a presence as an observer in the
Assembly of State Parties in 2009, when, supposedly, the signatory states are
to attempt a working definition of the crime of aggression. 77 However, as an
original signatory state, the United States has the right to attend. 171 Since the
Bush Administration took office in 2001, it has sent two delegations to the
Preparatory Commission Sessions. 179 Even though the Bush Administration's
delegations declared that the United States did not support the ICC and did not
participate in the plenary sessions, they did participate in the working groups on
financing of the ICC and the definition of the crime of aggression.' There is
simply too much at stake.
Specifically, the United States would not be able to voice its concern
regarding the definition of the crime in which the United States might fird itself
most exposed and little, if any, influence would have been exercised in its
formation. Although some, with greater insight, feel that the crime of
aggression will not be defined in the foreseeable future. 1'' The foregoing of any
significant influence over the eventual defmition of the crime of aggression may
prove to be ultimately rather unfortunate as it could either create an
unbridgeable chasm between the United States and the ICC or it quite possibly
could spell the eventual demise of the ICC.
174. Congressman Vito J. Fossella, Fossella Warns Int 7 Criminal Court Could Hinder America's
War on Terrorism, July 12, 2002, http://wwwhouse.gov/fossella/Press/pr020712.htm.
175. See Scheffer, supra note 10, at 98.
176. John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrives-The U.S. Position: Status and
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873, 880 (2002).
177. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 112 (describing the makeup and role of the Assembly of State
Parties within the International Criminal Court).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Bassiouni, supra note 7.
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Were the United States to reverse its current disengagement from the ICC,
there appears to be no internationally recognized requirement or procedure to
repudiate the Bolton letter of May 6, 2002, from the United Nations (U.N.).,, 2
According to the U.N. Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs, never before has a
state unsigned a U.N. treaty.183 Consequently, the procedures for withdrawal of
the document, if even necessary, are equally unexplored, specifically regarding
the legal significance of such a repudiation.
The Bolton letter was merely to notify the U.N. Secretary-General of the
United States intent to not become a party to the Rome Statute, a requirement
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." Per Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, once a state has signed a treaty it is
barred from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 5 The
United States passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA)
two months later, in late July, 2002.116
Simply renouncing the Bolton letter by diplomatic communiqud to the
Secretary General, total disengagement by the United States would ostensibly
terminate. Communicating United States intent to the U.N. is important
because, without doing so, any United States legislation closing the gaps in title
182. Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, to General Kofi Annan,
U.N. Secretary-General (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/bolton.pdf (This letter was
the official communication from the United States government which informed the Secretary General of the
U.N. that the United States did not intend to become a party to the Rome Statute, and stated that the United
States has no legal obligations arising from President Clinton's signature on December 31, 2000.) [hereinafter
Bolton Letter].
183. Press Release, World Federalist Association, Bush Official Hints at "Unsigning" of Rome
Statute (Mar. 28, 2002) (quoting U.N. Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs).
184. This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to
become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations
arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its
intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the
depositary's status lists relating to this treaty.
Bolton Letter, supra note 182.
185. Article 18. Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not
to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force
of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 18.
186. See ASPA, supra note 172; see Chronology of ICC-Related Legislation, WASHINGTON
WORKING GROUP ON THE ICC (May, 2001), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/aspa/presswiccaspa2002O8.doc.
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18 would not allow the United States to be "willing" to genuinely investigate
or prosecute, now that the United States was "able" to do so. Also, by
renouncing the Bolton letter, the ICC pre-trial chambers would be less
sympathetic to propio motu requests by the prosecutor to remove the case from
United States jurisdiction.
B. United States' Fears
The trepidation that the United States has expressed regarding the ICC was
best articulated by the United States contingent at Rome,'87 then rehashed by the
Bush Administration sometime subsequent. It appears to center around the fear
of the United States losing its sovereign decision-making power 8' over its
citizenry and national interests,'8 9 even when acting strictly within the U.N.
authorized confines of a peacekeeping mission."9 While the United States
currently maintains that it does not recognize any obligations under the Rome
Statute,' 9 ' remarkably, the United States is questionably more exposed as a non-
signatory state than a state who has signed the treaty."rc Additionally, questions
concerning sovereign integrity of non-party states to the Rome Statute arose
with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005, granting the
ICC Prosecutor "Chapter VII" authority to begin an investigation of the alleged
atrocities perpetrated in Sudan.'9 3
These are powerful and valid arguments and are not to be easily discarded
by those who merely disagree with the United States foreign policy or its
negotiating strategy in Rome. The validity of these arguments must not only be
discussed by the international community. They must be met with a political
response that re-engages the United States into the ICC fold and the inter-
national community as a whole. Without dialogue and a resolution, the ICC
will marginally exist at its own peril. Even if the United States Administration
continues its current policy of actively working to isolate itself from the ICC,
the United States should nonetheless prepare its federal criminal code in an
attempt to minimize, if not fully eliminate, its exposure and create the requisite
political and legal environment to protect its national interests and assure United
187. BALL, supra note 168, at 191.
188. Scheffer, supra note 173, at 15; BALL, supra note 168, at 201.
189. BALL, supra note 168, at 191; Thomas Omestad, The Brieffor a World Court; a Permanent
War-Crimes Tribunal Is Coming, but Will it Have Teeth?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 52.
190. BALL, supra note 168, at 192.
191. Bolton Letter, supra note 182 (The United States has no legal obligations arising from President
Clinton's signature on December 31, 2000.).
192. William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a United States
Military Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 131 (2001).
193. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005).
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States primacy over all potential ICC actions involving those United States
interests.
A possible scenario could develop as follows: the United States President
gives the approval to bomb what intelligence sources have indicated is a
building housing belligerents, when in fact it is later proven to have been a
hospital and innocent civilians are killed. An NGO, or the state where the
bombing took place, or a state of nationality of a victim (if they are members of
the ICC regime) informs the ICC Prosecutor of the incident. Before the ICC
Prosecutor can initiate an investigation, he must inform all relevant parties of
the incident. By calling on the states concerned, complementarity mandates that
the United States have the option to take control of the investigation in
accordance with Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute.
For the United States to comply with Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome
Statute'94 and assume primacy over the investigation and possible adjudication
of American citizens accused of an ICC crime, the United States would have to
be able to both investigate and prosecute the alleged crime. Currently, the
United States does not have the legal framework in place to strictly comply with
all the demands of Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute, as gaps exist in the
United States criminal code regarding certain ICC crimes. 195 The United States
would have to initiate a bonafide investigation within six months and prove to
the ICC Prosecutor that the investigation, if needed, was able to trace up the line
of command, possibly up to the Chief Executive level. 196 The Rome Statute
does not recognize immunity for heads of state from prosecution. 97 The fear
of an international judicial organ mandating an investigation and the mere
possibility of prosecuting the President of the United States for decisions made
in his official capacity is real. It may prove to be one of the political hurdles
that the United States is incapable of clearing.
The United States could argue that having to initiate an investigation of the
President at the behest of an international body is a loss of sovereignty. Were
the ICC Prosecutor not satisfied with the United States capability to prosecute
a suspect, the ICC Prosecutor could forward a request to the pre-trial chambers
of the ICC and ask for the judge's approval to handle both the investigation and
194. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17, 18.
195. Id.; Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091,2441, 1111 (2000); CASSEL, supranote
1, at 436.
196. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 436.
197. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27(1).
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possible subsequent prosecution of United States personnel involved in the
bombing of the hospital.
Failing in the Article 18 arguments, the prosecutor may then look to Article
17(1) for jurisdiction, which is a case by case jurisdictional test. Article 17(1)
of the Rome Statute states, "the court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution. .. If the United States does not have the
requisite criminal statutes to satisfy Article 17(1), then in fact the United States
is ipso facto "unable" to prosecute.'" Were the United States to have the
requisite laws on the books, then the only question would be whether the United
States is "unwilling" to investigate or prosecute. This is a fundamentally
different question since every state must face this test, regardless of the breadth
of their implementing legislation.
Another major reservation that the United States seems to have with the
ICC is the fear that United States civilian and military persons would be
prosecuted for Article 5 crimes by rogue and politically motivated states, the
ICC Prosecutor, or the ICC Judges due to the possibility of anti-American
propagandizing.2"u There is also very little in the Rome Statute that recognizes
the unique circumstances of the United States military such that the United
States has "reluctantly -had to conclude that the treaty, in its present form,
contains flaws that render it unacceptable."' ' The ICC only focuses on the
extremely heinous crimes, as they are defined in Articles 5 through 8, that are
crimes in which the United States government arguably does not engage.02 The
United States has been a world leader in establishing ad hoc tribunals and
bringing the need for adjudication of intemational criminals to the forefront in
war stricken parts of the world like Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, 23 and
most recently in Cambodia, where direct legislative attention is focused on
ending impunity for the surviving Khmer Rouge officials.2 4
198. Id. art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAw 165 (2003).
201. Rome Statute, supra note 2; BALL, supra note 168, at 201 (quoting Ambassador David J.
Scheffer who said, "On the practical side, no other nation matches the extent of the United States overseas
military commitments through alliances and special missions such as current peacekeeping commit-
ments. ... ").
202. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-8.
203. David J. Scheffer, P-I Focus: U S. Sabotages International Court at Its Own Peril, THE
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 1, 2004, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/158282_focus0l.html.
204. See Ker Munthit, Khmer Rouge Bosses Could Face Trials Soon, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.),
Oct. 6, 2004.
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Accompanying the United States Administration's disassociation from the
ICC, the United States Congress took a significant step to codify the political
disengagement, the purposes of which can be viewed as a precursor to continued
negotiations regarding United States involvement in the ICC regime. The
ASPA was signed into law in August, 2002, by President Bush in order "to
protect United States military personnel and other elected and appointed
officials of the United States Government against criminal prosecution by an
international criminal court to which the United States is not a party.""0 5 But for
the Dodd Amendment inserted into the bill which eventually became Public
Law 107-206, as a second degree amendment, the disassociation would have
been a complete rupture.2°
The United States has legislated attempts to not only insulate itself from
the reach of the ICC, but also to penalize those states who do ratify the Rome
Statute as evidenced in the recent international debate regarding the "Article 98
Agreements" which grants a waiver and allows states to disregard their
obligation to cooperate with the ICC regarding the surrender of persons wanted
by the ICC if it were to require the states to act inconsistently with their
obligations under international law and agreements.2"7
IV. COMPARISON
A. What the United States Can Learn From the Different Approaches
As discussed briefly above, the United States had legislated some of the
ICC crimes prior to the existence of the ICC.05 It would not be advisable, how-
ever, for the United States to consider those statutes as substitutes for the Rome
Statute Articles 5 through 8 for a few reasons. First and most significantly,
current federal jurisdiction regarding war crimes and genocide has significant
jurisdictional gaps which do not allow for their prosecution in certain cases.
Other democracies wrestled with the possibility of using preexisting
legislation as substitutes for the Rome Statute language, in part, due to the
familiarity that their courts and lawyers had with the former legislation.
Ultimately, the states came to the realization that to fully assure ratification of
the Rome Statute, their codes had to be updated. It was in their best interests to
do so.
205. See ASPA, supra note 172.
206. Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks
on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002).
207. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98.
208. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 2441 (these sections are respectively the United States federal crimes of
genocide and war crimes).
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Germany, for example, wrestled with using new language and ultimately
decided to not only update the old terminology with language from the Rome
Statute, but to broaden the scope of the implementing legislation by including
language from its international treaty obligations, which were not included in
the Rome Statute, arising from the Geneva Convention and Optional Protocols.
While the German technique is first-rate, there was no technical reason to
include the Optional Protocols to the Geneva Convention. The legal obligations
arising from ratified international treaties are binding nonetheless.
The United States will have to address Article 27 of the Rome Statute,
"Irrelevance of Official Capacity," in the near future regardless of whether the
United States wishes to ratify the Rome Statute.209 The fact that tests in Articles
17 and 18 require a state to be able and willing to genuinely investigate may
require an investigation of governmental officials (emphasis added).21 ° This
apparently cannot be avoided for state parties to the Rome Statute. The United
States can rely on the state of customary international law were the United
States to remain a non-state party to the ICC, as the ICJ in Congo v Belgium
drew a road map for head of state immunity.21' All state parties to the Rome
Statute have acquiesced to the abrogation of immunity for ICC crimes. A
government official may retain his or her immunity for domestic criminal
proceedings, but the domestic immunity will be ignored for ICC purposes. The
French example is on point. The French added a phrase to their constitution
recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICC according to the Rome Statute. The
constitutional amendment continues to provide domestic immunity for French
politicians acting in their official capacity from domestic criminal prosecutions
but does not shield the same persons from the ICC's jurisdiction. However,
non-state parties to the Rome Statute must rely on customary international law.
With regard to non-state parties to the Rome Statute, under customary
international law, the ICJ held in Congo v Belgium that there are four exceptions
to an incumbent head of state's absolute immunity:
1) A head of state is not immune from process in his or her home
country;
2) The home country has the option to waive the head of state
immunity in foreign jurisdictions;
3) There is no immunity for acts committed either before or after
the period that the head of state is in office, and there is no
immunity for international crimes committed while in office
which are committed in his or her private capacity; and
209. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27.
210. Id. arts. 17, 18.
211. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, Feb. 14, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 536, 551-52.
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4) No immunity exists when an international court has proper
jurisdiction."'
The Rome Statute emboldens the argument that incumbent head of state
immunity was eroding under customary international law.213 Falling squarely
into the fourth exception to head of state immunity, the ICC relies on the state
party's proper abrogation of head of state immunity under the Rome Statute for
jurisdiction. However, heads of states of both state parties and non-state parties
to the Rome Statute apparently must conform their actions committed in their
private capacity as there is no immunity under customary international law for
atrocity crimes. There is no defensible rationale for granting impunity for
incumbent heads of state from atrocity crimes because the heinous nature of
such crimes cannot fall within the justifiable requirements of the office.
Generally, it appears that actions not committed in a private capacity by a non-
state party's incumbent head of state retains immunity under customary
international law while a state party's incumbent head of state does not in
accordance with Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
The United States will have to examine at a later date whether to include
retrospective and universal jurisdictions to any legislation that Congress would
propose to close the gaps in title 18 of the United States Code. The purpose, as
stated above, would be to assure United States jurisdictional primacy and meet
the tests in Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute. The broader the scope of
any proposed legislation would be to provide more weight to the United States
argument of having initially met the jurisdictional tests (a good faith
investigation or prosecution would subsequently have to occur). If the United
States were to apply retrospection, an examination of past United States policies
may have to occur prior to any enactment of retrospective jurisdiction.
Australia, for example, decided not to utilize the tool of retrospection due to its
government's historical policies of dealing unjustly with the indigenous
populations.
True universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, may not serve the best
interests of the United States. Even though universal jurisdiction for a crime
does not mean that it can be prosecuted in any court in all circumstances,214 and
ICC jurisdiction is based on the consent of the state parties where the crime
occurred or the nationality of the accused,2"5 the United States should fashion
212. Id.; see also Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats orDefendants? Defining the Future ofHead-of-State
Immunity, 52 DUKE L. J. 651, 665 (2002).
213. Rome Statute, supra note 2; Tunics, supra note 212, at 660.
214. David J. Scheffer, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 233, 233 (2001).
215. Id. at 238.
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its jurisdictional boundaries for ICC crimes in any proposed legislation within
these limiting parameters. By mirroring the ICC's own outer limits to its
jurisdiction, the United States does not have to open itself up to be the world's
court for ICC crimes. The United States would be protecting its sovereign
interests by meticulously crafting its jurisdiction over ICC crimes to enable the
United States to assure primacy over any case that the ICC could have an
interest as it pertained to United States nationals, property, and interests. 16
By defining the United States jurisdiction as that equaling the ICC's
jurisdiction over any case in which the United States may have an interest, it
would allay doubt regarding the United States' capability to prosecute the
suspect. Germany decided on very broad universal jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide and, as a result, had to counterbalance the universality for the crime
of genocide with broad prosecutorial discretion in order to assuage the fear of
having the German courts clogged with suits from around the world in search
of a judicial forum. The United Kingdom applied jurisdiction to any United
Kingdom national, resident, or person who is subject to United Kingdom service
of process. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada all require a signature
from the Attorney General to move forward. Broadening the jurisdiction of the
United States federal courts to be able to prosecute all the ICC crimes is a
powerful tool for the United States regardless of whether the United States
ratifies the Rome Statute.
B. United States' Gaps
Title 18 of the United States Code, for example, does not codify crimes
against humanity as such. 217  A domestic federal charge of murder may
theoretically be analogous to the crime against humanity of murder, but may not
technically suffice to assure United States primacy over an ICC indictment. The
elements of the two crimes, Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and domestic
murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111 (a), are arguably too divergent to satisfy the ICC's
complementarity jurisdiction." 8 Furthermore, domestic murder does not
express the gravity of the alleged crime.1 9
216. Id. Incorporating the four kinds ofjurisdiction possible:
1) territorial,
2) nationality or personality,
3) passive personality, and
4) protective or effects.
217. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 2441, 1111.
218. Rome Statute, supra note 2, § 7(l)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a).
219. Rome Statue, supra note 2, pmbl. (the high threshold of an ICC crime, as the Preamble of the
Rome Statute notes, inter alia, that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
world).
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Article 7(l)(a) of the Rome Statute deems murder to be a crime against
humanity if certain circumstances are met.2 ' The Elements of Crimes further
defines the crime against humanity of murder to contain an element of a
"widespread or systematic" attack as part of the killing of a human being, and
the perpetrator had to have knowledge that the conduct was part of, or intended
the conduct to be part of, a "widespread or systematic" attack against a civilian
population.22' A simple murder does not constitute a crime against humanity.
The federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 1 11 (a), states that, "murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. '22 The federal
charge allows for there to be multiple charges of murder, if applicable.223 Yet,
there is no inference or requirement of a "systematic or widespread" attack in
the federal charge. 224 To put it simply, the only commonality between the two
charges is the word murder. The federal charge would technically apply to a
perpetrator of the crime against humanity of murder, but there still remain three
crucial questions which require debate. Those are: 1) whether the federal
charge of murder would suffice to fulfill Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute
and give the United States primacy over ICC jurisdiction; 2) would federal
courts have jurisdiction over the perpetrator, federal courts currently have
jurisdiction only over crimes against humanity committed overseas if they
involve torture, attempted torture, or certain types of international terrorism; 2 1
and 3) whether the federal charge of murder demonstrates, with sufficient
magnitude, the heinous nature of the crime to the international community so
that it rises to the high threshold which the Rome Statute requires.
This is but one example of a single crime in the Rome Statute. There are
many that require a similar examination. With the current United States
Administration's aspiration to disassociate from the ICC in any fashion, whether
the federal charge of murder is sufficient to guarantee primacy over an ICC
220. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(a).
221. See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81.
222. There can be little doubt that murder in the second degree would not rise to the level of a crime
against humanity because:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage,
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
18 U.S.C. § Il11(a).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. CASSEL, supra note 1, at 429.
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indictment should ring alarm bells on Capitol Hill. The fundamental question
of whether the federal courts even have jurisdiction over such heinous crimes
should also be the cause of a certain amount of apprehension in Congress.
Regardless of whether the current United States Administration is politically
inclined to participate in the ICC regime or subsequent decisions prove the
current federal law to be (or not to be) sufficient, incorporating analogues to the
Rome Statute Articles 5 through 8 into federal law would have a single and
profound effect. It would assure primacy of United States jurisdiction over any
crime in which the ICC could have an interest. Even passing legislation that
mirrors Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute would not technically
incorporate the United States into the ICC regime. It would simply protect
against the fears currently propagated by the United States.
The current federal genocide statute allows the federal courts to have
jurisdiction only when the crime is committed in the United States or by a
United States national.2 6 For war crimes, United States federal jurisdiction is
also not without its gaps. Only when the victim or the perpetrator is a United
States national or member of the United States military do United States courts
have jurisdiction.2 7 Other states parties to the Rome Statute dealt with the
jurisdictional gaps of their own by expanding the reach of their domestic
jurisdiction. The expansiveness depended on the established legal norms and
what the law would permit.
Whether the federal murder statute properly reflects the heinous nature of
the crime against humanity of murder is debatable. There are persuasive
arguments that the penalties for murder are similar in their gravity, if not more
so, in the United States since the United States can impose the death penalty.
Therefore, if the criminal justice system's punishment is retributive in nature,
there is parity. Since the federal murder statute can be used to charge multiple
murders, a suspected criminal can be dealt with accordingly.
More persuasive, however, are the arguments that the federal murder
statute does not properly reflect the magnitude of the crime against humanity of
murder since the mens rea elements are distinct. In the federal statute:
"Malice aforethought" is the characteristic mark of all murder, as
distinguished from the lesser crime of manslaughter which lacks it.
It does not mean simply hatred or particular ill-will, but extends to
and embraces generally the state of mind with which one commits a
wrongful act. It may be discoverable in a specific deliberate intent to
kill. It is not synonymous with premeditation, however, but may also
be inferred from circumstances that show a wanton and depraved
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1091; CASSEL, supra note 1, at 429-30.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
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spirit, a mind bent on evil mischief without regard to its
consequences.228
Article 7(1)(a) of the Elements of Crimes states that the mens rea element
is a subjective one and cannot be inferred as the federal statute allows.229 The
perpetrator must know that the killing of a person was part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population and, therefore, the
knowledge requirement is premeditated murder as part of a grand scheme.23°
One cannot know that he/she is going to kill a person as part of a widespread or
systematic attack if one does not already know that he/she is going to kill. 231 The
knowledge and preparation of killing as part of a widespread or systematic
attack is arguably premeditation.232 Not knowing exactly who it is that you are
going to kill is irrelevant.233 Malice aforethought is not synonymous with
premeditation, however, even if the killing were premeditated, because under
the federal statute there is no requirement of a grand scheme of a widespread or
systematic attack.234
There are three requirements for the crime against humanity of murder.235
They are 1) killing; 2) with knowledge (premeditation); and 3) as a part of a
widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population.236 The federal
murder statute has only two criteria: a killing, with malice aforethought.237 The
heinous nature of the ICC crime is manifested in the widespread or systematic
attack on the civilian population. For the reasons stated above, the federal
statute does not arguably rise to the level of "such grave crimes [that] threaten
the peace, security, and well-being of the world '2 38 without there being a
reference to a widespread or systematic plan to kill civilians.
Also, if the purpose of the imprisonment for a crime is rehabilitative in
nature, then the implementation of the death penalty by the United States for
premeditated murder (and the United States argument that the federal murder
statute reflects the heinous nature of the crime against humanity of murder)
228. Gov. of the Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 774 (1966) (defining malice aforethought).
229. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81, art. 7(1)(a).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 81, art. 7(l)(a).
235. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).
236. Id.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a).
238. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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arguably falls short, as no rehabilitation can occur when the convicted person's
sentence is consummated.
Proposed legislation to close the United States' gaps should address these
essential concerns. Below are the beginnings of proposed legislation that would
close the gaps in title 18. The difficulties in providing a launching pad for
proposed legislation is considering the political desire to officially recognize the
ICC. It would be simple and effective to codify the ICC crimes by reference to
Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute and provide for United States federal
jurisdiction accordingly, as many states did in their implementing legislation.
The United States scenario is distinct due to political concerns. Therefore, in
the proposed additions to the current analogues, no reference to the Rome
Statute is made. A reference to the ICC is used to broaden federal personal
jurisdiction with a consent requirement of the Attorney-General.
There is no codified federal analogue for Article 7, "Crimes Against
Humanity." 39 Two solutions are possible, however. The first solution is where
there is a federal crime similar to those included in Article 7 of the Rome
Statute, elements must be included to encompass the requirements of a
"widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population," the
jurisdictional elements of each crime must be broadened to the extent that the
ICC may have jurisdiction, and any additional elements of the crime itself
should be comparatively examined with the ICC Elements of Crimes
requirements. Where there is no federal analogue, for example, the crime of
apartheid, a new crime must be fashioned. The second solution is to draft
proposed legislation that mirrors the crimes in both the Rome Statute and the
ICC Elements of Crimes for crimes against humanity.
1. Genocide
With regard to the jurisdictional limitations of federal courts and the crime
of genocide, a broadening of the federal genocide statute, 18 U.S.C. §1091,
must occur. Additional elements should be added to subsection (d) of § 1091,
which aligns federal jurisdiction with that of the ICC and the definitional
section, §1093. This can be accomplished by simply adding the Attorney
General's consent to additional jurisdictional concerns.
(d) REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCE FOR OFFENCES.-
The circumstance referred to in subsections (a)
and (c) is that-
1) the offence is committed within the United
States; or
239. Id. art. 7.
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2) the alleged offender is a national of the
United States (as defined in section 101 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101)); or
Additional section 4 3) at the specific direction of the Attorney-
General where the offence is committed
outside the United States by any person;
and
Additional section 4 4) jurisdiction over the offence by the Inter-
national Criminal Court may occur.
Additionally, 18 USC §1093, the definitional section of the federal genocide
statute should be amended to include a definition of the ICC.
(9) The term "International Criminal Court" means the court
constituted by the Rome Statute of 1998.
2. Crimes Against Humanity
There is no federal statute codifying crimes against humanity as such. The
United States has codified various crimes which may (or may not) suffice for
securing United States complementarity jurisdiction, for example, the federal
murder statute (18 U.S.C. § 1111), discussed above, the federal torture statute
(18 U.S.C. §2340A), kidnapping (18 U.S.C. §1201), hostage taking (18 U.S.C.
§ 1203), sexual abuse (18 USC 2241-2245), etc.
A vastly more encompassing statute may be required, as is proposed below.
18 U.S.C. §XOO1-Crimes Against Humanity
(a) Offences.-
(1) In General.-notwithstanding any other section of this
title, it shall be an offence if anyone commits a crime
against humanity if-
(A) as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack, and
(B) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(C) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur; and
(D) commits an offence in (c).
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(b) Jurisdiction.-There is jurisdiction over the offences in
subsection (a) if-
(1) the offence takes place in the United States and-
(A) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(B) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur.
(2) the offence takes place outside the United States and-
(A) the Attorney-General expressly approves; and
(B) jurisdiction over the offence by the International
Criminal Court, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 093(9),
may occur.
(c) Definitions.-As used in this section, the ternm-"crime against
humanity" means-murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution or
any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against
any civilian population or any identifiable group and that, at the
time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime
against humanity according to customary international law or
conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations, whether or not it constitutes a
contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of
its commission.
3. War Crimes
With regard to the jurisdictional limitations of federal courts and the
federal war crimes statute (18 U.S.C. §2441), recognition of other persons (both
suspects and victims) is required as well as a broadening of the subject matter
jurisdiction. Currently, only when the victim or the perpetrator is a United
States national or member of the United States military do United States courts
have jurisdiction.
(a) Offence. however, whether inside or outside the
United States, commits a war crime, in any of the
circumstances described in subsection (b), shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to
the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of
death.
(b) Circumstances. he circumstances referred to in
subsection (a) are that the person committing
such war crime or the victim of such war crime
is:
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New numbering 4
New numbering 4
Additional section 4
Additional section 4
(1) a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States; or
(2) a national of the United States (as defined
in section 101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act); or
(3) at the specific direction of the Attorney-
General, any person.
(c) Definition. s used in this section the term ar
crime means any conduct
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the
international convention signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such
convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of
the Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a violation of common
Article 3 of the international convention
signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any
protocol to such convention to which the
United Kingdom is a party and which deals
with non-international armed conflict;
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed
conflict and contray to the provisions of
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3
May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3
May 1996), when the United States is a
party to such Protocol, willfully kills or
causes serious injury to civilians; or
(5) over which the International Criminal
Court, as defined in 18 USC 093(9), may
have jurisdiction.
C. Conclusion
The United States has codified a patchwork of international crimes, some
of which are contained in the Rome Statute. However, the patchwork is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction to United States courts for the full range of
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ICC crimes. The purpose of the United States in legislating crimes analogous
to Articles 5 through 8 of the Rome Statute would be to satisfy Article 17 and
18 of the Rome Statute and supplant ICC jurisdiction, thus assuring United
States primacy over all ICC investigations and prosecutions of persons accused
of an ICC crime regardless of the nationality of the suspect or victim.
As this paper has examined, many states prior to ratification of the Rome
Statute were in ostensibly the same situation as the United States currently finds
itself. No state had established the legal framework sufficient to guarantee
primacy over an ICC investigation or prosecution. Australia for the first time
codified the crime of genocide during the ICC ratification process and Germany
first legislated war crimes and crimes against humanity during the ICC
ratification process. Canada used the ICC ratification process to revamp its
criminal code which had previously codified war crimes and crimes against
humanity but the Canadian courts found them too difficult to domestically
prosecute. While the United States has the crime of genocide on the books, the
jurisdictional limitations of the current law do not allow for prosecution of non-
United States citizens who have allegedly committed genocide overseas and
who may be in the United States, or if the alleged perpetrator is an American
citizen.
Germany chose to legislate universal jurisdiction with few if any
limitations imposed, relying on prosecutorial discretion to not overburden the
courts with suits from around the world. Canada ultimately decided on
universal jurisdiction but added a presence requirement, made the application
of the crimes retrospective, and required the Attorney General's signature.
2 40
This assures that the Canadian jurisprudential principles and constitutional
limits of due process are protected. Australia also decided to apply universal
jurisdiction to ICC crimes to assure its courts ofjurisdiction, but decided against
making the crime of genocide retrospective due to past Australian governmental
policies of mistreatment of indigenous Australians. The United Kingdom
broadened its extradition law so that it could extradite to a third-party state a
suspect who has been accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.241 The suspect can be either a United Kingdom citizen,
resident, or somehow subject to United Kingdom service of process jurisdiction,
and has allegedly committed any of the ICC crimes either inside or outside of
the United Kingdom.
2 42
However, many of the ICC crimes had already been codified by the United
Kingdom Parliament, and the concern in London was whether the incorporation
of those previously legislated crimes would suffice for ratification purposes of
240. See CAHWCA, supra note 20 (Canada's ratification of the ICC and its domestic legislation).
241. U.K. ICC Act, supra note 100, § 51(2)(b).
242. Id.
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the Rome Statute.243 The United Kingdom decided not to assume that they
would suffice, and incorporated the ICC crimes in the most efficient and
unquestionable manner by referencing the Rome Statute directly.
Each state has uniquely implemented the Rome Statute. Due to the fear of
historical governmental actions, constitutional hurdles, established jurispru-
dential norms, and political maneuvering, the Rome Statute has proven flexible
enough to incorporate individual state's concerns yet still implement the most
comprehensive codification of international criminal statutes to exist.
The United States can utilize the full array of approaches that the other
ratifying states took to construct legislation that will close the gaps in title 18,
thus protecting United States' interests without the necessity of ratifying the
Rome Statute. When the political motivation emerges to do so, the ratification
process would then entail few, if any, modifications of domestic law, thus
expediting United States involvement in the future administration of the ICC.
Even if the United States were to adamantly decide to never ratify the Rome
Statute, by closing the gaps in title 18, the United States can assure primacy
over any ICC investigation and prosecution, thus protecting its sovereign
interests.
All the states that have ratified the Rome Statute, even those with seeming-
ly insurmountable constitutional jurisprudence have apparently been satisfied
with the principle of complementarity to resolve doubts and fears regarding
violations of sovereignty. As the American perspective on the ICC becomes
more and more isolationist based on fears which other western democracies
have overcome, the United States will find itself more in the focus of the ICC
as a non-member.
Finally, if the ICC were to promulgate judicial activism or deprive litigants
of well-reasoned justice, the other state parties and democracies would cease to
adhere to the ICC findings and the ICC would quickly become irrelevant and a
footnote in a textbook detailing its failed attempt to administer international
criminal justice. The ICC is dependent on the voluntary association of the
member states. In the meantime, the United States can protect its national
interests and its sovereignty by legislating the crimes contained in the Rome
Statute and still remain an outsider to the ICC.
V. ANNEXES
The annexes below have been compiled for the ease of the reader to
examine the various approaches the different states took to implementing the
Rome Statute. The annexes below are the author's own effort at correlating the
various national statutes with the Rome Statute. The German statute below of
243. See Progress Report by the U.K, supra note 97.
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the implementing legislation is a translation and not considered an official
version. Articles 6 through 8 of the Rome Statute are not reproduced in every
case, as they are extensive. A simple reference to the Article in question is
provided in its stead.
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ANNEX 1-CANADA
Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 3
This Act is binding on Her Majesty in
right of Canada or a province.
(c) a war crime.
Rome Statute
Article 5
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall
be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court
has jurisdiction in accordance with
this Statute with respect to the
following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
Rome Statute
Article 27 Irrelevance of official
capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to
all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In parti-
cular, official capacity as a Head of
State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official
shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural
rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.
Crimes Against Humanity WarCrimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 4(1)
4. (1) Every person is guilty of an
indictable
offence who commits
(a) genocide;
(b) a crime against humanity;
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Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 4(3)
"crime against humanity" means
murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture,
sexual violence, persecution or any
other inhumane act or omission that
is committed against any civilian
population or any identifiable group
and that, at the time and in the place
of its commission, constitutes a
crime against humanity according to
customary international law or con-
ventional international law or by
virtue of its being criminal according
to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of
nations, whether or not it constitutes
a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its
commission.
Section 4(3)
"genocide means an act or omission
committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, an identifiable
group of persons, as such, that, at the
time and in the place of its
commission, constitutes genocide
according to customary international
law or conventional international law
or by virtue of its being criminal
according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of
nations, whether or not it constitutes
a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its
commission.
Rome Statute
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute,
"crime against humanity" means any
of the following acts when com-
mitted as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Exter-
mination; (c) Enslavement; (d) De-
portation or forcible transfer of pop-
ulation; (e) Imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; (f) Torture; (g)
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prosti-
tution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable
gravity; (h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as imper-
missible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i)
Enforced disappearance of persons;
() The crime of apartheid; (k) Other
inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health.
Article 6 Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
2005] HatchellSection 4(3)
''war crime" means an act or
omission committed during an armed
conflict that, at the time and in the
place of its commission, constitutes
a war crime according to customary
international law or conventional
international law applicable to armed
conflicts, whether or not it consti-
tutes a contravention of the law in
force at the time and in the place of
its commission.
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members
of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to pre-
vent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Article 8 War crimes
2. For the purpose of this Statute,
"war crimes" means: (a) Grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949, namely, any of
the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provi-
sions of the relevant Geneva Conven-
tion: (i) Willful killing; (ii) Torture or
inhuman treatment, including biolo-
gical experiments; (iii) Willfully
causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or health; (iv) Exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly; (v) Compelling a
prisoner of war or other protected
person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power; (vi) Willfully depriv-
ing a prisoner of war or other pro-
tected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial; (vii) Unlawful depor-
tation or transfer or unlawful confine-
ment;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
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(b) Other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in inter-
national armed conflict, within the
established framework of inter-
national law, namely, any of the
following acts: (i)...
Crimes Against Humanity War Rome Statute
Crimes Act
Section 4(4) Article 10
For greater certainty, crimes Nothing in this Part shall be inter-
described in Articles 6 and 7 and preted as limiting or prejudicing in
paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Rome any way existing or developing rules
Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, of international law for purposes
crimes according to customary inter- other than this Statute.
national law. This does not limit or
prejudice in any way the application
of existing or developing rules of
international law.
Crimes Against Humanity War Rome Statute
Crimes Act
Section 5(1) Article 28
A military commander commits an In addition to other grounds of
indictable offence if criminal responsibility under this
(a) the military commander Statute for crimes within the
(i) fails to exercise control properly jurisdiction of the Court:
over a person under their effective (a) A military commander or person
command and control or effective effectively acting as a military
authority and control, and as a result commander shall be criminally
the person commits an offence under responsible for crimes within the
section 4, or jurisdiction of the Court committed
(ii) fails, after the coming into force by forces under his or her effective
of this section, to exercise control command and control, or effective
properly over a person under their authority and control as the case may
effective command and control or be, as a result of his or her failure to
Hatchell
effective authority and control, and
as a result the person commits an
offence under section 6;
(b) the military commander knows,
or is criminally negligent in failing to
know, that the person is about to
commit or is committing such an
offence; and
(c) the military commander subse-
quently
(i) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
prevent or repress the commission of
the offence, or the further commis-
sion of offences under section 4 or 6,
or
(ii) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
(2) A superior commits an indictable
offence if
(a) the superior
(i) fails to exercise control properly
over a person under their effective
authority and control, and as a result
the person commits an offence under
section 4, or(ii) fails, after the
coming into force of this section, to
exercise control properly over a
person under their effective authority
and control, and as a result the
person commits an offence under
section 6;(b) the superior knows that
the person is about to commit or is
committing such an offence, or
consciously disregards information
that clearly indicates that such an
offence is about to be committed or
exercise control properly over such
forces, where: (i) That military
commander or person either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the
forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes; and (ii) That
military commander or person failed
to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the com-
petent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and
subordinate relationships not des-
cribed in paragraph (a), a superior
shall be criminally responsible for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by subordinates
under his or her effective authority
and control, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly
over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or
consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes; (ii)
The crimes concerned activities that
were within the effective
responsibility and control of the
superior; and (iii) The superior failed
to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the com-
petent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.
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is being committed by the person;
(c) the offence relates to activities for
which the superior has effective
authority and control; and
(d) the superior subsequently
(i) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
prevent or repress the commission of
the offence, or the further commis-
sion of offences under section 4 or 6,
or
(ii) fails to take, as soon as practic-
able, all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to
submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
Crimes Against Humanity War
Crimes Act
Section 8
A person who is alleged to have
committed an offence under section 6
or 7 may be prosecuted for that
offence if
(a) at the time the offence is alleged
to have been committed,
(i) the person was a Canadian citizen
or was employed by Canada in a
civilian or military capacity,
(ii) the person was a citizen of a state
that was engaged in an armed conflict
against Canada, or was employed in
a civilian or military capacity by such
a state,
(iii) the victim of the alleged offence
was a Canadian citizen, or
(iv) the victim of the alleged offence
was a citizen of a state that was allied
Rome Statute
Article 11 Jurisdiction ratione
temporis
1. The Court has jurisdiction only
with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of this
Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this
Statute after its entry into force, the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction
only with respect to crimes
committed after the entry into force
of this Statute for that State, unless
that State has made a declaration
under Article 12, paragraph 3.
[Vol. 12:183
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Annex 2- Australia
ICCCA
268.3 Genocide by killing
(1) A person (the perpetrator) com-
mits an offence if: (a) the perpetrator
causes the death of one or more
persons; and (b) the person or
persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.
268.4 Genocide by causing serious
bodily or mental harm
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator causes serious bodily or
mental harm to one or more person;
Rome Statute
Article 6 Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.
with Canada in an armed conflict; or
(b) after the time the offence is
alleged to have been committed, the
person is present in Canada.
Section 9
(1) Proceedings for an offence under
this Act alleged to have been
committed outside Canada for which
a person may be prosecuted under
this Act may, whether or not the
person is in Canada, be commenced
in any territorial division in Canada
and the person may be tried and
punished in respect of that offence in
the same manner as if the offence had
been committed in that territorial
division.
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and (b) the person or persons belong
to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group; and (c) the
perpetrator intends to destroy, in
whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.
268.5 Genocide by deliberately
inflicting conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator inflict certain conditions
of life upon one or more persons; and
(b) the person or persons belong to a
particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group; and (c) the
perpetrator intends to destroy, in
whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such; and (d) the conditions of life
are intended to bring about the
physical destruction of that group, in
whole or in part.
268.6 Genocide by imposing
measures intended to prevent births
(1) A person (the perpetrator) com-
mits an offence if: (a) the perpetrator
imposes certain measures upon one
or more persons; and (b) the person
or persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such; and (d) the measures
imposed are intended to prevent
births within that group.
[Vol. 12:183
268.7 Genocide by forcibly
transferring children
(1) A person (the perpetrator)
commits an offence if: (a) the
perpetrator forcibly transfers one or
more persons; and (b) the person or
persons belong to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group; and (c) the perpetrator intends
to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such; and (d) the transfer is
from one group to another national,
ethnical, racial or religious group;
and (e) the person or persons are
under the age of 18 years; and (f) the
perpetrator knows that, or is reckless
as to whether, the person or persons
are under that age.
Annex 3 - United Kingdom
ICC Act 2001-Part 5
50-Meaning of "genocide", "crime
against humanity" and "war crime"
(1) In this Part-
"genocide" means an act of genocide
as defined in Article 6,
"crime against humanity" means a
crime against humanity as defined in
Article 7, and
"war crime" means a war crime as
defined in Article 8.2.
Rome Statute
Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Rome Statute
and corresponding Articles of the
Elements of Crimes.
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(2) In interpreting and applying the
provisions of those Articles the court
shall take into account-
(a) any relevant Elements of Crimes
adopted in accordance with Article 9,
and
(b) until such time as Elements of
Crimes are adopted under that
Article, any relevant Elements of
Crimes contained in the report of the
Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court adopted
on 30th June 2000.
ICC Act 2001-Part 5
51-Genocide, crime against
humanity and war crimes
(1) It is an offence against the law of
England and Wales for a person to
commit genocide, a crime against
humanity or a war crime.
(2) This section applies to acts
committed-
(a) in England or Wales, or
(b) outside the United Kingdom by a
United Kingdom national, a United
Kingdom resident or a person subject
to UK service jurisdiction.
Rome Statute
No corresponding Article
ICC Act 2001 Rome Statute
72 xtradition: exception to dual No corresponding Article
criminality rule under the 1989 Act
(1) Section 2 of the Extradition Act
1989 (meaning of xtradition crime
is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(b) (extra-
territorial offences), after sub-
paragraph (ii) add or
(iii) the condition specified in
subsection (3A) below. (3) After
subsection (3) insert-
(3A) The condition mentioned in
subsection (1)(b)(iii) above is that
the conduct constituting the offence
constitutes or, if committed in the
United Kingdom would constitute-
(a) an offence under section 51 or 58
of the International Criminal Court
Act 2001 (genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes),
(b) an offence under section 52 or 59
of that Act (conduct ancillary to
genocide etc. committed outside the
jurisdiction), or
(c) an ancillary offence, as defined in
section 55 or 62 of that Act, in
relation to any such offence.
Annex 4 - Germany
Code of Crimes
International Law
against
Section 6- Genocide
(1) Whoever with the intent of
destroying as such, in whole or in
part, a national, racial, religious or
ethnic group
1. kills a member of the group
2. causes serious bodily or mental
harm to a member of the group,
especially of the kind referred to in
section 226 of the criminal code,
3. inflicts on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about their
physical destruction in whole or in
part,
4. imposes measures intended to
Rome Statute
Article 6-Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute,
"genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group;
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prevent births within the group,
5. forcibly transfers a child of the
group to another group shall be
punished with imprisonment for life.
Code of Crimes
International Law
against
Section 7 Crimes against Humanity
(1) Whoever, as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population,
1. kills a person,
2. inflicts, with the intent of destroy-
ing a population in whole or in part,
conditions of life on that population
or on parts thereof, being conditions
calculated to bring about its physical
destruction on whole or in part,
3. traffics in persons, particularly in
women or children, or whoever
enslaves a person in another way and
in doing so arrogates to himself a
right of ownership over that person,
4. deports or forcibly transfers, by
expulsion or other coercive acts, a
person lawfully present in an area to
another State or another area in
contravention of a general rule of
international law,
5. tortures a person in his or her
custody or otherwise under his or her
control by causing that person
substantial physical or mental harm
or suffering where such harm or
suffering does not arise only from
sanctions that are compatible with
international law,
6. sexually coerces, rapes, forces into
prostitution or deprives a person of
his or her reproductive capacity, or
confines a woman forcibly made
(e) Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.
Rome Statute
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute,
rime against humanity means any of
the following acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the
attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer
of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of
international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of compar-
able gravity;
(h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as
impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of
persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
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pregnant with the intent of affecting
the ethnic composition of any
population,
7. causes a person enforced dis-
appearance, with the intention of
removing him or her from the
protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time,
(a) by abducting that person on
behalf of or with the approval of a
State or a political organization, or by
otherwise severely depriving such
person of his or her physical liberty,
followed by a failure immediately to
give truthful information, upon
inquiry, on that person fate or
whereabouts, or
(b) by refusing, on behalf of a State
or of a political organization or in
contravention of a legal duty, to give
information immediately on the fate
and whereabouts of the person
deprived of his or her physical liberty
under the circumstances referred to
under letter (a) above, or by giving
false information thereon,
8. causes another person severe
physical or mental harm, especially
of the kind referred to in section 226
of the Criminal Code,
9. Severely deprives, in contravention
of a general rule of international law,
a person of his or her physical liberty,
or
10. persecutes an identifiable group
or collectivity by depriving such
group or collectivity of fundamental
human rights, or by substantially
restricting the same, on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural or
religious, gender or other grounds
that are recognized as impermissible
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute
Article 8-War crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction
in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute,
"war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts
against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention:
(i) Willful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments;
(iii) Willfully causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body
or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or
other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power;
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of
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under general rules of international
law ....
Code of Crimes against Inter-
national Law
Section 8- War crimes against
persons
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. kills a person who is to be pro-
tected under international humani-
tarian law,
2. takes hostage a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law,
3. treats a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law cruelly or
inhumanly by causing him or her
substantial physical or mental harm
or suffering, especially by torturing
or mutilating that person,
4. sexually coerces, rapes, forces into
prostitution or deprives a person who
is to be protected under international
humanitarian law of his or her
reproductive capacity, or confines a
woman forcibly made pregnant with
the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population,
5. conscripts children under the age
of fifteen years into the armed forces,
or enlists them in the armed forces or
in armed groups, or uses them to
participate actively in hostilities,
6. deports or forcibly transfers, by
expulsion or other coercive acts, a
person who is to be protected under
international humanitarian law and
war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer
or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within
the established framework of inter-
national law, namely, any of the
following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects, that is,
objects which are not military
objectives
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks
against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved
in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or
civilian objects under the inter-
national law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack
in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by
whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are
2005] Hatchelllawfully present in an area to another
State or another area in contravention
of a general rule of international law,
7. imposes on, or executes a sub-
stantial sentence in respect of a
person who is to be protected under
international humanitarian law, in
particular the death penalty or
imprisonment, without that person
having been sentenced in a fair and
regular trial affording the legal
guarantees required by international
law,
8. exposes a person who is to be
protected under international
humanitarian law to the risk of death
or of serious injury to health
(a) by carrying out experiments on
such a person , being a person who
has not previously given his or her
voluntary and express consent, or
where the experiments concerned are
neither medically necessary nor
carried out in his or her interest,
(b) by taking body tissue or organs
from such a person for
transplantation purposes so far as it
does not constitute removal of blood
or skin for therapeutic purposes in
conformity with generally recognized
medical principles and the person
concerned has previously not given
his or her voluntary and express
consent, or
(c) by using treatment methods that
are not medically recognized on such
person, without this being necessary
from a medical point of view and
without the person concerned having
previously given his or her voluntary
and express consent, or
9. treats a person who is to be
undefended and which are not
military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a comba-
tant who, having laid down his arms
or having no longer means of
defense, has surrendered at
discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag
of truce, of the flag or of the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy or
of the United Nations, as well as of
the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions, resulting in
death or serious personal injury;
(viii) The transfer, directly or
indirectly, by the Occupying Power
of parts of its own civilian popula-
tion into the territory it occupies, or
the deportation or transfer of all or
parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside
this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not
military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the
power of an adverse party to
physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the
medical, dental or hospital treatment
of the person concerned nor carried
out in his or her interest, and which
cause death to or seriously endanger
the health of such person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding
treacherously individuals belonging
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protected under international
humanitarian law in a gravely
humiliating or degrading manner
shall be punished, in the cases
referred to under number 1, with
imprisonment for life, in the cases
referred to under number 2, with
imprisonment for not less than five
years, in the cases referred to under
numbers 3 to 5, with imprisonment
for not less than three years, in the
cases referred to under numbers 6 to
8, with imprisonment for not less
than two years, and, in the cases
referred to under number 9, with
imprisonment for not less than one
year.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character, wounds a member
of the adverse armed forces or a
combatant of the adverse party after
the latter has surrendered uncondi-
tionally or is otherwise placed hors
de combat shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than three
years.
(3) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict
1. unlawfully holds as a prisoner or
unjustifiably delays the return home
of a protected person within the
meaning of subsection (6), number 1,
2. transfers, as a member of an
Occupying Power, parts of its own
civilian population into the occupied
territory,
3. compels a protected person within
the meaning of subsection (6),
number 1, by force or threat of
appreciable harm to serve in the
to the hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will
be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the
enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended
or inadmissible in a court of law the
rights and actions of the nationals of
the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the
hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against
their own country, even if they were
in the belligerent's service before the
commencement of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even
when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned
weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or
devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which
expand or flatten easily in the human
body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely
cover the core or is pierced with
incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of the
international law of armed conflict,
provided that such weapons,
projectiles and material and methods
of warfare are the subject of a
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forces of a hostile Power or
4. compels a national of the adverse
party by force or threat of appreciable
harm to take part in the operations of
war directed against his or her own
country shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than two
years.
(4) Where the perpetrator causes the
death of the victim through an
offence pursuant to subscction (1),
numbers 2 to 6, the punishment shall,
in the cases referred to under sub-
section (1), number 2, be imprison-
ment for life or imprisonment for not
less than ten years, in the cases
referred to under subsection (1),
numbers 3 to 5, imprisonment for not
less than five years, and, in the cases
referred to under subsection (1),
number 6, imprisonment for not less
than three years. Where an act
referred to under subsection (1),
number 8, causes death or serious
harm to health, the punishment shall
be imprisonment for not less than
three years.
(5) In less serious cases referred to
under subsection (1), number 2, the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than two years, in less
serious cases referred to under
subsection (1), numbers 3 and 4, and
under subsection (2) the punishment
shall be imprisonment for not less
than one year, in less serious cases
referred to under subsection (1),
number 6,and under subsection (3),
number 1, the punishment shall be
imprisonment from six months to
five years.
comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute,
by an amendment in accordance with
the relevant provisions set forth in
Articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in Article 7,
paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a
grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a
civilian or other protected person to
render certain points, areas or
military forces immune from
military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings, material, medical
units and transport, and personnel
using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Convention in conformity
with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare
by depriving them of objects
indispensable to their survival,
including willfully impeding relief
supplies as provided for under the
Geneva Convention;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces
or using them to participate actively
in hostilities
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(6) Persons who are to be protected
under international humanitarian law
shall be
1. in an international armed conflict:
persons protected for the purposes of
the Geneva Convention and of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention (Protocol I) (annexed to
this Act), namely the wounded, the
sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of
war and civilians;
2. in an armed conflict not of an
international character: the wounded,
the sick, the shipwrecked as well as
persons taking no active part in the
hostilities who are in the power of the
adverse party;
3. in an international armed conflict
and in an armed conflict not of an
international character: members of
armed forces and combatants of the
adverse party, both of whom have
laid down their arms or have no other
means of defense.
Section 9-War crimes against
property and other rights
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character pillages or, unless
this is imperatively demanded by the
necessities of the armed conflict,
otherwise extensively destroys,
appropriates or seizes property of the
adverse party contrary to inter-
national law, such property being in
the power of the perpetrator's party,
shall be punished with imprisonment
from one to ten years.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict and
contrary to international law declares
the rights and actions of all, or of a
substantial proportion of, the nation-
als of the hostile party abolished,
suspended or inadmissible in a court
of law shall be punished with im-
prisonment from one to ten years.
Section 10-War crimes against
humanitarian operations and
emblems
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. directs an attack against personnel,
installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, as long as they are
entitled to the protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under
international humanitarian law, or
2. directs an attack against personnel,
buildings, material, medical units and
transport, using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Convention
in conformity with international
humanitarian law shall be punished
with imprisonment for not less than
three years. In less serious cases,
particularly where the attack does not
take place by military means, the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than one year.
(2) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character makes improper
use of the distinctive emblems of the
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Geneva Convention, of the flag of
truce, of the flag or of the military
insignia or of the uniform of the
enemy or of the United Nations,
thereby causing a person's death or
serious personal injury (section 226
of the Criminal Code) shall be
punished with imprisonment for not
less than five years.
Section 11-War crimes consisting
in the use of prohibited methods of
warfare
(1) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict or with
an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character
1. directs an attack by military means
against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities,
2. directs an attack by military means
against civilian objects, so long as
these objects are protected as such by
international humanitarian law,
namely buildings dedicated to reli-
gion, education, art, science or charit-
able purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, or against
undefended towns, villages, dwell-
ings or buildings, or against
demilitarized zones, or against works
and installations containing danger-
ous forces,
3. carries out an attack by military
means and definitely anticipates that
the attack will cause death or injury
to civilians or damage to civilian
objects on a scale out of proportion to
the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated,
4. uses a person who is to be pro-
[Vol. 12:183
tected under international humani-
tarian law as a shield to restrain a
hostile party from undertaking opera-
tions of war against certain targets,
5. uses starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare by depriving them
of objects indispensable to their
survival or impedes relief supplies in
contravention of international
humanitarian law,
6. orders or threatens, as a com-
mander, that no quarter will be given,
or
7. treacherously kills or wounds a
member of the hostile armed forces
or a combatant of the adverse party
shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than three years. In less
serious cases under number 2 the
punishment shall be imprisonment
for not less than one year.
(2) Where the perpetrator causes the
death or serious injury of a civilian
(section 226 of the Criminal Code) or
of a person who is to be protected
under international humanitarian law
through an offence pursuant to sub-
section (1), numbers I to 6, he shall
be punished with imprisonment for
not less than five years. Where the
perpetrator intentionally causes
death, the punishment shall be impri-
sonment for life or for not less than
ten years.
(3) Whoever in connection with an
international armed conflict carries
out an attack by military means and
definitely anticipates that the attack
will cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environ-
ment on a scale out of proportion to
the concrete and direct overall
20051 Hatchell
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military advantage anticipated shall
be punished with imprisonment for
not less than three years.
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I. ABSTRACT
Although the growth of extradition treaties has assisted in the prosecution
of suspects who are not present in the state seeking their prosecution, there will
always be situations where extradition is not available or plausible. In such
circumstances the prosecuting state may be tempted to undertake an abduction
in order to facilitate the prosecution of the individual in their own jurisdiction.
The objective of this paper is to examine the use of state-sponsored abductions
in light of international human rights law. Although the United States Supreme
Court recently held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that an extraterritorial abduction
does not violate the rights of individuals under international law, it is evident
that this judgment misread the content of customary international law.
Individuals have the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction and despite
the Supreme Court's decision, recognition of this right is necessary to ensure
that the fate of abductees is not entirely dependant upon whether states are
willing to advance claims on their behalf.
II. INTRODUCTION
The issue of extraterritorial abductions is fraught with important policy and
legal considerations. While there may be a pressing need to achieve justice by
interrogating or prosecuting a suspect, efforts to secure custody may compro-
mise the rights of the individual and those of the state where the individual
resides (the host-state). This paper acknowledges that in the absence of consent
by the host-state an extraterritorial abduction, or rendition, breaches inter-
national law by violating the sovereignty of the state. However, it is contended
that an examination of the issues surrounding extraterritorial abductions is not
limited to the confines of state sovereignty and it is therefore important that a
human rights dimension is added to the analysis. This paper will argue that
state-sponsored abductions violate an individual's right to be free from
extraterritorial abduction and that this right exists independently of whether
there is also a breach of a state's territorial integrity.
Such a right for individuals to be free from extraterritorial abduction was
not acknowledged in the recent case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.' The United
States Supreme Court had to consider whether abductees could bring a civil
claim under the Alien Tort Statute alleging a violation of the "law of nations."2
While the Court held that Alvarez had no cause of action, the approach of the
Supreme Court to customary international law regarding abductions was flawed,
and the decision was substantially influenced by the current war on terrorism.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2000).
Although the Supreme Court's decision not to bar all future suits alleging
violations of international law will be declared a victory by human rights
advocates, there is a risk that the aspect of the decision relating to extraterritorial
abductions may be overlooked. It is important that the Court's decision is not
recognized as an accurate appraisal of customary international law and that
domestic courts throughout the world endeavour to protect the rights of
abductees.
Section II of this paper will outline the international law regulating
extraterritorial abduction and the importance of recognizing individual rights
within this state-centric analysis. Section II will discuss the decision of the
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and will illustrate that the Court's
determination of the role of the Alien Tort Statute affected the analysis of
customary international law. This decision is further criticized in section IV,
which demonstrates that individuals have a customary international law right to
be free from extraterritorial abduction and that the Supreme Court's examina-
tion of this norm was inadequate. This section will also demonstrate that
although individuals have the right not to be abducted by states, as yet there is
no corresponding international right requiring states to refrain from prosecuting
those seized in violation of their rights. Finally, section v. will conclude that the
Supreme Court's analysis of customary international law cannot be reconciled
with state practice and will outline how the political climate and ideological
predispositions could have influenced the Court's misreading of the content of
customary international law.
It is only by recognizing the right of individuals to be free from extra-
territorial abduction that international law will be able to protect individuals in
circumstances where the host-state is complicit in the abduction or is unwilling
to protest the abduction. International law has traditionally been ineffective in
such situations as individuals have not been acknowledged as actors in
international law and the abduction is subsequently only viewed as a violating
the rights of the state. Widespread recognition of the right of individuals not to
be subjected to state-sponsored abductions is therefore an important
development and is consistent with the growth of international human rights law
which ensures that individuals are no longer completely dependant on states to
advance claims on their behalf.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL FRAILTIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The term "extraterritorial abduction" refers to the situation when a state
seeking the custody of a suspected criminal forcibly removes that individual
from a foreign country in order to facilitate criminal prosecution. States are
encouraged into undertaking extraterritorial measures by the fact that in many
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jurisdictions the mere physical presence of a suspect is sufficient for a court to
exercise jurisdiction without an inquiry into how the individual was detained.3
It is a fundamental principle of international law that states must not
perform "acts of sovereignty" within the territory of another state.4 There is
consequently widespread recognition that extraterritorial abductions breach
international law by violating the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
host-state.5 A breach of international law constitutes an international wrong, for
which the state in question has a responsibility to remedy.6 For individuals who
have been abducted, the key issue is whether the remedy for the breach of
international law mandates that they be repatriated.
The traditional view of international law is that the rights of the individual
are irrelevant to the issue of whether the abductee will be prosecuted by the
abducting state or returned to the aggrieved state. Traditionally, the only aspect
of extraterritorial abduction that invokes state responsibility is the violation of
sovereignty, the remedy for which has typically been left to the vagaries on
international diplomacy.7 While the host-state may demand the return of an
abductee as a remedy for the violation of its sovereignty, making an individual
reliant upon the initiatives taken by the host-state not only leads to inconsistency
in the treatment of abductees but also unsatisfactorily relegates the importance
of international human rights law. Focusing on the claim of the "injured" state
ignores the possibility that an individual may possess a right under international
law that has been breached independently from that of a state.
While a state may bring an international claim based on the breach of its
sovereignty, the law of diplomatic protection provides a means for a state to
protest the treatment of its nationals. A state may bring a claim against another
3. M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADTON: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 253
(2002).
4. L OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 295 (8th ed. 1955). See also Case of the SS
"Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 1, 18-19 (June 27); Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27).
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987); OPPENHEIM, supra note 4; BASSIOUNI, supra note 3.; Paul Mitchell, English-Speaking Justice:
Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible Abduction AfterAlvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383,
410 (1996); Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted in Violation of
International Law in the Aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 205, 240
(1998); Alberto Costi, Problems with Current International and National Practices Concerning
ExtraterritorialAbductions, 8 N.Z. ASS'N COMP. L. Y.B. 57, 61 (2002); Silvia Borelli, Terrorism and Human
Rights: Treatment of Terrorist Suspects andLimits on International Co-operation, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 803,
805 (2003)
6. International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 28, U.N. Doc A/56/1 0 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts]; SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR
ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 501 (Longmans Publishing, London 1992).
7. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 437.
state based on diplomatic protection when its citizens have been unable to
obtain satisfaction for injuries caused by a state's breach of international law.8
While such an approach minimises the failings of the international legal system
to recognize the rights of an abductee, it is a misconception to view diplomatic
protection as an effective means to vindicate the individual's rights. Although
a precondition of diplomatic protection is that an individual is harmed by the act
of a state, such an injury is viewed as an injury to the individual's state of
nationality rather than to the individual.9 So the claim is transformed into an
inter-state matter and the state is seeking redress for the injury caused to itself
rather than to the individual.'I As is the case for inter-state claims based on a
violation of sovereignty, an act of diplomatic protection is not a private right so
individuals are entirely dependant on their national state to espouse their
claim."
Recourse to diplomatic protection in cases of extraterritorial abduction has
been relegated in importance due to the development of modern human rights
laws. Since World War II this movement has not only facilitated a growing
recognition of human rights, but also led to the acceptance that many of these
rights are not simply derived from the rights of a state.' 2 Individuals are
increasingly viewed as distinct actors in international law, and an infringement
of their rights by a state may give rise to a claim being brought before an inter-
national organization 3 or provide the basis for a civil suit. The acknow-
ledgment that the rights of individuals are not necessarily fused with those of
the state is important in the field of extraterritorial abductions as it allows an
individual to challenge his/her abduction regardless of whether a state also
protests the abduction. Furthermore, it means that international law may be able
to provide a remedy to individuals who are abducted and removed from the
country with the collusion of the host-state.
In the absence of recognition of independent human rights, international
law has traditionally been unable to protect an abductee where connivance on
the part of the host-state means that there is no violation of the sovereignty of
8. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U. K.) 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 at 5, 6 (Aug.
30), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1924.08.30_mavrommatis/.(ast visited
9/30/05).
9. C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1990).
10. CUTHBERT JOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION: THE COMMONWEALTH OF
NATIONS 1 (1969).
11. AMERASINGHE, supra note 9, at 60.
12. Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and
Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST JOHN'S L. REv. 551, 555 (1993).
13. For example, accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights allows individuals to bring claims against that particular state before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
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the state, or where the host-state is unwilling to advance a claim. 4 However,
as this paper will demonstrate, these frailties of the international legal system
have, to an extent, been rectified by the development of an international norm
providing individuals with the right not to be subjected to extraterritorial
abduction.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
A. Background
1. The Criminal Proceedings
In 1985 a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent working in
Mexico was kidnapped and tortured over two days before being murdered. A
grand jury in the Central District of California issued a warrant in 1990 for the
arrest of Alvarez, a doctor, who was alleged to have been involved in
prolonging the life of the agent for the purpose of interrogation. After Mexico
refused to extradite Alvarez, the DEA approved a plan to abduct him in order
to bring him to the United States to face charges. The DEA hired Mexican
nationals, including Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and detain him overnight before he
was flown back to the United States where DEA officials arrested him.'
5
Following Mexico's protestation of the violation of its sovereignty, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1991 that the abduction
violated principles of international law protecting the territorial integrity of a
state as well as the extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States. 6
Consequently, the Court ruled that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the
proceedings and for Alvarez to be returned to Mexico. 17 However, the Supreme
Court subsequently reversed this unanimous decision by the Court of Appeals.
Adhering to an earlier decision in United States v. Rauscher that a defendant
may not be prosecuted in violation of an extradition treaty," the focus of the
Court was on whether the United States-Mexico extradition treaty was breached
by Alvarez's abduction. Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority determined
that the extradition treaty was only intended to provide a mechanism for
obtaining the custody of an individual in specific circumstances and was never
intended to stipulate the only means by which a state could gain custody of an
individual." After concluding that the treaty did not expressly prohibit
abductions, the majority held that general principles of international law
14. BASsIOUNI, supra note 3, at 256.
15. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2746.
16. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
19. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992).
provided no basis for inferring an implied term into the treaty precluding the use
of state-sponsored abductions.20
Just as controversial as the Court's meager analysis of international law
was the dismissal of the relevance of international law, with the Court declaring
it a matter for the Executive to take into consideration. 21 As well as a scathing
dissent from Justice Stevens, that labeled the decision as showing a "shocking
disdain" for international law, the decision received near universal criticism
from academics.22 However, while the Supreme Court settled the issue of
jurisdiction over Alvarez, he was acquitted in his subsequent trial, with the trial
judge noting that the case against him involved the "wildest speculation. 23
After having indicated in 1992 that Alvarez's abduction could give rise to
a civil remedy,24 the Supreme Court was given another opportunity to consider
the facts of the Alvarez case in 2004 when Alvarez filed claims against those
involved in his abduction. Alvarez brought a claim against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and a suit against Sosa and other
Mexicans involved in his abduction under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 21
2. The Civil Proceedings
a. The FTCA
Alvarez's FTCA suit against the United States Government was based on
the assertion that the DEA had no authority to arrest Alvarez in Mexico and that
the Government was accordingly liable for his false arrest. While the FTCA
was intended to make the Government as liable for tortious actions as an
individual,2 6 it provides the Government with immunity for "any claim arising
in a foreign country."'27 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and held that this exception applied even when tortious acts in
foreign states were planned within the United States. 8 Consequently the United
States Government had immunity against Alvarez's claim.
20. Id at 668-69.
21. Id. at 669.
22. See, e.g. Mitchell, supra note 5; Paust, supra note 12; Wilske, supra note 5; Kristin Berdan
Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459
(1994); Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme Court's
Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
23. Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669.
25. The Alien Tort Statute is also commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2000).
26. Mark Dean, Smith v. United States: Justice Denied Under the FTCA 'Foreign Country'
Exception, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553 (1993).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).
28. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2753.
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b. TheATS
This paper focuses on the Supreme Court's treatment of Alvarez's claim
under the ATS. The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 29
The issue for the courts to determine would appear, on the reading of this
statute, to be whether the individuals who abducted Alvarez violated the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States. However, rather than closely examining
the relevant facts, the court cases became a debate on the role of the ATS under
federal law.
The ATS is contentious because of its potentially wide use and political
implications. The ATS was enacted in 1789, but remained largely unused for
the most part of two centuries. ° However, it was revitalized by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.3" In that case the
Court held that a Paraguayan national could sue a former Paraguayan official
in the United States for acts of torture committed in Paraguay. The Court held
that the prohibition against torture was a specific, universal and obligatory
international norm, and consequently there was a breach of the law of nations.32
The view that the ATS could provide a forum for redressing any tortious
violations of the law of nations regardless of the nationality of the defendant or
the place of the violation prompted a flurry of human rights litigation in the
United States. 3' However, some courts in the United States have failed to
endorse the approach established in Filartiga,34 with many commentators also
concerned about the effects that widespread ATS litigation could have on the
foreign relations of the United States.5
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
30. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez Machain: What Piracy Teaches About the
Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111 (2004).
31. Filartiga v. Pena-Irsla, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. Id. at 878.
33. Cases that have been brought by foreigners under the ATS include alleging summary execution,
arbitrary detention, causing disappearance, genocide, war crimes, forced labour and violation of environmental
standards. Kontorvich, supra note 30, at 8.
34. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
35. See, e.g., Covey T. Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms and
Customary International Law of Human Rights in the United States Courts, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 59 (1981);
Charles F. Marshall, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C.J. INT'L. & COM. REG.
591 (1996); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1
(1994); Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs ofInternational Human Rights Litigation, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001);
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, J. INT'L
ECON. L. 245 (2004).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain therefore, provided the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to determine whether the recent revival of the ATS can be justified
as consistent with the intentions of the drafters in 1789. It is readily apparent
that to allow suits to be brought for any breach of international law would make
the court system unworkable and could involve United States courts
determining matters of international law that may have no relevance to the
United States. To limit this apparently open-ended jurisdiction, courts have
read in a requirement that the aspect of international law invoked by a plaintiff
must be a "well-established, universally recognized norm."36 The universal
nature of the norm would therefore provide a sufficient link for United States
courts to take an interest in providing a forum to hear claims based on the most
serious violations of international law. Although the ATS recognizes violations
of the "law of nations or a treaty of the United States," by requiring the rule to
have universal acceptance courts have effectively limited the scope of the ATS
as only applying to breaches of customary international law.37
Despite this judicial limitation on the applicability of the ATS, there are
still concerns as to whether the Filartiga line of cases is accurate in concluding
that the ATS creates a private right of action for individuals. Academic
commentary on the role of the ATS appears to be evenly divided into two broad
camps: those who believe that the ATS provides subject-matter jurisdiction for
breaches of universally recognized norms of international law,3" and those who
believe that the ATS merely confers procedural jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear claims but does not create a cause of action for individuals.39 This latter
viewpoint would severely limit the success of future ATS suits, as it would
require plaintiffs to show that a particular norm in international law explicitly
provides for a civil remedy.'
36. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878; In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F .2d 691 (2d Cir. 1992).
37. Jason Jarvis, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute under Extraterritoriality and the
Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671,674 (2003); see also Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law
in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 265, 271 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman and Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harvard Law Review Ass'n,
International Criminal Law: Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114
HARv. L. REV. 2025 (2001); Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531 (1997); Armin Rosencranz and Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental
and Human Rights Suits Against US Corporations in US. Courts, 18 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 145 (1999).
39. See, e.g., William R Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); William D'Zurilla Individual Responsibility
for Torture under International Law, 56 TutL. L. REV. 186 (1981); Marshall, supra note 35; Jarvis, supra note
37.
40. GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 421 (1988).
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It was against this background of contention as to the appropriate function
of the ATS that Alvarez brought his claim. Indeed, as it transpired, the majority
of submissions, and indeed all the amici curiae briefs, focused on the role of the
ATS in federal law rather than examining whether Alvarez's extraterritorial
abduction was prohibited by customary international law.
B. Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa affirmed the Filartiga
position that the ATS granted courts jurisdiction to hear claims for breaches of
international norms that were "specific, universal, and obligatory." '41 However,
the Court found it unnecessary to examine whether there was an international
norm prohibiting states from abducting individuals in violation of another
state's sovereignty as "the right of a nation to invoke its territorial integrity does
not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name
of the law of nations."'42 The Court was correct in its view that Alvarez did not
have standing to bring his claim solely on the violation of Mexican sovereignty.
Although there was a breach of customary international law, to allow a lawsuit
to be successful on this basis would mean that any individual of the wronged
state would be able to bring a civil claim. The primary aim of the law of torts
is to return an injured individual to their position prior to the alleged wrongful
act,43 but in this case the harm was caused to Mexico and granting damages to
Alvarez would not vindicate this harm.
Although Alvarez could not assert a claim for damages based on the breach
of Mexican sovereignty he did have valid arguments for claiming that his
extraterritorial abduction breached customary international law, and that
damages should accordingly be awarded under the ATS. This claim is based on
his individual rights, rather than the claim associated with Mexican sovereignty.
However, like the Supreme Court to follow, the Court of Appeals refuted this
claim, stating, "our review of the international authorities and literature reveals
no specific binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the United
States or its agents to refrain from trans-border kidnapping." This aspect of
the decision will be discussed further under the analysis of the Supreme Court
decision.
However, the Court also held that although there was no international
prohibition against extraterritorial abduction, there was a clear and universally
41. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612.
42. Id. at 617.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 5-6 (5th ed. 1984); W. V. H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 2-3 (11 th ed.
1979).
44. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619.
recognized norm against arbitrary arrest and detention.4 5 Indicating that the
DEA lacked authorization for extraterritorial law enforcement, the Court held
that Alvarez was arbitrarily detained from the time he was kidnapped until he
was handed over to authorities in the United States. 46 With the en banc Court
split 6-4, Sosa appealed to the Supreme Court.
C. Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in a
judgment designed to re-fashion future litigation under the ATS. The Supreme
Court agreed with Sosa's submissions that it is "frivolous" and "implausible"
to believe that the ATS authorizes the creation of causes of action for torts in
violation of international law.47 However, the Court then back-tracked from its
determination that the ATS is only jurisdictional in nature by recognizing that
when the statute was created in 1789 Congress would have intended claims to
be able to heard for a narrow set of international law violations. 4' The Court
adhered to the view of Sir William Blackstone in Commentaries on the Laws of
England that as of 1789 only international law norms prohibiting the violation
of safe conduct, the infringement of the rights of ambassadors and piracy were
part of the common law.49 Accordingly, the Court determined that the ATS can
permit suits based on a "modest" number of international law violations."0
Justice Souter for the majority indicated that to provide the basis for an
ATS suit, not only must an international norm be "specific, universal, and
obligatory,"'" but that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."52
Beyond the need for specificity and universal acceptance of the norm, the
Court did not establish any other conditions for when an international norm
would be considered analogous to the stated eighteenth century offences. This
was because Alvarez's suit was dismissed as not invoking a precise enough
45. Id. at 621.
46. Id. at 626.
47. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2755.
48. Id. at 2756.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2761.
51. Id. at 2766. In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the approach of the majority as encouraging
uncertainty as the requirement that a norm be "specific, universal, and obligatory" was exactly the same test
that led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to reach a contrary conclusion concerning Alvarez's abduction.
Id. at 2775 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2744.
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norm to found an ATS claim.53 However, the Court did stress for the purposes
of future cases that "this requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the
only principle limiting the availability of relief in federal courts for violations
of customary international law, although it disposes of this case.
5 4
While the majority limited the scope of future ATS claims, the decision not
to rule out future claims under the ATS was vehemently criticized by the
dissenting judges. Justice Scalia denounced the majority's treatment of the ATS
as a usurpation of Congress' lawmaking authority and lamented that "this Court
seems incapable of admitting that some matters-any matters-are none of its
business."55  The dissent stressed that the "law of nations" was originally
understood to refer to the regulation of state-to-state practices, and that any
redefinition of the term to restrain a state's activities towards individuals is an
"invention" by academics and human rights advocates.56 Such an approach pays
scant regard to the importance that human rights now have in international law,
and as this paper will make evident later, the notion that international law
should be viewed as a static concept at a point in time in the eighteenth century
is motivated by ideological convictions. International law is a mobile concept
and its development is dependant on the recognition of shifting state practice.
It is regrettable that the Supreme Court, and especially the dissenting judges, felt
constrained to strictly interpret the reference to the "law of nations" in the
circumstances when the ATS was originally enacted.
Alvarez's arguments before the Supreme Court were based on the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that his abduction constituted an arbitrary
arrest and detention as it was conducted without lawful authority.57 The
Supreme Court did not find it necessary to examine whether the DEA had the
authority to sanction an extraterritorial arrest, holding that "Alvarez cites little
authority that a rule so broad [as prohibiting arbitrary detention] has the status
of a binding customary norm today."" This paper will not only show that
Alvarez was hindered by the decision that his extraterritorial abduction should
be analyzed in light of the more general right to be free from arbitrary detention,
but that the Court's analysis of international law was inadequate and failed to
recognize the existence of an individual right to be free from state-sponsored
abduction.
After indicating that customary international law did not prohibit Alvarez's
abduction and subsequent detention, the Court concluded that "It is enough to
53. Id at 2769.
54. Id at 2766.
55. Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Brief of Respondent, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter
Brief of Respondent].
58. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer
of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a
federal remedy." "
Such a conclusion would appear to indicate that the Court was not
examining the content of customary international law from the same perspective
as judges and academics around the world. Rather, it was examining whether
there is a customary international norm specific enough to provide the basis of
a suit in domestic law. However, while the Court could simply dismiss a case
by holding that the alleged norm is not specific enough to found a suit under the
ATS, such an approach presupposes the existence of the norm at the
international level. The first determination of the Court has to be whether the
norm exists under customary international law, and, if it does, the Court then
has to examine whether it is specific enough to be incorporated into law under
the ATS.6 ' The Supreme Court implicitly accepted such an approach by noting
that the alleged norm prohibiting arbitrary detention was much too broad to
have the status of binding customary law, 6' but that in any event it was also too
broad to allow for a suit under the ATS. 62
This paper does not challenge the determination that the alleged norm
should not be actionable under United States federal law. Rather, it is
contended that the Court erred in its conclusion that customary international law
is not invoked by the abduction and detention of Alvarez. The implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain may not be limited
to restricting the possibility of future abductees being able to claim damages
under the ATS. By concluding that there was no customary international law
prohibition against the forcible abduction and detention of individuals the Court
may also have limited the potential for individuals to have criminal proceedings
dismissed based a violation of their rights.
59. Id. at 2769.
60. Kontorovich concurs with such an approach, indicating that a Court must first determine whether
an alleged norm has the required recognition to be part of the law of nations, before moving on to consider
whether it can be said to be part of a narrower subset of being defined with a specificity comparable to
eighteenth century offences. Kontorvich, supra note 30 at 13, 26.
61. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2744.
62. Id. at 2745.
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V. Is THERE AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION?
A. What Human Right Should be Analyzed?
As the Court of Appeals determined that there is no international norm
prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, Alvarez did not pursue this argument
before the Supreme Court. Rather, it was argued that his abduction nevertheless
violated a prohibition on arbitrary detention. The Supreme Court was therefore
only tasked with determining whether there is international recognition of the
prohibition of arbitrary detention. It did not examine the trans-border nature of
his abduction.63 Such an approach is flawed.
It is artificial to completely separate the analysis of the issues, as the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain did. The
question should not be whether international law provides a general right to be
free from arbitrary detention, but whether evidence of this general right may
demonstrate the existence of a more specific right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. By only focusing on the alleged right to be free from arbitrary
detention the Supreme Court was able to highlight the high degree of generality
of conduct that any such right would have to prohibit: ranging from
unauthorized and unlawful arrests by police officers64 to a temporary detention
by officers who overstep their authority.65 Due to an inability to prove that there
was uniform international practice regarding all these scenarios, the Court was
able to dismiss the alleged right to be free from arbitrary detention, without even
having to consider the transnational nature of the detention.
By only considering the duration of Alvarez's detention and not taking into
account the fact that he was forcibly removed from Mexico to the United States,
the Supreme Court's approach fails to take into account the very feature of
extraterritorial abductions that makes them scandalous. The Court is effectively
treating a transnational abductee in the same manner it would any other
individual who had been detained unlawfully by a state. However, where an
individual is unlawfully detained by a state within its borders for the purpose of
initiating criminal proceedings, there are often many due process rights that
domestic courts can invoke to censure the Executive and vindicate the breach
of the individual's rights. But where an individual is detained on foreign soil
and transferred to another country to face trial, courts have been all too willing
to hold that the procedural protections afforded by domestic law do not apply
63. Id. at 2767.
64. Id. at 2768.
65. Id. at 2769.
if the individual is not in the country.6 In the absence of such procedural
protections it is important that courts considering the human rights of
individuals are able to take into account the fact that the individual has been
forcibly removed from another state in order to face prosecution.
While the Court of Appeals dismissed Alvarez's claim that there is an
individual right prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, it did so on the basis that
the United States had no obligation to refrain from abducting an individual.67
It was evident that the Court considered itself bound by the 1992 Supreme Court
decision that Alvarez's abduction was not explicitly prohibited by the United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. Such a state-centric approach only upholds
individual rights to the extent that they do not restrict the actions of states. As
the Supreme Court focused solely on the possible existence of a right to be free
from arbitrary detention, the issue of whether individuals have a right to be free
from extraterritorial abductions was never satisfactorily examined by either
Court.
B. Determining the Content of Customary International Law
International law recognizes that state sovereignty is the basis of inter-state
relations, and tries to create a framework where states are only bound by what
they consent to. However, over time it is possible for state practice to create a
legally binding rule in the form of customary international law.6" Unlike
treaties, which are only binding on parties to them, customary international law,
once established, is universally binding.69 Customary international law will
emerge if there is consistent state practice coupled with opiniojuris, a belief that
such conduct is legally required.7"
66. For a good analysis of the issues surrounding the extraterritorial effect of domestic rights see
Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of US Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUS.
L. R. 307 (2002). Bassiouni notes that while the United States Constitution applies extraterritorially in respect
to the conduct of the United States towards its citizens, the law is not settled as to the extent that the
Constitution applies to conduct by the United States towards an alien in a foreign country. BASsIOUNI, supra
note 3, at 280-85. See also Paust, supra note 12; Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against
Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457; Timothy D. Rudy, Did We
Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie?, 26 ST. MARY'S L. J. 791 (1995).
67. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 617.
68. See Ernest Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 365 (2002), for a good review of critiques on the compatibility of customary international law with
traditional consent-based international law.
69. Although as will be discussed, a persistent objector to a customary rule while it is being
formulated is not bound by the application of the rule.
70. INT'L LAW ASSOCIATION (ILA), LONDON CONFERENCE: FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE-STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAw, (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf. (last visited
9/30/05) [hereinafter ILA].
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has indicated that the state practice
giving rise to customary international law must be "settled.",71 While the degree
of uniformity of the practice must be extensive there is no need for complete
consistency before norms become binding. 2 However, there is provision for
states to be exempt from being bound by customary international law if they can
be said to have been a persistent objector to a customary rule while it was being
developed.73
Although states may act in a uniform manner on an issue, there must also
be evidence that such conduct occurred because it corresponded with a legal
obligation or a legal right 4.7  This opinio juris requirement of customary
international law can often be inferred from state practice, or may be proven by
official statements or treaty-based law. While the obligations imposed on states
by their accession to treaties will not necessarily crystallize into customary
international law, this may occur if there is widespread participation and the
treaty is of a norm-creating character. 75 As the International Law Association
stated, the creation of customary international law through multilateral treaties
occurs because:
[P]arties to the treaty, in relation to nonparties, or non-parties in
relation to parties or between themselves, adopt a practice in line with
that prescribed (or authorized) by the treaty, but which is in fact
independent of it because of the general rule that treaties neither bind
nor benefit third parties. 76
The right to be free from extraterritorial abduction, as evidenced through
a prohibition against arbitrary detention, satisfies these requirements of
customary international law. The Supreme Court's analysis in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain of the effect that international instruments have on the formation of
customary international law was superficial and led the Court to erroneously
conclude that customary international law does not protect an individual from
extraterritorial abduction. Rather than simply focusing on the general protection
from arbitrary detention, it is arguable that the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights
have cumulatively shaped state practice regarding the right of individuals not
to be subjected to state-sponsored abductions.
71. North Sea Continental Shelf (F. R. G. v. Den.; F. R. G. v. Neth.) 1969 LC.J. Rep. 3 para. 60-82.
72. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99; ILA, supra note 70, at 25.
73. Fisheries Case (U.IC v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18, 1951); ILA, supra note 70, at 27.
74. ILA, supra note 70, at 32.
75. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 71, para. 72-73.
76. ILA, supra note 70, at 46.
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C. International Human Rights Law
1. The United Nations Framework
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter requires states to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. The
UN Security Council has interpreted this obligation to include state-sanctioned
abductions without the permission of the state where the abductee resides. After
Israel abducted former Nazi Adolph Eichmann from Argentina, the Security
Council condemned the action as a violation of Argentina's sovereignty." Such
a prohibition only relates to a violation of state sovereignty and is not applicable
where the host-state colludes with the abducting state. Furthermore, the Charter
may be seen as only regulating inter-state conduct and therefore not providing
individuals with any independent rights.7
However, the international law prohibition on violating state sovereignty
through the use extraterritorial abduction is relevant to the issue of whether
individuals possess an international right to be free from abductions. In many
cases the international denunciation of abductions also extends to the fact that
states have had to resort to extra-legal means to obtain custody of suspected
criminals.79 Consistent state practice of refraining from conducting extra-
territorial abductions may be due to the norm protecting a state's territorial
integrity, but such practice can also be used to found a norm protecting the
rights of an individual in such situations. However, proving that states refrain
from forcible abductions because of a concern for human rights remains an
important impediment to proving the existence of an individual right to be free
from transnational abductions.
One of the purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for
"fundamental freedoms" 80 and to this end the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights8' was adopted by the General Assembly to establish non-binding
principles relating to human rights and individual freedoms. At the time it was
not viewed as imposing legal obligations, but constant reaffirmation by the
General Assembly, universal acceptance by states, and wide-ranging reference
to the Declaration in numerous international and national instruments, has meant
that many of its standards have become binding customary international law.82
77. See generally S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doec. S/RES/4349 (June 23, 1960).
78. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The 'Federal Analogy' and U.N. Charter Interpretation: A Crucial
Issue, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1997).
79. Costi, supra note 5, at 68.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
81. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATiONS LAw § 701. After a thorough analysis of
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Although some academics believe that the Declaration in its entirety represents
customary international law,8 3 for the purposes of this paper it is only necessary
to examine the contribution that specific rights contained in the Declaration
have had towards a customary international norm prohibiting extraterritorial
abduction.
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration provides that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person," while article 9 more specifically states,
"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." The United
States submitted to the ICJ in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran 4 (The Hostages Case) that not only did every state
have an obligation to observe the Universal Declaration, but that articles 3 and
9 were fundamental rights to which all individuals were entitled.85 The Court
agreed, concluding that "wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom
and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."86 Given the substantial contribution that the
Declaration has had in the creation of customary international human rights law,
it is very significant that the ICJ indicated that individuals have a basic right not
to be arbitrarily detained. The recognition that such a right is consistent with
the framework of the UN may help to show that the opinio juris for any
customary norm prohibiting extraterritorial abduction can be found through the
desire of states to uphold human rights and to act consistently with the
principles of the UN.
In light of the link provided by the ICJ between human rights and the UN
Charter it is implausible that the prohibition of arbitrary detention would not
include situations when an individual is forcibly abducted from another state.
As a transnational abduction violates not only the rights of the individual, but
also the territorial sovereignty of a state, such abductions would undermine the
state practice the International Law Association declared in 1994 that "many if not all of the rights elaborated
in the . . .Declaration . . . are widely recognized as constituting rules of customary international law."
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE, BUENOS AIRES (1994).
83. As declared by the Montreal Statement for the Assembly for Human Rights, Mar. 22-27, 1968,
reprinted in 9 I.C.J. REv., June 1969; Professor Humphrey has declared that the Declaration represents
customary international law and is "the universally accepted interpretation and definition of the human rights
left undefined by the Charter." John Humphrey, The International Bill ofRights: Scope and Implementation
17 W.M. & MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976); Professor Sohn also held that the Declaration had become a
universally binding instrument. Louis B Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 129,
133 (1977).
84. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U. S. v. Iran) 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
85. Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 182 (Jan. 12).
86. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 91.
founding principles of the UN. Despite these indications of how the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights would inform the content of customary
international law, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain did not
conduct any such analysis. After noting that the Declaration does not by itself
impose any obligations under international law,87 the Court failed to adequately
examine the role that the Declaration has played in establishing human rights
norms, and particularly the evidence that the right to be free from arbitrary
detention under the Declaration has crystallized into customary international
law. The neglect of the Declaration and the principles underpinning the UN
Charter illustrate the extent to which the Court's analysis of customary
international law was result-orientated.
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR provides that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law." 88
Analysis of this right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention must answer
two questions: does it provide an individual with the right to be free from extra-
territorial abduction? And if so, what is the status of this right in international
law?
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is tasked with
hearing ICCPR claims under the Optional Protocol, has had several oppor-
tunities to examine the relationship between Article 9(1) and state-sponsored
abductions. In Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay,89 a claim was brought to the
Committee on behalf of a Uruguayan national who had been detained by
Uruguayan officials in Brazil and forcibly removed to Uruguay where she was
charged with offences against that state. The Committee upheld the claim,
concluding that the "act of abduction into Uruguayan territory" constituted an
arbitrary arrest and detention." Importantly the Committee noted that simply
because a state party is not acting within its borders will not preclude the
application of the Covenant.9 The Committee reached similar conclusions in
the cases of Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay92 and Almeida de Quinteros v.
87. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2767.
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
89. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc'n No.
56/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) [hereinafter Celiberti de Carariego].
90. Id. para. 11.
91. Id. para. 10.1.
92. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 52/1979,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (1981).
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Uruguay.93 The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
even examined the facts of Alvarez's treatment and held that the abduction of
Alvarez was contrary to international law as well as in violation of Article 9(1)
of the Covenant. 94
These decisions indicate that the Human Rights Committee has taken a
very strong position in favor of protecting the rights of abductees. As
commentator Paul Mitchell notes, "the Committee reinforced the customary
international law rule prohibiting forcible abduction and transplanted the rule
into the human rights context, protecting individuals qua individuals." 95
However, the decisions go further than simply recognizing the right of
individuals to be free from forcible state-sponsored abductions. They also did
not consider it relevant to examine whether the host-states had consented to the
rendition of the individuals. Indeed in Giry v. Dominican Republic96 and Canon
Garcia v. Ecuador97 the Committee held that even in situations where the host-
state agrees to the irregular rendition of an individual rather than extradition, the
abduction of an individual would constitute arbitrary arrest and detention. This
is a dramatic departure away from the traditional position under international
law whereby consent or collusion on the part of the host-state would mean that
there was no breach of the state's sovereignty and consequently no possible
remedy for the individual. Rather, it recognizes a right of the individual,
regardless of a violation of the state's sovereignty.
The ICJ has indicated that the ability of states to make reservations to a
right contained in a convention weighs against the potentially norm-creating
character of the convention, and the likelihood of the right being transposed into
customary international law.98 It is therefore pertinent that article 4 of the
ICCPR allows states to derogate from the prohibition on arbitrary detention in
times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. This may appear
to undermine the contention that the prohibition on arbitrary detention is not
limited to the ICCPR but also exists under customary international law.
However, the Human Rights Committee has determined that while the right may
be derogated from in emergencies, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and
detention is part of customary international law and accordingly a state may not
93. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 107/1981,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (1983) [hereinafter Almeida de Quinteros].
94. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], U. N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, at 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (Sept. 30, 1993).
95. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 442.
96. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Giry v. Dom. Rep., Commc'n No. 193/1985, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/39/D/193/1985 (1990).
97. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Can6fi Garcia v. Ecuador, Commc'n No. 319/1988, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 (1991).
98. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 71, para. 60-82.
reserve the possibility of contravening this right.99 The possibility of derogating
from this right in specific circumstances was intended to provide a means
whereby a state may have to resort to extreme measures when the legitimate
control of the state is threatened."° The narrow confines under which article 9
is inapplicable indicates the consensus of states regarding the importance of this
right to individuals. This consensus is widespread, with 152 states currently
party to the ICCPR, and another eight states being signatories.''
While the decisions of the Human Rights Committee attempt to infer the
existence of a customary norm prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, it is
arguable that by themselves they do no more than emphasize the ICCPR
prohibition on extraterritorial abduction. However, the extensive recognition
of the rights contained in the Covenant, the fact that Covenant is most certainly
of a norm-creating character, and the steadfast position of the Human Rights
Committee regarding the prohibition of extraterritorial abduction is certainly a
starting point towards showing that there is enough uniformity amongst states
to substantiate a claim that the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction has
crystallized as customary international law.
The Supreme Court did not seem particularly swayed by the rights afforded
by the ICCPR. Although the ICCPR had not been ratified by the United States
at the time of Alvarez's abduction," 2 it was in force when the Supreme Court
had to consider his suit based on the violation of customary international law.
The Court placed great weight on the Senate's decision not to make the
Covenant directly enforceable in domestic law, stating that "Several times,
indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of
interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the
substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing. ' '  Such an
assertion is to drastically misread the extent of the non-self-executing
declaration and the relationship between the ICCPR and customary international
law.
99. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating
to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or
in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, para. 9, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6
(November 4, 1994) [hereinafter Issues Relating to Reservations].
100. Id. para. 10.
101. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, (2005).
102. Alvarez was abducted on April 2, 1990. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.
I.C.C.P.R., supra note 88.
103. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
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Under the Constitution of the United States a treaty is as much a part of
domestic law as an Act passed by the legislature."° However, by attaching a
non-self-executing declaration to the ratified treaty the legislature can either
remove the standing of any individual to bring a claim under the treaty, remove
the right of any individual to rely on the treaty in any form, or deny the
existence of a cause of action in the absence of other incorporating legislation. °5
When the Senate ratified the ICCPR, a non-self-executing declaration was
attached with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accentuating that its
"intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in
US courts.' 0
6
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court used the legislative desire that
causes of action should not be directly founded on the ICCPR to dismiss any
relevance that the ICCPR may have in creating customary international law.
The implication of this approach is that Justice Souter viewed the non-self-
executing declaration as taking precedence over the content of customary
international law. The ICJ has declared that there are "no grounds for holding
that when customary international law is comprised of rules identical to those
of treaty law, the latter 'supervenes' the former, so that the customary inter-
national law has no further existence of its own."' 7 However, it appears that
this is precisely the basis of the Supreme Court's approach to examining the
ICCPR: the Court used the fact that the prohibition on arbitrary detention under
ICCPR was not directly enforceable in domestic law to undermine the
applicability of the same right being enforceable through customary inter-
national law.' The Court placed too much weight on the status of the ICCPR
under United States law rather than examining international practice concerning
such rights. Alvarez was not seeking to create a cause of action based on the
ICCPR, but merely claiming that multilateral instruments such as the ICCPR
directly inform the content of customary international law.
Furthermore, the extent to which the ICCPR is self-executing in the
domestic law of the United States is irrelevant as the ATS incorporates the "law
of nations." The Court should have recognized the role that multilateral
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. Chrissy Fox, Implications of the United States' Reservations and Non-Self-Executing
Declaration to the ICCPR for Capital Offenders and Foreign Relations, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303,309
(2003).
106. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Jan. 30, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 [hereinafter Senate Committee on Foreign Relations].
107. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99.
108. Indeed Sosa submitted that when the Court came to examine the content of customary
international law it could not take into account any treaty or international instrument that the United States
had not ratified as to do otherwise would compromise separation of powers principles. Brief of Petitioner,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
conventions, such as the ICCPR, have in formulating customary international
law and examined whether state practice and jurisprudence based on the rights
under the Convention had developed into a binding international norm
prohibiting abduction and arbitrary detention. Given the influence that the
ICCPR has on the formation of customary international law and the fact that the
United States is a party to the Convention, it is remarkable that the United States
Supreme Court viewed itself as being prevented from "interpreting and
applying" the ICCPR. 1°9 The Court's refusal to give adequate weight to the
rights contained within the ICCPR essentially negates the principle purpose of
the Covenant, which is to protect individuals from their own government.
3. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights"' (European Convention) is
another international instrument that has been invoked to protect the rights of
individuals who have been forcibly abducted from another state in order to face
prosecution. Although the Convention has obvious geographical limitations as
to the countries that it binds, it is yet another indication of a collective
recognition of the right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention. Article 5(1)
guarantees individuals the right to "liberty and security of person." Although
the language of "arbitrary detention" contained in the ICCPR is not used,
Article 5 requires all deprivations of liberty to be prescribed by law and to fall
within the exhaustive list of possible justifications for detention. European
institutions have had several opportunities to examine cases of extraterritorial
abduction and these cases contribute to the understanding of the right to be free
from state-sponsored abductions under customary international law.
In Bozano v. France,"' after a failed extradition application to transfer an
individual from France to Italy, the individual was abducted by French
policemen and was forcibly taken into Switzerland, where he was subsequently
extradited to Italy. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld the
applicant's complaint, concluding that the transfer by French authorities was a
disguised form of extradition designed to circumvent an earlier unfavorable
decision."' The refusal of the police to follow the domestic laws of France
rendered the abduction unlawful and in breach of article 5(1) of the Covenant.
Furthermore, the Court held that any measure depriving an individual of liberty
must be compatible with the purposes of article 5, which is to protect an
109. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
110. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms].
111. Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 297 (1986).
112. Idat317.
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individual from arbitrariness." 3 This purposive approach meant that the Court
was not solely limited to considering the legality of the detention, but could also
take into account the entire context of the abduction, detention, the effect of the
abduction on the applicant, and deliberateness with which French officials
violated the law. The willingness of the Court to examine all the circumstances
surrounding the abduction, rather than solely focusing on the legality of the
detention as required by a literal reading of article 5(1), illustrates a recognition
of the serious implications that an abduction may have on an individual's
interests.
The European Commission on Human Rights was more explicit in its
condemnation of abductions being contrary to article 5(1) in Stock6 v.
Germany."'4 The applicant alleged that he had been brought into Germany
against his will by a private citizen in collusion with the German police. The
claim was dismissed as unproven, although the Commission held that if German
officials had arranged the abduction then "the Commission considers that such
circumstances may render this person's arrest and detention unlawful within the
meaning of article 5(1) of the Convention."'"
Despite the indications that the European Convention provided individuals
with a robust right not to be forcibly abducted by states, this right is not
independent from the rights of the individual's state. In both Mlich Sanchez
Ramirez v. France16 and Ocalan v. Turkey"I7 it was held that consent on the part
of the host-state meant that there was no unlawful detention under article 5. The
ECHR noted that because the European Convention contains no provisions on
extradition procedure, all that is required for a rendition to be consistent with the
Convention is a legal basis for the transfer (such as an arrest warrant issued by
the state of origin) and co-operation on the part of the host-state."' It is truly
remarkable that an individual's right to liberty under the Convention, a
Convention created solely to protect individuals, is entirely dependant on
whether a state complains that its sovereignty has been violated. While this
aspect may undermine the significance given to an individual's right to liberty,
it is important to note that the ECHR held that the abduction of an individual in
violation of a state's sovereignty breaches the right to liberty under article
5(l)."' While not going as far as it could to uphold human rights, such a view
reaffirms the international endorsement of the right to be free from forcible
transnational abduction.
113. Id.
114. Stocke v. Germany, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 839 (1991).
115. Id. at852.
116. Illich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., application no. 28780/95 (1996).
117. Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2003).
118. Id. at273.
119. Id.
Although the European Court of Human Rights has been unequivocal that
the arrest of an individual by authorities of one state in contravention of another
state's sovereignty involves not only state responsibility vis-A-vis the other state,
but also violates an individual's right to security under article 5(1),120 the
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was unmoved. Neither the
European Covenant nor the decisions on the issue of abduction were even
canvassed by the judgment for the majority. For the Court to conclude that
there was no evidence to suggest the existence of customary rule prohibiting
arbitrary detention12 without examining the substantial European jurisprudence
on the matter is an oversight. The Court's fixated analysis on the generality
surrounding the alleged right to arbitrary detention ignores the more specific
right that has been recognized under the ICCPR and the European Convention:
that individuals have a right to be free from an extraterritorial abduction
conducted in violation of the sovereignty of another state. Although the
European Covenant does not create customary international law, when taken in
conjunction with other international instruments and state practice it is apparent
that there is a global repudiation of the use of extraterritorial abduction.
D. The Approach of Domestic Courts
Despite the evidence of an international consensus that individuals have a
right to be free from being forcibly abducted and transferred to another state,
there are occasions when domestic courts will proceed with the prosecution of
the individual regardless of any breach of their rights. The often-followed
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois held that courts
could exercise jurisdiction over an individual regardless of the unlawful manner
in which an individual may be made to appear before the Court.' This
principle stems from the Roman maxim "mala captus bene detentus": impro-
perly captured, properly detained.' 23 The doctrine has been rigorously enforced
by courts in the United States,'24 while at the same time being vociferously
criticized by academics as endorsing the Executive's violations of international
law. 125
However, decisions that an individual should be prosecuted following an
abduction are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a right to be free
120. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 429.
121. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
122. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
123. Rudy, supra note 66, at 802.
124. See e.g. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
125. See e.g. Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45
STAN. L. R. 939 (1993); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of linternational
Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INTrL L. 265 (1952); Wilske, supra note 5.
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from extraterritorial abduction. In such situations, the courts were not con-
cerned with the existence of a human right prohibiting transnational abductions,
but rather whether a breach of the alleged right would require proceedings to be
dismissed and the individual to be repatriated. Indeed, in many of these cases,
the courts avoided examining whether there is such a right by deeming it
irrelevant given that a breach of international law is a matter for the Executive
to remedy. 6 The refusal of United States courts to decline jurisdiction over
transnational abductees is relevant to the scope of remedies available to
abductees rather than a rejection of the right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. The existence of a customary norm protecting individuals from
extraterritorial abduction and a possible norm providing a remedy for a breach
of such a right are two separate issues.
Although courts have traditionally refused to examine the circumstances
of the arrest and detention of an abductee, there has been much progress in the
recognition of due process and human rights since the Ker v. Illinois decision
of 1886. The narrow conception of due process as only being concerned with
whether the accused has a fair trial now expands to situations where official pre-
trial misconduct can result in evidence being excluded. 27 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in US. v. Toscanino'28 recognized that the
exclusion of evidence was not an end in itself, but was a means to give effect to
the principles of due process and to ensure that the government should not be
able to benefit from its illegal conduct. 29 The proceedings against Toscanino,
who was abducted and tortured while in custody, were dismissed. There, the
Court gave particular weight to the need to uphold constitutional norms, which
were influenced by international human rights law.' However, the effect of
this case in advancing human rights law is minimal, as the decision has been
interpreted as only applying where the individual is treated inhumanely while
in custody.'3 '
The greatest challenge to the traditional view that courts should not
concern themselves with the means by which an abductee may be brought
before them comes from South Africa in State v. Ebrahim32 and from the
United Kingdom in Bennett v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court and
another. 3  In Ebrahim, the Court established a link between the sound
126. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 (holding that "the decision of whether respondent should
be returned to Mexico.. .is a matter for the Executive Branch").
127. Mitchell, supra note 55, at 400.
128. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir. 1974).
129. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 401.
130. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
131. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. at 1531.
132. State v. Ebrahim, 95 I.L.R. 417 (S. Aft. 1992).
133. THE ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTSANNUAL REVIEW 222 (BurrERWORTH 1994) [hereinafterALL
administration of justice and the fundamental principles of the promotion of
human rights and friendly international relations.' After an analysis of the
influence of international human rights norms on domestic law the Court
dismissed proceedings and Ebrahim was subsequently able to claim damages for
his unlawful abduction and detention. 3 In Bennett, the House of Lords deter-
mined that courts had the authority to examine the circumstances surrounding
the abduction of Bennett to face charges in England and that to allow criminal
proceedings to continue in such a situation would be an abuse of process. While
the individual judgments illustrate a myriad of factors that each judge used
when concluding an abuse of power by the Executive existed, Lord Griffiths
indicated that the Law Lords have a responsibility "to oversee executive action
and to refuse to countenance behavior that threatens either basic human rights
or the rule of law." '136 Lord Lowry rejected the Supreme Court's approach in
Ker v. Illinois, holding that the question should not be whether a court has
jurisdiction to try an individual, but whether such jurisdiction should be
exercised in light of the violation of rights under international law.'37
Although the courts in Ebrahim and Bennett did not examine whether
individuals had explicit right to be free from extraterritorial abduction, the
highest courts in South Africa and the United Kingdom both used the general
principles of international human rights law to conclude that the prosecution of
an abductee would violate domestic standards of due process. However, the
reluctance of many domestic courts (particularly in the United States) to
recognize and apply international human rights law in such situations is
concerning. The contention that courts need not concern themselves with the
rights of the individual prior to trial is an archaic notion that has no place in a
global community that is founded upon respect for human rights.'38
The approach of domestic courts to cases can influence the content of
customary international law by shaping state practice and indicating the
presence of a customary norm. However, the approach of domestic courts to
cases concerning extraterritorial abduction is a neutral factor in the analysis of
customary international human rights law on the topic. Although the vast
majority of prosecutions stemming from the abduction of an individual have
been upheld as valid, it is important to appreciate that such judicial decisions do
not undermine the existence of an individual right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. The decisions merely indicate that if such a right exists it is unlikely
ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNUAL REVIEW].
134. Ebrahim, 95 I.L.R. at 442.
135. Id. at417.
136. Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett), [1994] 1 A.C. 42, 62 (Eng. H.L. 1993).
137. ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNUAL REVIEw, supra note 133, at 163.
138. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (declaring that its members are determined to "reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person...").
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that the remedy of a stay of prosecution has also entered into customary
international law. Such a view has come about through the flawed belief that
the judiciary has no role to play in providing a remedy to an individual
subsequent to a violation of international law.'39 Although there is some
indication through South African and United Kingdom jurisprudence that the
human rights of an abductee are becoming increasingly relevant before domestic
courts, there is not enough uniform practice throughout the world to conclude
that the approach of the judiciary in such cases either contributes to or
contradicts the existence of a customary norm protecting an individual from
extraterritorial abduction.
E. Resolving the Issue: Is There a Customary Norm?
State practice concerning the abduction of individuals in order to bring
them before domestic courts will never be completely uniform. States are
inherently self-interested and are reluctant to ascribe to a norm that may limit
their ability to conduct self-help operations in the future. "° In the absence of
an enforcement mechanism for international law, states may often decide that
the benefits of breaching international law outweigh the costs. Therefore, it is
important that state actions that appear to be contrary to an alleged customary
norm are not automatically assumed to be evidence of the absence of the norm.
Inconsistent state practice could instead illustrate that the state concerned is a
persistent objector and that the state is not bound by the norm, or the state is
breaching an international norm that is otherwise adhered to.
The relevant test for examining inconsistent state actions was offered by
the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States, which emphasized that there is no need
for state practice to be in rigorous conformity with the rnle. 4' The Court went
on to comment that:
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems
it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. 142
139. See Costi, supra note 5, at 95-97 (discussing how the judiciary can invoke the international
responsibility of the state by ignoring an infringement of international law).
140. JOHN BAYLIS & STEVE SMITH, THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 117 (1997).
141. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99.
142. Id.
It is evident that state-sponsored abductions are certainly not seen as the
recognition of a new rule of international law, but are typically universally
condemned as infringing customary international human rights law.
The abduction ofAlvarez-Machain by the United States and the subsequent
decision by the Supreme Court in 1992 received international condemnation.
The Canadian government stated that it would not tolerate such abductions from
its soil, while the Argentine President derided the court decision "a horror."'43
As well as the abduction receiving widespread criticism from states, there was
near universal criticism from non-governmental organizations, lawyers and
academics. Furthermore the Inter-American Juridical Committee condemned
the attitude of the United States Government as violating fundamental rules and
principles of international law.'" Such criticism is comparable to that of Israel
following the abduction of Eichmann, where disapproval by individual states
was supported by a Security Council resolution decrying the breach of
international law.'45
When the United States has conducted extraterritorial operations to seize
suspected criminals, it has always attempted to tone down the implications that
such conduct could have for international law. Following the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain, a State Department Spokesman said that the Supreme Court
decision did "not represent a 'green light' for future abductions," and that only
in "extreme cases" would kidnapping be justified.' 6 Concern that foreign states
might undertake extraterritorial law enforcement operations in the United States
also led to a State Department lawyer resisting the contention that abductions
were consistent with international law. 47 The view that transnational abduc-
tions are inconsistent with customary international law is further supported by
a 1989 memorandum to the Attorney General outlining the President's authority
to breach customary international law by ordering the abduction of an individual
from a foreign country. 4 ' By arguing that transnational abductions are the
exception rather than the norm the United States is fulfilling the test established
143. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, SHOULD NATIONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO KIDNAP
CRIMINAL SUSPECTS? (2000), available at http://www.crf-usa.org/bria/brial0_4.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
144. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Legal Opinion on the Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in the Alvarez-Machain Case, in 13 HRLJ 395, 397 (1992).
145. S.C. Res. 138, supra note 77.
146. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 143.
147. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary "'Bill To Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack US Government Employees
and Citizens Abroad, " 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985).
148. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TO OVERRIDE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
EXTRATERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (1989), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/olc-override.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
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in the Nicaragua case: the conduct is typically viewed as breaching a rule rather
than creating a new rule.
While the international denunciation of forcible abductions will often focus
on any breach of state sovereignty, there is sufficient state practice and opinio
juris to suggest that a customary norm exists whereby the human rights of an
individual require states to refrain from extraterritorial abduction. Cumula-
tively, the decisions by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court
of Human Rights, the recognition of international human rights instruments, and
the practice of states provide enough evidence of consistent state practice and
opinio juris to establish a customary norm protecting individuals from extra-
territorial abduction.
The right to be free from abduction exists independently of whether there
is also a breach of the host-state's sovereignty. To make a breach of an
individual's rights dependant on there first being a breach of state sovereignty
is to effectively limit the scope of the right to being no more than a derivative
of a state's right to territorial inviolability. If the prohibition of arbitrary
detention is to be an effective human right it must also be available to protect
an individual in situations where the host-state consents to their abduction. This
approach is endorsed by Harry Blackmun, a dissenting Supreme Court Justice
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, who commented, "even with the consent
of the foreign sovereign, kidnapping a foreign national flagrantly violates
peremptory human rights norms."' 4 9 Such a view recognizes that the rights of
an abducted individual will be affected in the same manner whether the host-
state is complicit in the abduction or not.
F. The Implications of a Breach of This Right
When states breach international law there are legal consequences (which
may include reparation, compensation, and/or apologies) that flow from the
wrongful action. 5' The Permanent Court of International Justice upheld the
principles of state responsibility by stating that "the essential principle ... is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.' 15'
For an individual who has been forcibly removed to another jurisdiction
to stand trial, the most desirable form of reparation would be for the criminal
proceedings to be dismissed and to be repatriated. It is widely recognized that
when an abduction breaches a state's sovereignty and the protesting state
149. Harry A. Blacknun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 42(1994).
150. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 6;
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 501.
151. Chorzow Factory Case (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 1, 47.
demands the return of the individual then the first duty on the abducting state
is to return the individual. 5 2 However, this remedy is one that is owed by one
state to another and would not be applicable in the absence of a formal protest
from the host-state. The issue of the responsibility of states towards individuals
for breaches of international law is more uncertain,'53 and for this reason was
not incorporated by the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.'54 Unlike international human rights conventions, which tend
to explicitly require a state to provide an effective remedy to an individual
whose rights have been breached,'55 there is as yet no recognition of a binding
requirement on states to provide individuals with a specific remedy when their
human rights are breached.
Due to the uncertain content of international law regarding the remedies
that states owe to individuals, the ability of abductees to have a remedy for a
breach of their rights under customary international law is dependant on the
extent of each state's reception of international law into the domestic legal
system. 56 The status of international law in domestic law varies greatly, and
each legal system will have a slightly different view as to whether domestic
courts have a duty to allow individuals to enforce a right that exists at an
international level. It is outside the scope of this paper to conduct an exhaustive
inquiry into the trends relating to the status of international law in domestic
legal systems, but it is pertinent to note that the failure of courts to uphold
international law can invoke the international responsibility of the state. The
conduct of domestic courts are regarded under international law as being
attributable to the state,'57 and so a judicial infringement of an individual's
international rights can make the state responsible for remedying the breach.
152. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 295.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
432; BASSIOuNI, supra note 3, at 290.
153. Bassiouni is of the opinion that no area of international law is "as riddled with confusion" as the
topic of the enforceability of internationally protected human rights in domestic law. BASSIOUNi, supra note
3, at 29 1.
154. Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility Articles:
Introduction and Overview, 96 A.J.I.L. 773 at 790 (2002). However, art. 33(2) of the I.L.C. Draft Articles
makes it clear that the Draft Articles should be read as not prejudicing any international responsibility of a
state to a non-state actor. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 6, art. 33(2).
155. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 81; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 88, art. 2(3); European Convention, supra note 110, art. 13; American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 25, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 703.
157. Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (April 29); see also Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 6, art. 4.
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However, domestic courts cannot be said to be violating an individual's
rights simply by allowing the prosecution of an abductee. Therefore, the key
issue is whether domestic courts are under an international obligation to remedy
the Executive's breach of international law by refusing to prosecute an
abductee. While it may be desirable for domestic courts to refuse to endorse a
state's violation of its human rights obligations, there is no international
obligation on domestic courts to decline jurisdiction over an abductee. The
prevalence of the rule of "male captus bene detentus" throughout the world,
while controversial, is clear evidence of the non-existence of any norm requiring
states to decline the prosecution of abductees. It is therefore apparent that the
existence in customary international law of an individual right to be free from
extraterritorial abduction is not supplemented by any such norm requiring
domestic courts to divest themselves of hearing the case.
While it may be premature to claim that there is a customary rule
compelling courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over abductees, it is not
accurate to claim that the violation of an individual's internationally guaranteed
rights is irrelevant to a court's consideration whether or not to exercise jurisdic-
tion.'58 As evidenced by the decisions of Ebrahim and Bennett, where domestic
courts declined to exercise jurisdiction, the human rights of an individual can
be used in a domestic context. These two cases provide important examples
whereby courts were able to use international legal principles to interpret the
domestic expectations of due process. Such decisions should be applauded as
not only giving effect to an individual's rights, but also acting as a deterrent to
future violations of international law.'59 Only by declining to exercise
jurisdiction can domestic courts maintain the integrity of international human
rights and encourage states to abide by their international legal obligations.
Unfortunately for the subjects of an extraterritorial abduction, given that
international law does not mandate that domestic courts must refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over abductees, there will be occasions when they are not provided
with an effective domestic remedy. The only other traditional remedies,
compensation and an apology, are unlikely to resolve the problem for abductees
that they are now within the jurisdiction of a state that is determined to
prosecute them. However, it would be a misconception to consequently view
158. Borelli, supra note 5, at 8.
159. It is notable that the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Sentencing
Judgment - In Trial Chamber IM 1 30 (Oct. 9, 2002) determined that it could exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant who had been forcibly abducted, but did so only after concluding that the Tribunal's duty to respect
human rights was outweighed in this case by the fact that the defendant had been charged with a serious
violation of international humanitarian law. Id. While departing from the traditional mala captus bene detentus
rule, such a decision only acts as a deterrent to state abductions of minor criminals and indicates that the
violation of the human rights of more serious offenders can be overlooked by a higher duty to prosecute serous
human rights violations. Id.
the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction as little more than an "empty
right." The right of individuals to be free from state-sponsored abductions,
similar to much of international law, must derive a great deal of the force from
its prescriptive nature rather than the presence of an enforcement mechanism.
Not only does the right carry much moral force, but it can be viewed as an
important step towards the formation of an individual right not to be prosecuted
following the unlawful transfer from another state.' 60
VI. THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION AND
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
A. Reconciling the Supreme Court's Decision with the Customary Norm
While there will always be difficulties for an individual seeking a domestic
remedy for a breach of their international rights, such difficulties were com-
pounded in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain by the refusal of the Supreme Court to
recognize the existence of the individual right. The Court's flawed analysis of
customary international law not only means that individuals abducted by the
United States will be unable to receive compensation for their treatment under
the ATS, but more importantly, it reduces the possibility of an abductee having
the prosecution against them dismissed. In the absence of a breach of
sovereignty and an accompanying complaint by the host-state, the ability of an
abductee to avoid prosecution depends upon the extent to which domestic courts
will recognize the breach of their rights. Although United States courts have
traditionally been reluctant to dismiss proceedings for a violation of inter-
national law, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain should
not be adopted uncritically by courts as the basis for denying the existence of
an internationally accepted right of individuals to be free from extraterritorial
abduction.
While the Supreme Court concluded that Alvarez could not cite sufficient
evidence to support the contention that international law recognizes a norm
prohibiting the use of arbitrary detention, the Court then retreated from this
position slightly, holding that any "credible invocation" of a principle against
arbitrary detention requires more than a relatively brief detention.61 The Court
indicated that for any such claim to be successful the detention must be
"prolonged,"' 62 and that the alleged norm was therefore not applicable to
Alvarez who had been transferred into the custody of lawful authorities within
160. See Costi, supra note 5, at 95-99 (analyzing how the right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction could lead to the development of a right against prosecution).
161. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
162. Id.
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a day of being abducted. 63 Such a concession by the Court is not an attempt to
indicate that there are occasions where extraterritorial abductions may violate
customary international law, but is an attempt by the Court to take into account
the respected Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(the Restatement).'
The Restatement asserts that "[a] state violates international law if, as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ...prolonged
arbitrary detention.' 65 The Restatement acknowledges that many United States
courts have recognized that any form of arbitrary detention is prohibited by
customary international law,'" but does not provide any evidence as to why an
arbitrary detention must be "prolonged." This distinction made by the
Restatement has been labeled as "curious" and has been criticized as diverging
from the right recognized by international treaties, state practice and domestic
courts. 1
67
By taking the Restatement as being the defimitive authority on the content
of customary international law, the Supreme Court was able to dismiss the
seriousness of Alvarez's detention by only concerning itself with the duration
of Alvarez's detention. Although the irregular detention of individuals is
concerning, it is the fact that individuals are being transferred between countries
through an extra-legal process that is more disturbing. Rather than exclusively
focusing on the length of time that an individual was arbitrarily detained, the
interest of the Court should have been on what happened during that period.
Not only will most abductions violate the domestic law of the host-state, but the
removal of abductees from the control of the host-state deprives abductees of
the ability to invoke the protection of procedural safeguards that would typically
be available through any extradition process. Until abductees are brought
before a court to hear the charges against them, their fate is effectively in the
hands of the abductors. Abductees are likely to be subjected to various forms
of physical abuse, they might be drugged, they might not be brought before a
judge in an expeditious manner, they might be interrogated in the absence of a
lawyer, and they might also be unable to ascertain who has abducted them and
why. 1
68
The Supreme Court's contention that if customary international law
prohibits arbitrary detention it does so only to the extent that such detention is
prolonged, is accordingly unsound. However, this position did allow the Court
163. Id at 2769.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 702.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Paust, supra note 12 at 563; Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 287, 345 n.67 (1994).
168. Costi, supra note 5, at 68.
to dismiss any international precedent that supported Alvarez's position.
Although the ICJ had indicated in The Hostages Case that arbitrary detention
violated fundamental principles of international law, the Supreme Court
dismissed the attempt by Alvarez to invoke the same principles, holding that
"the detention in that case was... far longer and harsher than Alvarez's."' 69 If
such a requirement for prolonged detention did exist it would provide little
protection for individuals and could be viewed by states as permitting unlawful
detentions as long as they were not lengthy. Only by focusing on the motives
behind a state's actions and the overall effect of the detention on the individual
can human rights law effectively provide an individual with protection against
wrongful state actions.
A human rights inquiry into extraterritorial abduction should be concerned
with the deliberate attempt by a state to limit the procedural protection available
to an individual. International human rights law recognizes the importance of
procedural protections for individuals and this is the key reason why customary
international law prohibits the use of state-sponsored abduction as a means to
acquire the custody of a suspected criminal. The practice of states provides no
evidence that this human rights norm is entirely dependant upon the length of
time that an individual is denied access to the proper legal process.
The Supreme Court's analysis would have been more convincing if it had
attempted to argue that the United States was a persistent objector to the
creation of an individual right to be free from extraterritorial abduction. The
willingness with which the United States has used abduction as a means to
acquire the custody of suspected criminals would certainly lend weight to an
argument that it does not consider itself bound by any human rights norm that
limits the ability to use abduction in order to seize a suspect. 7 ' However,
Justice Souter for the majority failed to accommodate the persistent objector
rule, and rather than using examples such as the non-self-executing declaration
to the ICCPR as evidence that the United States did not adhere to such norms,
the Court used these examples to deny the existence of the norm. 71
B. Understanding the Influencing Factors on the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's flawed view of the substance of customary
international law was influenced by a number of important factors that
169. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
170. Recent U.S. cases involving the use of extraterritorial abduction include United States v. Lira,
515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Caro-
Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599 (D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kansi v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Yunis, 681 F.Supp. at 896; Noriega, 746 F.Supp. at 1506.
171. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2767.
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encouraged the Court to downplay the rights of an individual in Alvarez's
situation. Understanding the backdrop to the decision will help to explain why
the decision of the Supreme Court conflicts with international recognition of the
individual right to be free from extraterritorial abduction.
The Court's examination of customary international law was almost
certainly unduly influenced by the debate over the ATS. It is an indication that
the facts of Alvarez's abduction were almost incidental to the issues before the
Court that of the forty-nine pages in Sosa's submissions to the Court only two
pages were dedicated to arguing that the respondent did not violate customary
international law.'72 Indeed Alvarez's own lawyer commented after the
judgment that "we lost the battle in that case, but won the war on the ATS.' 173
Given that the 6-3 decision of the Court to not rule out the possibility of new
claims being created in the future under the ATS, the Court was in a position
where it needed to dismiss Alvarez's case to placate critics of the ATS.' 74 Not
only was the bar set very high before any customary international law can
become actionable under the ATS, but the judgment also indicates that there is
a very high threshold before the Court will consider any norm to be considered
customary international law. The Court was overly cautious in its examination
of the whether Alvarez's abduction and detention violated international law for
fear of opening the floodgates to litigation by foreigners. This need to reduce
the number of cases being considered under the ATS has led to an artificially
narrow reading of international law.
Ever since a decision of the Supreme Court in 1938 denied the existence
of a federal common law, 75 federal courts in the United States have been wary
of creating new causes of action. Although the existence of common law would
allow judges to ensure that the law can appropriately take into account
developments in society, for many judges this dynamic feature of the law
threatens to undermine the basis of democracy by allowing courts, rather than
the legislature, to create new law. 76 "Originalist" judges, for which Justice
Scalia is the leading voice, 177 are of the view that to give effect to the true role
of the federal judiciary the law should be viewed as static and that "an
172. Respondent's Brief, supra note 57.
173. Stacey Harms & Samira Puskar, On the Docket: The Court Opens the Door to International
Human Rights Cases, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, June 2004, available at
http://docket.medill.morthwestem.edu/archives/000991print.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
174. In particular the Bush Administration had been particularly vocal against the permissive
approach of judges in allowing ATS suits. Anthony Sebok, The Alien Tort Claims Act: How Powerful a
Human Rights Weapon Is It?, FIND LAW LEGAL COMMENTARY, June 12, 2004, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer-friendly.pl?page=/sebok20040712.htnl (last visited Oct. 6,2005).
175. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
176. Richard B. Saphire, Commentaries: Constitutional Predispositions, 23 DAYTON L. REV. 277,
284(1998).
177. Id. at 282.
authoritative text should be understood as of the time that the text was written
instead of some other time, like the present."'' 8 It is in the framework of this
ideological debate over judicial interpretation that the Supreme Court
considered how the reference to the "law of nations" in the ATS should be
interpreted.
To the consternation of Justice Scalia'79 the majority indicated that the "law
of nations" was a flexible concept that should be able to accommodate changes
in international law. 80 However, while conceding that the content of the law
of nations should not be limited to the international norms existing in 1789, the
Court then adopted an originalist position by maintaining that only those norms
with a specificity comparable to the norms that existed when the ATS was
enacted would be actionable. 8 '
However, the Court then proceeded to conflate the issues of whether the
norm exists under international law and whether a cause of action should be
provided. The majority decision urged "restraint in judicially applying
internationally generated norms,"'82 but it appears that such restraint was also
applied to the recognition of international norms. The Court's reluctance to
give appropriate weight to evidence of international custom was emphasized by
repeatedly stressing, "the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either
made or created."'83 While this aversion to creating new law is understandable
when the Court is being asked to create a cause of action, it has no place in any
analysis of the substance of customary international law. Customary
international law is not created through judicial recognition, but evolves over
time through consistent state practice. The approach to interpreting
international law is distinct from the process of applying domestic law.
It is evident that the Court was influenced by the debate over the
appropriate role of judge-made law in the United States and that this issue
unnecessarily affected its analysis of the content of customary international law.
Justice Souter for the majority stated "we have no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and
modem indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the
field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity. ''""4 The
178. John Harrison, Law and Truth: Panel M." Originalism and Historical Truth: Forms of
Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 89 (2003).
179. Justice Scalia believed that the drafters of the ATS would be "terrified" at the possibility that
a cause of action based on international law would be dependant on the discretion ofjudges. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S.Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
181. Id. at2761.
182. Id. at 2762.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2763.
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traditional reluctance of federal courts to create new causes of action has
therefore been transposed to a reluctance to "seek out" new customary
international law. The basis for the theory of originalism is the concern that a
judge who does not stick closely to the text of a statute and the associated
historical context has too much subjectivity in determining the content of the
law. "'85 Due to the unwritten nature of customary international law and the
degree of discretion available to courts in recognizing norms based on state
practice, the Supreme Court was accordingly wary of affirming a customary
norm in the absence of Congressional approval.'86  The need for a
"congressional mandate"' 7 in order to affirm the existence of a customary norm
indicates the reluctance of the Court to be bound by international law that the
United States had not explicitly consented to. Such a stance is consistent with
the notion ofjudicial minimalism in lawmaking, but is contrary to the principle
that the existence of customary international law is not dependant on express
state consent. 8 8 It is outside the scope of this paper to comment on the
resistance of federal courts to creating law in the United States, but it is
pertinent to comment that in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the Court's desire for
legislative guidance as to whether a cause of action should be created certainly
influenced its determination to deny the existence of a customary right to be free
from abduction and detention.
As well as being influenced by theories on the appropriate role of the ATS,
the Supreme Court's analysis of the legality of abducting and detaining an
individual needs to be placed in the context of the current war on terrorism. The
strong dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that by allowing Alvarez's claim
to succeed the majority had "needlessly shackled the efforts of our political
branches in dealing with complex and sensitive issues of national security." '89
The fear of restricting the Executive's conduct in foreign affairs certainly
influenced the Supreme Court to relegate the importance of human rights in
relation to national policy. The Court specifically noted that courts would have
to be aware of any "collateral consequences" that a decision under the ATS may
have on the Executive's exercise of discretion in foreign affairs.'"o
The Court was not only circumspect about unduly limiting the ability of the
Executive to use extraterritorial abduction in the war on terrorism, but it also
had to consider the implications of its own recent decisions. On the day prior
to the judgment in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain being released, the Supreme Court
185. Saphire, supra note 176, at 285.
186. Indeed the Court indicated that it "would welcome any congressional guidance in exercising
jurisdiction." Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2765.
187. Id. at 2763.
188. ILA, supra note 70, at 38.
189. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 658-59 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
190. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
released several high-profile decisions concerning the rights of those that the
Executive had detained in the war on terror. When viewing these cases together
it becomes apparent that any other decision by the Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain would have serious implications for the United States government.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that a United States citizen seeking
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
basis for his classification and be granted a fair opportunity to rebut the
government's assertions before a neutral decision maker. 9' Justice O'Connor
emphasized that "history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system
of detention carries the potential to become a means of oppression and abuse of
others who do not present that sort of threat.' 192 The importance of individuals
being able to challenge their detention was also emphasized in Rasul v. Bush
where foreigners being held at Guantanamo Bay were granted the right to test
the legality of their detention before federal courts. 93 While these two decisions
can be seen as upholding international law by limiting the right of a government
to indefinitely detain individuals without access to courts, why then did the
Court seemingly counter this the very next day by holding that there was no
right under international law to be free from arbitrary detention?
A primary policy reason for the approach of the Supreme Court stems from
the implications of allowing hundreds of individuals detained by the United
States military to challenge their detention: domestic courts would be required
to rule whether an individual's continued detention is justified or whether an
individual is being arbitrarily detained. A conclusion that an individual's
detention is unwarranted and arbitrary could therefore not only lead to that
individual's release but also to the possibility of civil claims being initiated
under the ATS. This concerned the minority in the Court of Appeals,"94 and
would have also influenced the Supreme Court's decision to read-down the
status of international law on the issue of arbitrary detention of transnational
abductees.
The decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has to be read in conjunction with
these earlier decisions. Although the Court took a stand against the government
by allowing Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention, the decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain duly limited the repercussions for the government. A
decision that an arbitrary detention could lead to civil damages would have
191. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
192. Id. at 2657.
193. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
194. Judge O'Scannlain noted that, "the majority has left the door open for the objects of our
international war on terrorism to do the same [as Alvarez] .... I believe that impermissibly encroaching upon
the duties rightfully reserved to the political branches is of serious consequence, and unfortunately such
encroachment establishes a very troubling precedent which we will regret." Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 645
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
2005] Loan
292 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:253
dramatically undermined the current Administration's treatment of terrorist
suspects and the Court may have been seen as encouraging the detainees to
bring suits the day after allowing them to challenge their detentions. The
importance of limiting the ability of individuals detained in the Government's
war on terrorism to file civil suits was underscored by the fact that the
government required Yaser Hamdi to waive any right to sue the United States
over his captivity before releasing him.'95
The Supreme Court's inadequate analysis of customary international law
protecting individuals from state-sponsored abductions can only be understood
in light of the cumulative effect that the aforementioned factors had on the
Court. Concerns over judicial law-making, the need to limit the scope of the
ATS, the desire not to restrict the Executive's actions, and the possible
implications that any contrary decision would have for the detainees of the
United States in the war on terrorism compounded the Court's reluctance to
consider itself bound by an international norm that the United States had not
expressly consented to be bound by. These considerations all contributed to the
Court's decision to read-down customary international law and not to recognize
right of individuals not to be subjected to extraterritorial abduction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the last sixty years the international legal system has aimed to ensure
peace and security through inter-state co-operation and by encouraging respect
for human rights.' 96 Extradition procedures provide a means for respecting state
boundaries and ensuring procedural safeguards for individuals, while also
combating the impunity of offenders that occurs when a suspect resides outside
a state that is seeking their protection. However, extradition is not a feasible
option when the host-state is unwilling or unable to co-operate. In such
situations states may resort to extra-legal methods in order to facilitate the
prosecution of suspects. The abduction, detention and forcible transfer of
individuals by state authorities challenges the foundation of the international
legal system by disregarding principles of state sovereignty and human rights.
In the absence of consent by the host-state, any attempt by the prosecuting
state to acquire custody of the suspect by conducting operations within the host-
state's territory violates international law. While such abductions are widely
recognized as breaching international law protecting the territorial integrity of
195. Although there are thoughts that such an agreement could be invalidated on grounds of duress.
See Michael C. Dorf, Have We Heard the Last of Yaser Hamdi? Why his Promise Not to Sue the Government
May not be Binding, FIND LAW LEGAL COMMENTARY, Sep. 29, 2004, available at
http://writ.news.,fmdlaw.com/scripts/printer-friendly.pl?page=/dorf/20040929.html (last visited Oct. 6,2005).
196. See U.N. CHARTER art. l, para. 3.
the state,197 they also breach the right of an individual to be free from
extraterritorial abduction. The basis of this right stems from the absence of
procedural protections available to an abductee and the deliberate attempt by the
abducting state to disregard the procedural safeguards available to the individual
under the domestic law of the host state. This individual right exists
independently from a breach of a state's sovereignty and can therefore be
invoked by an individual in situations when the host-state is complicit in the
abduction. The right of individuals not to be subjected to state-sponsored
abductions has clearly evolved through state practice under the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
European Convention on Human Rights. These international instruments have
helped to provide sufficiently uniform state practice and opinio juris for the
right to become universally binding under customary international law.
Yet, when the United States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
recently had an opportunity to affirm the existence of this norm, it declared that
there was scant evidence that the alleged norm was part of customary
international law.'98 This paper has demonstrated that the Court was motivated
by a need to restrict future claims under the ATS, was hesitant to recognize the
existence of a customary international law norm without legislative direction,
was influenced by the reluctance of the United States to adhere to the norm, and
was wary of the effect that any contrary decision could have on the ability of the
Executive in the war on terrorism.
These considerations, which are irrelevant to determining the content of
customary international law, prompted the Court to reach a conclusion that
unnecessarily relegates the importance of human rights norms. The implication
of denying the existence of an international right protecting individuals from
being abducted and detained by states is that abductees would be dependant
upon the willingness of a state to advance a claim on their behalf. Such an
outcome is unappealing. The recognition of the right of individuals to be free
from extraterritorial abduction is consistent with the development of human
rights law over the last sixty years and the increasing recognition of individuals
as distinct actors in the international legal system.
197. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432; BASSIOUNI,
supra note 3, at 252; OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 295.
198. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April of 2001, an agreement was entered into between Appollonia
(Applicant) and Maguffin (not party to this case) for the exportation of MOX,
produced by an Appollonian State-owned power plant. Since then, Appollonia
has exported MOX to Maguffin via shipments traveling through the waters of
Raglan (Respondent), located halfway between Appollonia and Maguffin.
Between 1995 and 1999, international organizations issued warnings
regarding the danger that pirate activity in the area surrounding Raglanian
waters could represent to ships. The IAEA determined that Appollonia's
shipment of MOX was in compliance with international standards.
In October 1999, Raglan put into practice an anti-piracy program in order
to guarantee the safety of the ships traveling through its waters reducing the risk
Distinguished Brief
associated with shipping in the region. In November 2001, Raglan began using
private contractors to serve as pilots since the Raglanian Navy was no longer
able to provide the escorting service to all incoming ships.
On July 26 2002, The Mairi Maru, a privately owned Appollonian-flagged
vessel headed for Maguffin and laden with MOX, requested an escort in
accordance with the requirements of Raglan's anti-piracy program. The vessel
was boarded by the assigned pilot, Good and two of his assistants.
Hours later, Good threatened the crew and locked them in the ship's galley.
Good and his confederates removed the navigation and communication
equipment disabling the vessel, making it impossible to steer. They
disembarked the ship, leaving it adrift on a course toward international waters.
On July, 28 an intense storm altered the course of The Mairi Maru which
ran aground on the Norton Shallows causing damage to the ship's hull resulting
in the leakage of MOX pellets in the surrounding waters. Hours later, the
Raglanian Royal Navy rescued the surviving crew members.
Diplomatic notes and official statements were exchanged between July 31
and August 2 of that same year, in which Raglan and Appollonia, respectively,
denied responsibility for the damages caused. Appollonia pointed out that Good
was an agent of Raglan, and was responsible due to its failure to police its
waters for pirate activities. Raglan denied responsibility under the presumption
that MOX was being shipped illegally.
On August 4, Raglan sent a diplomatic note to Appollonia informing it of
the decision to scuttle The Mairi Mar-u. Later that week, the vessel was scuttled
with the remaining MOX onboard.
The following week, diplomatic notes were exchanged. Raglan alleged
Appollonia had violated its duties as an exporter of MOX under the guidelines
of the IAEA, and Appollonia pointed out that Raglan had violated anti-dumping
provisions.
In October 2002, the owners and insurers of The Mairi Maru and the
members and families of the crew that had died initiated lawsuits in Raglan for
their respective losses. These claims were taken to Raglan's maximum judicial
authority without avail.
On April 5 2003, the legislative enactment, COMMA, which recited the
events surrounding the attack on The Mairi Maru was signed into law.
In July, both parties agreed to submit their differences to the ICJ.
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Appollonia and the Kingdom of Raglan have submitted
by Special Agreement their differences concerning the Vessel The Mairi Maru,
and transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court pursuant to article
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40(1) of the Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of
the ICJ pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court.
III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. The Court should declare that Raglan is responsible for the attack
upon and wreck of The Mairi Maru since (i) the acts of Good are
attributable to Raglan; and (ii) Raglan failed to respond appropriately
to pirate activities in its waters. Firstly, the attack on The Mairi Maru
does not constitute piracy jure gentium and Good was acting as an
empowered agent of Raglan, thus his acts are attributable to Raglan
under customary law. Secondly, Raglan had the obligation of
protecting Appollonians and their property from harm within its
jurisdiction, clearly failing to do so. Even if this Court were to decide
that the attack constitutes piracy jure gentium, Raglan had the
obligation of repressing piracy and failed to do so. Accordingly,
Raglan owes compensation to Appollonia for the attack upon and
wreck of The Mairi Maru.
B. Raglan violated international law by scuttling The Mairi Maru.
Firstly, the scuttling was a violation of the principle of flag state
jurisdiction and there exists no rule under customary international law
that would have allowed Raglan to scuttle the vessel. Secondly,
Raglan has breached customary rules prohibiting the dumping of
radioactive waste by scuttling the vessel with MOX onboard.
Thirdly, a state of necessity cannot be alleged in the present case as
(i) scuttling was not the only means available to Raglan and (ii)
Ranglan contributed to the alleged state of necessity. Accordingly,
compensation is owed for the loss of The Mairi Maru and the
remaining MOX.
C. This Court should find that Appollonia's shipment of MOX was
lawful under international law since the right of archipelagic sea lane
passage applies to all ships, and hence is applicable in this case.
Additionally, Appollonia was not bound to notify Raglan of its
shipment since there is no treaty in force between both parties in this
regard, and in any case the obligation to notify is not a rule of
customary international law. Moreover, the Precautionary Principle
was not breached since Appollonia complied with international
standards pertaining to the shipment of MOX and the non-notification
of the MOX shipments was indeed a precautionary measure.
Alternatively, Raglan cannot contest the shipment of MOX as it
acquiesced to the shipments formulating no protest to recurrent
shipment of MOX through its waters.
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D. Raglan's claim in this case is inadmissible since remedies were not
exhausted. In any case, Raglan does not have standing to seek
compensation for acts that occurred outside its jurisdiction as its legal
interests have not been affected nor does its right to exercise freedom
on the high seas grant it standing. Additionally, Appollonia bears no
responsibility for the damage caused to the Norton Shallows since it
may not be subject to the strict liability doctrine, which only applies
when accorded under a treaty, and in any event, the damage may not
be attributed to Appollonia's shipment of MOX as a proximate cause.
Even if found responsible, Appollonia would not owe Raglan
compensation since the losses it claims are not subject to
compensation and additionally Raglan's contributory negligence shall
in any case reduce the amount to be paid.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A. Whether the acts of Thomas Good and Raglan's failed efforts to
respond appropriately to pirate activities in its waters make Raglan
responsible for the wreck of The Mairi Maru and all consequences
thereof;
B. Whether the scuttling of The Mairi Maru is illegal and whether this
act would entail an obligation to pay compensation for the loss of The
Mairi Maru and the MOX;
C. Whether Appollonia violated obligations owed to Raglan under
international law in transporting MOX through Raglanian waters; and
D. Whether Raglan would have standing to seek compensation for
economic losses resulting from acts that occurred outside its territorial
waters and exclusive economic zone.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Raglan is responsible for the attack upon and wreck of The Mairi Maru
and all consequences thereof by virtue of(1) its failure to respond
appropriately to pirate activities in its archipelagic waters and (2) the acts of
Thomas Good, which are imputable to Raglan
1. Appollonia's Claim Is Admissible Since Local Remedies
Have Been Exhausted
For a claim to be admissible before an international court, the alien on
whose behalf the claim is brought must have pursued the essence of the claim
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as far as permitted by the local law of the state that committed injury,' as
recognized in international treaties and decisions.2
In this case, Appollonians injured by the attack upon and wreck of The
Mairi Maru pursued until the court of last resort, without avail, a claim seeking
compensation for Raglan's responsibility for such events, exhausting local
remedies. Thus, Appollonia has the right to invoke the responsibility of Raglan
and seek compensation on behalf of its nationals.
2. Raglan Is Responsible For The Illegal Acts Of Good
International responsibility of a state arises from acts which (i) are
attributable to that state, and (ii) constitute a breach of its international
obligations.3 The acts of Good fulfill both of these requirements, as proven
infra.
i. The Acts of Good are Attributable to Raglan
a. The acts of Good do not constitute piracy jure gentium
Raglan may attempt to elude responsibility for Good's acts by claiming
that they constitute acts of piracyjure gentium, which may not be attributable
to any state.4 Piracyjure gentium may consist of any illegal act of violence or
depredation, committed for private ends by crew or passengers of a private ship
on the high seas5 against another ship, or against persons or property on board
1. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 497 (5th ed. 1998); International
Law Commission, Draft Articles, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 44, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 182
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Electronica Sicula Spa Case (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20); American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica", art 46(1)(a), July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 155
[hereinafter ACHR]; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 2, Sept. 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; Organization of African Unity: Banjul
Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 56(c), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1986)[hereinafter AFCR]; Finnish Ships Arbitration (U.K. v. Finn.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1479 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1934).
3. Phosphates in Morocco, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 84, at 28 (1938); Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 23 (Dec. 24).
4. S.S. Lotus Case, Moore Dissenting Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No. 10, at71 (Sept. 7); Robert
Reuland, Interference With Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity
Rule of Flag State Jurisdictin, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1161, 1188 (1989); Rohn Rogers, The Alien Tort
Statute and How Individuals 'Violate'International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 50 (1988).
5. LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 105 (1992); BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNTIONAL SEA PIRACY 42 (1980);
Eugene Kontorvich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdictions Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 183, 191 (2004).
2005] Distinguished Brief
such ship.6 The customary character of this definition derives from national
decisions7 and its inclusion in treaties' and legislation.9
Based on the above definition, piratical attacks occurring within the
territorial waters of a state are not deemed piracy jure gentium. " For instance,
in US v. Smith" the US Supreme Court condemned Thomas Smith and others,
for piracyjure gentium, because the acts of plunder against the Spanish vessel
were committed on the high seas. In this case, The Mairi Maru entered
Raglanian archipelagic waters at 2200 hours and at 2300 hours Good threatened
the Captain with an explosive device and took control of the vessel. He then
committed robbery, disabled the aft propeller shaft, and disembarked The Mairi
Maru, all within Raglanian waters. Thus, the acts of violence and depredation
in this case occurred within Raglanian waters, and not on the high seas.
b. Good is an empowered agent of Raglan
It is a general principle of law that states can only act through agents and
representatives." This means that conduct of persons empowered to exercise
6. Zou Keyuan, Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea, 31 J. MAR. L. & Com. 107,
109-10 (2000); George P. Smith II, From Cutlass to Cat-O'-Nine Tails: The Case for International
Jurisdiction of Mutiny on the High Seas, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 277, 300 (1989).
7. John Castle and Nederlandse Stitching Sirus v. N.V. Parfin, 77 I.L.R. 537-9 (Dec. 19, 1986);
Starkle, Piraterie en Haute Mer et Compdtente Pinale. A propos de 'arr&t de la Cour d'appel d'Anvers du
19juillet 1985, RDPC soixante-septi~me annie (1987), nhm. 8-9-10, Aofit, Septembre, Octobre 1987, p. 738-
41.
8. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 436 [hereinafter
UNCLOS]; Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000); Territorial Waters Judicial Act, 1878, c. 73, § 6 (entered into force,
Feb. 1, 1991) (Eng.): Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act, 1997, c. 28 § 26 (entered into force, July
17, 1997) (Eng.); Canada Criminal Code, 46, §74(1); CYPRUS CONSTITUTION, art. 7, para. 2 (1960); Cypress
Criminal Code § 69, Codigo de Bustamante, 1932, art. 308; Codigo Penal de Venezuela (Penal Code of
Venezuela), art. 4(9) & 153 (2000), available at http://comunidad.derecho.org/pantin/codigopenal.html;
Codigo Penal de Argentina (Penal Code of Argentina), art. 198, available at
http://www.justiniano.com/codigosjuridicos/codigo_penal.htm; Laws of the Gilbert Islands Penal Code, ch.
67, §63, available at http://www.paclii.org/ki/legis/consol-act/pc66/; Cook Islands Crimes Act 1969, part V,
§ 103, available at http://www.paclii.org/ck/legis/num act/ca196982/; South Africa Defense Act 42 of 2002,
§24, reprinted in Government Gazette, Republic of South Africa, Vol. 452 at p.3 0 (Feb. 2003).
10. Phillip Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards A Revised Definition of Maritime
Policy, 8-WTR CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 61, 65 (1999); Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea:
Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 264
(2002); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modem Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45
HARV. INT'L L. J. 191 (2004).
11. U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
12. Acts and Documents Relating to Judgments and Advisory Opinions Given by the Court,
Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 3, at 22 (June 15- Sept. 15); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
9TH Edition (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Author Watts eds., 1996).
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elements of governmental authority acting in such capacity, are attributable to
the state even if the persons acted in excess of authority or contrary to
instructions.' Indeed, when states offer public piloting services, the individuals
performing them are deemed state agents exercising public prerogatives. 4
To identify an individual empowered to exercise elements of governmental
authority the following must be examined (i) if the functions have been
normally exercised by state organs; 15 (ii) how they were conferred on the
person;' 6 (iii) the purposes for which they were exercised; and (iv) the extent of
the person's accountability vis-6-vis the government. 7
The above conditions were met in this case since (i) Good was empowered
by the Raglanian Royal Navy (RRN) to carry out official functions normally
exercised by Raglanian naval officers; (ii) powers were conferred through a
contract between him and Raglan, made official by its Prime-Minister,
delegating public functions normally exercised by the RRN; (iii) powers granted
to him through the anti-piracy program are part of national defense activities;
and (iv) private contractors were accountable as they responded directly to the
RRN.
Furthermore, states may be responsible for unauthorized acts and
omissions of organs or agents committed with apparent authority"8 -as
recognized by international decisions and publicists-'9 or in use of means placed
at their disposition by such authority," even if the individual concerned has
13. Claire Finkelstein, Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law: The Case of Paul
Touvier, 30 TEX. INr'L L.J. 261, 278 (1995); Draft Articles, supra note i, art. 7.
14. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MINDING THE HELM, MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING 408
(1994); GOVT. OF HONG KONG, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, MARINE DEPARTMENT, MARITIME
SERVICES (2005), http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/pubservices/ocean/pilot.html; PORT OF StTE MARITIME
DOCKING SERVICES, PILOTING KNOWLEDGE: THE JOB OF A PILOT (2005),
http://www.sete.port.fr/partenairesen/pilotage.php; CYPRUS PORT AUTHORITY, MARME SERVICES (2005),
http://www.cpa.gov.cy/.
15. Santiago Vilalpando, Article, Attribution of Conduct to the Estate: How the Rules of State
Responsibility May be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 393, 403
(2002).
16. Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law Recognize A
Victim's Private Right ofAction? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 296 (2002); IAN BROWNLEE,
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 136 (1983).
17. See Villalpando, supra note 15, at 403; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSIONS ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 101 (2002).
18. Claire Claim (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Intl Arb. Awards 516, 530 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1929); Sandline
International, Inc./Papua New Guinea Arbitration, 117 LLR. 552, 561 (1998).
19. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No.4 (July 29, 1988);
DERECHO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICO, RESPONSABILiDAD INTERNATIONAL IN MANUAL DE DERECHO
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICO 519, 519-21 (Sorenson ed. 1992).
20. Youmans Claim (U.S. v. Mex.) 4 R. Intl Arb. Awards 110, 116 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1926); Mallen
Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173, 177 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1927).
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overtly committed unlawful acts under the cover of its official status.2 ' Indeed,
in Youmans Claim,22 Mexico was found responsible for the acts of troops sent
to protect aliens, but which in contravention of instructions and outside the
scope of their competence, joined the attackers killing the aliens they had to
protect. The same reasoning applies to this case, since Good boarded the ship
as planned and through a privately-owned vessel regularly employed by Raglan
for that purpose; brought the specially-designed flag of Raglanian naval
protection, which was flown on The Mairi Maru; and seemingly performed the
piloting of the vessel without perceivable irregularities, until he threatened the
Captain for control of the ship. Thus, he clearly acted within the apparent
authority of a Raglanian agent deployed to pilot the vessel.
As regards the means put at his disposal, in Mallen23 the Commission
found that an officer showing his badge evidences that he is acting in an official
capacity. In this case, Good, by virtue of the authority assigned to him as a
pilot, was able to board the vessel and commit robbery.
Therefore, Good's acts are attributable to Raglan since (i) he was
empowered by Raglan to exercise elements of governmental authority, and (ii)
he acted within the apparent authority conferred to him by Raglan.
ii. Raglan Breached lts International Obligation OfAbstaining From
Causing Harm To Foreign Citizens And/Or Their Property
States have the obligation to abstain from ill-treating directly, or through
their agents, foreign nationals in their territory.24 The customary character of
this rule is evidenced by its recognition in various instruments25 and
international decisions, 26 encompassing also a duty of abstention from physical
harm or destruction of property.27 As shown infra, Good -acting as agent of
21. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 10 commentary, reprinted in D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998), at 505; Crawford, supra note _Refl12730962\h \*
MERGEFORMAT 17, 107.
22. Youmans Claim, supra note _Refi 12730994\h \* MERGEFORMAT 20, at 110-6.
23. Mallen Case, supra note _Refl 12730994\h \* MERGEFORMAT 20, at 173-177.
24. Guiseppe Sperduti, Responsibility of States for Activities of Private Law Persons, 10
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 373 (1987).
25. U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doec. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); American Declaration of the Rights;18579;18579 and
Duties;18581 ;18581 of Man;18583;18583, art. I and XXm, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/ser.IJV./I.23, doc.21
rev.6 (1948); ICCPR, supra note _Ref1 12730669\h \* MERGEFORMAT 2, art. 6(1); ECHR, supra note
_Refl 12730669\h \* MERGEFORMAT 2, Art. 2; ACHR, supra note Refl 12730669\h \* MERGEFORMAT
2, Art.4(1) and 21; AFHR, supra note _Ref1 12730669\h \* MERGEFORMAT 2, art. 4, 14 & 29.
26. See generally, Roberts Claim (U.S. v. Mex), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1926);
Youmans Claim, supra note 20.
27. R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility
of States, 1980 GERM.Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 35.
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Raglan- caused the wreck of The Mairi Maru, Appollonian property, and the
death and severe illness of innocent Appollonians. Therefore Raglan, through
Good's actions, breached its duty of not causing harm and is responsible for the
injury caused.
3. Raglan Failed To Respond Appropriately To Pirate Activities In Its
Archipelagic Waters
Irrespective of whether the acts of Good are attributable to Raglan, Raglan
is responsible for the attack upon and the wreck of The Mairi Maru, due to its
failure to respond appropriately to pirate activities in its waters.
States have a duty to protect other states and their nationals against in-
jurious acts by individuals within their jurisdiction,2" with a correlative duty to
(i) prevent injury, and (ii) punish wrongdoers.29 This rule's customary character
is evidenced by international decisions, national decisions and legislation,3" as
well as governmental statements.31 States shall pay damages if they fail to
exercise due diligence in discharging such duties.32
i. Raglan failed to prevent harm being caused to
Appollonians and their Property
Even the utmost efforts of a state may result insufficient if it fails to measure up
to a minimum international standard in its duty to prevent.33 Indeed, in Neer the
Tribunal held that the treatment of aliens breaches international law when
28. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Intl Arb. Awards 1038, 1963 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1935);
Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 831 (Pem. Ct. Arb. 1925); Electronica
Sicula, supra note 2, at 15; Lillich and Paxmann, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by
Terrorist Attacks, 26 AM. U. L. REv., 1997, 225-30
29. Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 312, 324
(1991); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1928, 87-89; Pisillo-
Mazzeschi, supra note _Refl 12731242\h \* MERGEFORMAT 27, 22-26.
30. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952); U.S. v. Arizona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 711 (1987); CHINA'S PRACrICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME CASE STUDIES 268-320 (JEROME ALAN COHEN ED. HARV. UNIv. PRESS 1972); JEROME A. COHEN &
HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 828 (1974).
31. Note from U.S. Secretary of State regarding the Negrete Affair (Mar. 19, 1923), in A DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 961 (John B. Moore ed., 1906)[hereinafter DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW];
BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 135; Diplomatic Note from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S.
(Jan. 28, 1927), in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. V (Green H. Hackworth ed., 1943), at 659-60.
32. Christina E. Sorenson, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward Universal
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INTLE L. REV. 207, 217 (1990).
33. George T. Yates Ill, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in the Postwar Era,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBIlITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 214-15 (Richard B. Lillich ed.
1983); Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60, 61 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1926).
Distinguished Brief
governmental action is below international standards, allowing any reasonable
and impartial man to recognize its insufficiency.34
In this case, Raglan, despite the measures taken through the so-called anti-
piracy program, clearly failed to meet the minimum international standards
since: (i) the screening of the civilian pilots was so inefficient that the civilians
hired, carried out the attacks they were assigned to prevent, and (ii) the piloting
of The Mairi Maru should have been electronically monitored by the RRN,
according to the anti-piracy program, yet when the ship was steered out of the
sea lanes designated by Raglan for international navigation, the RRN took no
action to investigate such deviation.
Raglan cannot claim that it was incapable of employing more efforts, since
states are presumed to have the power of fulfilling their international
obligations, and may be held responsible for failing in their duties, even if they
are incapable of performing them.35 For instance, in Montijo,36 the arbitrator
held that where states promise protection to those they admit to their territory,
they must find the means of making it effective. Hence, Raglan may not justify
its impossibility to fully protect Appollonians and their property after it
promised such protection.
ii. Raglan failed to exercise due diligence in apprehending
and punishing the wrongdoers
International standards demand that governmental authorities take
affirmative actions to investigate and apprehend wrongdoers.37 For instance, in
Janes,8 the Mexican government was found liable for not having diligently
pursued and properly punishing the offender. In this case, Raglan has neither
located nor apprehended Good, nor is there evidence whatsoever that any
measures have been taken to such effect, evidencing either unwillingness to
apprehend Good, or undue delay, failing to exercise due diligence in its duty to
apprehend and prosecute Good and his confederates.
34. Neer Case, supra note _RefI 12731282\h \* MERGEFORMAT 33, at 61-2.
35. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 973-74 (discussing the Montyo Case(Colom.
v. U.S.), July 26, 1875)); Eagleton, supra note _Refl 12731362\h \* MERGEFORMAT 29, at 90.
36. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 973-74.
37. Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex), 4 R. Int'l Arh. Awards 82, 87 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1926);
Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals
Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L L. REV. 457, 474 (1994); CHrrHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURMS TO ALIENS, 1967, 54.
38. Janes Case, supra note _Ref112731420\h \* MERGEFORMAT 37, at 87.
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4. In The Alternative, If This Court Considers The Acts Of Thomas Good
To Be Piracy Jure Gentium, Raglan Failed Its Duty To Repress Piracy
Under emerging customary law states must cooperate for the repression of
piracy." This is evidenced by the inclusion of this rule in international instru-
ments,40 regional agreements," UN Resolutions, 42 national decisions and legisla-
tion,43 and governmental statements." Indeed, the International Law Commis-
sion ("ILC") stated that states having an opportunity of taking measures against
piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing their duty.45 Furthermore, when
the prohibition of a certain offense attains the status ofjus cogens, such as in the
case of piracy,4 6 it imposes on all states a duty to act to suppress it.
47
39. Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, 20 DEPAULL. REV. 337 (1970); AIR
POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, APP 1003 OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS USE OF FORCE IN
PEACETIME (2004), http://www.raaf.gov.au/airpower/html/doctrine/aapI003-main.asp (last visited Oct. 6,
2005); Lawrence J. Kahn, Pirates, Rovers, and Thieves: New Problems With an Old Enemy, 20 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 293, 306 (1996).
40. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
art. 13, March 1, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222.
41. Agreement Among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating
Status on Cooperation In Combating Crime, In Particular In Its Organized Forms, in force Mar. 2003, art. 1
(BSEC) in 10 L. AND Bus. REv. AM. 631 (2004); Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, April 28, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 829.
42. G.A. Res. 56/37, 15, U.N. Doc. A/56/58/Add. 1 (Oct. 5, 2001); UNrrED NATIONS, OCEANS: THE
LIFELINE OF OUR PLANET ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: 20
YEARS OF LAW AND ORDER ON THE OCEANS AND SEAS (1982-2002), PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THE OCEANS
AND SEAS, 1 1, http://www.un.org/debts/105/conventionagreements/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2005);
43. U.S. v. Kintock, 18 U.S. 144, 148 (1820); U.S. v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 620 (1818); 33 U.S.C.
§ 381 (2000); CONST. (1975), Art. 35, § l(b)(vi) (Papua N.G.); Hong Kong Regulations, Cap. 200-A,
Suppression of Piracy Regulations, http://www.legislation.gov.hkfeng/home.htm.
44. Maureen O'C Walker, U.S. Department of State, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Oceans
Affairs, Statement to the U.N. Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea
(May 10, 2001), http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/4994.htm; Liu Zhenmin, Head of Delegation of China,
Statement to Panel B of the Second Meeting of The United Nations Opened Informal Consultative Process
on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (2005), http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/flsw/t28537.htm; JAPAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EFFORTS IN GLOBAL ISSUES, SUSTAINABLE DEELOPMENT AND GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT ISSUES (2005), http://www.mofa.gojp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-c.pdf (last visited
Oct. 6, 2005).
45. Commentary ILC's Draft Article, [1956] 38 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 282, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1; Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'LL. SUPp. 743 art. 2 (1932).
46. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59-AUT
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
47. lan Patrick Barry, The Right to Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged Vessels on the High
Seas Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense of the Proliferation Security Initiative, 33
HOFSTRA L. REv. 299, 327 (2004); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 107-8 (2001); Georg
Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEx. L. REv. 455 (1967).
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Positioning naval units in piracy-prone regions has proven the only
effective method to combat piracy. For example, the US uses its Navy for
high seas law enforcement and suppression of piracy,49 and attacks on Russian
vessels in the East China Sea ceased when Moscow deployed a naval flotilla.50
Accordingly, in the five piracy-prone regions of the world (Far East, South
America and the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, West Africa, and East Africa),5
affected states employ naval patrols to combat piracy.52 Thus, states affected by
piracy have employed resources available to combat piracy, implementing
effective naval patrols in their waters and on the high seas. In this case, Raglan
solely applied a deficient piloting system in its waters that evidently fails to
provide appropriate protection. Therefore, Raglan did not fulfill its duty to
repress piracy, being no evidence that it invested any efforts to apprehend and
prosecute Good and his assistants.
5. Raglan Owes Compensation To Appollonia For The Attack Upon And
Wreck Of The Main Maru And All Consequences Thereof
A state responsible for an internationally wrongful act, which damage
cannot be made good by restitution, owes compensation for the financially
assessable damage caused.5 3 As proven supra, Raglan is responsible for the
attack and wreck of The Mairi Maru and all consequences thereof. Therefore,
this Court must award compensation for said losses.
48. Michael Vatikiotis, Gunboat Diplomacy, in FAR E. ECON. REV. p. 24 (Jun. 16, 1994); Timothy
H. Goodman, Leaving the Corsair's Name to Other Times: "How to Enforce the Law of Sea Piracy in the 21st
Century Through Regional International Agreements, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 139, 164 (1999); The
Pirates That Hollywood Does Not Portray, Lloyds List, Nov. 27, 1995.
49. Terrence Fokas, The Barbary Coast Revisited: The Resurgence of International Maritime
Piracy, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 427,460 (1997); Christopher A. Abel, Not Fit For Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus
Act, The United States Navy, and Federal law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L REV. 445,477 (1990);
50. Vatikiotis, supra note _Ref1 12731441\h \* MERGEFORMAT 48, at 24.
51. INTERNATIONAL MARrrIME ORGANIZATION, REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS Ift 1, 5 (2003).
52. Beckman et al., Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, I lBRU MARrME
BRIEFiNG 1994, 16; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Piracy Reporting Centre, Report of Jan.-June
30, 1998, 1; Mark Colvin, PM - Joint Anti-Piracy Patrols of the Straits of Malacca, July 20, 2004, ABC
ONLINE, http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/sl 158181 .htm; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Japanese Coast Guard
and Philippine Coast Guard Hold Drill to Combat Terrorism, Piracy, Dec. 21, 2004),
http://www.mol.co.jp/menu-e.shtml (last visited Oct. 6. 2005).
53. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12, at 49 (Nov. 21); Corfu
Channel Case, Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 49 (Apr. 9).
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B. Raglan is responsible for the loss of the Mairi Maru and the Mox and
other cargo that she carried, because its scuttling of the vessel was illegal,
and therefore owes compensation to Appollonia on behalf of its citizens who
suffered direct financial and other losses.
1. Raglan Violated International Law By Scuttling The Mairi Maru
i. Pursuant to the Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction the Scuttling of The Mairi
Maru was in Violation of International Law
It is a general principle of law and a pillar of the freedom of the high seas54
that vessels on the high seas are only subject to the authority of the state whose
flag they fly, precluding other states from exercising jurisdiction without prior
consent." Accordingly, when maritime casualties occur, affected states must
notify the flag state," as without prior consent, only the flag state may
intervene.-" In this case, Raglan made no effort to seek prior consent or consult
Appollonia before scuttling, simply sending a diplomatic note the day before the
action was taken, to inform Appollonia its intention to scuttle the vessel,
violating the flag state jurisdiction principle.
ii. Intervention to Prevent, Mitigate and Eliminate a Grave and Imminent
Danger to a State's Essential Interest cannot be accepted Under Customary
International Law
Raglan may claim that when a maritime casualty occurs on the high seas,
the threatened state may intervene to eliminate, prevent and mitigate a threat of
pollution to its essential interests. However, this rule is not customary," being
54. BRowNLiE, supra note _Refl 12730796\a \* MERGEFORMAT 1, 234; OPPENHEIM's
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note _Ref1 12992401\h \* MERGEFORMAT 12, at 248; R.R. CHURCHILL &
A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 208 (1983).
55. MN Saiga Case (St. Vincent & Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, 1999 ITLOS 2 (July 1);
Geneva Convention, supra note 8, arts. 4-6; UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 91-92.
56. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Conventin for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships 1973, Annexes I & I, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62, 197-98 & 233 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1984); International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 30 I.L.M. 733 (1991) (entered into
force May 15, 1995); Protocol on Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation to Pollution Incidents by
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, Mar. 15, 2000, available at
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainfrane.asp?topic-id=258&docid=683 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005); Bonn
Agreement, Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances 1983, art. 1,5, June 9, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 359.
57. Kiss & SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 552 (2004); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 800 (1982); XuE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11 (2003).
58. BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF
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only expressly included in one international treaty, 9 not ratified by either party
to this case. Additionally, there is no evidence of a widespread and general state
practice supporting custom. Indeed, Russia's proposal to include this rule in the
UNCLOS was rejected, in absence of acceptance by states. 6  Consequently,
Raglan cannot invoke custom to justify the scuttling of The Mairi Maru.
iii. The Scuttling of The Mairi Maru breached the Customary Prohibition
against the Dumping of MOX
Dumping is defined as the deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter
from vessels at sea. 61  Although there is debate as to whether the general
prohibition to dump has acquired customary status, there is consensus on the
customary status of the prohibition to dump high-level radioactive material such
as MOX,61 as evidenced from the rule's inclusion in international63 and regional
treaties,'M as well as its recognition by international organizations.65 Moreover,
Raglan ratified The London Convention without reservations to the rule that
DECISION 220 (1988).
59. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, May 6, 1975, 970 U.N.T.S. 212.
60. Russia's Proposal to Include Intervention on the High Seas During the Occurrence of a Maritime
Casualty, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.25 (1975), 4 O.R., 212.
61. UNCLOS, supra note _Refl 12731493\h \* MERGEFORMAT 8, art. 1 (5); Convention on the
Prevention of the Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London Convention of 1972),
Aug. 30, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 2403.
62. P.W. BIRNiE & A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 422 (2D ED. 2002);
Catherine Redgwell, International Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 668 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
2003); FRED L. MORRISON AND RUDIGER WOLFRUM, INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, 2004,276.
63. Antarctic Treaty, Jun. 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794; Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 2 Nov.
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455; Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, art. 9, May 1992, 28 LL.M. 649.
64. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 9, 1992,
art. 11 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000), available at http://www.helcom.fi/Convention/enGB/text; see
generally Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992,
32 .L.M. 1192; Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region art. 10, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (entered into force Aug. 18, 1990); Convention on the Protection
of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Apr. 21, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 15, 1994) available at
http://www.blacksea-environment.org/Text/BlackSea/BSBucharest.htm.
65. See generally Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Jun. 11 , 1974, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/nfcircs/Others/inf205.shtml; see also Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Aug. 1978, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf2O5alrl.shtnl; International Atomic Energy
Agency, Definition and Recommendations for the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Safety
Series No. 78 (1986); 10th Consultative Meeting, London Draft Convention, London Convention of 1972,
supra note 61.
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expressly prohibits the dumping of radioactive material.";B22;B22 In this case,
Raglan intentionally scuttled The Mairi Maru laden with MOX, placing this
radioactive material at the bottom of the ocean floor in breach of the customary
rule that prohibits dumping high-level radioactive material.
The fact that Raglan secured and encased the MOX canisters prior to
scuttling has no bearing, since Raglan cannot guarantee that with the passing of
time, the changes in temperature and currents, and other circumstances, the
MOX will not cause damage to the environment.67 Indeed, no security measures
regarding the storage of radioactive material are absolutely risk-free.6"
Raglan may also argue that the scuttling of The Maid Maru was taken
under the exception provided for under Article V(1) of the London Convention
that applies when dumping is necessary to save threatened human lives at sea.69
However, this exception is to be interpreted narrowly to prevent the unregulated
dumping of prohibited substances,7 ° only operating when it involves ships in
distress at sea. In this case, human lives aboard The Mairi Maru were not at risk
at the time of the scuttling since the crew had already been rescued. Thus,
Raglan breached customary law prohibiting the dumping of MOX.
2. The Wrongfulness Of The Scuttling Cannot Be Precluded
By Invoking Necessity
i. The conditions for necessity are not met
Raglan may not argue that the wrongfulness of the scuttling of The Mairi
Maru was precluded due to a state of necessity. Indeed, to claim necessity
66. Amendment to the London Convention, 1993, Res. LC.49(16), adopted Nov. 1993, Preamble;
Protocol to the London Convention, Annex II, art. 4(l)(2) 1997 (not in force), available at
http://www.londonconvention.org; London Convention, supra note Refl 12731592\h \* MERGEFORMAT
61, art. 7 (b), art. 10 (1).
67. CRAIG SMITH & ADRIAN GLOVER, ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM, THE DEEP
SEAFLOOR ECOSYSTEM: CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTUS FOR CHANGE BY THE YEAR 2025, available at
http://www.icef.eawag.cb/abstracts/smithglover.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), STUDYING DEEP-SEA BIODIVERSITY AND DUMPING,
http://oceanexplorer.noaa. gov/explorations/deepeast0I/background/dumping/dumping.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2005).
68. Maki Tanaka, Lessons from a Protracted MOX Plant Dispute: A Proposed Protocol on Marine
Environmental Impact Assessment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 337, 367 (2004).
69. London Convention, supra note 61, art. V; Interpretation of the "Force Majeure" and
"Emergencies" Exceptions under Article V of the Convention 1972, IMO LC.2/Circ. 343 (Oct. 25, 1994),
available at http://imp.amsa.gov.au/public/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
70. Jill Murakami, The Dumping of the New Carrisa: An Analysis of the Emergency Provisions of
The London Convention, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 705, 707 (1999).
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certain conditions established in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, and
recognized by this Court, must be fulfilled,7 which in this case were not met.
a. The Scuttling was not the only Means available to Reduce the
Environmental Damage
In order to plea necessity, it must be impossible to proceed by any means
other than the one contrary to international law.72 Hence, the state of necessity
only applies when all legitimate means to mitigate the possible damage have
been exhausted and proved to be of no avail. 73 Indeed, Raglan had several
legitimate methods which were not considered before scuttling the vessel, as has
been done in other cases (e.g. the Prestige, Acushnet, Hua Ding Shan, and
Kursk incidents).74 Moreover, international practice places scuttling among the
least employed methods of controlling pollution at sea, as its effects on the
marine environment have proven negative and violate ocean dumping
prohibitions. In this case, Raglan may have employed other lawful measures,
particularly considering that Raglan (i) was able to secure and encase the MOX,
which requires similar technical capabilities as discharging the cargo, and (ii)
towed The Mairi Maru to the location of its scuttling, a process which involves
similar techniques as taking it to shore. Accordingly, it is evident that scuttling
was not the only means available to Raglan.
b. Raglan Contributed to the State of Necessity
Necessity may not be relied upon when the state claiming it has
contributed, by act or omission, to the situation of alleged necessity.76 In this
case, Raglan contributed to the situation of necessity by failing to police its
waters and -through Good acting as a state agent- setting The Mairi Maru off
71. ARS, supra note 0, art. 25; The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 ICJ Rep.
para. 52 (Sept. 25).
72. The Oscar Chinn Case (Britain v. Belgium), 1934 P.C.I.J.(dissenting opinion Anzilotti) No. 23,
at 113 (Dec. 12); S.S. Wimbledon Case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. I at 306 (Aug. 17).
73. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty)(UK v. U.S.), art. VII (Nov. 19,1794);
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 71
(1994).
74. The Prestige Oil Tanker Disaster, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 20, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theissues/article/0,6512,843781 .00.html (last visited Oct. 4,2005); Kursk Victims'
Slow Death, BRITISH BROADCASTING CHANNEL NEWS (BBC), Oct. 26, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/Europe/1989680.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
75. Barry Sheen, Admiralty Law Institute: Symposium on American and International Maritime
Law: Comparative Aspects of Current Importance: Conventions on Salvage, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1387 (1983);
Joseph C. Sweeny, Collisions Involving Tugs and Tows, 70 TUL. L. REV. 581 (1995).
76. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, supra note _Refl 16195120\p\h \* MERGEFORMAT 71, at para.
57; ARS, supra note _Refl 12730796\h \* MERGEFORMAT 1, art. 25(b).
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course. Both of these circumstances caused the wreck of The Mairi Maru,
subsequently producing the leakage of MOX. Hence, Raglan contributed to the
alleged state of necessity and may not argue that the scuttling of The Mairi
Maru was taken under necessity since the conditions for its application are not
met.
ii. Alternatively, even if acting under necessity, Raglan
owes compensation to Appollonia
Even if this Court determines that the scuttling of the vessel was done
under necessity, the state that has taken measures under necessity, causing
damage to another state, is bound to pay compensation.77 Thus, in this case,
compensation must be paid to Appollonia for the material losses caused.
3. This Court Must Award Compensation For The Loss Of The Mairi Maru
And The MOX
As explained supra, when damage from an international wrong cannot be
made good by restitution, compensation is owed for the financially assessable
damage caused. As already proven, the scuttling of The Mairi Maru was an
internationally wrongful act which caused Appollonia and its nationals to suffer
direct financial damage from the loss of MOX and the vessel, a damage which
cannot be restituted. Therefore, this Court must award compensation for said
losses.
C. Apollonia did not violate any obligations owed to Raglan under
International Law in transporting Mox through the waters of the Raglanian
Archipelago
1. Appollonia's Passage Through Raglan's Archipelagic Waters Was A
Lawful Exercise Of The Right Of Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage.
An archipelagic state may designate sea-lanes to establish the extensive
right of other states to exercise archipelagic sea-lane passage,78 which is
analogous to transit passage through straits.79 Transit passage is the exercise of
77. ARS, supra note _Ref 12730796\h \* MERGEFORMAT 1, art. 27(b); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2001); MAn7HEW SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 708 (2003).
78. CHURCHILL AND LOWE, supra note _Refl12731781\h \* MERGEFORMAT 54, at 127;
UNCLOS, supra note _Ref1 12731493\h \* MERGEFORMAT 8, art. 53.
79. David L. Larson, National Security Aspects of the UnitedStates Extension of the Territorial Sea
to Twelve Nautical Miles, 2 TERR. SEA J. 189, 189-90 (1992); D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Navel/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 283, 289
(1999).
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freedom of navigation solely for the continuous and expeditious transit between
one area of the high seas or economic zone and another.8" This right applies to
all ships, regardless of type, cargo, means of propulsion or sovereign immunity
status.8' The mere transit of ships carrying High Level Plutonium, Irradiated
Nuclear Fuel and High Level Radioactive Waste (e.g. MOX) through the
territorial sea of a state is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of
the coastal state.82 In this case, Raglan by designating its sea-lanes, granted the
right of archipelagic sea-lane passage to all ships regardless of cargo, including
Appollonia's MOX shipment. Therefore, the passage of The Mairi-Maru
through Raglanian waters was a valid exercise of its right of archipelagic sea-
lane passage.
2. Appollonia Was Not Bound To Notify Raglan Of Its MOX Shipments
i. Appollonia Was not Bound to Notify Raglan under Treaty Law
Under the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and The
Basel Convention, states must notify the transport of nuclear materials and
hazardous wastes to other states through which said transport takes place.
However, neither of them bind Appollonia to notify Raglan, as Raglan has not
signed nor ratified any such treaty. According to Article 34 of the VCLT,
ratified by both states, treaties cannot create obligations or rights for third non-
party states."3 Hence, Appollonia was not bound to notify Raglan of the
shipment of MOX under treaty law.
ii. Appollonia was not Bound to Notify Raglan under Customary
International Law
Shipment of nuclear substances, including MOX, is a widespread practice
among states such as US, Japan, France, and UK (the principal shippers of
radioactive materials).' For instance, in September 2004, the Pacific Pintail
80. UNCLOS, supra note _Refl 12731493\h \* MERGEFORMAT 8, art. 38(2); BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 962 (1999); MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 189 (1993); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-10 (1993).
81. J. Peter A. Bernhardt, The Right ofArchipelagic Sea Lanes Passage: A Primer, 35 CA. J. INTL
L. 719, 768-69(1995).
82. Raul A. F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 207, 223
(1997).
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, Jan 27, 1900, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; CHRISTINE
CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1993); PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
TREATIES 140 (1995); CASSESE, supra note Ref1 16195265\h \* MERGEFORMAT 77, at 119.
84. DUNCAN E.J. CURRIE, SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW & ITS
ADMINISTRATION IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTION, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
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and the Pacific Teal, two British vessels, carried 140kg of weapons grade
plutonium from South Carolina to France, arriving on October 8, 2004.85 The
shipment of radioactive materials is not likely to be reduced in the future, as
evidenced from France's and Japan's contracts to ship radioactive waste until
2011 86 The practice of these states is of utmost importance for the purpose of
assessing the customary obligation surrounding such shipments.87
For a rule of international law to acquire customary status, a widespread,
consistent and actual state practice is required." With respect to the
notification of MOX, plutonium and other radioactive waste shipments, such
practice does not exist.89 For example, Japan kept the route of The Akatsuki
Maru, a vessel carrying 1700kg of plutonium, secret. 90 France, Japan and the
UK, never revealed the routes of The Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal.9' Hence,
although treaties may establish the duty to notify, the element of state practice
is lacking. Consequently, since the notification of MOX shipments has not
acquired customary law status, Appollonia was not bound to notify Raglan.
SHIPMENTS OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS: STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS TO PROTECT THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1998), available at http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/Nuclear /20Shipment
%20Paper.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
85. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, NUKES ON VACATION: ACTIVISTS LIE IN WAIT FOR NUCLEAR
SHIPMENT(2004), http://www.greenpeace.org/intemationalen/news/details?itemid=593488 (last visited Oct.
4,2005).
86. Lawrence Marin, Oceanic Transportation of Radioactive Materials: The Conflict Between The
Law of the Seas 'Right of Innocent Passage and Duty to the Marine Environment, 13 FLA. J. INTL L.361, 369
(2001).
87. See generally J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994); CASSESE, supra
note _Refi 16195265\h \* MERGEFORMAT 77, at 123.
88. SHAW, supra note _Refi 16195265\h \* MERGEFORMAT 77, at 80; PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEutRsT's MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1997).
89. Eugene R. Fidell, Maritime Transportation of Plutonium and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 31 INT'L LAW
757, 771 (1997).
90. Karen Fredericks, Plutonium Ship Endangers Millions, GREENLEFT WEEKLY-ONLINE EDITION,
1992, http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1992/ 76/76p5.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); Press Release,
Greenpeace, Condemning Japanese Plutonium Shipments (Nov. 12, 1992).
91. Press Release, Greenpeace, Plutonium Ships begin Sea Trials before Secret Voyage to Japan
(June 24, 1999), http://.archivegreenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctreans/1999jun24.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2005); Press Release, Greenpeace , Leaked Document Reveals Deadly N-Waste Wouldn't be Salvaged (Feb.
18, 1997), http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-pressreleases/1997/msg034.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005); Press Release, Greenpeace Activist Occupy Cherbourg Granes Prior to Imminent Plutonium
Shipment (July 11, 1999), http://archive.greenpeace.org/press releases/nuctrans/1999jull 1. html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005).
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3. Appollonia Did Not Breach The Precautionary Principle
i. Appollonia 's lack of notification of MOX shipments
was a precautionary measure
The Precautionary Principle, a general principle of law, defines the duty of
states to take all necessary precautions to avoid damage to the environment
when the threat of damage is serious and irreversible.92 With regard to its MOX
shipment, Appollonia complied with said principle by taking safety measures,
including not notifying. Indeed, lack of notification of MOX shipments, is
precisely a precaution to avoid damage to the environment, because the threat
of the damage is serious and irreversible, MOX being considered a high-level
radioactive waste capable of causing a grave environmental incidents and
classified as a possible object for terror attack, due to the high level of
plutonium in MOX fuel.93 Therefore, it is essential and appropriate to limit
information regarding MOX shipments to ensure that the environment, the ship
and its crew, as well as the cargo, are secure. 94 Indeed, the public opinion has
been aware for some time now that well-known terrorists (e.g. Al Qaeda, Osama
Bin-Laden) have been trying to get this kind of nuclear fuel since scientists have
confirmed that it would be easy to create nuclear bombs from fresh MOX. 95
Hence, to avoid a terrorist attack against a vessel carrying MOX, the secrecy
principle governs shipments containing plutonium.96 Accordingly, as already
mentioned (e.g. the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal) MOX shipment routes
throughout the world remain secret. 97 Moreover, due to matters of national
92. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities [hereinafter
Prevention of Transboundary Harm), arts. 3 and 15, 53dSess., Supp. No. 10, UNGAOR A/56/10 (Nov. 2001);
JUSTINE THORNTON & SILAS BECKWITH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 35 (1997).
93. Erik Martiniussen, New MOX-transports from Japan to UK, BELLONA, Apr. 26, 2002,
http://www.beona.no/en/energy/nuclear/nuclear/sellafield24269.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); Pete Roche,
Sellafield MOX Plant Struggles Onwards, SAFE ENERGY E-JOURNAL NO. 22, Sept-Nov. 2001,
http://www.hare-uk.org/safe-energy-no22.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
94. MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for the Prescription of Provisional
Measures under Art. 290, Para. 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2001 ITLOS 2
(Dec. 3); Pedrozo, supra note _Ref 16195839\h \* MERGEFORMAT 82, at 221; Tanaka, supra note
Refl 16195910'h \* MERGEFORMAT 68, at 366.
95. Green Challenge on UK Nuclear Plant Reaches Court, PLANET ARK-WORLD ENVIRONMENT
NEwS, Aug. 11,2001, http'//www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid= 13189 (last visited Oct.
4, 2005); Gordon Edwards, Nuclear Power: Exploding the Myths, ENCOMPASS MAGAZINE, Mar. 2001,
available at http://www.ccnr.org/encompass.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); Gordon Edwards, Chalk River
Test to Inaugurate Basin "Plutonium Economy," ENCOMPASS MAGAZINE, Mar. 1998,
http://www.glu.org/english/information/newsletters/l 2_l-winter-spring 1998/ChalkRiverMOXtest. html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2005).
96. Main, supra note _Refl 16195979\h \* MERGEFORMAT 86, at 373.
97. Press Release, Greenpeace, Plutonium Ships begin Sea Trials before Secret Voyage to Japan
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security and commercial confidentiality a state may withhold vital
information.98 Therefore, before crediting this standard of secrecy with having
caused attacks or wrecks of shipments of radioactive materials, it is pertinent to
mention that under this standard no such attacks or wrecks have occurred and
radioactive materials have been safely transported by sea since the 1960s.99
Accordingly, Appollonia complied with the precautionary principle by not
notifying Raglan of the MOX shipments.
a. Appollonia complied with international standards pertaining to the
shipment of MOX
Activities deriving from fissionable materials, such as the shipment of
radioactive materials (e.g. MOX), are subject to certain international standards
arising from the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which
Appollonia is a party. Appollonia fully complied with these standards,
established in Article 111.1 of said Non Proliferation Treaty, since it (i)
concluded a safeguard agreement with the IAEA; (ii) entered into separate
Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA concerning the transfer of MOX from
Appollonia to Maguffm; (iii) entered into an agreement with MARC and
reported this agreement to the IAEA; and (iv) reported its shipments of MOX
to the IAEA. In any case, Raglan may not invoke any duties or obligations
arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty as basis for its claim, since Raglan is
not a party to it and thus lacks any rights to invoke its provisions, under Article
34 of the VCLT. Therefore -even though Appollonia has indeed complied with
international standards- had it failed to comply with such standards, Raglan
would not be able to invoke such failure before this Court.
(June 24. 1999), http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctans/1999jun24.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005); Stormy Waters for Nuclear Shipments, BRITISH BROADCASTING CHANNEL NEWS (BBC), UK, July 19,
1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/uk/398387.stm (last visited Oct. 4,2005); Press Release, Greenpeace, Route
of Plutonium Shipment Kept Secret, Oct. 1 999
http://www.greenpeace.se/norway/english/9camp/3nuces/93main.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
98. Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note _Refl 16196038\h \* MERGEFORMAT 92, art.
14; Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of Prevention of Maritime
Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT'L REV. 369 (2002).
99. Japan's Nuclear Power Program: Power for the Future of Japan: Safety and Security First,
http://www.japannuclear.com/nuclearpower/transportation/safetyhtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); BNFL,
Transporting Nuclear Materials, http://www.bnfl.co.uk/index.aspx?page=609 (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
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4. Alternatively, Raglan Cannot Contest The Legality Of The Shipment of
MOX -Since It Acquiesced To Said Shipments
Acquiescence, a recognized general principle of law,"° has been defined
as silence or absence of protest in circumstances generally calling for a positive
reaction of objection.'01 When states acquiesce to the conduct of other states
without protesting against them, the assumption must be that such behavior is
accepted, therefore, said state cannot subsequently claim the illegality of such
conduct. 2 The IAEA noted, in its July 31, 1999 report, that Appollonia
shipped MOX through Raglan's waters without notifying. Accordingly, by the
time of the accident, in July 28, 2002, Raglan was aware that MOX was being
shipped through its waters without notification and not once did it protest,
complain or object to such shipment. As a result, Raglan acquiesced to
Appollonia's shipments of MOX and is barred from claiming the illegality of
such conduct.
D. Raglan does not have standing to seek compensation for economic losses
resulting from acts that occurred wholly outside of its territorial waters and
exclusive economic zone
1. Raglan's Claim Is Inadmissible Since Local Remedies
Were Not Exhausted
As established supra, before international claims are brought against a
state, all effective and available local remedies need to be exhausted.'03 In this
case, Raglanian tourism and sport fishing industries did not bring claims before
Appollonian courts as a result of the wreck of The Mairi Maru. Hence,
Raglan's claim is inadmissible.
Raglan may argue that it currently brings a mixed claim, primarily for the
losses caused to the state directly, and hence, would not need to exhaust local
remedies. However, when a mixed claim is brought before the Court and it is
not made preponderantly for direct damages to the state,'" local remedies must
be exhausted. The test used to determine preponderance is based on the nature
of the claim and whether it is brought to secure the interest of the state's
100. A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
401 (1996).
101. Delimination of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/U.S.), 1984
I.C.J.305 (Oct. 12); The Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 597 (Dec. 22).
102. Delimination of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 101 at 246;
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); SHAW, supra note, at 85.
103. Finnish Ships Arbitration, supra note 2.
104. Electronia SilcuaS.P.A. (ELSI), 1989 .C.J. at 52; AMERASINGHE, supra note Refl 12731420\h
\* MERGEFORMAT 37, at 188.
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nationals or that of the state itself.'05 In Interhandel Case, this Court decided
that the nature of the claim brought by the Swiss Government was indeed a case
adopted on behalf of its national, and hence, local remedies needed to be
exhausted."' 6 In this case, Raglan's claim for compensation for losses to its
fishing and tourism industries evidences the exercise of diplomatic protection.
Hence, Raglan's claim is inadmissible as local remedies have not been
exhausted by such corporations.
2. Raglan Lacks Standing Since Its Legal Interests Have Not Been Affected
i. The Damages to the Sandbars and its Surrounding Waters has not
Affected any of Raglan's Individual Legal Interests
A state only has standing to seek remedies for the commission of an
internationally wrongful act when it is injured on its own legal rights or
interests, 1 7 which, as recognized in the South West Africa Case, must be vested
in some text, instrument or rule of law.'
Raglan seeks compensation for the injury suffered by fishing and tourist
corporations due to damage caused to the Norton Shallows, an area located
outside its jurisdiction. The fact that this area has not been claimed by any
nation renders it terra nullius,'° making it available for the use and enjoyment
of all nations, which holds true for the waters surrounding it, regarded as high
seas. 11
0
In relation to incidents occurring in common areas such as the high seas,
states' individual legal interests are restricted to their flagships, nationals and
property,"' none of which were affected in this case. Indeed, states have been
only held responsible in similar cases when one of the aforementioned interests
has been affected." 2
105. Second Report on Diplomatic Protection by John Dugard, Special Rapporteur, to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1514 (2001); AMERASINGHE, supra note _Refl 12731420\ \*
MERGEFORMAT 37, at 198.
106. Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at para. 28.
107. ARS, supra note _Ref 12730796\h \* MERGEFORMAT 1, art. 31; Crawford, supra note
_Refl 12730962\h \* MERGEFORMAT 17, at 202, 254; HANQIN, supra note _Ref 12732373\h \*
MERGEFORMAT 57, at 236-37; LORIDAMRoscH ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 733
(2001).
108. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr., 1966 I.C.J. 6, 32-6 (July 18).
109. AKERHURsT, supra note _Refl16197746\h \* MERGEFORMAT 88, at 148; REBECCA
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 93 (1997); BROWNLIE, supra note 0, at 174.
110. BROwNLIE, supra note 0, at 174.
111. SMITH, supra note _Refl 12732449\h \* MERGEFORMAT 58, at 87-9.
112. See generally I'm Alone Case, 3 RIAA 1609 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1935); The Lusitania Cases, 7 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 32, (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1956); Owners of The Jessie (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R. Intl Arb. Awards 57
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For instance, in the Fukuryu Maru incident (involving the US and Japan),
when the US exploded a test hydrogen bomb in the Marshall Islands, injuring
Japanese fishermen on the high seas and a fishing resource customarily
exploited by Japan with radioactive fallout,113 the US did not manifest any
intention to allocate any part of its ex gratia payment for the incident to Japan's
losses resulting from the impairment of the area's environment." 4 In the 1989
Bahia Paraiso incident, an Argentinean ship grounded off the Antarctic
Peninsula causing an oil spill which affected US research activities carried out
for 20 years in the area." 5 However, no claim was made either by the US or any
other state to the Argentinean government claiming compensation for damages
suffered. Further, in the Amoco C6diz Case a US Court expressly recognized
that since damage was done to res nullius, no one had standing to claim
compensation for environmental impairment.'16
These cases evidence states' lack of standing to sue for damage caused in
these areas," 7 implying that when activities are carried out therein, states and
their nationals are at their own risk.
Therefore, since the MOX spill has not caused any damage to Raglan's
territorial waters or EEZ -and thus no injury to its individual legal interests- it
lacks standing to seek compensation.
ii. Raglan's Right to Exercise its High Seas'Freedoms in the Norton
Shallows do not Grant it Standing
Raglan may base its standing on the claim that the damage caused to the
marine environment of the Norton Shallows has impaired its exercise of the
freedoms of the high seas in the area. However, given the high seas' quality of
(Penn. Ct. Arb. 1955); See generally Cape Horn Pigeon, 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 51 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1959).
113. MARIoRIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 1-15 (1968); HANQN, supra
note _RefI 12732373\h \* MERGEFORMAT 57, at 20; O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict
Liability Issue: The Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic of International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, 18 DENV. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y, 1990, 178.
114. Personal and Property Damage Claims, Jan. 4, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 1; Emanuel Margolis, The
Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L. J. 638-39 (1995); PHILIPPE SANDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 887 (2002).
115. JONATHAN 1. CHARNEY, THIRD STATE REMEDIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE TO THE
WORLD'S COMMON SPACES, IN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 149-50
(Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991); John Noble Wilford, Ship's Oil Leak may Imperil
Antarctic Wildlife, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1989, at A9.
116. In Re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" offthe Coast of France on March 16, 1978, No. 376, 1988
U.S. Dist. Lexis 16832, at *29-30 (N.D. III. Jan. 11, 1988).
117. Robert Mclaughlin, Improving Compliance: MakingNon-State InternationalActors Responsible
For Environmental Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 388 (2000); ALEXANDRE KIss, DRorr
INTERNATIONAL DE LENVIRONNEMENT, 3 tTUDES INTERNATIONALES 105 (1989).
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res communis,"8 any damage caused to its environment would be suffered by
the international community as a whole as all states would be deprived from
their equal rights over it." 9 Accordingly, standing to seek due compensation in
this regard belongs to the international community, not to states individually,
20
which bars Raglan from pursuing an action based on individual interests.
3. Alternatively, Appollonia Is Not Responsible For the Damage To The
Norton Shallows
i. Appollonia is not Subject to the Strict Liability Doctrine
Raglan may argue that Appollonia is liable for the damage to the Norton
Shallows based on a regime of strict liability applicable to the carrying out of
hazardous activities. However, the strict liability doctrine may only apply if
expressly convened by states.'12  In this case, since no such agreement exists
between the parties, the standard of strict liability may not be invoked.
ii. The Damage to the Sandbar and its Surrounding Waters is not
Attributable to Appollonia
Should this Court find Appollonia's shipment of MOX unlawful or accept
to apply the strict liability doctrine, Appollonia may still not be held responsible
since the damage to the Norton Shallows was not caused by any conduct
attributable to it. In this regard, states only owe reparation when the damage
suffered is the proximate cause of the state's act,'22 which requires (i) a clear and
unbroken connection between the act complained of and the loss suffered,123 and
118. DAMROSCHET AL., supra note _Ref1 16198346\h \* MERGEFORMAT 107, at 1558; HANQIN,
supra note _Refl 12732373\h \* MERGEFORMAT 57, at 193.
119. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ Rep. 253, 457 (Dec. 20); CHARNEY, supra note
_Ref1 16198619\h \* MERGEFORMAT 115, at 166.
120. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note _Ref 12992608\h \* MERGEFORMAT 62, at 196; KISs &
SHELTON, supra note _Ref1 12732373\h \* MERGEFORMAT 57, at 325.
121. Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law by Robert Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/346 +Add.
1-2 (1981); JULIO BARBOZA, THE ILC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN: HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 78-9 (WETrERSTEIN ED., 1997); Henry Barron,
After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under International Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 660
(1987).
122. BROWNLIE, supra note 0, at 225; DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTs LAw 10 (1999); J.H.W. VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, MARTINUS
NuHOFF, 735 (1973).
123. Administrative Decision No. IL 7 R. Intl Arb. Awards 23, 30 (1923); Dix Case, 9 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 119 (1959); BROWNLIE, supra note 0, at 223-27.
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(ii) that the latter be either a normal or foreseeable consequence of the former. 24
Failure to meet these criteria renders the damages not subject to
compensation.'25 As proven infra, none of these criteria is met in this case.
a. There is no clear and unbroken connection between Appollonia's acts and
the damage to the Norton Shallows
Intervening causes in the chain of events that lead to a damage relieves a
defendant from responsibility.126 Regarding hazardous activities, this principle
is included in international instruments as a circumstance exempting liability
when the damage is caused by an intentional act of a third party.'" In this case,
the damage to the Norton Shallows would have not occurred without the
intervention of extraneous causes independent of any acts attributable to
Appollonia, namely (i) the acts of Good who dismantled The Mairi Maru and;
(ii) the existence of a severe storm which altered the course of the ship, causing
it to wreck in the Norton Shallows. Thus, a clear and unbroken connection
between Appollonia's MOX shipment and the damage caused is lacking.
b. The 'damage to the Norton Shallows was neither a normal or foreseeable
consequence ofAppollonia's MOX shipment
Raglan may argue that there was a high risk of a pirate attack to The Mairi
Maru at the time of its shipment, and that a spill of MOX resulting from such
attack could have been foreseen. However, the attack on The Mari Maru and
the way it occurred could have not been foreseen by Raglan. This is so if
considered that no ship piloted by Raglanian officers or private contractors had
ever been attacked by "pirates" and that all attacks that occurred in the past were
124. Lighthouses Arbitration, 12 R. Intl Arb. Awards 210, 17-18 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956); Naulilaa
Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1012, 32 (1930); Life Insurance Claims, German-US Mixed CI.Comm., in:
Opinions and Decisions January 1, 1933-October 30, 1939 133-4 (1930); Beha Case, German-U.S. Mixed
CI.Comm., in: Opinions and Decisions January 1, 1933-October 30, 1939 901 (1940); Heirs of Jean Maninat
Case, 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 55, (Penn. Ct. Arb.1905); Sir Cecil Hurst and R. Newton Crane, Joint Report
No. II (Aug. 12, 1904) (regarding the Samoan Claims Award (1902))
125. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1038; A. Hauriou, Les Dommages Indirects dans les
Arbitraux Internationaux, Droit International Public (RGDIP) 219 (1924).
126. Lusitania, 7 R. Int'l Arb. Award, 35-6; Yuille, Shortridge and Co. Case, Lapradelle and Politis,
Recuei des Arbitrages Internationaux, Vol. 2, 109.
127. International Convention On Civil Liability For Oil Pollution Damage, art. lHI(2)(b), Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 7(2)(b), 35 I.L.M. 1406 (not in force);
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage;25489;25489, art. 3(3)(b), 2001,
IMO LEG/CONF. 12. DCI, available at http://www.imo.org (last visited October 3, 2005).; Convention on
Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation
Vessels, art. 5(4),U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/84, U.N. Sales No. E.90.1.E.39 (1990) (including Explanatory
Report) (The ; 15640; 1 5640Convention has not yet come into force).
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carried out by private persons with no link to Raglanian authorities. Good's
attack was indeed the first to be carried out by a pilot of Raglan's anti-piracy
program. Consequently, Appollonia had no basis to foresee neither the
occurrence of this attack under these circumstances nor any of its consequences.
Additionally, considering that Appollonia had successfully been shipping
MOX for over seven years -even during the highest level of warning- with no
similar incident, a MOX spill resulting from a "pirate" attack cannot be regarded
as a normal consequence.
Hence, a MOX spill was neither a foreseeable nor normal consequence of
Appollonia's shipment of MOX, and thus, it should not be deemed its proximate
cause.
4. Alternatively, Appollonia Is Not Bound To Pay Full Compensation
i. Raglan's Alleged Economic Losses are not Subject to Compensation
Under international law it is still unclear whether loss of profits is recogn-
ized as an established head of damages.' 28 Notwithstanding, compensation can
not be recognized for economic losses suffered by individuals who enjoy a
public or common facility not involving a loss or injury to a proprietary
interest.129 Specifically, regarding harm caused by nuclear activities, the
existing treaties governing liability limit compensation to personal injury and
damage to or loss of property. 3 ' In this case, a proprietary interest over the
Norton Shallows is lacking as it is terra nullius. Hence, any claim for damages
occurring in said area should be disregarded.
ii. Since Raglan's Negligence Contributed to the Damage,
Full Recovery is Precluded
If the Court deems that compensation is owed by Appollonia, Raglan's
negligence in preventing an attack to The Mairi Maru must be considered, as it
128. Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of
International Law, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 940,940-42 (1986).
129. Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, not in force, art. 2(7)(c); First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of
Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities by P.S. Rao, Special Rapporteur, Para. 130, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/531 (2003); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 US 303 (1927); Union Oil Company
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (1974); In re Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 821 F.Supp 950 (1993); In Re The
Exxon Valdez, 2002 AMC 1 (2001); Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, [1990] A.C. 398.
130. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, art. 3, Apr. 1968, 956
U.N.T.S. 266; Agreement Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, art. I(1)(k), Dec. 1974, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, art. I(1)(k), Nov. 1977, 1063 UNTS 265.
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raises a question of comparative fault. 3' Indeed, in determining the extent of
reparation, account shall be taken of an injured state's contribution to the injury
by its willful or negligent conduct. 132 Indeed, international tribunals have
reduced a claimant's award in proportion to her culpability. 133 Thus, should
Appollonia be held responsible, it would not be bound to pay full compensation,
among other causes, due to Raglan's failure to prevent a "pirate" attack to The
Mairi Maru, as proven supra.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Appollonia respectfully requests that the Court Declare (i) that Raglan is
responsible for the attack upon and wreck of The Mairi Maru and all
consequences that arose from the wreck; (ii) that Raglan is responsible for the
loss of The Mairi Maru and the MOX onboard as the scuttling of the vessel was
illegal and is obliged to pay compensation for these losses; (iii) that Raglan
lacks standing to seek compensation for losses resulting from acts that occurred
outside its territory; and (iv) that Appollonia did not violate any obligations
under international law in the transportation of MOX through Raglanian waters.
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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Appollonia and the Kingdom of Raglan submit their
differences concerning The Mairi Maru to this Court by Special Agreement,
dated May 15, 2004, pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court's Statute. The
parties have agreed to the contents of the Compromis submitted as part of the
Special Agreement. In accordance with Article 36(1) of the Court's Statute,
each party shall accept the judgment of this Court as final and binding and shall
execute it in good faith in its entirety.
I1. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Raglan is responsible for the attack on The Mairi Maru.
2. Whether Raglan owes Appollonia compensation for any injury resulting
from the attack on The Mairi Maru.
3. Whether Raglan violated any obligation owed to Appollonia under
international law by scuttling The Mairi Maru.
4. Whether Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through
Raglan's archipelagic waters without giving Raglan prior notification or
receiving its consent.
5. Whether Appollonia is responsible for the damage to the Norton Shallows
and surrounding waters.
6. Whether Appollonia must compensate Raglan for the injury to its fishing
and tourist industries and the cost of decontaminating the area.
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Kingdom of Raglan is a small, developing archipelagic nation lying
roughly halfway between the Republic of Appollonia, a nuclear nation, and the
Democratic Republic of Maguffin. In 1990, Appollonia discovered uranium
deposits below its soil and developed a significant nuclear energy program.
Following its construction of a nuclear reactor, Appollonia reached a
"safeguards agreement" with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
regarding the operation of the plant in 1996. [Compromis In 1, 3].
Appollonia's nuclear reactor produced, as a by-product, a significant
amount of plutonium, which can be used to make mixed oxide fuel (MOX). In
1997, Appollonia entered into a five-year sales agreement with the Maguffm
Atomic Recycling Company, Ltd. for the surplus MOX. Appollonia shipped the
MOX via private carriers through the Raglanian Archipelago to Maguffm.
[Compromis n 4-5, 8].
From 1995 to 1999, several groups of technologically-advanced pirates
routinely attacked ships in Raglan's archipelagic straits. By 1998, the Insurers
of Lading and Shipping Association (ILSA) recognized the danger presented by
the attacks and issued, a "five-point warning," (ILSA's strongest warning) to
insurers and re-insurers of ships traveling the archipelago. As a result, shipping
traffic through the archipelago decreased dramatically. Appollonia, however,
continued its MOX shipment through the archipelago. [Compromis 16-8].
In a July 1999 report, the IAEA criticized Appollonia's transport of MOX,
noting that Appollonia "gives no notice to . . . Raglan that MOX will be
transported through [its] territorial waters or exclusive economic zones. MOX
is shipped without adequate safeguards on private vessels through waters known
to be frequented by pirates." Appollonia responded that its navy was ill-
equipped to protect its MOX shipments, that the private carriers provided better
security, and that the security of the shipments required secrecy. [Compromis
8-10].
To combat the continuing pirate attacks in its straits, Raglan announced its
anti-piracy program in October 1999. The voluntary program provided
requesting ship captains with a Raglanian naval officer to steer the ship through
Raglan's archipelago. The naval pilot would maintain constant contact with the
Raglanian navy, which could respond to an attack within thirty minutes. The
program was highly successful; during the program's first two years, no vessel
utilizing the program was attacked. In response to the reduction in attacks in the
archipelago, ILSA reduced its alert level to a "four-point warning." By
November 2001, the success of the piloting program created a demand that
Raglan's navy was unable to meet with its own personnel. Raglan hired one
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hundred private contractors to supplement its program. [Compromis 9[ 11-13,
Clarifications 9].
The Mairi Maru, a large, double-hulled ocean-going cargo ship, set sail for
Maguffin on July 26, 2002, carrying several canisters of MOX. Only the
Appollonian government, the IAEA, the captain and first officer of the vessel
were aware of the shipment. A storm delayed The Mairi Maru several hours
past its scheduled departure time, and it did not approach the archipelago until
near dusk on July 27, 2002. The ship's captain radioed Raglan requesting a
pilot. Shortly thereafter, one of Raglan's private contractors was transported to
the ship by a privately-owned and operated vessel hired by the Raglanian navy.
He arrived on the ship with two assistants and identified himself as Thomas
Good. [Compromis 14-16, Clarifications ]1 3, 9, 11].
Good boarded the ship on the high seas. The Mairi Maru entered
Raglanian waters at 2200 hours. At 2300 hours, Good informed The Mairi
Maru's captain that he had explosives he would detonate unless the ship was
surrendered to his control. The captain capitulated, and he and the crew were
locked in the ship's galley. Good took control of the vessel, navigating it to a
location where he met with fellow confederates. Good's group removed all of
the ship's navigation equipment, disabled the aft propeller shaft, and then
disembarked, leaving The Mairi Maru to drift on a south-easterly course toward
international waters. The MOX was left undisturbed in a locked hold.
[Compromis 91 17-18, Clarifications 3, 11].
The next day, July 28, 2002, a storm pushed The Mairi Maru into the
Norton Shallows, a region of uninhabited sandbars located 250 nautical miles
from Raglan's archipelagic baseline and used exclusively by Raglan-
incorporated firms for sport fishing and eco-tourism, which provide Raglan with
more than 80 million Euro of tax revenue annually. The Mairi Maru ran
aground in the Shallows. Its hull was breached, and the compartment
containing the MOX canisters was ruptured, causing damage to the canisters.
The canisters began to leak into the surrounding area, and over fifty kilograms
of highly radioactive MOX pellets spilled out onto the sandbar and into the
surrounding water. A Raglanian naval patrol boat spotted the wreckage on July
29, 2002. Upon arrival, the naval medical support team found several crew
members dead, and the rest suffering from acute radiation syndrome.
[Compromis 1 2, 19-20, Corrections 14, Clarifications 4].
Raglan's Prime Minister Robert Price notified the President of Appollonia,
Judith Stark, that The Mairi Maru had crashed, and was leaking radioactive
material causing severe damage to the entire region. Further, impending storms
threatened to spread the radioactive material toward Raglan's inhabited islands.
Mr. Price noted that Appollonia failed to give Raglan notice of the MOX
shipments, which he maintained violated Appollonia's duties as a member of
the IAEA. Had notice been given, Raglan would have either denied The Mairi
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Maru access to the straits, or taken greater efforts to protect the ship and its
cargo. Lastly, Mr. Price informed Appollonia that Raglan expected Appollonia
to pay for the cleanup of the area, and compensate Raglan for its lost tourism
revenue. [Compromis 21, 22, 24, 25].
On August 4, 2002, Raglan announced its intention to sink the ship and the
MOX to the ocean floor. Raglan maintained that scuttling The Mairi Maru was
its only option to minimize the danger presented by the ship. Later that week,
Raglan encased the MOX in canisters, towed The Mairi Maru to Sand Deep and
sunk the vessel 9000 meters. [Compromis 21-24, Corrections 4,
Clarifications l 4, 12].
Appollonia responded, claiming it had met its obligations regarding the
shipments, and that Raglan must bear responsibility "for the crash and its
consequences." Regarding the shipping, Appollonia maintained that Raglan
was aware of the shipping, it did not breach its obligations as a member of the
IAEA, and that Raglan has no standing to raise issues regarding IAEA
obligations. [Compromis 9J] 25-29].
Regarding the scuttling, Appollonia insisted Raglan was responsible for the
attack on The Mairi Maru, and that its negligence in screening pilots made
Raglan liable for the loss of the ship, and harm to its crew. Appollonia also
announced that it considered Raglan's actions a violation of the London
Convention. [Compromis Ti 28-30].
Taking notice of the increased tension between the two nations, the
Regional Organization of Nations (RON), in a July 1, 2003 session, called upon
Raglan and Appollonia to bring this case before the International Court of
Justice. The nations agreed, and the submissions of both parties followed.
[Compromis 30-33].
V. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I. Raglan incurred no liability for Thomas Good's attack on The Mairi Maru
because no international obligation owing to Appollonia was breached.
Piracy was codified as a crime under international law solely to provide
states with an extraterritorial basis for jurisdiction over crimes that
occurred on the high seas. As such, international law delineates no basis
for a claim of piracy in a case such as this, where criminals hijack ships
within sovereign waters. Additionally Raglan's successful anti-piracy
program, with the full force of the Raglanian Navy behind it, met the
general international law obligation of all states to cooperate fully in
suppressing piracy. In any event, the hijacking of The Mairi Maru was in
direct contravention of Good's duties as a safety officer and wholly outside
Raglan's control. Because international law distinguishes between acts
committed under a state's direction, and acts outside the scope of state
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control, refusing to hold states responsible for the latter, Good's actions
cannot be attributable to Raglan.
II. Raglan acted reasonably and in accordance with international law in
scuttling The Mairi Maru. Due to Raglan's treaty and customary
international law obligations requiring protection of the marine
environment, Raglan had no choice but to scuttle the vessel. Though the
radiation-leaking ship already posed a grave threat to the Norton Shallows
and surrounding waters, the impending rainy season threatened
catastrophic exposure to the entire region, making cleanup impossible.
Although time was of the essence, Raglan abided by all applicable
international obligations prior to and during the scuttling the vessel.
Raglan's lack of alternatives in the matter justifies its actions under the
necessity doctrine, which precludes wrongfulness where a state must take
actions that may be considered unlawful in less demanding circumstances.
IH. Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through Raglan's
archipelago without providing prior notification of the transit. Raglan's
right to require notification and/or consent is consistent with the provisions
governing navigational regimes and nuclear transport in the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, widely recognized as a codification of
international law. Further, evidence of the right to require prior
notification exists in the significant amount of domestic legislation that
requires prior notification of ships carrying ultra-hazardous cargo, and,
more importantly, in the number of shipping states that understand their
legal obligation to comply with this legislation. Furthermore, regulations
promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency require
Appollonia to notify "pass-through" states like Raglan of the shipment of
nuclear materials. Any claims that the secrecy of the transit was required
for security purposes demonstrates Appollonia's unabashed disregard not
only for the safety of the region's inhabitants, but also for the region's
entire eco-system.
IV. Raglan has standing to bring a claim for compensation for the cost of
decontaminating the Norton Shallows and the injury to its fishing and
tourism industries based on an erga omnes duty to protect the marine
environment. Appollonia is liable to Raglan under several theories of
liability. First, Appollonia violated its customary international legal
obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm. Second,
international law recognizes a strict-liability system of fault for injury
arising from ultra-hazardous activity, including the shipment of hazardous
nuclear material. Lastly, even under a "due diligence" system of fault,
Appollonia cannot plausibly maintain that it met its duty of general care to
prevent transboundary environmental harm when it launched The Mairi
Maru and its nuclear cargo without notifying Raglan of the ship's contents.
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VI. PLEADINGS
A. Raglan Is Not Responsible For The Attack On The Mairi Maru And Owes
No Compensation For Any Resulting Injury
1. Raglan met any obligation under international law to prevent piracy, and
is not responsible for the attack and its aftermath
Thomas Good's hijacking of The Mairi Maru was criminal and reprehen-
sible. However, under international law, Raglan incurs no liability based upon
Good's actions. Although pirates have long been considered hostis humanis
generis,' the duty of nations regarding piracy is less obligatory than that term
suggests. The 1932 Harvard Draft Articles on Piracy, which served as the
foundation for the piracy sections of both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas (hereinafter 1958 Convention) and 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 1982 Convention),2 explains that the
establishment of piracy as a crime is intended to permit states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute and punish pirates, but does not require
them to do so. 3
Moreover, any obligation imposed by either treaty or customary inter-
national law is far from absolute. Under Article 100 of the 1982 Convention,
to which Raglan is a party,4 and which codifies customary international law,'
"States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy
on the high seas."' 6 This obligation echoes Article 18 of the Harvard Draft,
which proposed that parties "agree to make every expedient use of their powers
to prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation." 7 Raglan's highly successful
anti-piracy program represented the fullest extent of its capabilities to prevent
such attacks. Raglan hired one hundred independent contractors to supplement
1. Ian Brownie, Principles of Public International Law 244 (3d ed. 1979); Patricia W. Birnie,
Piracy Past, Present and Future, 11 MARINE POL'Y 163, 165, 170 (1987).
2. George Smith, From Cutlass to Cat-O '-Nine Tails: The Case for Int 7 Jurisdiction of Mutiny
on the High Seas, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 227,230 (1989); Barry H. Dubner, Human Rights and Envt. Disaster,
Two Problems that Defy the "Norms " of the Int'7 Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1,
16-17 (1997).
3. Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Commentary to the Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L
L. Stpp. 749, 760 (1932) [hereinafter "Harvard Research, Piracy"].
4. United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, art. 100, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. See Patricia W. Bimie, supra note 1, at 165; D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea
(1982); John Norton Moore, Customary International Law After the Convention, in THE DEVELOPING ORDER
OF THE OCEANS 41 (Robert E. Krueger & Stefan A. Risenfeld eds., 1985).
6. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 100; Convention on the High Seas, art. 14, Apr. 27, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312 [hereinafter 1958 Convention].
7. Harvard Research, Piracy, supra note 3, at 746.
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a program that already employed all available naval officers to pilot ships
through the archipelago. As a developing nation, Raglan did all it could with
the limited resources available to it.
2. Thomas Good's actions do not constitute piracy under international law
and are not an appropriate basis for an international legal claim
Thomas Good's actions do not constitute piracy under international law.
As established in several international legal instruments, the offense of piracy
requires the following elements:
1) Illegal acts of violence or detention;
2) Committed for private ends;
3) By the crew or passengers of a ship;
4) against another ship or against persons or property on board the other
ship; and
5) On the high seas.'
The element requiring that piracy occur on the high seas is fundamental because
initial codification of the crime was to provide extra-territorial jurisdiction to
states seeking to prosecute pirates.9 Although Good boarded The Mairi Maru
on the high seas, his crimes were committed within Raglan's territorial
jurisdiction. While this Court has never definitively addressed the question
regarding the treatment of crimes in which the elements are committed in
multiple jurisdictions, this Court may refer to Article 38(1)(c) of its statute. 10
These general principles of law support the proposition that where any element
of an offense is committed within the jurisdiction of a state, that state may
consider itself the territorial state and may assert jurisdiction over the offender."
Thus, although Good may be prosecuted by Raglan for armed robbery,
hijacking, or a similar offense, he may not be charged with piracy.
8. 1958 Convention, supra note 8, at art. 14; UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 101; Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 222; Robert Beckman, Combating Piracy andArmedRobbery Against Ships in Southeast Asia: The
Way Forward, 33 OcEANDE. & INT'LL 317,328 (2002); Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas:
The Achille Lauro, Piracy, and IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 272 (1988).
9. Harvard Research, Piracy, supra note 3.
10. Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available at http:
//www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/basicdocumnts/Basetex/istatute.html.
11. See e.g., U.S. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(l)(a) (1962); HENRY P. DE VRIES ET AL., FRENCH
LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION (rev. 1988); Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 693; Mi
Zhou & Shizhou Wang, China, in 2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, (Dupont & Fijnaut eds., 1993); Daniel
David Ntanda Nsereko, Criminal Law and Procedure in Uganda, in INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS (L.
Dupont & C. Fijnaut eds., 1996); HR 6 April 1915, NJ 1915 (Netherlands), p. 427 (cited in J.A.W. Lensing,
The Netherlands 51, in 3 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, (Dupont & Fijnaut eds., 1993).
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3. Thomas Good's actions are not attributable to Raglan
Raglan is not legally responsible for the events surrounding the attack and
crash of The Mairi Maru. As explained in Article 2 of the International Law
Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which this Court
may consider as evidence of customary international law, states are only liable
for conduct attributable to the state that constitutes a breach of an international
obligation.' Raglan breached no obligation with regard to piracy. Good did
not commit piracy under the internationally recognized definition, and, in any
event, Raglan met any duty to prevent and suppress the same. Good's attack on
The Mairi Maru certainly violated municipal law. However, the attack breached
no international legal obligation owing to Appollonia 3 This Court recognized
in the ELSI case that "[c]ompliance with municipal law and compliance with the
provisions of a treaty are different questions."' 4 Good's actions cannot legally
be attributed to Raglan, and thus do not give rise to Raglan's responsibility for
the loss of The Mairi Maru.
a. Thomas Good acted contrary to Raglan's instruction and
outside Raglan's control
Under international law, a state is not responsible for all acts performed by
its nationals," and the state must direct or control the activity attributed to it. 6
12. International Law Commission [ILC], Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-third
Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 A/56/10 (Apr. 23 - June 1 & July 2 - Aug. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States]. See also, Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (June 27); Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 47 (Feb. 5); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 4, at para. 170
(July 29, 1989); The Rainbow Warrior Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 217 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1990).
13. Malvina Halberstam, International Maritime Navigation and the Installations on the High Seas,
in M. CHEREF BASSIoUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIANAL LAw 819 (2d ed. 1999); Beckman, supra note 8, at
320.
14. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELS1), (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 51 (July 20); See also
Norwegian Shipowners' Claims Case (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 309, 331 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1922);
See generally The Tinoco Case (U.K. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 371, 386 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1923);
The Wollemborg Case (Italy v. U.S.), 14 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 283, 289 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1956).
15. See e.g. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 132-66
(1983); David D. Caron, The Basis ofResponsibility: Attribution and Other Trans-Substantive Rules, in THE
IRAN-UNrrED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 109
(Richard B. Lillich et al., eds., 1998); HARITI DIPLA, LA RESPONSABILITE DE L'ETAT POUR VIOLATION DES
DRorrS DE L'HOMME: PROBLtMES D'IMPUTATION (1994); F. Prezetacznik, The Int'l Responsibility ofStates
for the Unauthorized Acts oftheir Organs, I SRI LANKA J. OF INT'L L 151 (1989).
16. DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates, supra note 12, at 104; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Gov't
ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U. S. C1. Trib. Rep. 122, 143 (1983); Loizidou v. Turkey, Merits, 6 Eur.
Ct. H. R. 2216, 2235-36 (1996).
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In Nicaragua, this Court refused to attribute the activities of Nicaraguan contras
to the United States, even though it recognized the substantial role of the U.S.
in "financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping the contras," as
well as "the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of
the whole of its operation."' 7 Instead, this Court required Nicaragua prove that
the U.S. directed the perpetration of the acts which formed the basis of
Nicaragua's complaint. Absent such proof, this Court held that the contras' acts
were not attributable to the U.S. 8 Under this test, Good's actions are clearly not
attributable to Raglan. Indeed, unlike the U.S. in Nicaragua, Raglan's purpose
in employing Good was to prevent attacks, not to direct individuals like Good
to carry them out. Because he acted contrary to Raglan's direction and outside
of its control, Good's acts are not attributable to Raglan under standards
established by this Court.
b. Raglan is not responsible for Thomas Good's ultra vires actions
Under international law, state responsibility for ultra vires actions only
attaches when individuals act so that they appear "as competent officials" using
"powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity."' 9  As the ILC
recognized, "[c]ases where officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit
unlawfully or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from cases where
the conduct is so removed from the scope of their official functions that it
should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable to the
State."2 Though he appeared as an official when boarding the ship, within an
hour it was clear that Good was acting far outside his capacity as a Raglanian
pilot. When Good and his associates threatened the crew with explosives and
commandeered the vessel, they ceased to be "competent officials or agents" of
Raglan.
Significantly, the Iran Claims Tribunal recognized in the Yeager Case2'
that an individual's ultra vires conduct is not attributable if the individual or
organ acts in a "purely private" rather than an official capacity, even if the
individual or organ "used means placed at its disposal by the State for the
exercise of its function."22 In Yeager, an Iran Air agent commandeered the
17. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64.
18. Id.
19. The Caire Case, (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 516, 530 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1929); The
Mosse Case, 13 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 494 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1953).
20. DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates, supra note 12, at 102; see also Jan Arno Hessbruegge
The Historical Dev. of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in Int ' Law, 36 N. Y U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 265, 270 (2004).
21. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 92 (1987); cf. Petrolane, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, 92 (1991).
22. Id. at 110-11.
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ticket office of Iran Air, a government-owned airline, and illegally required
passengers to pay extra money for plane tickets already purchased. In deter-
mining that the agent's acts were not attributable to the Iranian government, the
Tribunal noted that the Iran Air agent was not "acting for any other reason than
personal profit," and there was no indication that he had "passed on the payment
to Iran Air., 23 Similarly, Good abused his position as a privately-contracted
ship pilot. His actions were undertaken entirely for his own personal gain and
that of his confederates. Therefore, Good's acts are not attributable to Raglan
under international law.
B. Raglan Is Not Liable To Appollonia For Scuttling The Mairi Maru
1. Raglan is obligated to protect the marine environment
As a party to the 1982 Convention, Raglan is required to protect and
preserve the marine environment.24 In addition, customary international law
recognizes the rights of coastal states to intervene where their shores and
citizens are threatened by pollution.2 ' The radiation leaking from The Mairi
Maru presented a grave risk to the marine environment and human safety
throughout the region. Raglan had no option but to scuttle the vessel. As
Raglan's Prime Minster Price explained, "[w]ith every passing day, more
noxious material leak[ed] into the open waters." '26 Further, the impending rainy
season made it entirely likely that the pollution, then only twenty-five
kilometers from Raglan's exclusive economic zone, would soon spread to
Raglan's western islands.
2. Raglan's actions were necessary for the protection of the region's
inhabitants, as well as the surrounding waters and marine life
The scuttling of The Mairi Maru was justified under the doctrine of
necessity. International law recognizes that actions that may be considered
breaches under certain circumstances are justified when the situation presents
"nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity."27  In the Gabcikovo-
23. Id.
24. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 221.
25. See Int'l Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter
"SOLAS"]; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 1341 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]; International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, art. 1, Nov. 29 1969, 26 U.S.T.
765, 970 U.N.T.S. 212.
26. Compromis, 24.
27. R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 91 (1938); Russian Fur
Seals Controversy of 1893, 86 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 220 (1893); See generally Fisheries
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Nagymoros case,28 this Court recognized that the ILC's codification of necessity
in Article 33 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility "reflect[s] customary
international law."29 The recognized elements are as follows:
Necessity may be invoked only when the act "(a) [i]s the only way for the
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or the international community as a whole."30
Further, a state may only invoke necessity provided it has not "contributed
to the situation of necessity."
31
a. The nuclear materials emanating from The Mairi Maru presented a grave
and imminent peril
The radioactive material emanating from The Mairi Maru presented a
grave risk to the crew of the ship, several of whom are dead, the marine
environment surrounding the ship, and any cleanup crew dispatched to the area.
The impending rainy season and its accompanying winds threatened to spread
radiation throughout the region, endangering not only the Shallows, but the
nations of Raglan and Maguffin as well. Cleanup before the rainy season was
impossible.
International law recognizes the importance of human safety and
environmental health.32 The harm implicated by a nuclear accident is
unmatched in human experience. Not only do nuclear materials cause
immediate and mass destruction to the area in which the accident occurs, but the
harm continues for generations. Chromosomal damage and birth defects are an
irreversible consequence of nuclear exposure. 33 The Mairi Maru, stranded upon
the Shallows and emanating radiation, presented the gravest, most imminent
threat possible to the surrounding environment and the human community in the
Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4); Okon Akiba, Int'l Law of the Sea: The Legality
of Canadian Seizure of the Spanish Trawler (EstaQ, 37 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 809 (1997); See generally Andreas
Laursen, The Use o Force and (the State o) Necessity, 37 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2004).
28. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 7.
29. Id. at 40, 51; see also Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for International
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 4-12 (2000); M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea),
120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
30. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at art. 25(2)(a)-(b); See also,
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 45.
31. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at art. 25(2)(b); Roberto Ago,
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/318/ADD.5-7, reprinted in [1980]
2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 13 (pt. 1), para. 77.
32. Russian Fur Seals Controversy of 1893, supra note 27; Akiba, supra note 27.
33. See generally, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Lexis 8, 44-45 (July 8).
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region. These dangers would increase exponentially if the radioactive materials
were allowed to remain in the water long enough for a cleanup crew to attempt
to salvage the ship and detoxify it. Scuttling was the only means of avoiding a
catastrophe.
b. Raglan's interest in protecting the region at large outweighs any
competing interests in salvaging the wreckage
Raglan's scuttling was consistent with state practice on this question. In
the Torrey Canyon incident, the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon went
aground outside British territorial waters, spilling large amounts of oil that
threatened the English coastline.34 The British Government bombed the ship
and burned the remaining oil,35 "stress[ing] the existence of a situation of
extreme danger." No international protest resulted.36 This Court should view
Raglan's actions with similar deference, as its coastline was also threatened by
a crash outside its territorial waters. Just as Britain's interests in protecting its
coastline outweighed Liberia's interest in recovering the Torrey Canyon, this
Court should recognize Raglan's analogous interest in this matter. Appollonia
cannot plausibly assert that its interest in The Mairi Maru and its cargo was
greater than Raglan's interest in protecting human life and the marine
environment. Raglan concedes Appollonia's interest in preserving its flag
vessels; 7 however, the interest of the entire international community in avoiding
a nuclear disaster clearly justifies Raglan's actions.
c. Raglan did not substantially contribute to the situation requiring the
scuttling
Subparagraph 2(b) of Article 25 is a narrow exception preventing states
from relying upon the necessity plea if they substantially contributed to the
harm. As the commentary explains, "[fjor a plea of necessity to be precluded
... the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently substantial
and not merely incidental or peripheral."3 Given Raglan's lack of knowledge
34. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, THE "TORREY CANYON," 1976, Cmnd. 3246 [hereinafter
THE "TORREY CANYON"]; See also Anne Bardin, Coastal State s Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels, 14 PACE
INT'L L. REv. 27, 62 (2002); P. J. Griggs, Toward a Third Party Liab. Convention, 22 TuL. MAR. L. J. 119,
122 (1997).
35. THE "TORREY CANYON", supra note 34; See generally EDWARD COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE
TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); See generally CRISPN GILL ET AL., THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON
(1967).
36. THE "TORREY CANYON", supra note 34.
37. See generally S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
38. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 12, at 205; See also, Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, 1997 L C.J. at 7.
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about the ship's nuclear cargo, and its ongoing efforts to safeguard ships from
attack, it would be unjust to preclude Raglan's invocation of the necessity
defense, considering the catastrophic harm it prevented by scuttling The Mairi
Maru.
C. Appollonia Violated International Law When It Failed To Provide
Raglan With Prior Notification Of Its Clandestine MOX Shipments
In the last decade, several shipments of nuclear materials have
circumnavigated the globe,39 posing a threat to coastal nations' environmental,
ecological and economic security. Consequently, these states have protested
and claimed a right to deny permission to enter their national waters. The attack
on The Mairi Maru illustrates the hazardous outcomes that can occur when
states disregard the rights of nations along their shipping routes.
1. Appollonia violated the 1982 Convention by failing to notify Raglan of
the transportation of ultra-hazardous materials through its archipelago
a. The archipelagic regime permits Raglan to demand prior notification of
the transport of ultra-hazardous material through its archipelagic waters
As an archipelagic nation, Raglan's very existence depends on the sea.
The 1982 Convention represents an important development in the environ-
mental law of the sea that recognized and addressed the unique difficulties
facing archipelagic nations.40 Under the 1982 Convention, archipelagic waters
are submitted to the same regime as the territorial sea, i.e. the suspendible right
of innocent passage for foreign vessels.4' However, the archipelagic state may
designate sea lanes to be used for expeditious passage through the archipelago
42
Such sea lanes are submitted to a regime that is essentially identical to "transit
passage" through straits used for international navigation.43 All ships enjoy the
right of "archipelagic sea lanes passage" and no distinctions may be made
39. See Document 49, 3 THE UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOKS SERIES, 187 et seq. (1995).
40. See Moira L. McConnell & Edgar Gold, The Modem Law of the Sea: Framework for the
Protection and Preservation of the Marine Env't, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 99 (1991); see also, Rachel
Zajacek, The Dev. of Measure to Protect the Marine Env'tfrom Land Based Pollution: The Effectiveness of
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Auth. in Managing the Effects of Tourism on the Marine Env 't, 3 JAMES
COOK U. L. REV. 64, 65 (1996).
41. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 52(2).
42. Id. art. 53.
43. UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 54; B. Kwiatkowska, The Archipelagic Regime in the Practice
of the Phil andIndon.-Making or Breaking Int'l Law?, 6 INT'L J. OF ESTUARINE AND COASTAL L. 25-26
(1991).
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according to the nature of the vessel or its cargo.44 However, the enjoyment of
these freedoms does not limit the rights of the archipelagic state to require ships
carrying ultra-hazardous material to pass through specific sea lanes, and to
observe precautionary measures established by international agreements45 and
generally accepted international regulations." One such fundamental regulation
provides archipelagic nations the right to demand notice of ultra-hazardous
shipments traversing these sea lanes.47
Notification requirements do not impinge upon Appollonia's right to
continuous and expeditious passage through the archipelago,48 and are
consistent with the provisions of the 1982 Convention requiring that the flag
state has due regard for archipelagic states' rights and duties.49 Furthermore, a
requirement of notification does not constitute discrimination based on the
characteristics of a vessel's cargo, which would contravene Articles 24 and 26
of the 1982 Convention."0 Raglan stresses that prior notification by the
originating state does not hamper a vessels passage, and does not violate the
1982 Convention's non-discrimination provisions. This notification is vital for
archipelagic states, whose waters are often marked by shoals, rocks and coral
reefs. Navigation through these waters is far more dangerous and the risk of
accidents higher than in the territorial sea."' Without notice that the transit of
ultra-hazardous material is pending, an archipelagic nation cannot take the
safety precautions necessary to protect all potentially affected parties from
harm.5
2
b. The archipelagic regime in the 1982 Convention is customary
international law binding upon Appollonia
International law recognizes that provisions of multilateral treaties can bind
third party states by either incorporating or giving recognition to a customary
44. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 41-42, 44, 53(2); Cf HMAN W. JAYEWARDENE, 15 THE REGIME
OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62 (Shigeru Oda gen ed., 1990); See also T. Treves, La navigation,
in TRAIt DU NOUVEAU DRorr DE LA MER 687, 800-02 (Rene-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds.,1985).
45. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 38.
46. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 22, 23; E.g., MARPOL 73/78, supra note 25; SOLAS, supra note
25; Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, T.I.A.S. No.
8587.
47. See discussion infra Part W.B.
48. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 23.
49. Id. arts. 58(3), 87(2).
50. Id. arts. 24, 26.
51. MOHAMED MUNAVVAR, 22 OCEAN STATES: ARCHIPELAGIC REGIMES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
166 (Shigeru Oda gen. ed., 1995).
52. See Press Release, Dominican Republic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Declaration of
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic (January 2, 1998).
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rule, or as beingfors at ariso of an area of international law that subsequently
secured the general assent of states and thereby was transformed into custom.5 3
Rapid crystallization into customary law is possible where "state practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, [was] both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked," and if the
provision reflected "settled practice, [and] . . . evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."
Raglan submits that the provisions relating to archipelagic waters in the
1982 Convention, ratified by over 145 nations, are a codification of customary
international law." Chapter IV of the 1982 Convention reflects long-standing
practice of archipelagic nations and regional agreements proscribing rights in
the waters surrounding archipelagos.56 Moreover, although several maritime
nations, including the United States, have yet to ratify the convention, none
expressed their opposition on the provisions governing archipelagos. For
example, the United States initially withheld ratification because of the
provisions dealing with the deep sea-bed mining regime, but it nonetheless
recognized that the 1982 Convention otherwise expressed customary
international law; in fact, the treaty has been submitted to the U.S. Senate for
ratification." According to the U.S. State Department, "the convention...
contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which
generally confirm maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of
all states."58
53. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention]; Military and Paramilitary Activities In andAgainst Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 138;
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 43 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter
Continental Shell]; see also R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CoURS 27, 64 (1970);
Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, n. 4 (1970).
54. Continental Shelf supra note 53, at 1 74, 77.
55. Gulf of Maine (Can v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Christopher Joyner, The Southern Ocean
and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. J. INT'L L. 165, 180 (1985).
56. U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAWS AND REGULATION ON THE REGmM OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA at 38-39, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957); See generally An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 3046 (June 17, 1961) (Phil.), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15;
See generally An Act to Amend Section One of the Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-Six,
Entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", Rep. Act No. 5446 (Sept.
18, 1968) (Phil.), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15; Note verbale dated January 20, 1956 from the Philippines,
reprinted in II YB ILC 1956, at 69; Announcement on the Territorial Waters of the Republic of Indon. of 14
Dec. 1957, 4 M. WHrrEMAN DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 284 (1965).
57. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing on T.Doc. 103-39 Before the United
States Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar),
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrgO31014a.html.
58. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, white House Office of Policy
Information, Issue Update No. 10 at 8 (April 15, 1983); 83 Dep't of State Bull. No. 2075 at 70 (1983).
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2. Appollonia violated the customary international law obligation requiring
prior notification for the transportation of ultra-hazardous materials through
the waters of third party states
a. Widespread state practice reflects the existence of a norm requiring prior
notification for the transport of ultra-hazardous materials
Regardless of the 1982 Convention's applicability to Appollonia, wide-
spread state practice and opiniojuris evince a clear duty to provide notification
under customary international law. Many coastal states and archipelagic nations
require notice from shipping states regarding the contents of ultra-hazardous
cargoes. Countries on the most important shipping routes, including Oman,5 9
Iran,6 Egypt,6' Guinea,62 Malaysia, 63 Malta," Spain,65 Peru,'e Saudi Arabia,
67
and Yemen 68 require not only notification but also prior consent because these
states face a high risk of pollution from accidents at sea. Other states, including
the Philippines,69 Venezuela,70 Haiti, Fiji and several Caribbean states7' go even
further by forbidding the transit of any vessel carrying dangerous materials
59. See Declaration of Oman Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Aug. 17, 1989), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
60. AcT ON THE MARINE AREAS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE
OMAN SEA 1993, Sec. 9 (Iran), reprinted in 24 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 10 (Dec. 1993).
61. See Declaration of Egypt Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Aug. 26, 1983), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
62. Presidential Decree of Papau New Guinea, no. 336, 30 July 1980.
63. See Declaration of Malaysia Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Oct. 14, 1996), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/os/convention-agreements/conventions-decarations.htm.
64. Act no. XXVIII (Malta, 1981), UN Doc. LE 113 (3-3) (16 November 1981).
65. Act No. 25/64 of29 April 1964 ConcemingNuclear Energy, ch. XI, B.O.E. (1964), in U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16.
66. Decree No. 027-77-EM, Nov. 16, 1977 (Peru).
67. Declaration of Saudi Arabia Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (Apr. 24, 1996), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/os/convention_agreements/conventions-declarations.html.
68. Declaration of Yemen Issued upon Ratification of UNCLOS (July 21, 1987), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/Ios/convention-agreements/conventions-decLarations.html.
69. An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Providing Penalities
for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 6969 (Oct. 26, 1990) (Phil.).
70. Art. 54 of Presidential Decree no. 2/211 on Norms on the Control of the Generation and
Management of Hazardous Wastes (Venezuela, 1992).
71. See Note verbale dated February 18, 1988 from Haiti's Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization,
the General Police Force and the Civil Service, in 11 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 13 (July 1988).
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through their waters. The United Arab Emirates, 72 Yemen,73 Djibuti,74
Pakistan,7" Poland 6 and Canada" expressly require nuclear propelled vessels
and ships carrying dangerous substances to notify transit states of their pass-
age.78 Finally, France requires ships transiting through its territorial waters to
report the nature of their cargo before entering them.79
Further, evidence of state practice is indicated by the strident objections
voiced by the international community during the recent voyages of ships
carrying ultra-hazardous materials. Several Caribbean and Latin American
states, as well as Malaysia, forbade the entrance of the Pacific Pintail into their
territorial waters.8" In July 1999, South Africa ordered two ships carrying MOX
to Japan not to enter its territorial sea.8 In January 2001, an Argentine court
ordered the Argentinean government to prevent a British ship (the Pacific Swan)
carrying an eighty ton cargo of highly radioactive nuclear fuel to Japan from
entering waters under its control, arguing it would put the country's shoreline
at risk from a toxic spill.82
In 2001, Ireland came before the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, seeking provisional measures against the United Kingdom to suspend its
decision to construct a MOX plant. Ireland's objections were based on the risks
involved in the transport of radioactive material to and from the plant.8 3 The
Tribunal ultimately rejected Ireland's application because it found the situation
72. Federal Law No. 19 in Respect of the Delimitation of the Maritimes Zones of the United Arab
Emirates, art. 5(4) Oct. 17, 1993 (U.A.E.).
73. Yemen, Act no. 45/1977, Art. 8 in U.N. Legislative Series, National Legislation and Treaties
Relating to the Law of the Sea 21, at 24 (1980).
74. Djibuti, Law no. 521AN179, Art. 7, in R.W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN
ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 112 (1986).
75. Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, Pakistan, para. 3(3), Dec. 31, 1976, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/19.
76. Act Concerning the Maritime Areas of the Polish Republic and the Marine Admin., 1991, arts.
10 and 11, (Pol.).
77. Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations SOR/2001-286 (Can.).
78. Erik Jaap Molenaar, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in a European Regional Context, in 35
NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 22, 30 (Donald R. Rothwell & Sam
Bateman eds., 2000).
79. Decree No. 78-421 on Sea Pollution Caused by Shipping Incidents, art. 1, Mar. 24, 1978 (Fr.).
80. Malaysia Bans Ship Carrying Nuclear Waste to Japan, REUTER NEWS SERviCE, Jan. 15, 1997,
http://www.nci.org/c/cs-malay.htm; See also Press Release, Papua New Guinea, Shipment of Vitrified High
Level Nuclear Waste Must Respect Concerns of Forum Islands Countries (Jan. 24, 1997),
http://www.nci.org/c/cs-png.htm.
81. UK Nuclear Fuel Ships Asked to Stay Out of South Africa's Waters, BBC WORLD BROADCASTS,
Report by the South African News Agency SAPA, July 26, 1999, http://www.nci.org/k-m/moxclips.htm.
82. Court Blocks Nuclear Ship from Argentine Waters, REUTER NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11, 2001.
83. Memorial of Ireland MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001);
Maid Tanaka, Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute: A Proposed Protocol on Marine Envtl.
Impact Assessment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337 (2004).
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was not urgent;84 however, there was no contest as to the potential for environ-
mental harm.85
b. Opiniojuris reflects the existence of a norm requiring prior notification
for the transport of ultra-hazardous materials
States provide notice because of a sense of legal obligation. Virtually all
states have accepted specific obligations to notify potentially affected states of
the transport of nuclear material through their waters. Over 200 states are party
to the 1992 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,86 the 1991 Bamako Convention on the
Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,8 7 and the 1996 Izmir Protocol
on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, all of which require
notification to potentially affected states. In addition, the Rio and Stockholm
Declarations, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive
Material, recognize the existence of a customary notification obligation.88
3. Appollonia's failure to provide notification to Raglan also constitutes a
breach of the regulatory regime established by the IAEA for safe transport of
nuclear material
Appollonia is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) and a member of the IAEA. Under the NPT, Appollonia was
84. See MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Dec. 3, 2001); See
generally, Richard Nadelson, After MOX: The Contemporary Shipment ofRadioactive Substances in the Law
of the Sea, 15 INT'L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 193, n.2 (2000).
85. Id.
86. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 6, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC DOCUMENTS 32
(Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H. A. Soons eds., 1993).
87. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29, 1990 reprinted in 30 I.L.M.773-99.
88. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14 1992, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration]; INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA], CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE, at 111(5), IAEA Doc. GC(XXXIV)920 (June 27,
1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 557, 558 [hereinafter AEA Code of Practice]; United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14 at 3 (1973), reprintedin I1 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
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obligated to conduct its nuclear activities in accord with a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA.89 In administering the safeguards system, the IAEA is
authorized to require members to "observ[e] any health and safety measures
prescribed by the Agency.""' Because Appollonia is a member of the IAEA and
its nuclear program is subject to the IAEA safeguards system, any IAEA rules
or regulations relating to health and safety are binding.
The IAEA has adopted specific regulations obligating Appollonia to notify
Raglan of its MOX shipments. Section 820 of the IAEA's Regulations for the
Safe Transport of Radioactive Material requires "multilateral approval" for
shipments containing radioactive material.9' The term "multilateral approval"
means obtaining approval from "each country through" which the radioactive
material is to be transported. 2 Here, Appollonia failed to comply with these
regulations, as confirmed by the IAEA in its final report on Appollonia's
nuclear program: "Appollonia gives no notice to affected States such as Raglan
that MOX will be transported through their territorial waters or exclusive
economic zones."'93
Because the regulations require the approval of "each country through"
which the material is transported, obligations clearly run to third states not party
to the IAEA regime. Both Appollonia and Raglan are parties to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). While a treaty generally only
creates reciprocal rights between parties to the treaty, Article 36 of the VCLT
provides that rights in a treaty can arise for third parties if the parties to the
treaty so intend and the third party state assents thereto. 9' The assent of the
third party state "shall be presumed" so long as nothing contrary is indicated. 95
Because there is no indication of contrary intent, Raglan has the right to raise
Appollonia's violation of the IAEA regulations under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, even though it is not party to the NPT or a
member of the IAEA.
89. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 121 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161, art. IlH [hereinafter NPT].
90. Statute of the Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, art XIll, 1973, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency,
available at http: //www.iaea.org/About/statute-text.html.
91. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL § 820 (1996) [hereinafter IAEA Regulations].
92. Id. at § 204.
93. Compromis, 9.
94. Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 34.
95. Id. art. 36; I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1969).
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D. Appollonia Is Responsible For All Environmental Damage To The
Norton Shallows And Must Compensate Raglan For The Resulting Injury To
Its Fishing And Tourist Industries And The Cost Of Decontaminating The
Area
1. Raglan has standing under international law to seek redress on behalf of
the international community for a violation of the erga omnes obligation to
protect the marine environment
Raglan's claim for damage to the Shallows relies upon the erga omnes
doctrine. This Court has recognized that there are certain obligations owed to
the international community erga omnes and that all states have a legal interest
in upholding them.96 Customary international law recognizes the obligation on
the part of all states to "protect and preserve the marine environment." All
nations have accepted the obligation to ensure against activities that "cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."97
Appollonia may argue that the international community has never
recognized the ability to bring a claim actio popularis, on behalf of all people.
This argument is misguided. In the Southwest Africa case, this Court, while
refusing to recognize a claim actio popularis, intimated it was emerging.9"
Subsequently, in Barcelona Traction, this Court considered that, in view of the
importance of obligations owed to the international community as a whole, "all
states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection."99 Additionally,
distinguished publicists have repeatedly urged this Court to recognize actio
popularis in various contexts, particularly as a technique to ensure protection
of the environment.00
If the concept of actiopopularis were ever to be recognized by this Court,
surely this is the case. The damage to the Shallows was proximate to Raglan
and resulted in serious economic consequences. Additionally, Raglan is party
to numerous treaties establishing the duty to protect the marine environment.
While no singular injury may be sufficient to confer standing upon Raglan, the
totality of the circumstances in this case point towards this Court's recognition
of an actio popularis. Without this extension, no state may legally protect the
interests of the high seas. To require a territorial injury to states seeking to
96. Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253, 310 (June 22); Barcelona Traction Light & Power
Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 LC.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
97. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88.
98. Barcelona Traction, supra note 96, at 47; Sw Africa Case (Second Phase) (Eth. and Liber. v.
S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
99. Barcelona Traction, supra note 96, at 33; See also Nuclear Tests, 1974 LC.J. at 321.
100. IAN BROWNLIE, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1, 5 (1974).
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uphold the duty to protect the marine environment renders that norm a virtual
nullity. In such circumstances, the cost to each state of damaging common
spaces would be externalized,'' and the earth's common spaces would be
severely abused.
2. Appollonia breached the internationally recognized obligation to prevent
transboundary injury
The customary international law obligation to prevent transboundary
environmental harm is rooted in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
which establishes state responsibility for transboundary environmental harm." 2
Although the drafters opted for a non-binding declaration of principles, various
treatises,103 textbooks, 1' 4 and scholars0 5 state that Principle 21 reflects custom-
ary international law. Indeed, it has been called the cornerstone of international
environmental law.'0 6
a. Appollonia incurs liability for damage to the Shallows under
the sic utere tuo principle
The principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laeda (one must use his own
so as not to damage that of another) imposes an obligation on states to prevent
transboundary environmental injury.'0 7 Raglan submits that sic utere tuo is
customary law in the area of transnational environmental injury, as evidenced
by its incorporation into a number of international treaties' and declarations,
109
101. L.F.E. Goldie, The Management of Ocean Resources: Regimes for Structuring the Maritime
Environment, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 172 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk
eds., 4th vol. 1972).
102. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88, at princ. 21; John Knox, The Myth and Reality of
Transboundary Envtl. Impact Assessment, 96 Am. J. Intl L. 291, 296 (2002).
103. ALEXANDRE KiSS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 130 (1991);
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS]
104. EDITH BROwN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY 317 (1998).
105. David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Env't and Dev.: Two Steps Forward and One Back or
Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 620 (1995); Rudiger Wolftum, Purposes and Principles ofInternational
Environmental Law, 1990 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 308, 310.
106. DOCUMENTS, supra note 103, at 7; WEISS ET AL., supra note 104, at 316.
107. Armin Rosencranz, The Origin and Emergence of International Environmental Norms, 26
HASTINGS INT'L & CON]. L. REv. 309, 309 (2003); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, Int ' Envtl. Regulation,
and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L. J. 173,204-09
(1992).
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 194(2); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
prmbl., 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
109. Rio Declaration, supra note 88, print. 2; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 88.
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including the 1982 Convention, and international decisions holding states
responsible for extraterritorial environmental harm regardless of fault." 0
Several cases illustrate the sic utere tuo principle. In the 1941 Trail
Smelter Arbitration,"' the tribunal applied the principle in holding Canada
responsible for agricultural damage in the United States resulting from sulphur
dioxide fumes emitted from a private smelter in British Colombia. Likewise,
in Corfu Channel"2 this Court held that every state has an obligation "not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
States.....3 In the 1974 Nuclear Test Cases before this Court, Judge de Castro
confirmed the obligation to prevent transboundary harm as a principle of
international law. 1 4 More recently, the decision of this Court in its advisory
opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons"5 evidences
the existence of the obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm
arising from hazardous activities. Other arbitral awards, including the Lac
Lanoux" 6 and Gut Dam"7 arbitrations, confirm the existence of this obligation.
While Appollonia has a right to pursue its own economic and environmental
policies, in accordance with international law," 8 it has an obligation to ensure
that activities within its control do not damage the environment beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." 9
b. Appollonia incurs liability for damage to the Shallows under the
precautionary principle
Appollonia's failure to take adequate precautions to safeguard its MOX
shipments violates the precautionary principle. A number of present day
international legal instruments enshrine this doctrine, 20 evidencing its general
310. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938), reprinted
in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40;
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.
111. See Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1905.
112. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9).
113. Id.
114. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 389.
115. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40.
116. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 22 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281, 314-317 (Pern. Ct. Arb.
1957).
117. Gut Dam Arbitration, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 316, 316-18 (1969).
118, Rio Declaration, supra note 88, princ. 2.
119. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Int'l Law
Comm'n, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 UNGAOR A/56/10 (Nov. 2001).
120. See Rio Declaration, supra note 88, princ. 15; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, art. , Nov. 13, 1972, 26 U.N.T.S. 2406; See U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, opened for signature May 9, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849.
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acceptance as a norm of customary international law.12 1  Indeed, in the
environmental context, there are no instances of nations refusing to apply the
precautionary principle. 22 The European Union promulgated the precautionary
principle as a binding principle of their environmental policy.
23
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides that
it is necessary for states to "apply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory
approaches so as to avoid degradation of the marine environment, as well as to
reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible adverse effects upon it.' 2 4 The
principle recognizes that states using the oceans must err on the side of
protecting the environment.2  A state that fails to assess the extraterritorial
environmental impact of its proposed activities can hardly claim that it has taken
all practical measures to prevent environmental damage. 26 Accordingly, the
precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof in environmentally risky
activities to the state that engages in the activity.
127
Appollonia had a customary international law obligation to evaluate the
possible effects of transporting nuclear materials through the Raglanian
archipelago and to determine the deadly consequences that could result from an
accident. Appollonia's failure to reassess its plan of action after being delayed
by storms is but one example of Appollonia's failure to take the necessary
precautions. These failures incur Appollonia liable for the damages to the
Norton Shallows caused by The Mairi Maru.
3. Appollonia is strictly liable for the damage to the Norton Shallows
a. Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is a general principle of law
The principle of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is a general
principle of international law and may be applied in this case. 2 ' The principle
121. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Lexis at 40; Communication
from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000)1 (Feb. 2, 2000).
122. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments ofRadioactive
Materials, 27 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379 (1996).
123. See DAVID HUNTER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 405-11 (2d
ed. 2002).
124. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14 1992, Report of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, para. 17.22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol.
I) (Aug. 13, 1992).
125. Van Dyke, supra note 122, at 383.
126. 126. Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in Int I1Envil. Agreements, 67 BRrr Y.B. INT'L
L. 275, 279 (1996).
127. Daniel Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in US. Environmental Law, in INTERPRETING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 203, 210 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
128. UNCLOS, supra note 4, § I(A), part 1 & n.8 pp. 2-3; See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E.
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 92-98 (1994); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the
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of strict liability has its roots in antediluvian law, 129 and is found in the modem
legal systems of most states.'30 Strict liability of states, even in conducting "not
unlawful" ultra-hazardous activities, has been accepted in conventions con-
ceming nuclear activities, outer space activities, and marine oil pollution. 3'
These conventions articulate the principle that a state may be liable even though
its activities were not wrongful. 3 2 The ILC approved this general concept of
liability without unlawfulness."'
State practice supports this proposition. Several multilateral treaties hold
states operating nuclear ships strictly liable for nuclear damage caused by an
accident involving nuclear fuel or wastes from the ship.'34 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, whose members include the United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan, adopted the "polluter pays" principle in
relation to routine accidental pollution.'35 The European Union moved toward
formal adoption of strict liability for environmental pollution in June 2003.36
A recent survey showed that the doctrine of strict liability applies in such
diverse legal systems as the Federal Republic of Germany, the U.S., Mexico,
Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLLUTION 61, 63-64 (Daniel Barstow Magra ed., 1991).
129. See, e.g., LUDOVIC BEAUCHET, 4 HISTOI.E DU DROIT PRIVt DE LA RtPUBLIQUE ATHENIENNE
(1976); THE CODE OF MAiNMONIDES: BOOK OF TORTS (BOOK XI) (Hyman Klein trans., 1954); The
HAMMURABI CODE, arts. 195-246 (Chilperic Edwards trans., Kennikat Press 2003) (1904).
130. Vernon Palmer, A General Theory ofThe Inner Structure ofStrict Liability: Common Law, Civil
Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (1988); see also Sobranie PostanovIenii Sovieta
Ministrov [Rsfsr] [Collection of Rsfst Gov't Regulations] 1964, § 454 (U.S.S.R.); Code. civ. art. 1384 (Fr.);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977). See also, Ryland v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 H.L. 330, 337, 341 (1868);
Francis Bohlen, The Rule in Ryland v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 310 (1911).
131. See, e.g. Vienna Convention on Civil Liab. for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2 LL.M.
727,733; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. II, Mar. 21, 1972,
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
132. Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue: The Work of the
In 'l Law Comm "n on the Topic of Int 7 Liab. for Injurious Consequences Arising Out ofActs Not Prohibited
by Int l Law, 18 DENv. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 145, 147 (1990).
133. Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited By International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (1983); Alan Boyle, Codification ofInternational
Environmental Law and the International Law Commission: Injurious Consequences Revisited, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
61, 76-79 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).
134. See Paris Convention on Third Party Liab. in the Field of Nuclear Energy and its Additional
Protocol, Jan. 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 264; Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 31, 1963, 2 LL.M. 685.
135. The Organization for Economic Cooperation, The Implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle, art. III(1), Doc. No. C(74)223 (Nov. 14, 1974), available' at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/oced/OCED-4.09.htn.
136. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Cmty., art. 130R, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11;
Council Recommendation (EEC) of Mar. 3, 1075, O.J. (L 194) 1.
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Venezuela, Egypt, Libya, Senegal, Madagascar, Ethiopia, India, Thailand,
Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Japan and is part of the civil codes
of Russia and France.137 Even publicists generally resistant to the notion of
strict liability acknowledge the responsibility of flag states for ultra-hazardous
vessel conduct.' Appollonia is strictly liable for any damage caused by the
transportation of ultra-hazardous waste through the Raglanian archipelago.
b. Appollonia is strictly liable for any damage caused by the transportation
of ultra-hazardous waste through the Raglanian Archipelago
For strict liability to attach to a state in connection with private activity,
international law requires 1) an ultra-hazardous activity 2) of transnational
character 3) under the control of the state. 139 These conditions are clearly met
in this case. First, transportation of radioactive material, such as MOX, is an
ultra-hazardous activity."4  Second, the injury is of transnational character
because Appollonia's actions caused damage beyond the area of its national
jurisdiction. Finally, Appollonian officials commissioned The Mairi Maru to
transport the ultra-hazardous material.
Appollonia may argue that the decision by the crew of The Mairi Maru to
transit through the Raglanian archipelago was that of a private vessel and is thus
not attributable to Appollonia. However, conduct of private individuals may be
directly imputable to a state where the individuals acted on behalf of the state,
having been charged to carry out a specific operation.141 When a state assumes
legal authority over a ship by grant of its flag, the state also assumes an
obligation to take measures to ensure that the vessel acts in a fashion consistent
with international law.'42 Here, the Appollonian government charged The Mairi
Maru's captain and crew with the transportation of MOX. As a result,
Appollonia was responsible for insuring that the vessel complied with its
137. See, e.g., JOHAN LAMMERS, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 101-03
(1985); J.M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV. INT'LJ. 209,216
(1972).
138. WILFRED JENKS, LIABILITY FORULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVmESN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967);
N. A. Ushakov, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its 26th Session, reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 157 (pt. 1);
Gunther Handl, State Liab. for Accidental Transnat ' Envtl. Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
525, 565 (1980).
139. Kelson, supra note 137, at 209; See generally, Jenks, supra note 138, at 151.
140. Jenks, supra note 138, at 193.
141. Roberto Ago, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/246 and ADD.1-3,
reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199 (pt. 1); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24).
142. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1962); ROBERT RIENOW, THE TEST OF
NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL (1937).
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obligations under international law and is obliged to make reparations for the
injuries suffered by Raglan.
4. Assuming a fault-based standard applies to the incident involving The
Mairi Maru, the damage caused to the Norton Shallows was foreseeable and
imputable to Appollonia
Appollonia may argue for a due diligence approach to liability.143 Under
this approach, each state has a duty to exercise "due diligence" to ensure
suitable protection of the rights of other states.'44 The standard of due diligence
required depends upon the particular situation; protection of the environment
requires an especially high degree of diligence. 145 It is a general principle of law
that the exact nature of the ensuing damage need not be foreseeable; it is
sufficient if that type of harm ought to have been foreseen.146 Each state has a
duty to take steps to prevent any vessel flying its flag from engaging in conduct
harmful to the environment of another state. 147
Appollonia must have been aware that its MOX shipments presented a
serious risk of danger: the substances that leaked into the waters off the Norton
Shallows were highly noxious, and the ship's path led straight through the
shallow waters of Raglan's archipelago. Given Appollonia's inability to
adequately protect these shipments, and the transnational risks associated with
transporting it, due diligence required some control over the way in which The
Mairi Maru went about its transport.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent, the Kingdom of Raglan,
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to find, adjudge, and declare as
follows:
1. That Raglan is not responsible for the attack on The Mairi Maru, and
owes no Appollonia no compensation for any injury arising from the
attack.
143. Alan Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences ofActs
Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1990);
David D. Caron, The Law ofthe Env't: A Symbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528,536 (1999).
144. Riccardo-Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm,
in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 15, 21 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio
Scovazzi eds., 1991); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL ASPECrS
OF TRANS-FRONTIER POLLUTION 384 (1977).
145. Id. at 371.
146. Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963) A.C. 837, 847 (H.L.).
147. Jenks, supra note 138, at 141.
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2. That Raglan breached no obligation owed to Appollonia under
international law by scuttling The Mairi Maru.
3. That Appollonia violated international law by shipping MOX through
Raglan's archipelagic waters without giving Raglan prior notice or
receiving its consent.
4. That Appollonia is responsible for the damage to the Norton Shallows
and must compensate Raglan for the injury to its fishing and tourist
industries and the cost of decontaminating the area.
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